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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about a charity, Christian Aid (CA) and the experience of that charity 
working in Ethiopia over three decades. The thesis looks at the evolving capabilities of 
CA in the world of relief and development. It asks whether CA has learned anything 
from its experience.
The study looks at CA from the beginning of the 1960s through major famines and 
through a process by which charities have grown from small apolitical organisations to 
prominent political players, both in the southern countries where they work, and in the 
northern countries where they undertake publicity, lobby and advocacy. With changing 
priorities and demands on aid, practical experience on its own, has not been enough to 
ensure a coherent institutional response. There is a significant danger that CA has not 
had time to reflect on what has happened. This thesis provides an institutional memory, 
a historical reflection on CA's own development.
The thesis sets CA in the context of development in general and Ethiopia in particular. It 
looks at the charity as an organisation, at its evolution and positioning within the 
broader institutional and theoretical setting. It explores the different levels of policy and 
concern within the organisation. The various paradigm shifts in development policy 
over the past 30 years are examined, setting up debates that had real meaning for the 
charity around a set of specific policy concerns in Ethiopia. The main body of analysis 
focuses on CA's performance in Ethiopia. The charity's experience of famine in the 
mid-1970s and mid-1980s is explored and its response analysed. How CA articulated 
development policies in Ethiopia from the late 1980s is examined. Throughout, the 
focus is on how CA has positioned its mandate, how theory related to practice and how 
the experiences of the past have informed the present.
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1Introduction 
THE CHALLENGES OF CHARITY
This study is about a charity, Christian Aid (CA) and the experience of that 
charity working in Ethiopia over three decades.1 A prominent and long-established 
British aid agency, CA has been involved in the major post-war disasters, its 
development grants go to over seventy countries in the world, it has a strong 
campaigning and lobbying profile, and an impressive international reputation. This 
thesis looks at the evolving capabilities of CA in the world of relief and development. It 
asks whether CA has learned anything from its experience.
There are three reasons for writing a thesis on this subject. One is that the role 
of CA in particular and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in general are 
expanding and that within what has been dubbed the ‘new world order’2, they are 
increasingly acting asmechanisms of international public policy. The contemporary aid 
industry has become an important subject of discussion and research.3 The hope that 
research and practical thought about charity may benefit from a historical perspective is 
one reason for this first attempt to provide one.
1 For the sake of clarity within this analysis, Eritrea (which gained independence from Ethiopia in April 
1993) is included in references to Ethiopia.
2 The ‘new world order’ constitutes the post-Cold War balance of power in North-South relations 
envisioned by President Bush in his inaugural speech. It was hoped that the end of the cold war would 
establish the habit of co-operation between the superpowers and that the United Nations would thus be 
able to fulfill its intended role as the framework for a world society in which disputes would be settled 
without war. In the literature on the aid industry, the ‘new world order’ is characterised by the enhanced 
role of NGOs, in which such tilings as the principle of non-interference, especially in relation to 
humanitarian aid, is less firmly supported. See Mark Duffield & John Prendergast, Without Troops & 
Tanks: humanitarian intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Red Sea Press: New Jersey, 1994) pp. 9 & 
64; Michael Edwards & David Hulme (eds.), Non-Governmental Organisations - Performance and 
Accountability: beyond the magic bullet (Earthscan for SCF (UK): London, 1995), pp. 17, 20 & 31
3 For discussion of the contemporary aid industry see Mark Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies and the 
crisis of developmentalism’ IDS Bulletin, 25 (October 1994), pp. 37-45; Mark Duffield, ‘NGOs, 
disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn: political survival in a permanent emergency’ Development 
and Change, 24 (1993), pp. 131-157; Mark Duffield, ‘Famine, conflict and the internationalisation of 
public welfare’ in Martin Doombos et al. (eds.), Beyond Conflict in the Horn: the prospects for peace, 
recovery and development in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan (Institute of Social Studies in 
association with James Currey: The Hague, 1992), pp. 49-61; African Rights, Humanitarianism 
Unbound? Current dilemmas facing multi-mandate relief operations in political emergencies Discussion 
Paper No. 5 (African Rights: London, November 1994); John Borton, ‘Recent trends in the 
international relief system’ Disasters, 17 (1993), pp. 187-201; Edwards & Hulme (eds.), Non- 
Governmental Organisations', Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: altruism under fire - non-profit 
organisations and international development (Intermediate Technology Publications: London, 1995); 
Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media (I. B. Tauris & Co.: London, 1993)
2The second reason for writing this thesis is the belief that lessons have not been 
learned and mistakes, both logistical and conceptual, repeated. The inevitable qualitative 
and interpretive nature of NGO evaluation and the absence of formal mechanisms for 
analysis have created enormous problems for institutional learning. Evaluations are 
typically internal, under-funded, and subjective. To escape such defects requires a 
history: a broad time-frame and a co-ordinated analysis of experience. The history of 
CA in Ethiopia permits an experiment in establishing institutional memory.
The third reason is personal. Unless properly analysed, charity may become 
marred by unfair criticism or misplaced acclaim. The aim is to identify major 
characteristics about CA, to treat CA as a social institution and so provide a historical 
tool for future debate. The intention is to reflect on the origins, meaning, limits and 
possibilities of CA’s development and relief interventions.
1 . Christian Aid: a non-governmental organisation
CA is an important social institution, active at the cutting edge of the divide 
between the industrialised world and the developing world. CA’s income in 1996 
exceeded £39 million.4 Among British Third World charities its performance was 
bettered only by Oxfam and Save the Children Fund.5 Development grants constituted 
the largest item of expenditure. In 1996, £16.5 million was allocated for development 
work. A further £11.2 million was spent on emergencies and refugee programmes.6 
The charity does not have its own staff on overseas station. It makes grants to partners, 
and these are drawn in roughly equal measure from local churches, Christian-inspired 
organisations and secular bodies. In 1996, it had 214 partner organisations in Africa. 
Around the world, the total was 671.7 Early on, the senior staff in CA decided that the 
organisation should attempt to influence public opinion in Britain with respect to the 
need for government policies sympathetic towards the Third World. By the late 1960s
A CA, Annual Review 1995-96 (CA: London, 1996)
5 Peter J. Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World (Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 1991), p. 54
6 CA, Annual Review 1995-96
7 ibid.
3the charity was claiming that to remain silent in Britain ‘is to be highly political, since it
means that we are content for the status quo to continue.’8 The charity’s refrain was
barely any different twenty years later:
‘We and our government have still to learn that the west’s affluence is one of the 
causes of world poverty; that we ourselves are part of the problem, and 
therefore hold the key to part of the solution.’9
Christian Aid has associated itself with controversial positions, such as its
condemnation of the Nicaraguan contras and their American backers, and by calling
quite openly for economic sanctions against South Africa. The charity’s trustees
allowed up to 10% of income to be spent on development education and public
campaigning. By 1996, £3.6 million - an amount equivalent to 9.6% of its total
expenditure - was being spent in this way.10
Through its major annual fund-raising event - Christian Aid Week, its
involvement in disaster relief, its strong campaigning profile and its presence in the
local community as a focus for voluntary service and as a member of the Church, CA
by the 1990s was a household name. CA had also acquired a heightened prominence on
the international stage. This reflected important changes in the charity’s operating
environment. To explain such change, we need to look at the broader institutional and
policy environment within which CA has existed and the context of changing North-
South relations.
The aid industry as a whole has expanded and been significantly transformed 
over the last 10-15 years. The 1980s were judged by Hellinger to have been the decade 
of NGOs.11 The number of development NGOs registered in the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development countries of the industrialised North grew 
from 1,600 in 1980 to 2,970 in 1993; the total spending of these NGOs rising over the 
same period from US$ 2.8 billion to US$ 5.7 billion in 1995 prices.12 The increase in 
CA’s total spending was from £5.7 million in 1980 to £36.2 million in 1996. In the
8 Cited in Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World, p. 55
9 CA, Annual Report 1985-86 (CA: London, 1986)
10 CA, Annual Review 1995-96
11 D. Hellinger, ‘NGOs and the large aid donors: changing the terms of engagement’ World 
Development, 15 Supplement (1987), pp. 135-144
12 Edwards & Hulme (eds.), Non-Governmental Organisations, p. 3
41990s, the access of NGOs to decision-makers in both North and South was greater 
than ever before, as their advocacy role expanded and they were courted in debates over 
policy and practice. In many situations, NGOs were the chief providers of public 
welfare, but even more significantly, and increasingly in the Horn of Africa, they acted 
as news agencies and diplomats. NGOs were seen as vehicles for ‘democratisation’ and 
essential components of a thriving ‘civil society’. In this respect, NGOs were seen to 
act as a counter-weight to state power - protecting human rights, opening up channels 
of communication and participation, providing training grounds for activists and 
promoting pluralism.
Governments channeled increasing amounts of official aid to and through 
NGOs. The proportion of total aid from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development countries channeled through NGOs increased from 0.7% in 1975 to 3.6% 
in 1985, and at least 5% in 1993-4.13 For CA, total government grants rose from 
£10,000 in 1976 to £13.1 million in 1996, equivalent to one-third of total income. In 
general bilateral agencies were spending a steadily increasing proportion of their aid 
budgets through NGOs and most NGOs depended on these donors for an increasing 
slice of their total budgets. As one analysis concluded, ‘the overall picture is one in 
which NGOs are seen as the “favoured child” of official agencies and something of a 
panacea for the problems of development. ’14 A number of factors contributed to these 
trends. These included the perceived failure of official aid agencies - bilateral and 
multilateral - and of national governments to effectively promote development and to 
raise the standard of living of the world’s poor; the unprecedentedly large financial 
contributions channeled through NGOs such as CA during the African famines of the 
mid-1980s that focused attention on NGOs’ effectiveness in dealing with emergencies 
and relief; and donor country governments’ ideological preference for ‘private sector’ 
development and for the encouragement of pluralistic political systems.
Not so clear were the broader implications of these trends and what NGOs like 
CA should have been doing to prepare for the future: as one analyst said, ‘to fashion
13 ibid., pp. 4-5
14 ibid., p. 5
5change’ rather than to react to ‘changing fashions.,1S There was a growing awareness 
that the expanding and changing role of NGOs had not been systematically documented 
or assessed. As a result, in the 1980s NGOs began to come under scrutiny. At issue 
was not just the expanded importance and scale of NGO activities but the nature of their 
changed operating environment and the direction of international public policy. Some 
authors argued that with the end of the Cold War, and parallel to processes of economic 
reform and the rolling back of state structures, a significant shift in the international aid 
system away from development investment towards relief assistance for the South had 
occurred.16 To a large part, this was in support of relief programmes in situations of 
armed conflict in the post-Cold War ‘new world order’. What some termed ‘military 
humanitarianism’ was occurring, characterised by negotiated access and the erosion of 
national sovereignty.17 Within such operations, the emphasis was on separating political 
from humanitarian relief. In other words, short-term relief assistance was becoming a 
substitute for foreign policy among some Northern countries in Africa.18
This process of substitution could be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s and 
the phenomenal growth of NGOs in response to emergencies generated by conflicts, 
mainly in the Horn of Africa. The Biafran war in 1968-1970 first established a 
precedent for aid agencies, like CA, operating within countries without the authorisation 
of the state.19 But it was not until the mid-1980s, during the wars and famines in the 
Horn of Africa, that NGOs, under the banner of neutrality and humanitarianism, 
crossed borders and reached places the United Nations could not, constrained as it was 
by Cold War politics from intervening politically. The cross-border operations 
supported by CA into Eritrea and Tigray and analysed in this thesis are examples of
15 Tim Brodhead, ‘NGOs: in one year, out the other?’ World Development, 15 Supplement (1987), p. 1
16 Borton, ‘Recent trends in the international relief system’, pp. 187-201
17 See Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, pp. 37-45; African Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound?
18 Mark Adams & Mark Bradbury, Conflict and Development: organisational adaptation in conflict 
situations Discussion Paper No. 4 (Oxfam: Oxford, 1995), p. 20
19 For an analysis of the Biafran humanitarian crisis and of Jointchurchaid, the relief operation organised 
by 33 European and North American church agencies, including CA, without the authorisation of the 
Nigerian state see Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, pp. 101-106; Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media, 
pp. 92-108; Maggie Black, A Cause For Our Times: Oxfam, the first 50 years (Oxfam & Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1992), pp. 117-131; John de St Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (Hodder & 
Stoughton: London, 1975)
6this. In these operations, CA and others, covertly provided a channel for donor funds
into rebel areas. At the close of the 1980s, the first United Nations mandated cross-
border operations emerged.20 This set a pattern for a division of labour that
subsequently became formalised in sub-contracting relations between the United
Nations, donor governments, and NGOs.
There were five main concerns about this changing operating environment for
NGOs. Firstly, that the merging of aid and foreign policy meant that decisions on
humanitarian aid and human rights were being increasingly dictated by geopolitical
considerations rather than human need. For some, this raised the spectre of a new form
of colonialism. Secondly, that expenditure on high profile emergency operations was
diverting resources from non-emergency development investment. Thirdly, that the new
‘contracting era’ was placing the independence of NGOs’ in jeopardy. Fourthly, that
relief assistance was becoming the North’s principal means of political crisis
management in the South and that this represented an institutional accommodation by
the North to political crises and conflict in the South. Short-term relief threatened to
reduce aid to a technical fix, detracting from a search for long-term solutions.
Negotiated access programmes, while retaining an aura of neutrality, effectively
legitimised the military protagonist in the conflict. Finally, that NGOs were simply not
capable of fulfilling their expanded role within the new policy environment. Historically
used to working within a confined ‘humanitarian space’ defined by governments in
their own self-interest, NGOs, in the 1990s, were being increasingly drawn into
political emergencies where they were subject to an uncertain and unique set of rules
and constraints. For CA, this meant involvement in such places as Angola, Rwanda and
Somalia. As one writer on NGOs commented:
‘the disasters that scar the “new world order” test the very limits of altruism, 
drawing NGO leaders into heated political controversy and their front-line 
workers more and more frequently into dangerous, unfriendly fire. The 
financial, political and developmental implications of the increasingly terrible 
disasters that seem to mark the world have been enormous for NGOs, raising 
profound questions that go to the root of what they are, what they do, and who 
they answer to.’21
20 Examples include south Sudan, Ethiopia and Angola. See Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, p. 41
21 Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, p. 98
7A leading advocacy group, African Rights, has been at the forefront of calls for 
an evaluation of the new expansive role that NGOs, like CA, have taken on. It argued 
that ‘the components of the “enlarged mandates” of relief NGOs may sometimes be in 
serious conflict, presenting fundamental dilemmas’22 and that whenever there was a 
clash between the charitable imperative on one hand, and on the other, principles of 
justice, rights, conflict resolution and advocacy, fund-raising NGOs would always go 
with the charitable imperative. They would submerge and sometimes subvert more 
important questions which in the long run might reduce the need for charity: ‘To 
pretend that mandates do not conflict, and that humanitarianism can provide a political 
and human rights programme, would be a dangerous dishonesty.’23 African Rights 
expressed concern that aid agencies were ‘expanding into a void left by the contracting 
power of host governments and the declining political interest of western powers’ and 
that it was ‘a void they cannot fill.,24
In Ethiopia, in the famine of the mid-1980s, CA confronted the implications of 
an expanded mandate. Moreover, its involvement spanned the re-working of North- 
South relations outlined above. That is, from a cold war system based upon nation-state 
sovereignty to an emerging balance of power characterised by the enhanced role of 
NGOs, in which such things as the principle of non-interference, especially in relation 
to humanitarian aid, was less firmly supported. In order to look at the evolving 
capabilities of CA this thesis looks beyond the organisation as an entity unto itself, to 
address its broader institutional and policy environment. It gives careful consideration 
to how this environment has impacted on CA and how CA has positioned itself within a 
changing world order. In the Ethiopian famines of the 1970s and 1980s in particular, 
the thesis looks at how CA defined its role within the international community and the 
broader policy environment.
22 African Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound?, p. 10
23 ibid., p. 36
24 ibid., p. 6
82 . Institutionalising Memory
This study looks at CA from the beginning of the 1960s through major famines 
and through a process by which NGOs have grown from small apolitical organisations 
to prominent political players, both in the southern countries where they work, and in 
northern countries where they undertake publicity, lobby and advocacy. With changing 
priorities and demands on aid, practical experience, on its own, has not been enough to 
ensure a coherent institutional response. There is a significant danger that agencies like 
CA have not had time to reflect on what has happened. This thesis intends to provide an 
institutional memory, a reflection on CA’s own development. Such an endeavour 
corresponds to a feeling of internal despair and cynicism within CA; a malaise about 
CA’s past and its future, about its ability to fashion change instead of respond to 
change, and about its ability to find its voice. Such despair is not limited to CA. A 
recent survey of a number of British aid agencies, including CA, found a general lack 
of confidence not only in aid but more widely in the agencies’ own involvement in 
development.25 The malaise was not identified as one of competence (it was recognised 
that there was always room to improve on that) but of belief in what the agencies 
themselves were doing.
In general, three main areas of concern within CA can be identified. Firstly, that 
development education and advocacy have not gone far enough and that the general 
public’s knowledge-base around development issues has remained extremely low. 
While CA as an organisation has moved forward in its own perceptions of 
development, there was a general feeling that the charity has failed to take its donors 
and the broader public with it. As a result, development priorities have continued to be 
dictated by short-term notions of charity rather than longer-term commitments to 
justice.26 Secondly, that CA has not been able to make the transition, heralded in the late 
1970s and 1980s, from implementers of aid to ‘catalysts’, ‘trainers’, and ‘partners’. 
Development has continued to be top-down and it has proved particularly hard to find
25 Hugh Raven, Future Imperfect: policy strategist report to the British Overseas Aid Group (BOAG, 
1997)
26 ERD.6, Paul Renskaw; & CA.5, Sarah Hughes
9ways to make alliances with a life outside the financial relationship.27 Thirdly, the 
failure to de-link official development assistance from commercial and political interests 
and a recognition that the agenda was increasingly set by official donors has raised the 
spectre that aid was simply another form of imperialism and that NGOs like CA were in 
danger of becoming co-opted, their independence and accountability distorted.28
CA’s ability to find a new vision of development to offer its supporters, and a 
new analysis of its work to enthuse its staff, has depended upon a co-ordinated analysis 
of experience. Knowing what works, and why, was essential. Knowing what does not 
work, and why, was almost more important. The inability to learn and remember is an 
acknowledged and widespread failing of the development community as a whole. For 
aid agencies like CA it represents a particular dilemma, because there are few reasons to 
disseminate the positive lessons of development, and many more powerful reasons to 
conceal the negative ones. Part of the problem had to do with the expectations of 
supporters, the public and governments. In the 1960s, when much of CA’s work was 
relief-oriented, their advertising messages stressed their ability to reach the poorest 
quickly, effectively and efficiently. As CA became more involved in development 
work, in the hope that by tackling the causes the need for relief would be eliminated, the 
message remained the same. Moreover, as the numbers of northern NGOs expanded in 
response to continuing emergencies throughout the 1970s and 1980s, competition for 
funding increased and promises escalated. But development was not a speedy process. 
CA staff, working with the very poor in marginal areas, knew that effectiveness and 
efficiency were far less easy to deliver and to measure than, say, infrastructure 
development or food hand-outs in emergency situations. Development was a qualitative 
enterprise, it was non-linear; measuring performance and defining ‘results’ was 
extraordinarily difficult. Having promised too much to the donor and the public, 
however, CA was trapped in a vicious circle. If funding was to be maintained or 
increased, success was essential. With an inbuilt tendency to exaggerate success and 
downplay failure, important lessons were not learned. Part of the solution to this
27 CA.l, Michael Taylor; ERD.7, Jenny Borden; & FFHC.7, Beverley Jones
28 Raven, Future Imperfect
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problem has to do with public perception and here the importance of development 
education is crucial. Much has to do with the development of transparency, 
accountability and, ultimately, greater credibility - through appropriate types of 
evaluation, research and the dissemination of findings. This thesis contributes to such 
evaluation. It provides an institutional history and a tool for institutional learning.
The context for such a history is Ethiopia. Ethiopia in the latter 20th century is 
the logical place for a first attempt at research about charity. It was the Ethiopian famine 
in 1984, and the subsequent conception of Band Aid that changed the fund-raising 
scene in Britain decisively, and with it perceptions of charity. Bob Geldof, with 
remarkable speed, galvanised the pop and rock industry, raising huge sums of money 
from a new audience of young people, and commanding the attention of the media. A 
record of the song, ‘Do They Know It’s Christmas?’ was brought out and became 
number one in the charts. Six million copies were sold at £1.30, almost all the proceeds 
going to Band Aid, so that about US$ 8 million was raised. In July, Live Aid, the 
‘global jukebox’, took place simultaneously in Wembley, London, in front of 70,000 
people and in Philadelphia in front of 80,000, and was seen on television via satellite by
1.5 billion people, raising over US$ 80 million. As Bob Geldof in his parting statement 
wrote: ‘Our idea was to open up the avenues of possibility.’29 Ethiopia’s role in 
defining a generation’s perception of the Third World and of development possibilities 
within that world was paramount. More money was channeled into Ethiopia than to any 
other disaster.30 Ethiopia is to a large extent responsible for much of the aura, 
confusion, acclaim, criticism and expectations that surround NGOs. Yet while Ethiopia 
represents a country intimately connected in the general public’s mind with the world of 
charity, it is not a typical development scenario. Its experience has been at one extreme 
of the spectrum, dominated by acute famine and one of the longest running wars in 
Africa. The thesis provides an institutional history of CA in a particular policy 
environment, one dominated by war and famine.
29 Cited in Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media, p. 85
30 John Borton, The Changing role of NGOs in the Provision of Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance: 
case study 3 - northern Ethiopia and Eritrea ODI Working Paper 76 (ODI: London, May 1994), p. 27
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3 . Theory and Interpretation
To analyse the evolving capabilities of CA as a charity, the thesis sets CA in the 
context of development in general and Ethiopia in particular. It deals with general 
theories of development as they relate to CA’s raison d ’etre, and theories of famine as 
they relate to CA’s specific experience in Ethiopia. All practice contains implicit theory. 
Theories of development and famine, perhaps only partly-assimilated, and other 
assumptions strongly influenced how policies and programmes were carried out.
Indeed one of the issues that arises in the thesis is that CA had a problem finding a 
voice; that people within the organisation held different views about development and 
famine theories and practice. How theory was related into practice is a crucial focus of 
this study.
The thesis’ interpretation draws upon a number of key studies focused around 
two sets of issues: famine causation; and notions of power. Mark Duffield, in NGOs, 
disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn: political survival in a permanent 
emergency31 argued that famines could result from the conscious exercise of power in 
pursuit of gain or advantage by the politically strong and examined the role of donors 
and NGOs in terms of how they related to the weak and the strong in such a context.
He took this further in The symphony o f the damned62, arguing that humanitarianism as 
constituted in the 1990s was incapable of analysing power. This had profound 
implications for the validity of the entire humanitarian undertaking by aid agencies and 
donors. David Keen in The Benefits o f Famine*3 examined why famine in Sudan in the 
mid-1980s should not be considered a policy ‘failure’, as it reflected the success of 
powerful groups. Keen highlighted the failures of the international donors to speak up 
on behalf of those who lacked political influence in their own society. By placing the 
local effects that famine and relief produced at the centre of his research, he analysed 
famine and relief as manifestations of power relations. In her study of Burundi refugees
31 Duffield, ‘NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn’, pp. 131-157
32 Mark Duffield, ‘The symphony of the damned: racial discourse, complex political emergencies and 
humanitarian aid’ Disasters, 20 (1996), pp. 173-93
33 David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: a political economy of famine and relief in southwestern 
Sudan, 1983-89 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994)
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in Tanzania, Purity and Exile34, Liisa Malkki, showed how the identification and 
construction of ‘the refugee’ had important ‘power’ and ‘control’ effects. She analysed 
the exercise of a ‘special philanthropic mode of power’35, identifying key tendencies of 
institutional behaviour within the humanitarian intemationale. Alex de Waal, in Famine 
That K ills36 questioned western conceptions of famine and causation and the 
implications of this on the appropriateness of relief. In a later study of the link between 
famine and certain kinds of political institutions, Social contract and deterring famine: 
first thoughts'37, De Waal identified a number of politically regressive tendencies in 
actually existing humanitarianism. James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine38 
analysed the implementation of a specific development project in Lesotho, showing 
how the ‘development’ apparatus acted as an ‘anti-politics machine’, obscuring political 
realities and all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political 
operation of strengthening the state presence in the local region.
All the writers mentioned above have found theories of power useful and have 
been influenced by the theoretical work of French philosopher Michael Foucault. 
Foucault’s philosophical project involved suspending the attempt to explain historical 
processes in terms of the motivations of institutions such as the states, or the 
distribution of power among different classes, and focusing instead on the actual 
‘power effects’ that emerged in a given context.39 By so doing, it became possible to 
identify new forms of domination and subordination woven into the fabric of the 
everyday social realm:
‘rather than focus on the issue of the motivation or interest of particular groups,
classes, or individuals in the exercise of domination ... attention should be
34 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: violence, memory, and national cosmology among hutu refugees in 
Tanzania (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1995)
35 ibid., p. 296
36 Alex de Waal, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-5 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989)
37 Alex de Waal, ‘Social contract and deterring famine: first thoughts’ Disasters, 20 (1996), pp. 194-205
38 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “development," depoliticisation, and bureaucratic power 
in Lesotho (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1994)
39 Michael Foucault, Madness and Civilisation (Random House: London, 1961); Michael Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings (C. Gordon (ed.), Har vester Press: Brighton, 
1980)
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directed to the processes by which subjects are constituted as effects of
power.’40
Foucault looked for these processes in unusual realms that were not normally 
considered to be powerful in and of themselves. Specifically, he examined various 
discourses within the human sciences that served to construct the social world as a 
rationalisable, and hence programmable system. In his analysis of prisons and asylums, 
Foucault explored how discourse established scientific ‘knowledge’ and targets of 
interventions for institutional practices 41 In this way, power and control were 
elaborated.
Influenced by the writers mentioned above, this study also seeks to follow 
Foucault by exploring in detail the exercise of power that emerged in the context of 
CA’s relief and development interventions. The aim is to understand how development 
worked in practice and to identify and explain some of the tendencies of institutional 
behaviour within the development apparatus. One of the issues that emerges is that the 
driving force behind much of CA’s development and emergency policy in Ethiopia was 
a set of powerful discourses and widely perceived images of change. The thesis 
analyses how ‘the problem’ and ‘solution’ were framed with regard to famine policy in 
Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s, and development policy in the 1980s/1990s. 
Foucault’s conception of ‘discourse’ draws attention to the way in which ideas about 
development and relief embodied relations of power and how they were embedded in 
particular institutional structures. It is important to note here that Foucault did not 
believe that discourse was ideological, in the sense that it masked a truer perception of 
reality. Rather, he believed that discourses were distinct orders of reality in and of 
themselves, because they produced real power effects in the social domain. Instead of 
ignoring the lexicon and statements produced by the development apparatus on the 
grounds that they were ideological, this study takes such words and statements as its 
point of departure for an exploration of the way in which development initiatives are
40 B. Smart, Foucault, Marxism, and Critique (Routledge & Kegan Paul: Wiltshire, 1983) cited in 
Barbara Hendrie, ‘Knowledge and power: a critique of an international relief operation’ Disasters, 21 
(1997), p. 59
41 Foucault, Madness and Civilisation
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produced and put into practice.
The thesis is about understanding development. In this respect it investigates 
how specific ideas about ‘development’ are generated, and how they are put to use; and 
a demonstration of what they end up doing, of what effects they end up producing. 
Foucault re-emerges throughout as an analytical tool to explain the relationship between 
theory and practice; to explain why theoretically, structurally and strategically, it was 
often more convenient for CA to promote emergency and development policy that had 
more to do with a specific cultural policy paradigm of ‘outsiders’ and little to do with 
the specific historical and socio-political context of those who were actually suffering, 
the ‘insiders’. The thesis looks at CA’s evolving capabilities in overcoming such flaws. 
This leaves unanswered many questions about the ‘development’ value and its origin, 
but it may perhaps given an indication of why it is necessary to question such a value in 
the first place.
The major point of departure that this study offers is in adopting a large time 
frame and historical analysis. A number of popular myths about NGOs and 
development have their origins in attempts to infer process from form; that is, to make 
assumptions about the history of a given initiative on the basis of a ‘snapshot’ view of 
its current state. There has been a tendency in much of the debate about development for 
theories and paradigms - the general assumptions made about the subject matter - to be 
used in isolation of the particular field of activity under study. This thesis demonstrates 
the importance of using an historical framework to study processes of institutional and 
theoretical evolution. Attention to historical detail provides a better understanding of 
various fundamental aspects of NGOs’ priorities, performance and relationships with 
other forces in the development process.
4 . Method and Sources
This thesis is the first comprehensive historical study of CA. There have been 
numerous and discrete agency programme evaluations and a recent publication by 
Michael Taylor, CA’s current Director, on how churches and church organisations
15
around the world have tried to respond to the challenge of development42, but no 
attempt to analyse the specific history and capabilities of CA. Most of the information 
on which this thesis is based comes from primary material located in the Christian Aid 
archives. These are divided between the Library of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies and CA’s London office. The archives contain the fullest record of the 
organisation’s activity in Ethiopia, including extensive files on decision-making, 
correspondence, policy inception and execution, administration, fund-raising, project 
selection and project implementation. The archives also contain more general records of 
CA’s management, policy and publicity. In addition the archives contain much grey 
literature - field reports and project assessments - often commissioned and written 
independently of the organisation.
The method used in the analysis of primary material was open-ended. 
Information was contextualised by analysing the chains of command within CA and the 
broader institutional environment. Given the extensive nature of the sources, it was 
possible to compare the concerns that informed specific projects in Ethiopia with those 
that were important to CA’s overall mandate; to investigate how needs and demands 
generated from the ground related to and impacted on policy statements’ at the 
directorate level. By linking files on projects in Ethiopia, to files on publicity, the 
directorate, the European Community and Overseas Development Administration, and 
the World Council of Churches, it has been possible to piece together a picture of how 
CA’s development and relief agenda has been informed and where ‘accountability’ has 
lain; with the partners in the South, with the ecumenical movement or with the public 
and official donors in the North.
Information also came from oral sources. In England, interviews were 
conducted over a 2 year period with CA staff, both past and present. Interviewees were 
targeted and questioned according to information gained from archival research. In 
Ethiopia, field research was conducted between December 1995 and July 1996. This 
comprised visits to development sites and numerous interviews with individuals
42 Michael Taylor, Not Angels but Agencies: the ecumenical response to poverty - a primer (SCM 
Press: London, 1996)
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associated with CA’s partner organisations and supported programmes: Ethiopian NGO 
workers, Western NGO workers, government officials, academics, local officials, 
farmers and women’s groups. The basic methodology pursued was that of open-ended 
and semi-structured interviewing, and documentary collection and analysis. The types 
of questions pursued in interviews were largely formed through a process of 
documentary analysis and discussion with various actors. Where possible, repeat 
interviews were conducted. Evidence gained from the Ethiopian ‘grassroots’, was 
usefully treated as a ‘control’ on other kinds of evidence, rather than as itself a ‘source’ 
for hard information. Within the framework of examining the operation of CA in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, while not exhaustive, the case studies were chosen to illustrate the 
range of CA’s activities, operating conditions and policy environment. For example, 
CA’s response and ability to cope with famine in the 1970s and 1980s, and its ability to 
respond to the development challenges of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The approach 
throughout was qualitative rather then quantitative.
Inevitably there were methodological problems connected with the type of 
research undertaken. Firstly, the research project was limited. It was confined to an 
analysis of CA within a specific policy environment, that of Ethiopia and yet many of 
the management and publicity issues confronting CA, as an institution, originated 
outside that particular environment. As a response to this problem, chapters 1 and 2 of 
the thesis have a more general focus, charting CA’s evolution within a broad 
institutional and theoretical policy environment. In chapters 2 to 6, the focus shifts to 
CA’s position within the specific policy environment of Ethiopia. Secondly, any 
research on development falls prey to core-periphery structures of power and 
knowledge. Despite aspirations of ‘new professionalism’, of reversing the values and 
roles of ‘normal professionalism’43, the power relations which operate at interfaces 
between inhabitants of local African environments and development research^ have 
proved persistent. This researcher found a bewildering readiness to internalise
43 For explanation of ‘normal’ and ‘new’ professionalism see Robert Chambers, Challenging the 
Professions: frontiers for rural development (Intermediate Technology Publications: London, 1994), pp. 
1-14
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development lexicon and confirm outsider’s agendas. Such confirmation may have 
arisen out of fear, suspicion, or a desire to remain on good terms by accepting what had 
been offered, as well as the relations of authority and the memory of past experience 
which structure such interactions. Thirdly, there are problems with the terminology 
typically used in development. Words, like ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘civil 
society’, ‘women in development’, are frequently invoked but rarely theorised. 
Meanings and intentions are too easily obscured and hidden behind rhetoric. This thesis 
attempts to deal with the weakness of words used in the development lexicon by 
exploring the links between the discursive and the non-discursive; between the words, 
the practices and the institutional expression of development. By analysing the power 
relations that underlie the terminology, it aims to contextualise the language, to explain 
why it is used and what it means. Finally, the thesis is weighted towards an analysis of 
famine. A result of studying the specific policy environment of Ethiopia, it leaves itself 
open to debate about whether such a case study is appropriate to an analysis of CA’s 
evolving capabilities as a charity. Recent scholarship has tended to de-isolate famines 
from ‘normal’ times and has shown that local historical, political and economic 
processes transcend what is perceived by outsiders as a sudden ‘disaster event’.44 
Further it is argued that many of the concerns and issues - structural and conceptual - 
surrounding ‘relief’ are identical to those surrounding ‘development’ and that, for local 
people, relief and development represent a continuum around which varying strategies 
are organised. In this respect, it is hoped that this study’s analysis of Ethiopia will have 
some wider relevance to an understanding of charity in other locations.
5 . Chapter Outline
Structured chronologically, the thesis explores the evolution of CA’s 
capabilities, as a charity in Ethiopia over three decades. The thesis is arranged in six 
chapters.
44 De Waal, Famine that Kills', Keen, The Benefits of Famine', Amrita Rangasami, ‘“Failure of 
exchange entitlements” theory of famine: a response’ Economic and Political Weekly, 20 (12 October 
1985), pp. 1747-1752 & (19 October 1985), pp. 1797-1801
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Chapter 1 looks at CA as an organisation, at its evolution and positioning within 
the world of relief and development. One issue that emerges in particular is the problem 
CA has faced in finding a voice, a clear articulation of the charity’s goals and strategy.
It highlights the different levels of policy and concern within the agency and the need to 
approach it both as a single entity, an organisation with an official voice, and as a 
community of individuals, an organisation with many voices. Exploring the origins, 
motivations and structures encompassed within CA, the chapter looks at how the 
agency has turned intentions into action, how it has coped with conflicting interests, 
and how it has made choices and compromises. It looks at how CA has related to its 
donors and supporters in the North and its partners and beneficiaries in the South. The 
aim is to understand how CA works by investigating the complex set of social, cultural, 
historical and financial interests located within it.
Chapter 2 looks at the relevance of theories of famine, relief and sustainable 
development to CA’s experience. It explores the various paradigm shifts in 
development policy over the past 30 years and their implication for how NGOs, like 
CA, have positioned themselves. One issue that emerges is how theories of famine, 
relief and development have produced a number of local power effects. Drawing on 
Foucault as a tool of analysis the chapter explores how in the context of relief and 
development, power is exercised. It explores the links between the discursive 
construction of ‘famine’, and ‘poverty’ and the institutional practices that are 
subsequently prioritised. The chapter examines the implication of such links on charities 
like CA. By analysing how theories of development are generated, the chapter explores 
not just theory but the structure of international relations and the current economic 
order. This chapter is a prelude to an analysis of CA’s performance in Ethiopia. It sets 
up debates that had a real meaning for CA around a set of policy concerns in Ethiopia; 
debates about how to define its position within the economic and political world order 
vis-a-vis its donors, the host state, the media, its beneficiaries and its partners.
Chapters 3 ,4 , 5 and 6 look specifically at CA’s performance in Ethiopia. 
Chapter 3 examines CA’s experience of famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1970s and the 
nature of its response. By looking at the concrete local effects of famine and relief, a
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critique of the operation is put forward. In particular, the chapter looks at how CA 
positioned itself within theories of famine and disaster relief. The purpose of the 
analysis is not to provide a simple time-specific evaluation but to highlight CA’s 
capabilities in the mid-1970s, to explore what the experience meant for CA, what the 
lessons were, and whether lessons were institutionalised. In 1984, famine returned to 
Ethiopia. Chapters 4 and 5 look at CA’s ability to deal with the challenge. They look at 
the evolution and positioning of CA’s mandate; at how the experiences of the past 
informed the present; and at how both influenced the framework for the future. Chapter 
4 focuses on the local and international environment. It looks again at the relevance of 
theories of famine to NGOs, like CA, and at how policy concerns were conceived. 
Chapter 5 turns directly to CA’s experience through its involvement in the Emergency 
Relief Desk. This Desk channeled aid, illegally, into rebel-held territories of northern 
Ethiopia and represented a radically different theorisation of famine. The chapter 
explores the alternative framework for action presented by the Desk and what this meant 
for CA. In particular the implications for the positioning of CA’s relief and development 
mandate is examined. Together, chapters 4 and 5 provide a critique of conventional 
models of assistance. But they also highlight the structural and ideological constraints 
that continued to determine how ‘relief’ and ‘development’ worked in practice. The 
chapters raise profound questions for CA, that go to the root of what it is, what it does 
and who it answers to.
In chapter 6, the analysis moves away from famine and focuses on how CA 
articulated development policies in the late 1980s and 1990s. The chapter looks at the 
relevance of theories of development to CA at this time. It explores the 
conceptualisation, planning, and implementation of one rural development programme, 
the Freedom From Hunger Campaign, in southern Ethiopia, supported from its 
inception by CA. The chapter uses Foucault as a tool of analysis, looking at the links 
between the development discourses of the time and the institutional practices that 
emerged. Exploring the hidden and discrete functions of such discourses, the chapter 
shows how the programme, designed and implemented as an ‘alternative’, ‘bottom-up’ 
development strategy, in reality became a conventional, top-down development
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programme. By analysing how power was elaborated in development, the analysis 
questions whether CA was institutionally equipped to respond to challenges for 
‘alternative development’. It suggests that despite the shifts in the institutional language 
of development, the set of power relations which underlie the development process 
have reflected a greater degree of continuity and persistence.
For CA as for other charities, the journey from the optimistic 1960s to the 
reality of the century’s last years has been one fraught with painful but important 
lessons; lessons about poverty, community and change, about failure, growth and 
achievement. The concluding chapter looks at what lessons have been learned. It 
revisits the relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive and the problems 
CA has faced. It concludes by asking whether a history of this kind can contribute 
anything in policy terms, and makes suggestions as to what such contributions might 
be.
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Chapter 1
THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN AID: A PROCESS
OF ADAPTATION
This chapter indicates the broad character and capabilities of CA over 50 years 
as a basis for analysis of its actions in Ethiopia. One issue that emerges in particular are 
the different levels of policy and concern within CA. For this reason, it will be 
necessary at times to present CA as an organisation while at others, to turn to its 
internal and sometimes divisive dynamics. The aim of the chapter is to understand how 
CA works by investigating the complex set of social, cultural, historical and financial 
interests located within it. Attention will be paid to the link between theory and practice 
and the process by which concerns are implemented.
1 • The Origins of Christian Aid 1945 to c. I960
CA embodied the traditions, preconceptions, concerns and circumstances of its 
origins. This section looks at their relevance. Formally dated from September 1945 as 
the official relief and development agency of the British Council of Churches, CA’s 
formation lay within a broader process, the development of an ‘ecumenical’ movement, 
started in 1922 and only formally inaugurated in 1948. There are a number of key 
dates.
In 1922 the European Bureau for Inter-Church Aid was set up by the Swiss 
Protestant Church and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Its 
aim was to resettle and secure the nationality of the large numbers of stateless persons 
following the First World War.1 By 1945, with the end of the Second World War, the 
Bureau became involved in more general works of relief and rehabilitation throughout 
Europe. It was joined in this work by the Christian Reconstruction in Europe 
Committee, an organisation created by the Protestant Churches of Britain and Ireland. 
The Committee represented the ‘service’ arm of the British Council of Churches, 
which had been created 3 years earlier in 1942, by the same churches. It was the
1 Between 1933 and 1939 the Bureau also became involved internationally in helping the Jews fleeing 
from Hitler and Nazi persecution.
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forerunner of CA. In 1945 the Committee launched a Million Pound Fund Appeal in 
Great Britain. Its target was reached by 1949, achieved partly through VE-Day 
Collections in churches and partly by a diocesan quota system both in the Church of 
England and in other denominations. The funds raised were used for refugees and the 
needs of the European churches, particularly in Germany and were distributed through 
the World Council of Churches. While not yet inaugurated the World Council was in 
‘process of formation’, having a small office in Geneva and from 1945 an office in 
London. The World Council was officially inaugurated in 1948 at its first assembly 
held in Amsterdam with representatives from churches worldwide. At the assembly, it 
was decided that the World Council needed a service arm, to provide for the hungry 
and the refugees. The Department of Inter-Church Aid and Service to Refugees2 was 
created, replacing the Bureau. One year later, the British Council of Churches changed
i
the name of its service arm, and the Committee became the Department of Inter-Church 
Aid and Refugee Service. The department was a related agency of the World Council’s 
department, seeking to raise funds for its project list, but remained entirely 
autonomous. Both were primarily concerned with refugees and other aid programmes 
in Europe. It was at the World Council’s second assembly at Evanston, USA in 1954, 
that their mandates were extended to include aid programmes throughout the world. 
This expansion necessitated vast increases in resources and in 1957, the British 
Department of Inter-Church Aid introduced its first fund-raising ‘Christian Aid Week’. 
Two hundred towns and villages took part and £26,000 was raised. Christian Aid 
Week became established as an annual event and in 1964, the name of the Department 
changed for the second time and became ‘Christian Aid’.
CA was thus created within an ecumenical family as part of an ecumenical 
response to poverty. Such a response aimed to overcome divisions: to unite a divided 
church and to do so in the task of raising the living standard of the under-privileged,
2 The Department of Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service went through a number of name changes, in 
1960 becoming the Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service, in 1971 die Committee 
of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service and in 1992 Unit IV. For clarity, diis study shall refer 
to it as the Department of Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service throughout.
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making one a divided world.3 It involved a commitment to the poor, free from the 
evangelical strings of the traditional missionary structures of the Church. The response 
was operationalised through the members of the family. These were divided into three 
main groups. Firstly, there were the so-called agencies, of which CA was one. These 
were agencies of churches in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand.
They were usually ecumenical in character; in other words, they acted for more than 
one church and in close co-operation with the World Council. Initially they raised 
money from their churches alone but this soon extended to include governments and the 
general public. As the main source of funds for the ecumenical response to poverty, 
these agencies were often referred to as ‘donor agencies’. The second group was made 
up of councils of churches in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Pacific 
and the Middle East.4 Most of them were national councils, although there were a few 
regional councils. Many of the national councils had originally been ‘missionary 
councils’ but with independence became representative of the indigenous churches. 
Their agendas included a range of Christian work and witness, and also development. 
The third members were found within the World Council and in particular within its 
many and varied departments specifically set up to respond to poverty. The ecumenical 
response to poverty was particularly identified with the Department of Inter-Church Aid 
and Service to Refugees. From 1956, this published a ‘project list’, a register of 
defined pieces of work with budgets or price-tags attached. Such projects were 
screened and recommended by the national councils in the South and approved and 
listed for funding by the World Council. The agencies in the North, such as CA, would 
then pick and choose among them.
How CA worked was to a large extent defined by it origins within this 
ecumenical movement. It was a non-operational charity; it did not employ its own staff 
on overseas station (unless requested to find and sponsor an individual/individuals) but 
operated through partner organisations, staffed and managed by local people. Its
3 For a more general analysis of the ecumenical response to poverty see Taylor, Not Angels but 
Agencies, pp. 1-20
4 Today, councils of churches number well over 70 worldwide
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‘natural’ partners were the overseas churches and councils of churches. As the 
development agency of the over 40 British and Irish member churches of the British 
Council of Churches, much of CA’s income came directly from the churches or 
through efforts of church members. The main fund-raising activity was concentrated on 
two annual campaigns - the Christmas Appeal which operated through CA subscribers 
and the churches; and Christian Aid Week, in May, when the Church went to the world 
locally and nationally to tell people about need and ask for support. The first Christian 
Aid Week in 1957 was organised by local councils of churches who ran a week of 
events and door-to-door collections. Following this, Christian Aid committees were 
formed to operate in conjunction with the local councils of churches. Where no such 
councils existed, special inter-denominational committees sprang up. Unlike secular 
agencies, such as Oxfam, which had to create an active volunteer base, CA was able to 
draw on a countrywide cadre of church workers who could be mobilized through such 
committees.
While the structure and ideology of CA reflected the specific history and 
characteristics of an ecumenical movement, the movement was not itself isolated.
Indeed it was very much part of a broader ideological setting, one carried forward by 
people whose outlook had been strongly influenced by the ideals of international 
understanding to which the carnage of the two World Wars had given birth. The 
‘internationalist’ ideology to which they all subscribed had launched the League of 
Nations, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions and in the post-World 
War II period led to the establishment and mushrooming of voluntary development 
agencies. The vision they all shared was of a fairer world, free from poverty. Such 
visions were not of course new, injustice and poverty were far older than the war, but 
there was a fresh determination to deal with them and high hopes that they could be 
overcome.
This internationalist ideology was firmly shaped by economic theories and 
development strategies influential at the time. Framed within a modernist paradigm, 
development was constructed as a relatively linear process, a function of capital
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investment and the adoption of Northern values and technologies.5 The mode of
operating was essentially project based, with goods or services being delivered. In a
review of development theory literature, Esman and Uphoff commented:
‘... the development thinking of the 1950s was largely influenced by 
technological concerns. A “technology gap” was identified between the 
advanced and backward nations, to be filled by the transfer of technology to the 
latter. ...The various “resource gaps” ... were to be filled by transfer of 
resources from richer to poorer nations - in sufficient amounts, it was hoped, 
for “take o ff ’ into self-sustained economic growth.’6
Emphasis was placed on capital transfers, formal planning, specialisation, central
government control with a top-down development approach, the centre dominating the
periphery, etc. This was a ‘production-centered’ approach to economic and social
development. Development education and policy advocacy, in as far as they existed,
served solely to bring in the necessary funds.
Despite its own individual message, the Church’s involvement in development
which came through the ecumenical movement, followed or at least echoed such
theories and prescriptions. Within the ecumenical response, development was oriented
towards project implementation and the transfer of aid. A great deal of faith was put in
the spread of technology, industry and economic growth rather than charity as the key
to justice and an end to the worst of poverty. The second assembly of the World
Council at Evanston in 1954 was full of praise for economic and technical aid,
describing ‘the response of more developed countries through expanded international
programmes of technical assistance’ as ‘one of the brightest pages of recent history.’7 A
similar faith was evident in several reports of the Council’s assembly in New Delhi in
1961: ‘Technological development promises liberation from hunger, disease and
misery’; ‘in the specific field of economic development, we welcome the vigorous
5 For a general explanation of development theory and its evolution see Milton J. Esman & Norman T. 
Uphoff, Local Organisation: intermediaries in rural development (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 
New York, 1984), pp. 42-57; David C. Korten, ‘Third generation NGO strategies: a key to people- 
centred development’ World Development, 15 Supplement (1987), pp. 145-59
6 Esman & Uphoff, Local Organisations, p. 49
7 Extract taken from report of the World Council of Churches assembly at Evanston in 1954 cited in 
Taylor, Not Angels but Agencies, pp. 62-63
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effort to increase production and raise living standards. ’8 Moreover, by the end of the 
1960s, the refrain had not changed: ‘the developing countries must achieve a much 
more rapid rate of growth.’9 In this respect, the ecumenical movement, and therefore 
CA, followed the economic and ideological fashions of development dictated by the 
secular world.
CA’s origins were thus shaped by a broad theoretical setting and by specific 
ecumenical structures. It is in such origins that the contours of future tensions and 
ambiguities within CA can be identified. The main problem revolved around the conflict 
of a specialised development agency operating within an ecumenical family. From the 
beginning, there was a basic contradiction within CA’s mandate. CA was at once an 
agency created formally to meet immediate human need and to help poor communities 
overcome material poverty and at the same time a member of an ecumenical family 
committed to a more holistic response to poverty that included Christian education and 
even evangelism. CA was part of a broad ecumenical movement but with a purely 
‘developmental’ mandate. This created tensions in its external relations with the World 
Council and with its ecumenical partners in the South, the churches and councils of 
churches, who often wanted a more ‘holistic’ or rounded response to their needs.10 It 
also created tensions internally about strategy; between a commitment to ecumenism 
and its manifestation as partnership with councils of churches, and a commitment to 
efficiency and a realisation that the councils were not necessarily capable development 
partners.
The problem of efficiency became more crucial as CA’s mandate expanded 
beyond Europe to include refugees from Palestine, Korea and China following the 
eruption of conflicts throughout the world in the 1950s and to Africa, following the 
challenges of independence and nation-building. By the end of the 1950s, CA’s annual
8 Extract from report of the World Council of Churches assembly in new Delhi in 1961 cited in ibid., 
p. 63
9 Extract from a conference in Beirut in 1968, organised by the World Council of Churches cited in 
ibid., p. 64
10 Holism means combining service (development) with witness and mission.
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income had risen from £29,000 at the beginning of the decade to £483,000.11 Where 
and how this money was spent was to become a matter of increasing concern. Initially, 
the contradiction between efficiency and ecumenism was resolved through the strategy 
of institution-building. The northern churches and agencies shaped the councils of 
churches into useful development partners, into organisations through which projects 
could be assessed and aid channeled. However this, in turn, threw up new problems 
about partnership within an ecumenical family. In effect, the councils were being turned 
into instruments of the North, equipped to do what the North required. In the process, 
they were diverted from their traditional holistic tasks to more specialised 
‘development’ tasks.
The debate about whether mission and development should be kept apart or held 
together, a heritage of its ecumenical history, was to prove a defining feature of CA’s 
history, manifesting itself in internal divisions about strategy. But the charity’s 
ambiguous position with regard to the ‘mission’ and ‘development’ components of the 
ecumenical movement also impacted externally on its public identity. While Inter- 
Church Aid had represented a desire by the Northern Churches and their supporters for 
a different approach, distinct from the divisive denominational approach of the missions 
and their association with colonialism, the title Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service, 
and then Christian Aid implied that the money raised was confined to one church 
helping another. It was not understood by many that aid was given regardless of 
religion. Doubts about the nature of CA’s ‘Christian’ identity were to prevail 
throughout its history and for many staff within CA, anxious to promote a more secular 
and developmental message of their work, remained a major concern.
The contours of a second major problem existed in the prevalent modernist 
paradigm for development and its expression through the funding of projects. 
Institutionalised through the World Council’s project list and the councils of churches, 
it was to prove a key feature of the ecumenical response to poverty. As the theory that 
underpinned such an approach came under re-examination in the late 1960s, the
11 CA News, ‘Christian Aid From 1944 to 1990’ (CA: London, March 1990)
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question emerged as to whether CA (or indeed the World Council) would be able to 
negotiate an alternative development role, despite these structural origins.
The ambiguities of structure and discourse highlighted above went to the heart 
of the issue of capability, touching on the limitations and possibilities of CA’s role. 
Most importantly, they reveal how already by 1960, CA was made up of many voices 
and represented different interests. The following section looks at the growth of CA 
and the evolution of its mandate. In particular, it explores how these different voices 
and interests were accommodated.
2 . The Evolution of Christian Aid, 1960-90
Between 1959 and 1990, CA expanded and was significantly 
transformed: its annual income increased from £483,000 in 1959, to £31,248,115 in 
1989/9012; its restricted relief mandate extended to encompass development, human 
rights, publicity, lobby and advocacy; and its operational environment changed from 
the limited and well-defined apolitical framework of the Cold War to the complex 
shifting international setting of the ‘new world order’. Four main stages are identified 
in this evolution, each reflecting CA’s evolving capabilities: 1960 to the early 1970s, a 
time during which CA’s mandate was transformed and CA became engaged in a social 
justice debate; the watershed years of the mid-1970s when CA was riven with internal 
divisions over theory and practice; the 1980s with debates about how CA should move 
forward mid what its beliefs were; and 1987, the year of new commitments and new 
confidence. Within this periodisation, five key themes re-emerge and provide a discrete 
ordering: development strategy; fund-raising; education; partners; and relations with 
states.
2 .1  A development mandate & the social justice debate 1960-73
In 1960, CA was a charitable relief organisation focused primarily on meeting 
immediate needs through the financing of direct action - distribution of food and the
12 CA financial statements and reports (1951-84), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
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provision of shelter. Over the next 10 years, as CA became involved in non-disaster 
situations and in the challenges of independence and nation-state building in Africa, 
concerns about addressing the longer-term ‘development’ problems that underlay 
poverty and the disasters it created were expressed. Over the same time, CA had begun 
to weaken its links with the World Council and expand into new partnerships. The 
operational and institutional environment that had given CA a clear and limited role in 
the 1950s had changed. By the early 1970s, Hugh Samson, CA’s public relations 
adviser, argued that ‘CA ... [was] confronted with a wide variety of choices as an anti­
poverty movement and as an ecumenical instrument for development.’13
The quantitative picture tells part of the story. What had begun in the late 1950s 
as a few area secretaries, largely concerned with servicing Christian Aid Week 
committees, was by the end of the 1960s a network of full-time staff covering England, 
Scotland, Wales and Ireland. These staff became the representatives of CA in all sectors 
of their local communities, performing the role of fund-raisers and educators. The 
London head office had also grown, occasioning a move to larger offices in 1968 and 
CA’s annual income had risen from £483,000 in 1959 to £3,121,713 in 1973.14The 
other half of the story lies in the fundamental change in CA’s mandate. At the outset, its 
message, transferred from a northern setting to a southern one, had primarily been one 
of ‘compassion’ and ‘concern’ and its role, as meeting the special needs imposed on 
people by war, political tension and natural disasters. In the 1960s, Hugh Samson, 
stated that this role came ‘to include remedial measures against the basic economic 
causes of poverty.’15 Charity and relief were replaced by a strategic commitment to 
address development and justice.
Such a challenge, to move away from paternalistic programmes of charity to 
address the real causes of poverty, reflected the concerns of communities and countries 
in the South as they emerged from their colonial history. Within the ecumenical family, 
such concerns were made particularly evident in the statements of the All Africa Council
13 Hugh Samson, ‘A re-appraisal of CA’s role’ (August 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/15.1)
14 CA financial statements and reports (1951-84), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
15 Hugh Samson, ‘A re-appraisal of CA’s role’ (August 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/15.1)
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of Churches. This council had emerged out of an ad hoc meeting of churches in 1958 to 
‘discern more fully the role of the Church in present day Africa. ’16 The churches 
agreed to remain united and in 1963 the council was formally inaugurated in Kampala, 
Uganda. The purpose of the council was to respond to the new responsibilities of 
independence. In this respect it aimed to forge a new relationship between the churches 
in Africa and the World Council of Churches; one of fellowship, ‘no longer of Teacher 
and pupil’17; one of unity, not of denominational rivalry; and through such partnership 
to promote development. The council glimpsed the ‘possibility of a renewed Church, 
awakened to the concern for the needs of men, women, and the youth, in a new 
Africa.,18 The western churches and missions were challenged to respond with a post­
colonial form of developmental and ecumenical cooperation.
At the same time, calls for a new development commitment were being echoed 
in the North. The United Nations led the way by announcing that the 1960s would be 
the ‘decade of development’. Guided by its northern and southern constituency, CA 
began to branch out from immediate relief of need towards a more diversified set of 
commitments. A shift towards long-term development, with an emphasis on more 
integrated development projects and programmes as well as appropriate technology 
occurred. An important channel for such action was provided by the Freedom From 
Hunger Campaign launched by Dr. B. R. Sen, then the Director of the United Nations 
Food and Agricultural Organisation. It was a programme directed not against famine 
and its immediate relief, but against the causes of permanent insufficiency of food 
supplies and its long-term alleviation. Moreover its design was for self-generated 
agricultural development; it relied on national committees set up in countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America as well as in the West; and it placed as much importance on 
education as on fund-raising. From 1961, CA used the programme as a channel
16 All Africa Council of Churches, ‘Basis of co-operation with the World Council of Churches 
concerning the Special Agency for the Emergency Programme’ (November 1965), (SOAS.CA/A/1.2)
17 Rev’d Gabriel Setiloane, ‘Freedom and anarchy in the Church’, (Kampala Assembly, 1963), 
(SOAS.CA/A/8.1)
18AU Africa Council of Churches, ‘Programme on social, economic national and international affairs’ 
(Kampala Assembly, April 1963), (SOAS.CA/A/8.1)
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through which to finance agricultural development. In many ways the programme
helped CA recast its role to confront the challenge of world poverty to which it had
been made so sensitive by its church partners overseas. It also enabled CA to join the
development decade as a partner of the United Nations system and to become involved
in a network of like-minded voluntary organisations in Britain; Oxfam and War on
Want were also closely involved with programme. It has been written that: ‘the
Freedom From Hunger Campaign profoundly influenced the philosophy and approach
of Oxfam and other overseas aid agencies towards the longer-term development
objectives of the projects it supported.’19 The same was true of CA and by the early
1970s, the agency was funding more than 100 long-term development projects in over
40 countries. It had indeed become an ‘anti-poverty movement.’20
In a similar vein, in 1965, recognizing the urgent necessity to adopt more
comprehensive approaches to emergency situations in Africa, the World Council’s
Department of Inter-Church Aid, in partnership with the All Africa Council of
Churches, launched an appeal for a fund of $10,000,000 over a period of 5 years. The
fund was administered by a Special Agency set up in Africa, the Ecumenical
Programme for Emergency Action in Africa. Its purpose was to enable the churches in
Africa to respond adequately to emergency situations, especially:
‘the acute need arising from man-made emergency situations (such as political 
refugees) and also the urgent development problems confronting the emerging 
new nations as they seek to build up their nationhood.’21
A comprehensive and integrated ‘programme approach’ as opposed to a ‘project
approach’ was developed for inter-church aid :
‘the adventure of undertaking a planned programme of emergency action over a 
period of years is a new experiment in the work of inter-church aid. If it 
succeeds it may have much to teach us concerning effective inter-church aid in 
tackling a regional situation and influencing its development.’22
19 Black, A Cause for Our Times, p. 74
“ Hugh Samson, ‘A re-appraisal of CA’s role’ (August 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/15.1)
21 All Africa Council of Churches, ‘Basis of co-operation with the World Council of Churches 
concerning the Special Agency for the Emergency Programme’ (November 1965), (SOAS.CA/A/1.2)
22 World Council & All Africa Council of Churches, ‘Ecumenical Programme for emergency action in 
Africa’ (1965), (SOAS.CA/A/8.2)
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Over the 5 years of its operation, CA gave about £80,000 to this programme.23
A commitment to such long-term development strategies was accompanied by a 
recognition and deeper analysis among members of the ecumenical family of the 
structural causes of poverty and underdevelopment. At the World Council’s fourth 
assembly in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1968, the churches were challenged: ‘to move 
beyond the piecemeal and paternalistic programme of charity which have sometimes 
characterized Christian mission, and ... confront positively the systematic injustice of 
the world economy.’24 Recognition of the politics of poverty and consequently the need 
to move beyond treating the symptoms to address the underlying causes became a 
common refrain within ecumenical circles. The validity of the ‘project’ approach was 
under attack. At the Montreux Conference of 1970, it was declared that: ‘the debate 
about development and the churches’ involvement in development is still much too 
oriented towards project implementation and the transfer of aid.’25
By the beginning of the 1970s, the task of the churches and the ecumenical 
movement had been significantly recast. A previous Head of CA’s Aid Sector defined 
such a role as one of ‘participation with the poor and the oppressed in their struggle for 
development - through the promotion of justice, self-reliance and economic growth.,26 
In 1968, the Director of CA had already talked about a ‘certain change in perspective 
about what we are doing.’27 He argued that ‘the popular image of us is still largely in 
the shape of the old relief charity organization’ and that, ‘overall I do want the churches 
and I suppose the general public, as quickly as possible, to see CA as the total response 
to world need.’28 Concepts of justice, partnership and a commitment to structural 
change appeared in CA’s literature about its motivation and reasoning. These changes, 
in the size of its operations and the remit of its mandate, had profound implications for 
CA. By opening up new possibilities, they exposed the different voices within the
23 CA financial statements and reports (1951-84), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
24 Cited in Taylor, Not Angels but Agencies, p. 49
25 Cited in ibid., p. 49
26 Paul Spray, ‘CA’s role in inter-church aid’ (26 October, 1988), (CAO.DIR 208)
27 Rev’d Alan Brash, memo to Hugh Samson (19 June 1968), (SOAS.CA/I/15.2)
28 ibid.
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organisation, the different concerns, interests, motivations, goals and agendas.
Tensions and ambiguities merged around three key issues. These issues went to the
core of what CA meant to different people.
The first involved how CA related to people in industrialised countries, through
fund-raising and development education. Early on, Janet Lacey, CA’s first Director
(1952-68), had been sensitive about the use of images and their impact on perceptions
of the South. She expressed doubts about the emotions aroused by,
‘pictures of children with swollen bellies. It is that emotion that compels 
devoted members of voluntary organizations and churches to raise money to 
send to these unknown personalities behind the photos. Yet it is these very 
photos that offend the peoples of the hungry world. They see them as an insult 
to their dignity. ’29
Moreover as a member of a worldwide ecumenical family, committed to unity and
equality within that family, such portrayals would be quickly challenged as
contradictory and unacceptable. At its inaugural Kampala assembly, the All Africa
Council of Churches pushed the point home:
‘we would like to draw the attention of the overseas churches and their 
missionaries to the content and presentation of appeals which they make to the 
generosity of their constituency. We would ask that they make a special effort to 
present Africa and the churches of this continent in their reality and their present 
form rather than dwelling on their folklore in a sentimental and inaccurate 
fashion.’30
The expanded social justice mandate of the 1960s seemed to resolve such concerns. As
Janet Lacey again made clear:
‘what is needed is a careful and planned process of educating public opinion 
and turning the world and our structures slowly but surely up-side down ... 
reliance on oversimplified propaganda, publicity and other methods of the 
“charity business” however necessary is not enough ... the effort to feed the 
hungry without agitation for social justice is a doubtful exercise.’31
However, there were strong institutional rationale for the use of negative imagery. Even
by 1965, the national situation in which CA operated had changed: ‘many more
organizations have entered into the refugee and aid field and many more appeals for
29 Janet Lacey, ‘The development apocalypse’ (Oxford annual conference: the role of the voluntary 
agency in development, n.d), (SOAS.CA/I/15.4)
30 All Africa Council of Churches, ‘The life of the Church’ (Kampala Assembly, April 1963), 
(SOAS.CA/A/8.1)
31 Janet Lacey, ‘The development apocalypse’, (Oxford annual conference: the role of the voluntary 
agency in development, n.d), (SOAS.CA/I/15.4)
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money have been made’, such that there is now ‘more competition in every facet of the
work. ’32 As a result, in the same year that Janet Lacey was denouncing the merits of
‘disaster pornography’, she was receiving arguments of a different kind from CA’s
public relations adviser:
‘in the future when money is going to be tight we’ve got to hit harder in our 
press advertising. The gentler, symbolic approach adopted these last two years 
will achieve less with people who are beginning to clutch their purses and count 
their pennies. I think we’ve got to employ the direct statement, expressed 
tersely and illustrated graphically... I need pictures of real impact.’33
This contradiction between what CA wanted to do and what it was able to do
was still recognisable in the 1990s. The problem, then as now, was significantly
contributed to by independent media coverage. Indeed the integration of television with
the dynamics of disaster relief can be said to date from the 1960s. Television increased
the potential for the impact of images and hence the competition for them. Further, the
images of a ‘disaster’, an ‘event’ that it portrayed and the outpouring of compassion
aroused by the prospect of tangible relief - a food convoy, a feeding center - that it
facilitated increased ‘the gap between... over-simplification in publicity ... and a
broader and deeper sense of British responsibility towards World Poverty.’34 In 1963,
a significant attempt was made by the major charities to diminish the effects of
competition in disaster situations, both in terms of co-ordinating activities but also in
terms of preventing opportunistic fund-raising and the exploitation of negative imagery,
when the Disasters Emergency Committee was formed. Previous to this, agencies had
run their own appeals at disaster times; the argument in favour of competition was that
the total amount of money raised by several appeals must be larger than the amount
from one single joint one. Television changed things. Commercial advertising for
charitable causes was not allowed but the TV authorities were prepared, for a major
disaster, to run a peak-time appeal for the victims. They would not run several different
appeals or give one charity preferential treatment. It was therefore agreed that the five
32 Notes from CA staff conference (Famkain Castle, 11-16 September 1965), (SOAS.CA/I/15.4)
33 Hugh Samson, letter to Janet Lacey (5 January 1967), (SOAS.CA/I/15.1)
34 Janet Lacey, A Cup of Water: the story of Christian Aid (Hodder & Stoughton: London, 1970), p. 
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main British agencies, the British Red Cross Society, CA, Oxfam, Save the Children
Fund and War on Want, would mount a joint Disasters Emergency Committee appeal
and split the proceeds.35 However, while the Committee represented an important
attempt to combat the negative effects of competitive fund-raising and clearly worked
well, disagreements and competition between member agencies remained:
‘individual agencies continue to steal marches on one another, for example in 
making separate appeals, sending individual representatives to scenes of 
disaster, slanting their publicity to their own advantage etc.,36
Images, in a competitive environment, provided a tool upon which to capitalise.
In this sense they had their own momentum. With increased media coverage from the
1960s, the stakes became higher. This impacted in three ways. Firstly, it amplified the
tendency to exploit negative imagery as the best way of tapping into the public’s guilt
and compassion and hence purses. Secondly it created a new imperative, to be seen to
be doing something even where and when the capability to do so might be lacking.
With CA, this was already visible from 1967. In that year, the agency sent a
photographer, Margaret Murray, to take photos of Sudanese refugees in western
Ethiopia, for whom the World Council of Churches was raising funds. Following
reports from the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, Margaret Murray also went to Wollo
province, Ethiopia, to look at the famine situation there. It seems that the images she
brought back to England created a momentum at head office that proceeded to race
ahead of the capabilities on the ground. The Associate Director of CA, B. J. Dudbridge
wrote to Christopher King at the World Council: ‘as we seem to have brought the news
of this famine, to England, it would seem appropriate that we should do what we
can.’37 On the ground, the Rev’d Robert Huddleson thought differently and complained
35 The DEC’s present membership is Christian Aid, the British Red Cross Society, Oxfam, Catholic 
Fund for Overseas Development, and Save the Children Fund. Help the Aged and Action Aid became 
associate members in 1986. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office , the London office of the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees, and the British Refugee Council are observer members. The 
Overseas Development Administration helps with the running cost of the DEC Secretariat. The 
Committee of London and Scottish Bankers and the Post Office offered facilities for receiving donations 
from the public which were paid into one central account administered by one of the charities in 
rotation. Each member charity was allocated an equal share of the appeal proceeds, although this could 
depend on the extent of each agency’s involvement in the affected country.
36 Evelyn Shuckburgh, letter to Rev’d Alan Booth (10 January 1973), (SOAS.CA2/D/11.6)
37 B. J. Dudbridge, letter to Christopher King (17 March 1967), (SOAS.CA/A/2.2)
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to Dudbridge that ‘the whole effect is to force us to do something to justify the 
publicity.’38 In this particular instance, action was not taken but the implications about 
the impact of images were clearly apparent. Finally, the incentive to capitalise on 
increased media coverage impacted negatively on CA’s ability to educate the public 
about the real meaning of development. In this respect, the conflict between the 
demands of short-term fundraising that required the use of ‘starving child’ images and 
development education was not simply about strategies but about perceptions of what 
CA was and where its mission lay.
A survey of CA’s goals and objectives undertaken in the early 1970s identified 
a clear political, social and economic analysis, on its part, of poverty and a critical 
attitude to international power structures. More so than Oxfam, CA as an organisation 
was seen to offer a coherent analysis of global structures and a commitment to 
campaign against injustice.39 It was seen to recognise that the causes of under­
development more often lay in the political and economic structures of an unequal 
world - in trade, commodity prices, debt, land distribution - and in the misguided 
policies of governments, than in the actions of the poor themselves; that such issues 
could not be addressed in the micro context of the traditional project; and that lobbying 
and advocacy were ways in which it could increase its impact and effectiveness.40 In 
1968 Hugh Samson, CA’s public relations adviser advocated that;
‘CA, like other overseas aid bodies, has “popularized” the effects of poverty - 
in personalizing them. What we now have to do is also to popularize the causes 
of poverty - by humanizing the economic and statistical factors. ’41
However the issue about how much weight to give to education and how much to aid
programmes remained crucial. It was an issue that created much debate within the
agency, reflecting individuals’ perceptions of what kind of an organisation CA was and
should become. By choosing to be a ‘total response to world need’, Hugh Samson
expressed concern that the emotional giving and support, triggered by a ‘disaster’ and a
38 Rev’d R. Huddleson, letter to B. J. Dudbridge (2 May 1967), (SOAS.CA/A/2.2)
39 E. De Clerck, A. Keune & A. Kooke, ‘A survey on funding agencies and development education’ 
(Development Research Institute: The Netherlands, June 1972), (SOAS.CA2/D/9.5)
40 ibid.
41 Hugh Samson, memo to Rev’d Alan Brash (12 November 1968), (SOAS.CA/I/15.2)
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relief project, upon which CA as an institution depended for its financial survival would 
be undermined. He warned that, ‘CA’s constituency and supporters ... find it 
increasingly difficult to re-discover the simple logic and clear focus which attracted their 
allegiance.’42 The concern felt by many staff was that by extending its responsibility for 
education beyond what CA actually did with its money and why, it would go beyond 
what CA’s supporters felt it should be doing.
The dilemma of how to balance fund-raising messages for a public most easily 
moved by short-term disaster appeals, with a recognition that longer-term development 
depended on the willingness of that same public to support difficult and costly 
structural change, was never resolved, and individuals within CA remained divided 
over how much emphasis CA should give to its project work and its educational work. 
Ultimately, a way forward was negotiated by an institutional commitment for CA to 
undertake bolder advocacy and, in those instances where concerns about CA’s profile 
arose, to support other independent efforts. Thus according to a revision of its 
constitution in 1968, CA was authorised to spend a proportion of its income on 
educating its supporters and the public on development issues and North/South 
inequalities. In 1970/71 2.5% CA’s expenditure was subsequently spent on 
development education. Similarly, in 1969 the first edition of Christian Aid News was 
published, a paper with a strong educational function. In the same year CA launched a 
joint campaign with other overseas charities entitled Action for World Development, 
with a Manifesto calling for increased development aid from the British government and 
more favourable trading arrangements with the poorer countries. When in 1970, the 
Charity Commissioners took issue with the Manifesto, stating that direct calls upon 
government for policy change were uncharitable, it was decided that an independent 
non-charitable body, the World Development Movement should be set up that could 
develop its own campaigning strategies, calling on the agencies for support where 
appropriate. CA helped fund the Movement. CA, along with Oxfam, also set up the
42 Hugh Samson, ‘A re-appraisal of CA’s role’ (August 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/15.1)
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New Internationalist in 1973, an independent campaigning magazine designed to 
inform on development issues.
The second key area of tension concerned CA’s operating mechanisms. The 
dilemma faced in the 1950s about the capability and efficiency of CA’s ecumenical 
partners in the South was intensified by its commitment to a social justice mission. 
Further, the growing criticism of the ‘project’ approach questioned the very validity of 
the national councils which had been shaped primarily to implement such projects. CA 
responded during the 1960s, by forging partnerships with other indigenous groups, 
such as through the Freedom From Hunger Campaign. The fundamental dilemma was 
not however resolved but in many ways was amplified. It would re-emerge 
dramatically in the mid-1970s and will be discussed in more depth below.
Finally, the shifts of the 1960s impacted profoundly on CA’s relations with 
states, both at home and overseas. By adopting a mandate committed to social justice, 
CA could not avoid the political implications of its role. At home, a number of 
problems both with the state, mediated through the writs of the charity commissioners, 
and with some of CA’s supporters, were consequently experienced. These experiences 
divided CA staff over how ‘political’ CA should become.43 A particularly good 
example of how CA’s ability to challenge the established order could be restricted by 
pressure within its domestic setting was that of the Programme to Combat Racism. This 
was set up in 1969 by the World Council of Churches to support victims of racial 
oppression and organisations like the African National Congress in South Africa. Part 
of the programme was a special fund which made annual grants to such groups. CA 
distanced itself from the programme from the start. While this decision alienated some 
of its staff and supporters, who saw it as a betrayal of the very people they believed 
they were called to stand by, it was no doubt designed to reassure the vast majority of 
donors that their money remained in safe hands and would not be fostering armed 
revolution or supporting so-called guerrillas, as well as complying with British charity 
law, in turn reassuring other staff members and supporters. The Programme to Combat
43 David Smithers files. (CAO.DIR.47-52)
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Racism was essentially about the political dimension of the struggle against poverty: the 
need to match immediate help with attempts to confront causes and bring about 
structural change. As such it brought to the fore the issue of power and questions about 
its redistribution. As a charity restricted by charitable law and by the sensitivities of 
some members of its domestic constituency, along with some of its own staff, CA’s 
social justice mission was clearly not without its conditions. Ultimately, its mission 
was carried forward by broadening negotiations. In this respect, CA continued to speak 
out against apartheid and oppression and in support for a number of liberation 
movements in Africa and Central America. That it continued to be criticised for such 
advocacy exposed the parameters within which negotiations were made.
CA’s expanded role also had implications for its relations with governments 
abroad, such as South Africa during apartheid. For CA, as a non-operational agency 
this did not impact on it own staff or institutional presence. What it did impact on was 
the relationship of its southern partners to their governments. While free from some of 
the difficulties that agencies such as Oxfam might have faced in terms of direct 
confrontation, CA had to bear the responsibility that supporting partners in an 
unfriendly government climate threatened to expose them to further oppression. In 
particular, advocacy on the behalf of oppressed communities could lead to an increase 
in violence and not a decrease.
The fact that charity in the sense of relief and development was rarely neutral, 
that it impacted on internal political relations and the challenge this posed to agencies 
such as CA was most clearly exposed towards the end of the 1960s in Biafra, Nigeria. 
The Biafran war of 1967-69 and the humanitarian emergency that accompanied it, was 
essentially manipulated by governments at home and abroad. Further the story of 
Biafran relief left an outstanding question. Did the mobilisation of the world’s concern 
for the starving children of Biafra in mid-1969 - a mobilisation in which CA played a 
part - have the effect of prolonging the war and thereby increasing the suffering? Biafra 
proved to be a fiery baptism for CA. It exposed the fundamental problem of how CA 
dealt with the issues of power and politics that underlay the poverty and suffering they
40
were mandated to relieve. The implications of CA’s expanded role and the relationship 
between non-states and states was to become a major issue and focus of debate by the 
mid-1970s.
By the end of the 1960s, CA had evolved from a small European relief 
organisation into a worldwide agency committed to a broad development and social 
justice mandate. In the process a number of structural and ideological
problems had been confronted and a role negotiated. However, the underlying 
ambiguities within this expanded role and in particular the internal conflicts of interest 
and concern within CA remained. In the 1970s, many of them came to a head.
2 .2  1974-75: the watershed years
The mid-1970s represented a time of profound self-questioning, debate and at 
times, conflict within CA. As the horrors of famine in the Sahel and Ethiopia exposed 
the frailty of the development efforts of the 1960s and internal conflicts in Burundi, 
Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Mozambique and Angola dampened the excitement of nation- 
building, the euphoria of the 1960s gave way to doubts. CA, along with other 
agencies, found itself groping for a new role and a new strategy. In the process, the 
fact that CA had meant different things to different people both within the organisation 
and outside it, was exposed. At times, the debates that ensued threatened to destroy the 
organisation. This section explores the nature of the crisis and how CA emerged from 
it. It focuses on the internal dynamics of the organisation and in particular, on two 
over-lapping events around which tensions crystallised: an internal staff confrontation 
over the administration of the aid division; and the appointment of an Aid Advisory 
Committee to ‘review and report to the Board on general aid policies.,44
The context for debate in the mid-1970s was an organisation looking to find a 
way of coping with the changing demands that were being made on it. While CA’s 
mandate had expanded and matured during the 1960s, its operating capabilities had not. 
As described above, much of CA’s aid policy had initially been in the form of a
44 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
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response to initiatives from Geneva. Projects were funded primarily through the World 
Council’s project list, although CA also allocated aid through a few major councils of 
churches with whom it had bilateral relationships. During the late 1960s, as the volume 
of development funds increased, and the emphasis moved from simple relief operations 
to more sophisticated schemes of general community development, it proved 
impossible for the small staff of the World Council’s Department of Inter-Church Aid 
to maintain the kind of evaluation and screening of programmes required. This plus a 
growing awareness that decisions needed to be made closer to the place where work 
was to be carried out meant that by the early 1970s, the Department was seen as a 
central clearing house for information rather than as the central executing and evaluating 
arbiter. In turn, CA had found it necessary as the funds at its disposal increased to build 
up its own small aid team and to accept more responsibility in building up and 
maintaining relations with partners in the South. In 1971 CA set up its own overseas 
aid department. A weakening of ties with the World Council did not however bring 
with it an automatic increase in effectiveness or efficiency. In many ways it simply 
represented a transference of responsibility.
Further, within a few years, the size of CA’s operations were such that the 
policies and procedures inherited unchanged from the past, governing the allocation of 
funds, the monitoring of projects and the feedback of information both to the board of 
CA and its constituency were clearly in need of re-organization. Evaluations of 
completed projects were rare; once committed to a project, the aid department would 
exercise little further control over its progress; criteria for assistance were not clearly or 
strictly defined; requests for assistance tended to be considered on their individual 
merits and by individuals rather than as a planned strategic response; and the onus was 
on the sponsor to present projects rather than on the aid department to seek out areas of 
greatest need. A review of CA’s management in 1972 stated that while:
‘rapid growth has been one of the main factors shaping the organisation of CA
... the tendency has been to react to new situations instead of anticipating them
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... the state has now been reached at which the management must consider 
whether the organisation is equipped to cope with further expansion.,4S
By 1974 the need for a firmer administrative structure and clearer policy guidelines was
according to the then Director, the Rev’d Alan Booth, ‘everybody’s intention.’46 On
25th April 1974, an Aid Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Sir George
Sinclair was subsequently set up by the board of CA. It represented;
‘an attempt to define the proper general policies for the allocation of funds, 
together with proposals about the type of machinery and the structure of staff 
needed to implement them.’47
The Committee represented the first strategic attempt by CA to clarify what it was and
to define its role. The report was not however produced until June 1975, by which time
CA’s aid department had come under scrutiny from a different quarter and issues about
its strategy had been debated in a less formal and consensual atmosphere.
In September 1974, CA’s Deputy Director and Aid Administrator, David
Smithers resigned. What ensued in many ways took on the aspect of a personal
vendetta by David Smithers against CA and is not relevant here. What is of relevance is
that the event exposed and in turn stimulated debates within CA about its efficiency,
effectiveness and accountability as an agency in general and of its aid department in
particular. What emerged was a period of intense internal questioning about CA’s
mandate and purpose. David Smithers’ initial grievances were directed against two
incidents of administrative slackness in the aid administration in which the arrival of
emergency funds had been delayed; and against a more general but fundamental aspect
of CA’s working, its partnership with national councils of churches and churches
overseas. Administrative delay had occurred both in the dispatch of a grant of £4,000 to
a refugee camp for Malien Tuareg on the outskirts of Niamey over 6 weeks during
Christmas 1973 and over the dispatch of a grant of £10,000 for a food-for-work
programme for destitute nomads in Wollo province, Ethiopia, between September and
November 1973. In the first instance, CA admitted administrative delay on its part but
45 L. J. Ashman, A.C.A., ‘The management of Christian Aid: a critical review’ (MSc thesis: City 
University, September 1972), (SOAS.CA2/D/13.6)
46 Rev’d Alan Booth, letter to Hugh Samson (3 July 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/15.1)
47 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
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rejected the accusation made in the heading of an article, published in The Times, that, 
‘inefficiency by charity led to loss of lives’48; and in the second the delay was attributed 
to an overseas bank and led to a change in procedure for future transactions. The more 
fundamental grievance lay with CA’s mode of operating through councils of churches. 
In the same article mentioned above and based on an interview with David Smithers, 
such councils were criticized as lacking, ‘the expertise to give adequate supervision to 
development projects. ’49 A profound and bitter debate was set in motion, partly carried 
forward in the letters column of The Times and in the church press, concerning the 
accountability of CA and the effectiveness of its aid programmes.50
Meanwhile, by June 1975, the Advisory Committee had completed its report. 
The focus was again on efficiency and accountability. The committee argued, ‘that the 
resources available to CA ... call for a sharper definition of objectives and a 
concentration on the areas of greatest need.’51 It highlighted that there was scant liaison 
between different departments; that records and information flows were poor; and that 
little capacity existed to meet the demands that an emergency might place upon the 
organisation. It advocated that priorities needed to be set and functions and objectives 
redefined so as to enable more proactive actions and initiatives in new areas of work. 
The report indicated that the administrative delays of 1973 reflected a broader 
institutional malaise. The famines of the early 1970s in Ethiopia and the Sahel had 
stretched CA’s aid administration beyond its capabilities. Reform was needed.
In order to respond to poverty more effectively and strategically, the Committee 
laid down recommendations for the reform and prioritisation of CA’s policy-making 
and management systems: four regional committees were established (Africa; the Indian 
sub-continent; South East Asia and the Pacific; Latin America and the Caribbean) and
48 Clifford Longley, ‘Inefficiency by charity led to loss of lives’ The Times, 19 January 1976
49 ibid.
50 The Times (Longley, 19 January 1976; Slack, 21 & 23 January 1976; Smithers, 22 January 1976; 
Sinclair, 23 January 1976; Williams, 23 January 1976; Booth, 23 January 1976); The Methodist 
Recorder (29 January 1976; Smithers, 5 February 1976; Greet & Atkinson, 12 February 1976); & The 
Church of England Newspaper (6 February 1976; Slack, 14 February 1976; Smithers, 19 November 
1976)
51 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
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were delegated responsibility to approve all aid allocations; additional staff were 
employed; staff were encouraged to visit countries in which CA was committed, to 
brief the project officer on their return and so enable him/her to prioritise requests; and 
attempts were made at geographical and programme targeting: ‘allocation policy should 
be directed towards making the greater part of CA’s resources available to the poorest 
countries and to the pockets of real poverty in other countries.’52 The best way of 
achieving such targeting was interpreted as concentrating on those countries with per 
capita annual incomes of less than US$ 200.53
Staffing levels were to be increased across the organisation. The Committee 
called it ‘a case of too large a programme administered by too few persons.,54 
Historically, CA had kept administrative costs down - in 1969/70,3.1% of total 
expenses was spent on administration and 9.8% on fundraising.55 The real cost of low 
overheads had been identified in an earlier independent report of 1972, which argued 
that the ‘constant effort to keep overheads at a minimum ... has now reached a point, 
where the overhead target of 3% of income has become an end in itself’, and that this 
mitigated against increased managerial efficiency.56 The Committee agreed and blamed 
‘the desire to keep the establishment and the overhead administrative costs to the 
minimum’ for inhibiting the aid administration from ‘demanding those additions of staff 
which were desirable for a fully efficient administration.’57 However, the concrete 
problem of maintaining low overheads remained unresolved. Public relations 
determined then as in the 1990s that charities were about ‘charity’, not business and so 
administrative expenses were to be kept low.
With regard to how CA related to the public, the Committee reported:
52 ibid.
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
55 E. De Clerck, A. Keune & A. Kooke, ‘A survey on funding agencies and development education’ 
(Development Research Institute: The Netherlands, June 1972), (SOAS.CA2/D/9.5)
56 L. J. Ashman, A.C.A., ‘The management of Christian Aid: a critical review’ (MSc thesis: City 
University, September 1972), (SOAS.CA2/D/13.6)
57 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
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‘there is general agreement that CA’s own shift of emphasis from “relief” to 
“development” is not widely understood in the constituency and that in this 
respect a major educational task remains to be done.,58
The issuing of a Policy Statement in 1974, ‘Christian Aid and World Development’,
went some way to meeting this need. Building upon the 1968 constitution, this firmly
stated that:
‘while CA is primarily called to confront man with the need of his neighbour, 
and to find channels for effective action, it also has a direct responsibility and 
willingness to share with others in a nationwide understanding and response to 
that need ... A spokesman for the weak and poor is needed. Here, the Christian 
community as a whole, along with others like-minded, must be prepared to 
raise its voice and express its convictions based on the best information at its 
disposal.’59
The issue of how much weight to give education and public information as opposed to 
overseas aid proved harder to deal with. By the mid-1970s this problem had reached a 
peak. Involvement in famines in Ethiopia and the Sahel had led to the recognition that it 
was not just war that created tragedies. They were as much created by the national and 
international neglect of peoples who remained marginal to the political and economic 
interests of those levering power. This posed the question of whether CA’s aims, to 
help communities in poorer countries find their own solutions to the problems of 
economic survival and betterment, be better achieved by solely concentrating on 
educating the British constituency about the unjust world economic structures. CA’s aid 
department was divided over this issue.60 The Committee ultimately adopted a 
compromise position, advising that, ‘education is not an alternative to an aid 
programme, but an integral part of it’61 and that an educational programme is best 
financed as a by-product of a money-raising effort with a much larger aim: ‘our 
educational effectiveness depends, both in principle and for its financing, on our being 
seen to be practically effective in assisting the poorer world.’62
The debate about CA’s partnerships, highlighted by the David Smithers affair, 
was another key focus of the report. As mentioned above, the contours of this problem
58 ibid.
59 CA and World Development: policy statement (November 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/22.9)
60 David Smithers files. CAO.DIR.47-52
61 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
62 ibid.
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lay in CA’s origins and in the division between its role as a development agency and as 
a member of a wider ecumenical movement. At the heart of the criticism and debate of 
the mid-1970s lay the question, highlighted by a former Director of CA, the Rev’d Alan 
Booth of,
‘whether we remain an agency within the complex ecumenical family suffering 
all the limitations and frustrations attendant on belonging to that family and not 
simply doing our own thing in our own way. Alternatively, should we be a 
more professional distinctly British church agency making many of the 
decisions ourselves about how we spend our money and being, therefore, 
liberated from many of the frustrations which arise when you have to adopt the 
role of servant to your Christian colleagues in other parts of the world?’63
As an agency of the churches and a member of the ecumenical family, CA had a
historical obligation to work with its ecumenical partners. As the Rev’d Alan Booth
himself recognised, CA was ‘fundamentally an expression of the life of the churches,
as they try to fulfill their calling to serve humanity. Moreover, it is an expression of the
desire of the churches to work together in unity, both at home and as part of the
universal church throughout the world.,64 In the words of the Advisory Committee,
‘national councils of churches, initially designed to promote church co-operation over a
wide field, were the natural original counterpart bodies with which CA, as a department
of the British Council of Churches, could relate.,6S The important qualifying point lay
in a comment by the same committee that, ‘it is right for CA first to seek local partners
within the churches ... it has not, however, in the past confined itself to such channels
where they were inadequate to the job in hand.’66 Indeed, it pointed to the dangers of
expecting too much from councils of churches, ‘to burden a national council of
churches with responsibility for a large development programme attracting substantial
foreign finance could result in a major distortion of the programme and structure of the
national council of churches itself, and for its own sake other channels may be
preferable.’67 The report concluded that where:
‘there is no realistic prospect that ecumenical or other church channels will be 
adequate to the job needing to be done ... we recommend ... that the Board of
63 Rev’d Alan Booth, letter to Kenneth Greet (27 January 1975), (CAO.DIR.47)
64 ibid.
65 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
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CA should support bolder initiatives to find adequate partners and, if necessary, 
to draw them from a group considerably wider than the local Christian 
community.’68
And recommended:
‘CA should strongly encourage efforts in the developing world directed to 
increasing the professional competence of the local churches in selecting, 
evaluating and supervising projects.’69
In effect, the division between CA’s inter-church aid function and its function as a 
development agency was to be resolved by bolder initiatives in finding alternative 
partners and continued support to help turn churches and councils of churches into 
better development agencies. The basic contradiction was not resolved.
The Advisory Committee also focused on CA’s relationship with states. In the 
mid-1970s this relationship had assumed new importance as CA became internally 
divided over the issue of how ‘political’ the organisation should be. Within CA’s aid 
administration, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy o f the Oppressed 70(published in Britain in 
1972) had had an enormous and divisive impact.71 The concept of ‘conscientisation’ 
developed by Freire held that development could occur only through the growth of a 
public consciousness about the shortcomings of one’s own society and political 
system. The task for northern agencies was therefore to ‘empower’ people to undertake 
their own development. The project approach was discredited and a new approach 
which concentrated on advocacy work, development education and political lobbying 
developed. The concept of ‘conscientisation’ was greeted with enthusiasm by the more 
radical minds in CA. However many senior staff and trustees regarded it with 
misgiving. Essentially, divisions occurred between those supporting traditional fund­
raising and project work and those who felt that CA’s mandate would be better 
achieved by supporting education and promoting the sort of enlightenment and 
‘conscientisation’ among the poorer communities overseas which would lead them 
towards effective political action for their own advance.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Penguin: Harmondswordi, 1972)
71 Correspondence and memos between aid administration staff. CAO.DIR.47-52
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Divisions among CA staff on this issue had moreover been carried into CA’s
constituency, with lively correspondence in the letter column of Christian Aid News.
CA’s condemnation of the Nicaraguan contras and their American backers, support of
victims of a repressive military dictatorship in Chile and of liberation movements in
Mozambique were seen by some supporters as indicative of a left-wing stance. The
response of CA’s Africa regional desk, hiding its own internal divisions, was that,
‘CA has a simple and logical position with regard to assisting work in areas 
under the control of liberation groups or for that matter dictatorial and 
oppressive governments. CA is concerned primarily and solely with assistance 
to people - the poor, deprived and oppressed ... Our responsibilities are on the 
one hand to the poor and deprived, but on the other hand to our own donors 
who trust CA to channel assistance to the most needy areas of the world. With 
other voluntary agencies CA is in the unique position of not having to bow to 
the wishes of governments or pressure groups - we do not have to work within 
the limits imposed on inter-governmental agencies like the United Nations.’72
The Advisory Committee was more circumspect about CA’s relations with states and
advised that while:
‘timidity within the law is as much to be avoided as the deliberate financing of 
subversion ... The general rule should be that CA is ready to assist poorer 
communities in ways which are clearly likely to increase the pressures for a 
juster society, but denies its own competence to intervene in the local political 
debate by word or money.,73
The question about where ‘pressure’ ended and ‘political debate’ began remained
unanswered.
The David Smithers affair and the Aid Advisory Committee suggest that the 
mid-1970s were characterised by internal debate and argument within CA about what 
different people at different levels of the organisation felt CA’s role was and should be. 
To a degree, internal dynamics reflected broader debates within the aid community. The 
1970s were a time of ‘alternatives’ in the theory and practice of development.74 Old
72 Celia Williams, memo to Rev’d Alan Booth (23 September 1974), (SOAS.CA2/D/15.8)
73 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
74 For the new line in development and economic thought in the 1970s see Michael Lipton, Why Poor 
People Stay Poor: a study of urban bias in world development (Temple Smith: London, 1977); Gunnar 
Myrdal, ‘Underdevelopment and the evolutionary imperative’ Third World Quarterly, 1 (April 1979), 
pp. 24-42; Hollis B. Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth: policies to improve income 
distribution in developing countries in the context of economic growth (Oxford University Press: 
London, 1974); Hans Singer, ‘Dualism revisited: a new approach to the problems of the dual society in 
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theories and methodologies of reducing rural poverty were seen not to be working and 
new ideas about ‘growth with equity’, ‘basic needs’, ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘people-centred development’ emerged. It was how to relate theoretical 
prescriptions to practice, as much as the more basic pressures of institutional growth, 
that lay at the heart of CA’s internal conflicts. Operational mechanisms of the past had 
been adequate for the limited role of the past. Bolder initiatives, clearer strategy and 
modem management were needed for the development alternatives of the 1970s. As a 
result, 1974-75 were pivotal years in which CA’s strategies regarding fund-raising, 
education, partners and relations with states were questioned. Ultimately, the reforms 
advocated and subsequently implemented by the Committee left unresolved a number of 
fundamental contradictions and internal divisions within CA.
2 .3  The search for professionalism: clarifying objectives and 
strategy
In the mid-1980s the international community turned to NGOs as the 
most effective channel for meeting the new criteria of reaching the poor.75 The high 
profile enjoyed by NGOs in the relief of famine in Ethiopia in 1984-5 - as much as 80% 
of the relief assistance provided between 1984-1991 in the government-held areas and 
those areas controlled by the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation movements was 
channeled through NGOs76 - crystallized their favourable reputation. Observers spoke 
of the 1980s as the ‘decade of NGOs.,77 This section looks at the relevance of such 
optimism for CA and at how CA positioned itself within the world of relief and 
development.
Certainly, the increase in official funding during the 1980s marked an important 
episode in CA’s evolving capabilities. Mechanisms for the official sponsorship of the 
voluntary sector in Britain had emerged in the mid-1970s. This was partly in response 
to new philosophies of ‘development alternatives’ pushing NGOs into the arena as the
75 Borton, ‘Recent trends in the international relief system’, pp. 187-201; Michael Bratton, ‘The 
politics of govemment-NGO relations in Africa’ World Development, 17 (1989), pp. 569-87; Korten, 
‘Third generation NGO strategies’, pp. 145-59
76 Borton, ‘Recent trends in the international relief system’, pp. 203-204
77 Hellinger, ‘NGOs and the large aid donors ’, pp. 135-144
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most suitable agents for their implementation. In 1974, a Disaster Unit (now the 
Emergency Aid Department) was set up within the Ministry of Overseas Development 
to work with the leading charities, those on the Disasters Emergency Committee, and to 
use them as a channel for cash and material assistance. The Joint Funding Scheme 
followed in 1975. This allowed for the co-funding of ‘new’ ‘developmental’ projects 
which would be submitted by the British charities and in which the Overseas 
Development Administration would meet up to 50% of the cost. It was greeted with 
caution by CA and on the proviso that CA would not ‘allow ourselves to come to be 
regarded as quasi-official organisations or as an instrument of British foreign policy.’78 
By the end of 1977, a variant of the Scheme was introduced by which CA was allowed 
to receive a guaranteed block grant. Projects were still submitted for approval, but 
alternative submissions could be made in the place of any which were not approved at 
the first attempt. In 1976, the European Community introduced procedures for the joint 
financing of projects and for the allocation of emergency assistance and food aid. The 
most significant increase in official sponsorship occurred in the mid-1980s, largely in 
response to the enhanced profile of NGOs generally during the Ethiopian famine. 
Between 1984 and 1989, official funding for CA increased four-fold and CA set up an 
office to deal specifically with government support for its programmes:
Table 1.1 Christian Aid: Income from Official Sources (£) 1982-89
1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
589,119 862,889 2,176,700 3,242,351 2,797,186 5,583,000 8,090,849
Source: CA financial statements and reports (1951-84), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
From the beginning CA and other major charities introduced self-res training 
ordinances, placing an upper limit on the income accepted from official sources. In 
1978 the ceiling stood at 10% CA’s total income; in 1984 this was revised upwards to
78 Vernon Littlewood, memo to Rev’d Alan Booth (23 January 1975), (SOAS.CA2/D/22.3)
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15% total income, exclusive of emergency relief; and in 1988 a 20% ceiling was 
applied to non-emergency income and the over-all ceiling revised to 30%.79
Yet the confidence and capability signaled by increasing official funding of CA 
hid fundamental weaknesses within the organisation. While CA had survived the crisis 
of the mid-1970s and had responded with important reforms, these reforms had failed 
to resolve key internal contradictions and conflicts. The David Smithers affair itself did 
not disappear but evolved into a long-running legal dispute well into the 1980s. This 
proved a huge burden to both the staff and the Board of CA and a major distraction in 
terms of primary tasks.80 In addition, CA continued to face key institutional 
weaknesses, as identified by a former Director.81 Firstly, there was a lack of direct and 
relevant development experience within the organisation. Many of the Board members’ 
experience of the Third World was out-dated while the development experience of the 
senior staff was insufficient. Secondly, there was a conflict between the radicals and 
the conservatives, between those who felt it was necessary for CA to position itself on 
the side of radical change and those who favoured a more cautious approach. The 
tension reflected the debates centered in CA’s aid department in the 1970s over support 
for liberation movements and empowerment. The real tension, in the 1980s as in the 
1970s, was between those who were most comfortable with a disaster-response type of 
approach and those who were ready to tangle with the ambiguities, messiness, 
uncertainties and confusions of a genuine commitment to development. Even among the 
latter, there was great uncertainty about how CA could and should get involved. 
Thirdly, there was a clear cleavage between the regional staff - those most in touch with 
the local churches and the donor base - and the office staff and particularly the aid 
department. Individual aid officers tended to decide how development grants would be 
dispersed, leaving little room for developing a more pro-active and strategic approach 
and little opportunity for educating and mobilising the donor base.
79 June Wyer, ODA income for Africa/Middle East committee, (CA: London, August 1992)
80 CA.7, Charles Elliott (former Director of CA), (private communication with author, 25 July 1997)
81 ibid.
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From the mid-1980s, with more resources at its disposal and a recognition that
the persistence of poverty and scale of emergencies (notably in Sudan and Ethiopia in
the mid-1980s) continued to challenge the agency’s capabilities, the need to clarify
goals and strategy became a critical concern of CA’s senior staff. Some felt that CA did
not have a sufficiently clear idea of what the organisation was trying to achieve, and
that its objectives were too vague.82 An external observer judged CA in 1984 to have
been ‘almost wholly without clear goals or future strategy.,83 The challenges of the
1980s required a new strategic voice. Consequently, in 1984, a management
consultant, Charles Handy, was called in. The problem identified by Charles Handy
was that as a voluntary organisation, CA suffered from the assumption that ‘when
people of one mind and one faith are gathered together the organization of them will be
necessarily harmonious, trouble-free and efficient.’84 The problems facing CA were
due to the ‘business of combining a lot of individual wills and talents into one
organization.’85 The result was a confusion of roles and purposes. The solution was to
place a premium on communication, on bringing the voices together and on
modernising management.
On 1st April 1986, modem management in the form of a Matrix management
system was introduced. The aim was:
‘(a) to spread responsibility and decision-making more widely throughout the 
organisation where appropriate knowledge and experience is readily available, 
rather than concentrate too much decision-making round the Director and 
Associate Director, and (b) to foster a better inter-relation between the varied 
aspects of CA’s work (project funding and education for example) by forming 
inter-disciplinary teams.
Building on the reforms of 1975, the matrix system aimed to establish a more dynamic
and strategic framework for decision-making and a more coherent linking of
82 Max Peberdy, ‘What’s Wrong with the Focus?’ (27 October 1985), (CAO.DIR.208)
83 Cited in Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World, p. 99
84 Charles Handy, ‘Decision-making in Christian Aid’ (June 1984), (CAO.DIR.193)
85 ibid.
86 Michael Taylor, ‘An explanatory note on the matrix’ (February 1987), (CAO.DIR.187)
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activities.87 Individual’s roles and jobs were to be defined and lines of authority
delineated: ‘charitable organizations often prefer to leave roles unclear because they
think it gives more scope to the individual. It is a mistake because it only causes
confusion.’88 Concerns were again expressed about the need to tie CA’s educational
and operational work together more closely at all levels in the organisation. The newly
structured Africa/Middle East Group was challenged to:
‘to ensure that in decision making regarding future relationships and continued 
support the point of view of all CA partners in the Region is as well understood 
as possible, and that the views of the ecumenical family and CA’s supporters 
are considered in making such decisions. ’89
To address such a challenge, a number of tools were introduced. Country 
Briefing Papers were developed to share information with a wider range of people and 
to push project work into a more strategic framework. These papers were drawn up in 
consultation with partner organisations abroad. A typical policy paper offered some 
political, social and economic analysis; a strategic plan indicating where special 
attention should be given to certain parts of the country, certain groups and certain 
issues (for example, sustainable agriculture or gender); and a survey of the players in 
the field and their present and potential contributions. Once the policy was agreed, 
grants to particular partners and projects would be considered in the light of it.
Another device was to prioritise policy, both at an organisational level and at the 
level of CA’s relationships with individual countries and partners. In 1982 geographical 
prioritisation was attempted, using such criteria as poverty, population figures, church 
partners, historical links and strategic, educational and political importance. The 
exercise proved difficult to carry out as staff and partners alike did not want to see CA 
withdraw from certain areas. It did however result in a categorisation of countries, with
87 The old departments (Aid, Finance, Communications, Education) were replaced by 5 Sectors and 4 
Groups. The Groups were responsible for the whole of CA’s work overseas and at home (fund-raising, 
funding, education, information and communication, finance) in relation to four regions: Asia/Pacific, 
Africa/Middle East, Latin America/Caribbean, UK/Ireland. The Sectors related to areas of special 
competence or discipline: Aid, Fundraising, Education, Communication, Finance. Members from each 
of the Sectors were attached to each Group.
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Ethiopia designated a priority area.90 An attempt to formulate priority policy areas was 
made: food and agriculture, with special attention to small-holder agriculture and food 
aid; health, especially Aids and primary health care; training, considered a priority by 
CA’s partners; debt; conflict and development; and women.91 Project guidelines in 
various sectors were elaborated. These set out questions to be asked of any project in 
order to evaluate how it tied in with current prioritisation or policy.
Changing styles of funding were institutionalised. The block grant funding of 
total programmes of the late 1970s were developed into country programmes and 
consortia involvement, and round table structures set up which brought North and 
South, agencies, mission boards and national councils of churches face-to-face to 
discuss programmes and decide how they should be funded. The aim was to create a 
strategic and flexible aid policy and to permit more integrated development 
programmes. Through the development of round tables moreover, the historic problem 
about CA’s accountability to the holistic needs of its southern ecumenical partners was 
finally resolved. Round tables brought together, around one table, representatives of 
the southern churches and councils of churches, the World Council of Churches and 
the northern funding agencies, both missionary societies and development agencies. 
The holistic framework was generated by the southern partners as they set out their total 
programme, including evangelism, Christian education, relief and development. The 
funding agencies could then support different aspects of the programme according to 
their various mandates.
However such devices were essentially technical. What they failed to address 
was a more fundamental task: ‘to clarify and articulate what CA believes about aid and 
development.,92 In many ways, the emphasis on restructuring obscured the more 
significant and long-term problem for CA about how to find and articulate a voice. The 
problem lay, according to one staff member, in a ‘wooliness about much of our
90 In 1983 priorities areas were Namibia, South Africa, Lebanon, Zaire, the Sahel, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Egypt and the Palestinians. Africa/Middle East group, ‘Priorities: countries and issues’ (16 December 
1986), (CAO.AF/ME.326)
91 Jenny Borden, inter-office memo (13 January 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.578)
92 Michael Taylor, ‘Programme for 86 - 87’ (17 December 1985), (CAO.DIR.208)
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thinking’ and ‘a lack of clarity in strategy, i.e. in our thinking about goals and
means.’93 The implication was that CA lacked intellectual clarity, and that ‘the concepts
we’ve taken from the secular disciplines have been haphazardly inserted into our
thinking.’94 What was required was a body of knowledge, understanding and theory
which could guide CA’s actions:
‘I am not suggesting that we should aim to become a one-message organisation, 
or that there should be a CA creed that all staff must accept, but we do need 
some channel, some forum, by which we can share ideas and develop a more 
rigorous understanding of the issues. Because we don’t have a common pool of 
experience, our messages become the idiosyncratic views of whoever happens 
to have been given responsibility for their production.’95
The debate of the 1980s about intellectual clarity and institutional strategy
reflected a broader concern about power. Power had been repeatedly recognised as a
key issue in ecumenical documents from the 1960s. In the 1980s, it gained a new
momentum in CA. In part this was because of CA’s growing experience of working in
deeply polarised societies, such as Sudan and Ethiopia, and in part because of the
continued awareness of the structural causes of poverty. To some staff, establishing a
clearer idea of who and what CA was, involved deciding just how radical it dared to be
as an organisation; how far it should go in its commitment to a just society.96 While the
devices implemented by the matrix system were relevant to the issue of power in that
they aimed to share decisions about the use of resources and bring the interested parties
around one table, they failed to address CA’s broader role within the relief and
development community. What was needed, in the words of CA’s Director, was ‘a
rigorous theology of power’97 to enable CA to challenge the existing order.
2 . 4  1987: the year o f commitments
In 1987 CA’s Board adopted a Statement of Commitment, ‘To 
Strengthen the Poor’. This represented a corporate manifesto, supplementing CA’s
93 Max Peberdy, ‘What’s Wrong with the Focus?’ (27 October 1985), (CAO.DIR.208)
94 ibid.
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 Michael Taylor, ‘Programme for 86 - 87’ (17 December 1985), (CAO.DIR.208)
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mandate, as laid out in its constitution. The statement spelled out the charity’s sense of
purpose, for the benefit of its own officers and supporters and for its overseas
partners.98 It was an important marker in CA’s evolution, representing the culmination
of the debates of the 1970s and 1980s and an attempt to clarify CA’s message.
The statement advocated a strategy for justice and a commitment to ‘strengthen
the poor.’ In the words of CA’s then Director, it reflected the belief that ‘the most
effective and respectful way to bring about lasting improvement in the quality of life of
the powerless is to put (back) into their own hands the means to help themselves.’99
Such a strategy for justice was taken forward in key policy areas. Firstly, in the more
campaigning style of CA’s work in the late 1980s. CA ran its own direct campaigns on
such complex issues as debt, aid and trade and how they interacted with conditions of
poverty overseas. The 1987 statement advocated that:
‘education must increase understanding of poverty and what can be done to 
remove it; but it must go further and increase understanding of the need for a 
strategy to strengthen the poor so that more and more are in a position to 
support it.’100
To do this, CA attempted to build on the interrelationship between particular issues
overseas and particular constituencies within this country - programmes centered
around land reform overseas were to be targeted at work with rural constituencies in the
UK. Secondly, in a re-examination of notions of partnership and development strategy:
‘This strategy for justice is not ours. We must pursue it in partnership with the 
poor and all who stand by them. We commit ourselves to partnerships of 
mutual sharing and accountability. ’101
Development was to be bottom-up and priority was placed on participation, shared
decision-making, capacity-building, the development of exchanges and networks and
accountability. Finally, the 1987 commitment provided a clear statement about power
and the relationship between non-states and states. It recognised that overseas partners
98 Previous such statements included ‘CA and World Development’ (1974); & ‘The Task of CA’ 
(1981)
99 Michael Taylor, ‘Programme 1986/87’ (Africa/Middle East forum meeting, 22 May 1986), 
(CAO.AF/ME.326)
100 CA, To Strengthen the Poor: a statement of commitment adopted by the Board o/CA, (CA: 
London, July 1987)
101 ibid.
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did not operate in political vacuums and that the tendency for northern agencies to cast
them as ‘neutral’ failed to address the political, and sometimes military, reality; the role
of the partners; and the institutional dilemmas facing them. Experiences during the high
profile Ethiopian famine, in the mid-1980s, when relief became overtly politicized
focused attention on this, although experiences in Biafra in the 1960s and Central
America in the 1970s had already made it an issue. A commitment to:
‘act strategically to strengthen the arm of the poor until they can stand up to 
those who so often act against them, and have the power to determine their own 
development under God,’102
clearly recognised the need to seek political solutions to humanitarian injustices.
While the implications of the statement were clear, whether CA would be able to
achieve the new agenda was not so clear. A commitment to a bolder campaigning style
continued to confront opposition among CA staff who believed that the organisation
should not engage in controversial, political, or conflictive situations, and continued to
come up against the rules of charity law as interpreted by the charity commissioners.103
A commitment to pursue equal partnerships and a bottom-up development strategy was
riddled with ambiguities and contradictions as recognised by CA’s then Overseas Aid
Director:
‘in the extent to which our partners are powerful in their own rights and cannot 
be said to be the poor and powerless; and in the extent to which CA exercises its 
own power which if used in a dominating way would not be true to the 
conviction.’104
Difficulties arose on an operational level:
‘we are perpetually being pulled to spend more and more funds in less poor 
countries where there is infrastructure, educated committed middle class 
activists within and outside the churches working with the poor and bringing 
CA in touch with them ... I am conscious that it is very easy for us to find good 
partners and programmes and allocate a lot of funds in such areas, and much 
more difficult to be involved in the poorest areas.’105
And on a strategic level, there was real concern within CA about the ‘conflict between
what CA in the conviction sees as a priority and what many of our partners see as their
102 ibid.
103 Jenny Borden, memo to Michael Taylor (9 April 1988), (CAO.DIR.208)
104 Jenny Borden, memo to Michael Taylor (28 May 1986), (CAO.AF/ME.326)
105 Jenny Borden, memo to Michael Taylor (13 December 1985), (CAO.DIR.191)
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priorities.’106 This raised the question of how far CA should exercise power in looking 
for new partners for whom the 1987 commitment would seem to be a priority. Despite 
the language of ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’, the power relations that underlay 
the development process and their manifestation in top-down ‘project’ approaches thus 
remained decisive.107 Finally, CA’s commitment to solidarity with the poor was 
problematic. While its actions in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, explored in chapters 4 and 
5, were characterised by a remarkable degree of solidarity, at the same time, they 
exposed the continuing structural limitations imposed on such a mandate.
While emerging from CA’s own specific history and debates, the 1987 
commitment, to a large extent, reflected the preoccupations of secular development 
theory in the 1980s in which development agencies were recast as facilitators and 
catalysts, rather than as implementers and providers and in which the ‘project-by­
project on its merits’ approach was again rejected and a broader ‘process’ approach - an 
approach that continued to prove so elusive in practice - advocated. The implication was 
that CA, in clarifying its message, continued to follow the development fashions and 
lexicon of the secular world. The question of ‘how radical we [CA] dare to be, and 
how many casualties we are prepared to have on the prophetic road’108, remained 
unanswered.
3.  Christian Aid in the 1990s
In the run-up to CA’s 50th Birthday in September 1995, policy and priorities 
were again re-examined. While an anniversary provided a suitable occasion for 
reflection, the need for such reflection lay more with renewed debates within CA about 
its role and capabilities. As in 1975 and 1984, so again in 1994, CA restructured. As in 
the decades earlier, so in the 1990s, such restructuring obscured a more fundamental 
and less tangible malaise, that of finding a clear voice. This section explores the key 
issues and evolving capabilities of CA in the 1990s.
106 Jenny Borden, memo to Michael Taylor (28 May 1986), (CAO.AF/ME.326)
107 See chapter 6 below
108 Max Peberdy, ‘What’s Wrong with the Focus?’ (27 October 1985), (CAO.DIR.208)
59
In 1994, the matrix management system was replaced and staff organised into
smaller, more flexible inter-disciplinary teams. Again, a large part of the restructuring
was aimed at tying communication work more closely to CA’s operational work109; and
at delegating decision-making closer to where the greater information lay.110
Prioritisation, at an organisational and programme level, was pursued. Arguments
against geographical concentration continued to be strong: the arbitrary nature of the
GNP yardstick and the pockets of real poverty which it could conceal; the categories of
need, deprivation and suffering other than the purely economic; Britain’s historical
responsibilities etc. Programme prioritisation was equally rife with difficulties, coming
up against issues of accountability: how far was it right for CA to identify sectoral
priorities for a region, if these were not the priorities coming to them from their natural
partners?; was there justification for seeking new partners for whom these were 
fpriorities^; was there justification in abandoning or reducing support for long standing 
partners with different priorities? Inevitably priorities set in the London office did not 
automatically line up with funding requests from partners. Concerns about the use and 
abuse of power in setting the agenda and choosing the partnerships continued to be 
expressed.111
A central concern of the restructuring in the 1990s, as in the 1970s and 1980s, 
was communication and the prioritisation of CA’s information and education system. 
To this end, regional overseas teams were given responsibilities not just for aid 
allocation but through the communications officer, for fund-raising, education and 
information work. Further, the communications officer was expected to visit the field at 
least once a year thereby enabling the project-work of the team to be backed up by the 
relevant story-gathering necessary for publicity and fund-raising. Whether the 
contradiction between CA’s analysis of the problem and the motivation for concrete
109 For example, funding proposals and commitments for the following year of each team were included 
in annual Country Programme Papers, giving a clear indication of the strategy to be pursued in the year 
ahead.
110The responsibility for aid allocation had originally rested with the board of CA, in the mid-1970s, 
it was delegated to the relevant regional committees and in the 1990s to the relevant team.
111 CA.3, Polly Mathewson; CA.3, Ruth Segal; FFHC.7, Beverley Jones; ERD.7, Jenny Borden
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action which it suggested to the general public was reconciled through this managerial
arrangement remained open to interpretation. While the increased premium placed on
communication helped reduce tension within the teams, it was clear that tension still
existed at a broader institutional level between the overseas regional teams and the
media team which had responsibility for general communication: ‘what is going to be
attractive to the public isn’t necessarily the priorities of the project.’112This impacted in
two ways. Firstly, it led to a ‘gap between what people think we do or want us to do,
and what in fact we are doing.’113 Secondly, it led to the recognition that public
relations was important. CA’s ‘Development Project Guidelines’, were used to find out
how useful a project was going to be for education and media work. While it is clearly
incorrect to imply that project selection was governed by public relations, there
remained an interaction between the two. Difficulties continued to arise as criteria for
media work did not necessarily correlate with criteria for good development work.
The ability of CA, and other British agencies, to pursue development education
and advocacy at home in the 1990s continued to be determined by UK charity law. This
was especially so in a climate of increasing competition for funds, when charity law
had more leverage - charitable status brought with it tax concessions worth up to 30%
of an agency’s income, and allowed an agency to tap into charitable giving by the
British public. Charities in Britain were differentiated from non-charitable bodies by the
charity commissioners’ ‘guidelines’ on political activity. The 1994 revised guidelines
by the charity commission on ‘political activities and campaigning by charities’ stated:
‘By the very nature of their knowledge and social concern ... some charities are 
well placed to play a part in public debate on important issues of the day and to 
make an important contribution to the development of public policy ... It would 
be wrong to think that this cannot and should not happen ... where charities 
wish to raise issues in a way which will inform public debate and influence 
decisions of public bodies, great care must be taken to ensure that the issues 
concerned are relevant to their purposes and that the means by which they raise 
them are within their powers and appropriate to a non-political organisation’114
The problem of defining ‘purposes’ and ‘appropriate means’ was rife with difficulties.
112 CA.3, Polly Mathewson
113 ibid.
114 Cited in Oxfam, The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief (Oxfam: Oxford, 1995), p. 390
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Definitions had evolved on a case-law approach, ‘on the grounds that it allows 
flexibility as new needs arise or old ones become obsolete or are satisfied.’115 The 
effect had been that charitable agencies were at the mercy of the charity commissioners’ 
interpretation of what constituted ‘appropriate’ political activity. Although the 
commission has not been over-eager to remove charitable status, the financial 
implications of such a move were well understood by agencies and the possibility of 
deregistration served as a considerable implicit discouragement to testing the 
boundaries.
As early as 1964, the Freedom From Hunger Campaign discussed above and 
supported by CA came under the active investigation of the commissioners who argued 
that calls for more international concern for the problem of world hunger were taking 
charities away from charitable concerns and into the realm of politics. This broadened 
into a debate about whether humanitarian aid for development as opposed to relief was 
‘charitable’ or ‘political’. In their 1963 report, the commissioners accepted, in the 
development charities favour, that it was indeed ‘charitable.’116 In the 1970s, the 
commitment of some overseas charities to increase education and advocacy brought 
further investigations. In 1970 CA and Oxfam were forced to retreat from the ‘Action 
for World Development’ initiative and in 1981 from direct funding of the New 
Internationalist. Attempts to promote changes in the law (or the maintenance of an 
existing law) of any government were deemed political purposes by the commissioners, 
and hence not charitable. Moreover, to seek a particular line of political administration 
or policy was also deemed to be a political purpose, and in strict terms not charitable. In 
1978 CA was advised not to make undesignated grants to the World Council of 
Churches following a publication of a report by the Council’s Commission on the 
Churches Participation in Development which admitted that it financed political action. 
The Commission had been set up in 1970, in order to find a way around what some
115 Chris Dolan, ‘British development NGOs and advocacy in the 1990s’ in Michael Edwards & David 
Hulme (eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs and development in a changing world (Eaithscan in 
association with SCF (UK): London, 1992), p. 207
116 Black, A Cause for Our Times, p. 90
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had felt to be the rather conservative and ecclesiastically-oriented agencies of national 
councils of churches, and to establish counterpart organisations overseas more radically 
involved in new forms of community development. Essentially charities like CA had to 
refer all advocacy to humanitarian motivations. This denial of the politics of poverty 
and of development, of the fact that, ‘so much of the deprivation which we are 
mandated to m eet... (was) politically caused and politically perpetuated,’117 seriously 
limited CA’s ability to educate the public about the real situation.
For many staff in the 1990s, CA’s ecumenical partnerships and inter-church 
function continued to be a dilemma, reflecting a solidarity that had little to do with 
solidarity with the poor. Yet at the same time it was recognised that the church’s 
grassroots networks were extremely valuable in reaching the rural poor. As a staff 
member argued, ‘the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is in a position to reach large numbers 
of the population and have structures already in place to do so.’118 In this respect, it 
was felt that, ‘it is our responsibility to help them become a good development agency 
because they are in a position to do good work if they actually had the institutional 
capacity and the resources.’119 This echoed the conclusion of the Aid Advisory 
Committee in 1974:
‘where the indigenous Christian community is itself already seriously involved, 
or trying to become so, in general development programmes beyond its own 
religious boundaries, it can be an invaluable partner with CA’s operations 
because it speaks genuinely for the poorer and needier communities.’120
For as long as CA’s ecumenical partners ‘wanted’ to help the poor, then it was felt
within CA that the agency had an obligation to support them in doing so.121 It could be
argued that behind this conditionality lay a consistency that had enabled CA to build
lasting commitments to its partners and had enabled those partners to conduct their
negotiations on a more equal basis. As Paul Spray, Head of the Aid Sector in 1989
said, ‘Oxfam can walk away from its partners. CA cannot.’122 CA’s interventions
117 CA, ‘Year Report’ (April 1982-March 1983), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
118 CA.3, Ruth Segal
119 ibid.
120 Aid Advisory Committee, ‘Report’ (27 June 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
121 ERD.7, Jenny Borden
122 Cited in Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World, p. 63
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tended to portray a degree of consistency. In an environment where the power of the 
media and the necessities of strategic prioritisation were sometimes seen to, ‘take one 
into Africa and Central America and then appear to be crisis-driven and media-led’123, 
such consistency was especially valuable.
By the 1990s a structural shift in CA’s major sources of income had occurred.
In 1990, official sources supplied an amount equivalent to just under one half of CA’s 
overseas expenditure and one third of CA’s total income.124 Roughly equal amounts 
came from the Overseas Development Administration and the European Community. In 
the same year, the ceiling on income received from official sources - 30% CA’s total 
income - had been reached, largely on account of food aid grants to Eritrea and Tigray 
and redefined, remaining at 30% but exclusive of food aid grants. In 1973/4, about 
52% of CA’s total income came from Christian Aid Week. In 1993/4, 22% total income 
came from Christian Aid Week. In 1975/6, the first year when they were applicable, 
government grants totaled £10,000, equivalent to less than 0.25% total income. 
Government grants, in 1993/4, totaled £18,205,000, equivalent to about 43% total 
income.125 In the 1990s, government funding to CA went predominantly to the 
Africa/Middle East regions, driven by emergency funding and demands for food aid in 
these crisis regions. From the late 1980s, the Africa/Middle East region accounted for 
78%-100% emergency funding from the Disaster Unit and 100% of food aid from the 
Overseas Development Administration’s European Community Food Aid 
Department.126
Clearly, there were problems with official funding: the implications of sudden 
withdrawal, political independence, distortion of criteria or priorities, and partners’ 
attitudes. Frequent discussion about such possibilities have occurred within CA. The 
importance of cultivating plural sources of support and of maintaining fungibility of 
expenditure allocations funded from non-official sources was recognised. As a result,
123 ERD.7, Jenny Borden
124 Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World, p. 209
125 CA financial statements and reports (1951-84), (SOAS.CA/J/1); Year Ending 30 September 1974 
(SOAS.CA/J/1); CA, Report Back 1993-1994: working for change, (CA: London, 1994)
126 June Wyer, ODA Income for Africa!Middle East committee
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CA in the 1990s continued to seek funds from other agencies, such a Comic Relief and 
was involved in a whole range of styles of funding from individual projects on a 
bilateral basis to multilateral block grant funding of major programmes and 
organisations. Ultimately, the claim by CA not to have surrendered control of its own 
agenda or to have experienced undue interference in its choice of projects, programmes 
and operating procedures is probably sound. Jenny Borden, CA’s Overseas Director, 
argued that CA had a strong and clearly articulated role and that it was not vulnerable to 
adopting the development agenda of its funders, ‘we take official funding when we 
want to and refuse it when we don’t.’ Moreover, ‘by receiving funds from official 
sources, it gives CA greater access to dialoguing about issues.’127 Indeed, relative to 
other European countries, UK government funding to NGOs in the period 1988-91 
was comparatively undeveloped and represents a very small proportion of the total aid 
budget: 4.3% in 1988/89, 4.1% in 1989/9, and 5.2% in 1990/91.128 As June Wyer, 
leader of CA’s co-financing team, remarked, ‘concern at CA is not so much about 
exceeding ceilings as about declining levels of official income.’129
By the 1990s, CA found itself increasingly operating in situations characterised 
by a decline in state power. Such situations added a new dimension to debates about the 
relationship between aid agencies and states. As Jenny Borden warned, ‘the new jargon 
is very much about civil society but states are better than no states.’130 Certainly the 
perceived decline in the power, or indeed very existence, of the state in the post-Cold 
War era had been identified by many aid practitioners as crucial to prospects for 
sustainable development. With reference to CA’s mandate, Jenny Borden explained that 
‘an important development is that in some countries - for instance, Eritrea - CA is 
supporting good governments.’131 In this respect it is recognised that voluntary action 
should not replace governmental action but should complement it. Clearly what was 
crucial and what created difficulties continued to be the conditionality of ‘good’. Where
127 ERD.7, Jenny Borden
128 June Wyer, ODA Income for Africa/Middle East committee
129 CA.4, June Wyer
130 ERD.7, Jenny Borden
131 ibid.
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the reality was of an increase in state power, often to the detriment of vulnerable and
oppressed groups, the task remained one of accountability to people and not to states.
Certainly, the role of CA in the world of relief and development was veiy
different in the 1990s to the 1960s: ‘NGOs [in the 1990s] need to see their role more in
scaling-up and in being involved in the broader picture than just in individual
projects.’132 While this ‘reduces the level of personal satisfaction that can be obtained
by the staff through a small scale project, the important thing is the overall programme
and not necessarily the success/failure of an individual project.’133 This conception of
CA’s role in the 1990s ties in with Korten’s conception of 3rd generation NGOs134
which, concerned with issues of sustainability and breadth of impact, become less
directly involved at village or project level and increasingly involved in processes
facilitating development by other organizations:
‘while a second generation strategy is directed to building capacities in 
individual communities to meet needs through self-reliant action, third 
generation strategy will concentrate on reorienting supportive systems and 
policies so that they strengthen the capacity of many communities to address 
identified needs.’
By the 1990s, it was no longer acceptable, in development theory, for NGOs to 
work exclusively at the local level.136 Capability was defined in terms of securing 
linkages between the ‘micro’ level and broader development policies whether by 
disseminating understanding about development; or by influencing changes in donor 
policies and action. As in previous decades, CA was challenged to define its position 
and articulate its voice within the broader development environment. In the 1990s, 
increasingly operating at a macro level, this meant defining its attitude to aid in general, 
clarifying where it stood in development economics, and articulating what it meant by 
poverty and human rights.137 The indication was that while CA in the 1990s appeared
132 ibid.
133 ibid.
L34Korten, ‘Third generation NGO strategies’, pp. 145-59
135 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Voluntary Aid for Development: the role 
of nongovernmental organizations (OECD: Paris, 1988)
136For analysis of shifting development theory see Korten, ‘Third generation NGO strategies’, pp. 145- 
159; and Charles Elliott, ‘Some aspects of relations between the North and South in the NGO sector’ 
World Development, 15 Supplement (1987), pp. 57-68
137 FFHC.7, Beverley Jones
6 6
ready to become a more strategic and prophetic organisation, it had still not got to the 
stage of knowing what it should be prophetic about. It had not clarified its message.
4 . A Process of Adaptation Reconsidered
The analysis above has focused on five key themes in CA’s history: 
development strategy; fund-raising; education; partners; and relations with 
governments. It has shown how CA, in the context of a changing operational 
environment, defined its role and capabilities in relation to these themes. A fundamental 
part of such a process has been the need to negotiate with key structural and ideological 
contradictions which in turn have exposed different voices within CA. It has been only 
by analysing CA as a complex social institution, rather than as a structure that simply 
and rationally expresses a set of objective interests, that a real understanding of its 
history has been reached.
Four main contradictions have been identified. Firstly, the conflicting 
perceptions within CA of the organisation’s development strategy. In the 1960s CA 
became a multi-functional charity - it was committed to disaster relief, refugees 
development programmes, development education in Britain, policy research and 
advocacy, and the lobbying of Western governments and multinational corporations. 
Problems of prioritization and strategy have inevitably occurred. The response in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s was to restructure. Typically this focused on improving 
communication flows: to increase the ability to tap into expertise and experience where 
it was greatest; to identify priorities so as to increase impact; and to define objectives so 
as to allocate aid strategically. Organizational reforms and modern management did not 
however remedy the more fundamental structural problem, that of what different people 
at different levels have perceived CA’s role to be: should CA’s expressed concern be 
limited to the level of its active concern?; should CA focus on specific groups of poor 
or should it address the ‘world’s poor’?; should CA reflect the majority opinion of its 
constituency or should it allow its project policy to develop faster than that majority 
opinion?; should CA stimulate a larger discussion? etc. Further complication arose from
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the division of CA’s domestic and overseas constituency between those who saw its 
primary function as a development agency and those who saw it as part of a wider 
ecumenical movement. Throughout its history, CA has had difficulties clarifying its 
voice. To do so would have exposed fundamental structural and ideological 
contradictions.
The second major contradiction faced by CA lay in its wish to present a more 
positive image of developing countries’ population’s own efforts and how this might 
effect the outcome of its own fund-raising appeals. There remained a structural 
contradiction between CA’s financial survival, dependent as it was on the public’s 
support for identifiable projects, on tangible ‘relief’ and its broader and more long-term 
objective of addressing the real causes of poverty and educating the public about the 
real purpose of charitable giving.
Thirdly, the structural and ideological contradictions surrounding notions of 
partnership and accountability. Over the decades, CA’s partnerships shifted 
fundamentally, from primarily indirect funding relationships through the World Council 
of Churches in the 1960s to more direct ‘partnerships’ in the 1980s. Essentially, this 
was in response to problems of creating strategic and efficient channels for aid 
allocation. Yet as Charles Elliott, a former Director of CA, remarked: ‘quite frankly, 
good overseas partners are as scarce as gold dust.’138 Good ‘partnerships’ are equally 
problematic and the area of discourse associated with partnerships and with any 
commitment to ‘strengthen the poor’ and to ‘justice’ is riddled with ambiguities and 
begged questions, about the nature of community, the nature of participation and the 
nature of styles of authority within partnerships. While the ‘new orthodoxy’ of the late 
1980s called for a fundamental shift from the northern to the southern NGO as the 
leader of the development process, it is not clear whether partnerships became any more 
real or remained dialogues of unequals. CA’s Director in 1990, Michael Taylor argued
138 Charles Elliott, in Minutes of Evidence to Foreign Affairs Committee (1987), p. 106 cited in 
Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World, p. 106
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that development workers, like evangelists, are ‘still far too arrogant. We still believe 
we know what is good for people.’139
Finally, the politics of state-NGO relations were riddled with contradictions. 
Throughout CA’s history the principle of humanitarian neutrality, the idea that CA 
operated ‘above politics’, had formally defined CA’s relations with states at home and 
overseas. Yet within this lay a fundamental contradiction, that ‘so much of the 
deprivation which we are mandated to m eet... [is] politically caused and politically 
perpetuated.’140 No aid activity could ever be neutral unless its effect was zero as all aid 
projects were likely in one way or another to have affected such factors as the 
distribution of income, the balance of power, social mobility and economic 
opportunities in the recipient community or nation. Mandated to assist the poor and 
deprived, and operating in situations where ‘neutral’ humanitarian ground was often 
conspicuous by its absence, CA’s definition of its role clearly evolved. Arguably, as a 
non-operational NGO, CA was possibly able to pursue a more flexible policy and 
higher profile in the field of international lobbying than other charities; illegal solidarity 
and active campaigning did not threaten its field operations in the way it would other 
NGOs - CA is non-operational, its’ funded programs project an essentially indigenous 
profile and are not clearly identifiable as ‘CA’, ‘Oxfam is Oxfam wherever it is’141 Yet 
while CA did not propagate a superficial or undifferentiated view of neutrality, of its 
decision-making criteria or of the actual effect of its aid programmes, a structural 
tension remained between the claims to neutral humanitarianism and the reality of 
political involvement. Conflicts with the charity commissioners and with CA’s own 
domestic constituency were reflective of this deeper structural problem that went to the 
heart of CA’s role in developmental and humanitarian interventions.
This chapter has provided a historical understanding of CA and its capabilities 
over 50 years. While CA’s role has clearly evolved, the analysis has shown how
139 CA News (CA: London, July/September 1990)
140 CA, ‘Year Report’ (April 1982-March 1983), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
141 Paul Renshaw, ‘Ethiopia, CA and the media: considerations for the formulation of a policy’ (25 
March 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.318)
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institutional and ideological structures have continued to impact on that role. In 
particular, CA has struggled to clarify its message. The focus now turns to Ethiopia and 
an analysis of CA’s message and role within a specific policy environment.
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Chapter 2
CHRISTIAN AID, FAMINE, RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT: A 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Chapter 1 argued that, throughout its history, CA had difficulty finding a voice. 
Part of the problem lay in specific structural contradictions within CA. The other part 
lay in CA having to respond to a changing theoretical environment. This chapter looks 
at the relevance of theories of famine, relief and development to CA’s experience. It 
explores the paradigm shifts in relief and development policy over the past 30 years and 
their implication for how agencies, like CA, positioned themselves.
One issue that emerges is that different theories of famine, relief and 
development can lead to the dominance of particular kinds of institutional practice and 
the prioritisation of particular kinds of knowledge at the expense of other modes of 
understanding and action. For Foucault, the discursive construction of a subject as an 
object of knowledge and the institutional practices that emerged in relation to this 
knowledge was a key concern. As a result discourse was seen to produce real power 
effects. This chapter uses Foucault as a tool of analysis in order to explore changing 
patterns of power in relief and development.
In its organisational growth, CA moved away from crisis intervention, in 
natural and man-made disasters, to longer-term development work, in the belief that 
political and environmental stability could best be achieved through sustainable 
development. Yet, despite its wish to be involved in sustainable development, CA 
continually found itself predominantly tied up with famine and disaster relief - Biafra 
1967, the Sahel and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, Ethiopia and Sudan in the mid-1980s, 
Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. Much of the policy debate within the 
organisation has been about how to move from famine and relief to sustainable 
development. As a prelude to an analysis of CA’s performance in Ethiopia, this chapter 
looks at the three components of this continuum in turn, exploring how theory has 
impinged on CA. My concern is not with a critique of theory but with an understanding 
of how and why agencies, like CA, have positioned themselves as they have.
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1 . Conceptions of Famine: understanding its nature and causes
Famine has been an important policy issue for CA and a major concern in 
Ethiopia. As we shall see in chapters 3 ,4 , and 5, CA experienced various problems 
operating in such a policy environment. To a large extent such problems derived from 
the organisation’s perception of famine and change in Africa. The chapters will show 
how CA was weak on theory and definition and how this, in the 1971-75 Ethiopian 
famine particularly, affected its capabilities. This section argues that sound definition 
and theorisation of famine are crucial not because of semantics but because the 
discursive construction of the idea of a ‘famine disaster’ has important functions and 
power effects, providing the criteria and timing on which relief resources are released or 
withheld and determining the nature of the relief required, be it food aid, medicine, 
political or military intervention. It explores the evolution of famine theory and its 
relevance to CA’s actions in Ethiopia.
Famines have been routinely depicted in analyses over the past 30 years as 
temporary ‘disasters’; their primary cause being inadequate food supply, whether 
arising from bad weather, inappropriate agricultural practices, or population growth; 
and their essential nature being mass starvation. Such ‘supply-side’ explanations of 
famine have been labeled ‘food availability decline’ or FAD theories and have been 
frequently applied to African famines.1 Yet FAD theories have several major 
weaknesses. In the first place they discuss only supply factors, but shortages can occur 
for either supply or demand reasons as when real purchasing power declines due to an 
increase in food prices or a fall in individual incomes, either of which can produce 
famine in a situation of unchanged or even rising aggregate food availability. Second, 
even in the case of famines which are characterized by reductions in per capita food 
availability, FAD theories ‘says little about who is dying, where they are dying and 
why.’2 It ignores, ‘the distributional effects of food supply shocks, which translate into
1 See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famine: an essay on entitlement and deprivation (Clarendon: Oxford, 
1981)
2 R. Bush, ‘Briefings: “drought and famines’” Review of African Political Economy, 33 (August 1985),
p. 61
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starvation for the poor but allow the wealthy to survive (and even prosper).’3 Thirdly 
FAD theories explain only a production disruption and are unable to explain why a local 
food deficit is not offset by inflows of food from surplus regions elsewhere, through 
the agency of traders, governments or relief organisations. Essentially FAD 
explanations fail to go into the relationship of people to food.4 They say nothing about 
poverty or inequality and allow for no differentiation of vulnerability. Finally, supply- 
side theories of famine typically concentrate on the precipitating factors or triggers of 
famine - droughts, floods - but say little about the processes that set people up for 
natural disasters:
‘to consider famines simply as natural disasters manifests a fatalistic tendency to 
place the whole responsibility upon nature when in fact society itself, by the 
manner in which it exercises control over natural resources and access to food 
supplies, is a prime contributor.’5
Drought, on its own, fails to explain why particular groups of people become
vulnerable to famine.6 Most importantly, emphasizing drought as the prime causal
determinant portrays famine as ‘nobody’s fault’ and obscures political responsibility for
timely intervention:
‘what begs for explanation is the period between the time when drought is 
recognised and the commencement of the period of starvation. It is this period 
of waiting passively that allows the process of famine to develop to its full 
capacity of destruction.’7
It was Amartya Sen’s seminal work in 1981, Poverty and Famines, which 
offered the first comprehensive departure from conventional food supply theories, 
challenging the view that decline in food availability was either a necessary or a 
sufficient cause of famine.8 The most important feature of Sen’s approach was that it 
directed attention away from supply-side explanations of food crises, towards an
3 Stephen Devereux, Theories of Famine (Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead, 1993), p. 26
4 Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 154
5 UNRISD, Famine risk and famine prevention in the modem world’ (UNRISD: Geneva, June 1976), 
p. 1 cited in Devereux, Theories of Famine, p. 40
6 See Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability to Famine in Ethiopia, 1958-77 (Intermediate 
Technology Publications: London, 1986), pp. 121-143; Africa Watch, Evil Days: 30 years of war and 
famine in Ethiopia (Human Rights Watch: New York, 1991), pp. 133-134
7 Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability, pp. 127-9
8 Sen readily conceded that food availability decline could contribute to famine, and that it did in the 
Sahelian famine of 1969-73. His point was to show that there was no necessary connection between 
the two. Sen, Poverty and Famines
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analysis which treated such crises as symptoms of demand failure:
‘Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. It 
is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. While the latter 
can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many possible causes.’9
Sen argued that the roots of famine lay in reduced individual ‘entitlements’ to food
which rendered rural populations impoverished and vulnerable to climatic shocks which
would otherwise have caused no undue distress. Sen’s work on entitlements linked
famine to poverty: ‘the food problem is not concerned just with the availability of food
but with the disposition of food.’10 Essentially he drew a distinction between aggregate
availability or supply of food, and an individual’s access to or ownership of food. The
entitlement approach also explained why food could actually be exported from areas
where people were starving:
‘frequently food does move out of famine areas when the loss of entitlement is 
more powerful than the decline - if any - of food supply, and such food- 
counter-movement has been observed in famines as diverse as the Irish famines 
of the 1840s, the Ethiopian famine in Wollo of 1973 and the Bangladesh famine 
of 1974.’11
However, while Sen’s analysis represented a critical step forward in the study of causal 
factors, it shared important characteristics with the one he was rejecting and the idea of 
‘famine’ itself implicit in his works still ran along conventional lines. As Keen 
observed:
‘... in his [Sen’s] analysis, there were victims of famine, but few immediate 
culprits or beneficiaries. Indeed, “market forces” had in some sense taken over 
from previous non-human actors (God, the weather) as the principal author of 
famine: the lives of men and women were still depicted as being at the mercy of 
Supply and Demand. Famine was still a “disaster”; in Sen’s conception, it was 
now an “economic disaster”.’12
Such limitations were also evident in Sen’s second account of famine promoted
alongside his analysis of ‘entitlements’. This account put liberal civil and political rights
at the center of famine prevention:
‘The diverse political freedoms that are available in a democratic state, including 
regular elections, free newspapers and freedom of speech, must be seen as the 
real force behind the elimination of famines. Here again, it appears that one set
9 ibid., p. 1
10 Amartya Sen, ‘The food problem: theory and policy’ Third World Quarterly, 4 (July 1982), p. 459
11 ibid., p. 456
12 Keen, The Benefits o f Famine, p. 5
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of freedoms - to criticize, publish and vote - are usually linked with other types 
of freedoms, such as the freedom to escape starvation and famine mortality.’13
The hypothesised association between civil and political liberties and protection from
famine was persuasively and most notably supported by examples from India.14
However while the account argued that particular types of state (lacking democratic
forms of government or a free press) were likely to be particularly neglectful of famine
relief, the possibility that states and politically powerful groups would actively promote
famine and actively obstruct relief for rational purposes of their own was not addressed.
Famine was still construed as an event - in this instance a failure of public policy - and
not a process. In effect, the issue of the creation of famine was ignored.
An alternative perspective to that of Sen was provided by Amrita Rangasami
who challenged Sen’s analysis on two grounds. Firstly Rangasami suggested that: ‘the
famine process cannot be defined with reference to the victims of famine alone. It is a
process in which benefits accrue to one section of the community while losses flow to
the other.’15 Secondly, Rangasami challenged Sen’s notion that famine necessarily
involved mortality, stressing that famine may, but need not culminate in mortality.
Drawing from local understandings of famine, Rangasami argued that famine was a
‘politico-socio-economic process’ and that ‘mortality can be retarded or halted, due to
state intervention or other reasons.’ 16 A similar critique came from Alex de Waal. His
work in Darfur, Sudan, highlighted the fact that famine was a crisis of the entire
livelihood of people and not just an individual biological crisis. In this respect, famine
and mortality were distinct, there were ‘famines’ and ‘famines that kill’: ‘when people
are dying, manifestly because of the hardship and disorder associated with a famine, it
13 Amartya Sen, ‘Individual Freedom as a social commitment’ New York Review of Books, (14 June 
1990)
14 The establishment of Famine Codes in India in the late nineteenth century has been seen as crucial to 
India’s success in fighting famine. However De Waal has argued that the links between respect for civil 
and political rights and protection from famine are far more complex, and the fact that mass famine has 
largely been eradicated in India is explained not simply by the advent of democracy, but also by the fact 
that the legitimacy of post-independence governments has depended explicitly on preventing famine; 
other social evils, not being a threat to political legitimacy, have remained. De Waal, ‘ Social contract’, 
pp. 194-205
15 Rangasami, ‘ “Failure of exchange entitlements’” p. 1748
16 ibid., p. 1748
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is a “famine that kills”.’17 Moreover, as De Waal went on to argue, most famine 
mortality was not directly related to undemutrition but was caused by outbreaks of 
disease.18 The crisis was one of health, typically caused by social disorder, and not one 
of lowered food consumption.
The definitions of famine provided by such scholars as De Waal and Rangasami 
recognised that famines had social and political dimensions, distinct from their 
nutritional manifestation. This broader concept of the famine process was developed 
further by David Keen in The Benefits o f Famine}9 Keen argued that as an extended 
economic and political process, famine needed a new political-economy theorisation to 
take account of functions as well as causes. He added a political dimension to previous 
economic analyses of food insecurity, vulnerability and famine. In analysing the causes 
of famine among the Dinka of Sudan’s Bahr el Ghazal region, Keen argued that, rather 
than poverty, it was their ‘natural wealth’ in livestock that made the Dinka vulnerable to 
raiding from northern Baggara tribes.20 The vulnerability of the Dinka arose from their 
political powerlessness - they had been excluded since the mid-1970s from participation 
in government - not from their poverty. This indicated that the implicit assumption of 
entitlement theory that it was the poor who become malnourished and died in famines 
needed to be treated with caution.21
From the mid-1980s, with the resurgence of conflict-famines in Africa (in 
particular, Ethiopia and Sudan), theories of famine increasingly reflected a political- 
economy approach and an analysis of power.22 And if famine represented an extended 
economic and political process in which benefits accrued to one section of the 
community while loses flowed to the other, some scholars felt that it was possible in
17 De Waal, Famine that Kills, p. 76
18 Alex de Waal, ‘A re-assessment of entitlement theory in the light of the recent famines in Africa’ 
Development and Change, 21 (1990), p. 481
19 Keen, The Benefits of Famine
20 ibid., p. 92
21 Work on famine in Somalia in the 1990s, has shown that the groups most affected by the famine 
were those that owned die most productive agricultural land. Alex de Waal, ‘War and famine in Africa’ 
IDS Bulletin, 24 (October 1993), pp. 38-40
22 See Keen, The Benefits o f Famine-, Duffield, ‘NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in die Horn’, 
pp. 131-157; P. V. Cuder, ‘The development of die 1983-5 famine in northern Ethiopia’ (PhD diesis: 
London University, 1988)
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certain circumstances that ‘the groups benefiting from famine are likely to have an
interest in preventing effective relief.’23 Peter Cutler argued that policy choices about
famine control were dictated almost exclusively by political considerations and that
while well-informed individuals might have been able to identify famine risk, they
might not always have been able to persuade key decision-makers within aid institutions
to act to prevent famine.24 Or as Keen observed:
‘when famine occurs, we may hear a great deal about “ market failure” and 
“policy failure”. But who exactly is failing (and who succeeding) when markets 
behave in particular ways, or when the expressed policy of relieving famine 
does not work out in practice?’25
Even as policy-makers ‘failed’ to achieve stated goals (famine prevention), it was
possible that they might be achieving other, unstated goals (settlement of pastoralists,
undermining political opponents etc.). Duffield wrote:
‘the conventional approach [to famine] neglects the question of power and 
whether famine can be the result of its conscious exercise in pursuit of gain or 
advantage. ... From a political perspective, not only is it unnecessary for famine 
to be natural or the result of market failure, it need not even be temporary if its 
continuation is advantageous to the powerful.’26
The above analysis implies that different kinds of knowledge about famine have 
existed, typically reflecting the differing perceptions of the ‘outsider’ and the ‘insider’, 
the Western academic or humanitarian and the people who actually suffered. 
Conventional ‘outsider’ definitions of famine, adopting a Malthusian logic27, tended to 
stress food shortage, severe hunger and excess mortality. In contrast, recent research 
has suggested that famine victims in Africa and Asia saw famine more as a problem of
23 Keen, The Benefits o f Famine, p. 7
24 Peter Cutler, ‘Responses to famine: why they are allowed to happen’ in John Osgood Field (ed.), The 
Challenge of Famine: recent experience, lessons learned (Kumarian Press: West Hartford, Connecticut, 
1993), p. 74
25 Keen, The Benefits of Famine, pp. 11-12
26 Duffield, ‘NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn’, p. 143
27 Thomas Malthus’ theory of demographic dynamics was perhaps the first coherent theory of famine 
causation to be advanced. Malthus’s theory was based upon a simple arithmetic principle; that 
population increases geometrically while food production can only increase by arithmetic progression.
If voluntary restraint in reproduction fails, he argued that population would inevitably outstrip the 
quantity of food available in a region or country. At that point ‘gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the 
rear, and with one mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world.’ Thus famine was 
identified as an absolute shortfall in the supply of food in a given area and, simultaneously, as the death 
by star vation of a substantial proportion of the inhabitants. Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the 
Principle of Population (Macmillans: London, 1798)
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destitution, not just starvation and as a continuation of normal processes, not a unique 
event.28 As we shall see in chapter 3, CA’s experience of famine in Ethiopia in the mid- 
1970s related directly to such debates. At that time, CA adopted a conventional supply- 
side explanation of famine. Lacking an analysis of processes of impoverishment and 
vulnerability, CA took too long to recognise that the famine was about politics: there 
was no noticeable food availability decline for Ethiopia as a whole in the worst famine 
year of 1973 but local shortages linked to the erosion of rural production systems of 
certain groups; local food deficits were not offset by inflows of food from surplus 
regions elsewhere, either through the agency of traders, governments or relief 
organisations; the Ethiopian government hid the famine until it had developed to its full 
capacity of destruction; and the vulnerability of the Afar pastoralists and Ogaden 
herdsmen, the worst-hit victims of the famine, arose from their political powerlessness 
and not from their poverty.29 In contrast, in the 1983-85 famine, events gave rise to a 
different approach by CA and a political-economy analysis of the crisis. This will be 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. And yet, as can be clearly seen in the development 
discourse, discussed in chapter 6, that emerged from the 1983-5 crisis, robust 
theorisation of famine remained notably absent.
2 . Disaster Relief: the difficulties and effects of responding to 
crisis30
CA experienced various operational problems in responding to famine in 
Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s. As will be shown in chapters 3, 4 and 5, these 
included: the ability to define the relief problem and to move beyond government 
definitions of when and where relief distributions were acceptable and possible; the 
ability to monitor the delivery of relief or to ensure it reached the intended beneficiaries; 
the ability to address the underlying causes of famine; and the ability as a fund-raising
28 De Waal, Famine that Kills, p. 141
29 See chapter 3 below
30 The following focuses on the management of famine episodes. This is not intended to imply any 
exceptionality from other disasters - earthquakes, floods and typhoons - but simply reflects the concern 
of this study and the relevance of famine to CA’s experiences in Ethiopia.
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NGO to combine a neutral charitable image with a commitment to the principles of 
justice, human rights, conflict resolution and advocacy implicit in a social justice 
mandate. This section looks at the difficulties of responding to crisis and how CA’s 
experience relates to theories of disaster relief. One issue that emerges is how the 
dominance of a particular discourse on famine determines the prioritisation of certain 
kinds of institutional practices and how in the process, a number of local power effects 
are produced. The construction of a particular knowledge enables famine to be detached 
from its historically specific and locally based economic and political processes. This 
detachment means that famine can be established as a subject of scientific knowledge, 
the content of which need not necessarily refer to these processes in order to be 
understood. Nor do the institutional practices applied to famine need necessarily relate 
to these processes in order to establish their legitimacy. As one analyst observed, 
‘historically specific and locally based processes of famine can be “bracketed out”, 
without fundamentally compromising the validity of a relief operation, whose 
humanitarian goals remain intact.’31 Using a Foucaultian analysis, this section explores 
how and why this happens and its implication for agencies like CA.
2.1 The theoretical setting
Despite the shifts in famine theorisation highlighted above, the idea of 
famine as an event has remained predominant in the ‘official discourse’ of the aid 
community. Typically, it was the fact of famine’s occurrence, and particularly its 
biological manifestations, to which institutional attention was overwhelming directed. 
Consequently, despite the wide diversity of situations in which famines have occurred, 
relief interventions have tended to exhibit a remarkable uniformity of approach, in terms 
of the timing and orientation of the response. The result, in the words of one observer, 
has been ‘a curious, one might say almost pathological discontinuity between an intense 
emotional commitment to a particularly dramatic symptom and a continuing neglect of
31 Hendrie, ‘Knowledge and power’, p. 63
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the chronic disease of which the symptom is part.’32 This discontinuity has three main 
characteristics.
Firstly, the tendency among major donors to equate famine with mass mortality. 
This has had important implications for the timing of relief. As Keen argued in his 
description of the relief operation in south-western Sudan, ‘a focus on famine as 
starvation helped legitimise late interventions and confines relief to a stage when loss of 
assets has already progressed very far’.33 If famine was identified as mass mortality, 
the focus inevitably became one of responding to a measurable emergency once it had 
been allowed to happen, rather than preventing it. Secondly, an overriding concern with 
nutritional status. This has had important implications for targeting relief as nutritional 
status is typically used as the main criteria for intervention: anthropometric status of 
individual children is used as admission criteria for supplementary and therapeutic 
feeding programmes; and population surveys of child anthropometric status, in 
combination with other indicators, are often used to target food aid at geographical areas 
or population groups.34 Yet targeting interventions at the malnourished assumed that 
malnutrition was a good indicator of mortality risk. Case studies have suggested that 
there was no simple relationship between undemutrition and mortality and that 
starvation might not always be the problem.35 De Waal has developed an account of 
famine whereby mortality was linked to social disruption and the breakdown of 
people’s coping strategies.36 It was this disruption, characterised by migration and 
ultimately over-crowding in relief camps that created a health crisis and hence mortality 
- research in drought affected areas of Wollo, Shewa and Sidamo in Ethiopia in 1985 
found that there was ‘a higher prevalence of communicable diseases among famine
32 Charles Elliott, C om fortab le  C om passion? Poverty, P ow er and  the C hurch  (Hodder and Stoughton: 
London, 1987), p. 10
33 Keen, The B en e fits  o f  F am ine, p. 236
34 Susanne Jaspars & Helen Young, ‘Malnutrition and poverty in the early stages of famine: North 
Darfur, 1988-90’ D isa s te rs , 19 (1995), p. 198
35 In Darfur, 1984-85, ‘star vation was not the problem: it was a greater incidence of familial* diseases 
such as diarrhea, measles, and malaria’. De Waal, ‘A re-assessment of entitlement theory’, p. 481
36 ibid., pp. 483-488
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victims in shelters than in normal population.’37 Thus nutritional deficit was not 
necessarily a good criteria for targeting38, and by giving legitimacy to the creation of 
emergency relief camps - and intensifying exposure to disease in a degraded public 
health environment - might actually have a negative impact. De Waal’s social disruption 
analysis in which it was the process whereby coping strategies are undermined that lead 
to famine, suggested an alternative model for targeting intervention in the earlier social 
stages of famine rather than simply at its physical symptoms.39 Thirdly, a tendency 
among major donor’s to see mass migration as an indicator of famine. Again this has 
had implications for the timing of relief as such migration occurred at the terminal phase 
of famine, representing the final stages of social breakdown, the point of surrender in 
the attempt to maintain a household unit.40 It was also the stage at which large numbers, 
particularly women and children, flood into the degraded disease environment of relief 
camps, and die (see above). By focusing on this final phase, the need for interventions 
earlier are eschewed and the whole dimension of famine as a collective experience 
which poses a threat not only to lives, but more importantly to livelihoods is ignored.
The donor’s tendency to focus on the physical state of the population - nutrition, 
migration - has meant that the specificity of the context of famine and the means by 
which it progresses, have received far less attention. In this respect the social and 
political dimensions of famine have been ignored. At the operational level the impact 
has been crucial. Firstly, the apolitical model of relief typically employed by major 
donors and NGOs has failed to acknowledge the problem of defining the relief problem 
and monitoring its implementation. Keen has argued that:
‘those who wish to prevent famine need to face up to the major problems
involved in targeting needy groups who lack political muscle within their own
37 Adugna Getahun, ‘Aspects of health and famine’ in A. Penrose (ed.) B eyond  the  F am ine: an  
exa m ina tion  o f  the  issues b eh in d  fa m in e  in  E th iop ia  (International Institute for Relief and Development 
and Food for the Hungry International: Geneva, 1988), p. 152
38 The problems with nutritional surveillance and targeting have been analysed by De Waal who has 
argued that ‘nutritional deficit’ can take precedence over excess deaths as a criterion of famine: ‘for 
instance, during 1974 in the Ethiopian Ogaden, investigators found high levels of excess child 
mortality but near-normal levels of nutrition, and decided that there was currently no famine.’ De Waal, 
F a m in e  th a t K ills , p. 31
39 See De Waal, ‘A re-assessment of entitlement theory’, pp. 483-488
40 Dessalegn Rahmato, F am ine  a n d  Surviva l S tra teg ies  (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: 
Uppsala, 1991), pp. 156-161
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societies. More often than not, it is the political weakness of victim groups that 
has exposed them to famine the first place.’41
A government of a country threatened by famine may respond to that threat with
different degrees of enthusiasm, depending upon the political and strategic importance
of the population at risk. As Cutler argued, remoter rural people have rarely constituted
a threat to the established order, so they have been of little direct interest. As a result, in
Ethiopia, ‘the Ethiopian state has traditionally ignored rural famine and has done so
with impunity’ 42 As will be shown in chapter 4, this proved an important issue in CA’s
ability to respond to the 1971-75 Ethiopian famine effectively. Examples of biases in
food distribution have also been found. During the 1983-85 famine in Ethiopia, reports
of fieldworkers and journalists indicated that food aid was allocated by the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission in ways that supported the political objectives of
government.43 Again, CA came up against this difficulty and found it necessary to make
policy choices accordingly, effectively channeling aid through alternative routes.44
Secondly, conventional discourses on famine and relief have failed to address
the underlying causes of famine and may, in certain circumstances, have supported
processes of famine. They have failed to take account of the political and economic
processes creating famine45; of the possibility that a variety of relatively powerful
groups might have an interest in promoting and sustaining processes of famine; and
consequently of the importance of ‘who’ relief interventions have supported. Donors’
tendency to focus on famine the ‘event’ has played all to easily into the hands of local
groups manipulating famine for their own purposes. In this context, interventions may
not only have failed to address the problem but may actually have become part of the
problem. Keen’s exposition of the process of famine creation and maintenance in south­
41 Keen, The B en e fits  o f  F am ine, p. 232
42 Cutler, ‘Responses to famine’ in Field (ed.), The C ha llenge o f  F am ine, p. 75
43 J. W. Clay and B. K. Holcomb, P olitics  and  the E th iop ian  F am ine: 1 9 84 -1985  (Cultural Survival: 
Cambridge, MA, 1985) cited in Cutler, ‘Responses to famine’, p. 77
44 See chapters 5 and 6 below
45 Keen, The B enefits  o f  Famine-, & Duffield, ‘NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn’, pp. 
131-157
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western Sudan explained how conflict was sustained by efforts to control and co-opt
efforts to relieve the famine.46 His warning was clear:
‘if donors do not address themselves to the underlying processes creating 
famine and to the local power structures that shape famine and famine relief, 
their interventions may actually reinforce these power structures, deepen 
inequalities, and exacerbate famine.’47
This issue was particularly relevant to CA’s experience of famine in Ethiopia the 1970s
and 1980s. In both instances famine was caused and maintained by political and
economic processes implemented by the Ethiopian government. The different policy
that CA pursued in the 1980s, compared to the 1970s - about ‘who’ to support -
reflected changes in the organisation’s theoretical framework and will be dealt with in
chapter 3 and chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
Thirdly, conventional discourse on famine has ignored the politics of relief and
implied a neutrality marred by reality. Chapters 4 and 5 below, show that in the choices
made by CA, during the 1983-85 famine in Ethiopia, to work alongside the Tigrayan
and Eritrean liberation movements, CA provided relief, foreign exchange and legitimacy
to combatants. The apolitical model of relief implicit in conventional discourse
presented humanitarianism as a neutral endeavour. As a result a genuine commitment to
resolve the situation, complete with all its ambiguities, politics and confusions has been
eschewed. In the process, NGOs, like CA, as shown in chapters 4 and 5, have been
left to operate subject to an uncertain and problematic set of rules, and have been
restricted by the need to present a neutral, charitable, fund-raising profile in a situation
demanding an involved, political and advocacy role.
The above analysis implies that as long as famine is simply identified with
starving to death, the idea that famine relief needs to be anything more than neutral,
technical, non-participatory and externally managed has been hard to credit. Appropriate
questions in this perspective have concerned ‘needs’ and ‘numbers’; disaster relief is
discussed predominantly in narrow terms of resource deficits; and humanitarianism is
46 David Keen, ‘The functions of famine in Southwestern Sudan: implications for relief’ in Joanna 
Macrae & Anthony Zwi (eds.), W ar a n d  H unger: reth inking in ternational responses to com p lex  
em ergencies  (Zed Books in association with SCF (UK): London, 1994), pp. 111-124
47 Keen, The B en e fits  o f  F am ine , p. 235
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cast as apolitical. It should however be clear from the above discussion that such a 
model is flawed both empirically and strategically. It has been shown how the evolving 
debates about disaster relief, its nature and effects, were relevant to CA’s experience in 
Ethiopia. Certainly by the 1980s, CA’s intervention differed significantly from that of 
1970s, when, as shown in chapter 3, the focus was on the biological crisis and policy 
orientated towards targeting relief camps. By the 1983-85 famine, CA’s intervention, 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was characterised by a political-economy discourse and 
targeted at supporting local processes of survival. Most significantly, CA’s changing 
response to famine in the 1970s and 1980s, relate to the notions of power in disaster 
relief theorisation and reflect the changing theoretical framework. In the 1971-75 
famine, as discussed in chapter 3, CA adopted a conventional relief approach which 
tended to reinforce the power structures that underlay the famine. In 1983-85, 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, CA adopted a radically different approach characterised 
by solidarity and a political commitment to address the underlying causes of the crisis.
2 .2  The institu tional setting
In both the 1971-75 and 1983-85 famines in Ethiopia, despite CA’s evolving 
position, patterns of empowerment and CA’s ability to pursue a social justice mandate 
continued to be affected by various structural difficulties that determined how discourse 
was constructed and presented to its supporters. This section looks at the institutional 
setting for theories of disaster relief.
There are four main influences that determine the construction of discourse and 
institutional behaviour of NGOs, like CA and contribute to their difficulties in 
responding to relief. Firstly, the institutional imperative of producing concrete and 
visible results. In this respect, at an individual agency level, a focus on famine as a 
nutritional emergency corresponds to that agency’s operational capabilities. The disaster 
is ‘do-able’ and the intervention is targeted at improving the physical state of the 
affected population through the application of a range of universal technologies: 
identifying vulnerable groups; getting food aid to those in greatest need; monitoring 
nutritional status. Conversely, the local knowledge of the famine based on its social,
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rather than physical manifestations presents a complexity that is less programmable. 
Conflict-famines in particular present enormous operational problems, both 
ideologically, in terms of accountability and involvement and structurally, in terms of 
access and safety. Discourses on famine reflect agencies’ concerns, those in turn reflect 
what is perceived as ‘do-able’. It should therefore come as no surprise that the logic of 
much conventional relief activity has derived from a ‘natural disaster’ theorising that 
pays little attention to social or political factors and has been characterised by the 
delivery of basic survival commodities and services. Agencies are good at provisioning 
supplies, they are less good at mediating within complex political processes.
Secondly, and on a much broader level, the institutional context for disaster 
relief has impacted on the way famine is perceived and responses are constructed. Since 
the early 1980s, the international relief system has undergone a process of rapid and 
fundamental change. A significant development has been the dramatically enhanced role 
played by NGOs, like CA, within the system. Increased support from private sources 
has been an important contributory factor to this trend, but of much greater significance 
has been the increased use of NGOs, as described in chapter 1, as channels for the 
provision of relief assistance by donor agencies.48 The principal reasons for this shift in 
donor funding away from states and towards NGOs included: the poor economic 
performance of many developing countries, particularly in Africa, during the 1980s 
which weakened the capacity of state structures to act as a channel for donor aid; the 
comparative flexibility and speed of response shown by NGOs and their greater 
accountability to the donors which increased their attractiveness as an alternative 
channel; the political instability and numerous conflicts in areas of Africa and Asia 
during the 1980s which constrained the ‘channeling’ options available to donor 
agencies (political instability reduces the efficiency of government agencies and conflict 
introduces the risk of diversion of assistance from their intended beneficiaries by the 
combatants); the respect for national sovereignty, central to the United Nations Charter 
and the constitutions of the principal United Nations specialised agencies and
48 Borton, ‘Recent trends in the international relief system’, pp. 187-201
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programmes involved in humanitarian assistance, which limited their ability to provide 
assistance in areas of political instability and conflict where sovereignty was disputed 
and large areas were beyond the effective control of government agencies and which 
catapulted NGOs into the limelight as agencies free to ignore national borders and to act 
independently of host governments (constitutionally if not pragmatically).49 Thus until 
10 years ago, NGOs worked within a confined ‘humanitarian space’ defined by 
governments in their own self-interest - not a truly apolitical space but conveniently 
described as one; and NGOs had relatively small budgets, for all major programmes 
were handled by governments - in the UK, it was only in 1975 that NGOs first started 
receiving government funding; only in 1985 that they started receiving significant 
amounts of food for distribution.50 Since the 1980s, the post-Cold War ‘new world 
disorder’ has generated a new operating environment: NGOs are playing an enhanced 
role in the international relief system; and increasingly this role is characterised by 
intervention in situations of political instability and conflict.51
An important part of this enhanced role has been the emergence of what Korten 
describes as ‘public-service contracting’ arrangements.52 These have typically involved 
a major bilateral or multilateral donor paying Northern NGOs to implement a 
predetermined package of assistance. The concept has been particularly well developed 
in conflict situations where Northern NGOs have been seen as neutral channels for 
humanitarian assistance without political allegiance, able to implement operations 
which, under international law, multilateral and bilateral agencies might not wish to 
support directly. From the mid-1980s, donor governments became increasingly 
involved in such subcontracting relations, typically in support of cross-border relief 
operations. By the beginning of the 1990s, the United Nations also accepted the
49 Many Northern NGOs also feared alienating national governments and risking expulsion in order to 
protect their long-term development and relief interests. While not subject to the same constitutional 
constraints as the UN and its related agencies, many NGOs still had to consider the risk of expulsion.
50 Alex de Waal, ‘NGOs as institutions’ in Royal Anthropological Institute, In te rn a tio n a l N G O s an d  
C om plex  P o litica l E m ergencies: p ersp ec tiv es  fr o m  an th ropo logy  (RAI: London, 1995), p. 11
51 Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, pp. 37-45; & Borton, ‘Recent trends in the international relief 
system’, pp. 187-201
52 David C. Korten, G etting  to the  2 1 st C entury: volun tary action  an d  the g lo b a l a genda  (Kumarian 
Press: Connecticut, 1990), cited in Joanna Macrae & Anthony Zwi, ‘Famine, complex emergencies and 
international policy in Africa: an overview’, in Macrae & Zwi (eds.), W ar a n d  H unger, p. 27
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necessity of working in unresolved conflict situations and a new United Nations-NGO 
subcontracting relationship was established: the United Nations would secure access, 
funds and provide coordination while NGOs would carry out the actual relief 
programmes.53 Although heralded as a major breakthrough at the time, this kind of 
approach represented not so much a departure from the official discourse on famine as 
an adaptation of its application to complex political situations. Meanwhile, the power 
effects of the official discourse remained essentially intact. The ‘disaster’ was still an 
event, alienated as a subject of knowledge from its specific context, and susceptible to 
the application of institutional practices designed to save as many lives as possible. 
Indeed with the development of formal rule-based physical security and delivery 
systems, the de-contextualisation of the disaster had been reinforced and an 
accommodation with violence enhanced.54 CA’s experience in Ethiopia in the 1983-85 
famine, discussed in chapters 4 and 5, lay at the centre of this historic shift of donor 
funding away from states and towards NGOs, and of the increasing development of 
donor-NGO subcontracting relations. Changing donor policy during the mid-1980s 
meant that the previously illicit cross-border operation into Ethiopia, supported by CA, 
gained de facto recognition at the expense of nation-state sovereignty. Ad hoc, 
donor/NGO sub-contracting relations arose. The effect of the changing institutional 
arrangements on discourse, were also apparent. CA was used by the British 
government and by the EC as a neutral channel of aid, a means by which food could be 
accessed to the starving. The profile of the operation was to be discrete and charitable. 
Yet CA itself was attempting to confront not a ‘neutral’ ‘event’ but the complex reality 
of internal war. The neutral disaster discourse apparent in the institutional structure of 
donor-NGO subcontracting thus created enormous problems for CA’s ability to 
construct and publicise a political-economy discourse.
Thirdly, the de-contextualisation of disasters has occurred as a function of 
donor funding procedures. It is now commonly accepted that patterns of relief are
53 This type of formal system can be seen in Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989, Special Relief 
Programme for Angola 1990, and in Bosnia 1992. Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, pp. 37-45; & 
African Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound?
^Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, pp. 37-45; & African Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound?
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actively shaped by the priorities and agendas of international donors and that donors are
aware of the vital political role of food aid - for example the Reagan administration’s
delayed response to famine in Ethiopia reflected its overt anti-marxist ideology.55 And it
has been argued that:
‘in the absence of a coherent and transparent international policy framework to 
guide intervention and distribution of resources, ad hoc decisions motivated by 
strategic political and institutional concerns, and even by the personal attitudes 
of policy-makers rather than the needs of conflict-affected populations have 
determined the design of emergency aid.,56
Given the increasing dependence of NGOs, like CA, on official funding, further
concern is expressed that NGOs have lost their relative independence and have become
implementers of donor policy. As Joanna Macrae writes:
‘the reliance of the international community on private agencies to implement 
disaster-relief programmes may exert pressure on Northern NGOs to refrain 
from publicising the conditions that have created famine and that block relief 
operations. It has been suggested that the role of NGOs as contractors to 
bilateral and multilateral agencies may serve to maintain their silence if they fear 
that their comments are likely to elicit sanctions.’57
There is a danger that the independence of NGOs, like CA may become sacrificed to the
wider institutional need to be seen to respond to humanitarian crises in an apparently
‘neutral’, apolitical way. The advocacy role of British NGOs has been further restricted
by the charity commissioners’ rules about how far a charity may go in ‘political’
campaigning. Essentially, the advocacy of work of agencies in Britain has been limited
to ‘apolitical’ campaigning activities. The issue of an agency’s ability to set the relief
agenda and independence to pursue advocacy became particularly important in Ethiopia
in the famine of the mid-1980s. As will be shown in chapter 5, it was an issue that CA
was never able to resolve.
Fourthly the functional effects of media representation have impacted on the
way discourses on famine and relief are constructed. Concerns have been expressed
about the media dependency of agencies such as CA and the role and power of the
media in setting the discourse on famine and relief. At its crudest, it can be said that
55 Jack Shepherd, ‘‘‘Some tragic errors”: American policy and the Ethiopian famine, 1981-85’ in Field 
(ed.), The Challenge of Famine, p. 99
56 Macrae & Zwi, ‘Famine, complex emergencies and international policy in Africa’, p. 26
57 ibid., p. 28
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‘disasters do not exist - except for their unfortunate victims and those who suffer in 
their aftermath’s - unless publicized by the media. In this sense the media actually 
construct disasters.’58 By extension, relief is also constructed by the media; 
Governments and national relief agencies come under intense pressure to respond to 
those emergencies which are in the public eye; and a major concern becomes to be seen 
to be doing something, even if the capacity to act effectively is not there. Torn between 
the institutional need to gain media coverage and raise funds - dependent on such 
coverage - NGOs join the rabble. Critics argue with particular reference to conflict- 
famines, that the result is often more about appeasing the sensibilities of northern 
constituencies than tackling the crisis. The institutional dilemma is explained by one 
practitioner:
‘In a concentration of NGOs such as Goma there is such an imperative to 
establish a trademark and territory, and all the technical standards go to the wall. 
In Goma there has been a cholera epidemic which for all practical purposes ran a 
natural course despite the spending of several hundred million dollars on relief. 
In Goma, about 80,000 people or 8% of the population died. There were some 
170 agencies in Rwanda engaged in uncoordinated relief action. For Save the 
Children Fund, it is a difficult question of either competing or staying away - in 
which case we lose out on both media coverage and money.’59
The effect of Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin’s report in Ethiopia in 1984, as will
be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was a clear example of this difficulty.
Media dependency also operated at a more discrete level. Jonathan Benthall has
written persuasively about popular images and narratives of disaster relief and how
these are constructed by the media. He has argued that disasters are essentially
packaged by the media and that such packaging is subject to the discourses and
functions of the news room: the need to be ‘pacifying and consensual’60; the preference
for strong visual images and sensationalism which typically present the Third World as
a place of helplessness and negativity; the need to deliver ‘hot news’; the tendency to
gauge the scale of disasters according to the number of deaths; and the tendency to be
susceptible to unpredictable shifts of consumer fashion.61 In effect, television news is
58 Benthall, D isasters , R e lie f  a n d  th e  M ed ia , p. 27
59 John Seaman, ‘The changing context for international NGOs’ in Royal Anthropological Institute, 
In te rn a tio n a l N G O s a n d  C o m p lex  P o litica l Em ergencies, p. 4
60 Benthall, D isasters, R e lie f  a n d  the  M edia , p. 193
61 ibid., pp. 191-204
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not well suited to exploring the social and economic disruption which both precedes and 
follows disasters; to shaking up the audience’s social and political assumptions and 
giving a voice to unknown and unaccredited people; or to countering the image of 
‘disasters’ as an event, a big story, a sensational human tragedy, here today and gone 
tomorrow.
Anne Winters, the Information Officer at United Nations Children’s Fund
Geneva, has written:
‘the increasing trivialisation of the media because of the influence of television 
has been a subject of concern to communication experts for some years. The 
world of television and particularly of television news, is what has been called a 
‘peek-aboo’ world where an event pops into view for a moment and then 
vanishes. It is a world of fragments, discontinuities, where the worth of 
information lies in its novelty and entertainment value rather than in its relevance 
to social and political decision-making and debate.’62
Such one-dimensional representation and interpretation of disasters impacts on NGOs’
operations by setting the narrative of the disaster and the parameters for public debate.
As a result the media plays a crucial role in setting the configuration of relief: its timing;
its nature; and its purpose. Cutler has shown how during the 1983-85 famine in
Ethiopia, it was the power of the media that shifted an intervention-averse political
environment into an intervention-friendly one, thereby enabling NGOs to act:
‘in the case of the 1983-5 Ethiopian famine, it was initially risky for agency 
representatives to press for a response owing to resistance on behalf of their 
superiors in Europe and North America. Following the dramatic TV coverage 
of the famine, immense political pressure was put on those same organisations 
to respond. The risk profile had reversed; it had become risky not to be seen 
responding.,63
Not only had humanitarianism, in this instance, become the responsibility of those who 
controlled and filtered the news; but it became dependent on the media’s conception of 
the problem as ‘a biblical famine’64, an event manifest in mass starvation; what was 
missing was hard-hitting, complex political analysis. It was the absence of this 
analysis, discussed in chapters 4 and 5 below, that proved a major constraint to CA’s
62 ibid., p. 203
63 Cutler, ‘Responses to famine’, pp. 81-82
64 This was the text narrated by Michael Buerk that accompanied the international screening of 
Moliamed Amin’s film on famine in Korem and Makelle relief camps, Ethiopia, on 23 October 1984
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social justice mandate and ability to educate the public about the real situation during the 
1983-85 famine.65
Clearly, with the extension of media images and the extension of the scale on 
which NGOs are expected to operate, the ambiguities of charitable actions have grown. 
Agencies, like CA, have to balance the need to exploit the fund-raising opportunities 
presented by dramatic media reporting with the need to ‘maintain an institutional ethos 
appropriate to the organization’s “deprived” clientele and the professional practice of the 
field personnel directly concerned with them.’66 Advocacy and development education, 
with its emphasis on reason and not emotion, on breaking down the stereotypical 
imagery of the Third World as a place of ‘natural and political disasters and not much 
else’67, on shifting the focus away from the logistics of aid to the wider field of moral 
and political considerations, sits uneasily against the tide of mass media discourse. 
Further, popular representations of ‘the other’ present problems not only with 
perceptions of the intended beneficiaries of programmes and their needs but also with 
the profile of indigenous relief agencies. Increasingly, in the context of conflict- 
famines, aid agencies rely on partners; in the 1983-85 Ethiopian famine explored in 
chapters 4 and 5, CA relied on the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief 
Society of Tigray (REST) to deliver relief into rebel-held areas. Macrae and Zwi have 
written:
‘such groups may have clear political allegiances. The provision of food into 
rebel-held areas may serve numerous functions over and above the 
humanitarian: by maintaining food supplies, civilian communities are able to 
remain in their homes, or at least within the region. This is significant not only 
for their own health, but also serves to legitimise the rebel force ... food aid 
may be used to feed military personnel.
65 Similarly, recent events in Rwanda were stereotyped as a sudden descent into primitive and atavistic 
tribalism; and relief conceived of in terms of setting up refugee camps for the ‘neutral’ survivors. A 
more thoughtful analysis of the crisis as the end product of a political and economic process, widi 
beneficiaiies as well as victims was not given as much publicity and the need for political solution was 
conveniently substituted with humanitarian action. For a political analysis of the crisis see John 
Eriksson, Synthesis Report, The In terna tiona l R esponse to C on flic t a n d  G enocide: lessons fr o m  the  
R w a n d a  E xperience  (The Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda: Odense, 1996)
66 Benthall, D isa s te rs , R e lie f  a n d  th e  M ed ia , p. 56
67 John Fiske, T elevision  C u ltu re  (Routledge: London, 1987), p. 285 cited in ibid., p. 187
68 Macrae & Zwi, ‘Famine, complex emergencies and international policy in Africa’, pp. 28-29
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In both instances, a particular fighting force may be sustained and the outcome of the 
conflict affected. NGOs’ partners are political, they work in support of humanitarian 
and political survival. Yet they are presented as neutral agencies; the question of their 
political accountability ignored and the implications of their role on the dynamics of 
conflict left unchallenged. As will be shown in chapter 5, the broader public debates 
about political accountability at the national and international level are left untouched.
The above analysis implies that there are strong institutional reasons determining 
how discourses on famine and relief are generated and put to use. For CA, the 
functional effects of donor funding procedures and media representation in the 1983-85 
famine impacted significantly on the agency’s operational capability and will be 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. In the 1973-75 famine, as discussed in chapter 3, the 
discourse and approach was determined more by the organisational imperative of 
needing to be seen to be doing something. The implication throughout was that in its 
operations in a relief policy environment, there were a number of issues that CA was 
unable to resolve because of various structural difficulties affecting the construction and 
presentation of discourse.
By the 1990s, key scholars, writing on disaster relief, had a clear message for 
agencies like CA: apolitical humanitarian approaches which equated famine with mass 
mortality and responded to physical need without regard to the political processes of 
famine, had not only proved inadequate at solving the problem of famine but had at 
times contributed to the problem, supporting forces which were promoting violence 
against civilian populations.69 For some the validity of the entire humanitarian 
undertaking as it was then constituted was fatally flawed:
‘an exploration of the principles that drive “actually-existing humanitarianism”
reveals that its power is exercised and its resources dispensed at the cost of
69 African Rights, Humanitarianis?n Unbound?-, Keen, The Benefits of Famine-, & Duffield, ‘NGOs, 
disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn’, pp. 131-157
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weakening the forms of political accountability that underlie the prevention of 
famine.’
For CA, this message had real meaning around a set of policy concerns in Ethiopia. 
These will be looked at in the chapters below.
3 .  Sustainable Development: exploring its meaning
Historically, many agencies like CA began their lives as ‘relief’ organisations, 
responding to need in crisis situations. By the 1970s, many had moved towards 
development work, seeking a longer-term solution to the problems they were 
continually being called to face. Chapter 1 described how CA broadened its mandate in 
the 1960s from one committed to relief to one orientated towards sustainable 
development. Yet in reality, many agencies still found themselves tied up in responding 
to disasters. Much policy debate was therefore about how to move from relief to 
development. For CA in Ethiopia, a policy environment dominated by famine, such 
debates were particularly relevant. This section looks at the evolving theories 
surrounding this relief-development continuum, their meaning and their implication for 
CA. Notions of power, the way in which power emerges in agency interventions and 
how this effects CA are again considered, this time in the context of development. 
Whether local interpretations and priorities become more important when attention 
shifted from the immediacy of saving lives to support for rehabilitation and 
development is explored.
3 .1  No shortcuts to progress71
The fundamental characteristic of conventional discourse on 
development has been the assumption of the universality of social progress. As Duffield
70Alex de Waal, ‘Human rights and freedom from famine, (Preliminary draft, December 1995), 
Introduction, p. 5; In Somalia, De Waal argues that Northern NGOs and UN agencies have undermined 
the development of indigenous civilian institutions that provide a basis for mitigating disaster. Alex de 
Waal, ‘Dangerous precedent? Famine relief in Somalia 1991-93’ in Macrae & Zwi (eds.), W ar a n d  
H unger, pp. 139-158
71 The quote refers to the main thereof Goran Hyden’s book on development in Africa. Goran Hyden, 
N o Shortcu ts  to P rogress: A frican  developm ent m anagem ent in perspec tive  (Heinemami: London,
1983)
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observed, ‘development is a normative process of becoming: a series of interconnecting 
movements leading from poverty and vulnerability to security and well-being.’72 
Development is thus firmly rooted within a modernist paradigm. Certainly, within this 
paradigm, development theory has evolved; in the post-war era, ‘development’ was 
used to mean the process of transition or transfonnation towards a ‘modem’,
‘capitalist’, ‘industrial’ economy and was seen primarily as a function of capital 
investment, whereas from the mid-1970s, ‘development’ defined itself more in terms of 
‘quality of life’, the reduction or amelioration of poverty and material want and was 
seen as a function of empowering civil society. Yet while the usage of development 
shifted from being a movement in history to a social programme with a more specific 
locational understanding of underdevelopment, the idea of development itself implicit in 
the literature and project papers still ran along modernist lines. In effect the idea that 
shared progress was the normal and long-term direction of all social change remained73 
and much of the language still viewed development as a linear sequence of change, 
from ‘under-developed’ to ‘development’, from ‘vulnerability’ to ‘sustainability’, from 
‘relief’ to ‘development.’74
Moreover, despite the outward shifts in development practice from technology- 
centered to people-centered and from blueprint to process development, the power 
effects of the discourse remained essentially intact. Development was perceived as an 
externally quantifiable change of state among populations, and one that could be 
managed by the application of a range of universally applicable technologies and 
procedures, typically implemented through ‘projects’. Thus it was possible to speak 
about development without reference to the specific context in which it was to occur, or 
the particular local configuration of socio-economic and political processes that might 
have rendered it problematic in a given situation. In his study of the development 
apparatus in Lesotho, Ferguson has shown how the discursive construction of Lesotho 
as an object of development ‘bracketed’ out alternative interpretations. The result was
72Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, p. 38
73 ibid., p. 38
74 Adams & Bradbury, Conflict and Development, p. 28
98
the application of a standardised rural development package and in the process, an
expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power. Ferguson commented that the
development apparatus in Lesotho was,
‘an “anti-politics machine”, depoliticising everything it touches, everywhere 
whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost 
unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic 
state power.’75
As with discourses on famine, the removal of ‘development’ from its locally based
economic and political context meant that ‘development’ could be established as a
subject of scientific knowledge, the content of which need not necessarily refer to that
context in order to be understood. Ferguson commented:
‘through Africa - indeed, through the Third World - one seems to find closely 
analogous or even identical “development” institutions, and along with them 
often a common discourse and the same way of defining “problems,” a common 
pool of “experts,” and a common stock of expertise. The “development 
industry” is apparently a global phenomenon.’76
Such characteristics of theory and practice have impinged directly on CA. CA’s 
theoretical and structural origins, as discussed in chapter 1 above, were firmly framed 
within a modernist paradigm, development was constructed as a relatively linear 
process, a function of capital investment and the adoption of northern technologies, and 
the organisation’s mode of operation was essentially project based, with a package of 
goods or services being delivered. It was on the issue of how to contextualise 
development, how to locate it in a particular local configuration of socio-economic and 
political processes, that CA, as discussed in chapter 1, experienced so much internal 
debate and division. Indeed it was this issue that provided the rationale for CA’s 
institutional restructurings from the 1970s to the 1990s. As discussed in chapter 6, it 
was an issue that CA was never able to resolve. Here, a development programme 
supported by CA in southern Ethiopia is analysed. The findings suggest that even in the 
1990s, it was more convenient for CA to promote particular, off-the-shelf intervention 
‘packages’ which framed problems and solutions in technical terms obscuring 
alternative analyses such as those which might have been found in the realm of political
75 Ferguson, The Anti-Politic Machine, p. xv
76 ibid., p. 8
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economy. Development became stereotyped and in the process it was removed from its 
own context into the realm of regulation and control by humanitarian and development 
institutions. Moreover, the power effects produced in this, and discussed in chapter 6, 
imply that Ferguson’s analysis of an ‘anti-politics machine’ in Lesotho may constitute a 
more general institutional tendency of development agencies.
To understand how development is constructed and why CA, like other 
agencies, has had difficulties escaping from conventional modernist discourse, the 
structural influences that impact on agencies need to be considered. These are similar' to 
those determining discourse on relief, discussed above. In brief, discourses are 
constructed to correspond with the only sort of intervention a development agency is 
capable of launching: the apolitical, technical development intervention. As Ferguson 
argued with reference to Lesotho, ‘the constitution of Lesotho as a suitable theoretical 
object of analysis is also, and simultaneously, its constitution as a suitable target for 
intervention.’77 Certainly, in the 1960s and 1970s, as described in chapter 1, CA was 
not organisationally equipped to deal with anything other than the provision of neutral 
services and goods. And while, reforms and restructuring designed to create a more 
strategic organisation were implemented in the mid-1970s, 1980s and 1990s, this issue 
of capability remained. Secondly, the functions of donor funding and media 
dependency ensure that physical western technological transfer predominate over less 
‘do-able’, ‘noticeable’ and ‘quantifiable’ processes of people-centred development. 
Again this was an issue that CA was never able to resolve and will be discussed in 
chapter 6 in tenns of CA’s institutional need for clear, visible and quantifiable results.
By the 1980s an alternative approach to development was being advocated by 
key scholars.78 The message for agencies like CA was similar to that on famine and 
relief discussed above: intervention needed to begin with a broader analysis of the 
problem and in particular the historical and socio-political context. Most importantly,
77 ibid., p. 73
78 Korten, Third generation NGO sUategies’, pp. 145-59; Elliott, ‘Some aspects of relations between 
the north and the south in the NGO sector’, pp. 57-68; Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress; Robert 
Chambers, Rural Development: putting the last first (Longman: London, 1983); Bratton, The politics 
of govemment-NGO relations in Africa’, pp. 569-87
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agencies needed to wake up to the fact that the problem might not be one of 
underdevelopment but of maldevelopment. One strand of research argued that problems 
of development and change in Africa reflected a more general crisis within the global 
community, characterised by the increasing marginalisation of the South. Focusing on 
the resurgence of armed conflicts in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, key scholars 
identified a structural crisis in Africa’s formal economies, brought about as a result of 
global political, economic, and social transformations.79 In turn, a significant shift on 
the part of the North away from development investment to relief assistance for the 
South was identified, institutionalised through donor-NGO and United Nations-NGO 
sub-contracting relations as described above.80 This was seen to represent an 
accommodation that left untouched the global dimensions of the systemic crisis. New 
mechanisms of international accountability and new strategies for disbursing 
international relief and development assistance were needed.81 The conventional 
discourse of development, with its linear notions of social change, was incapable of 
understanding political crisis as anything but a short-term or abnormal occurrence. As 
Duffield observed, it was ‘powerless and uncomprehending in the face of growing 
systemic crisis and political fragmentation, a trend that is the antithesis of the 
developmental world-view.’82 This issue of the global dimensions of underdevelopment 
had particular relevance to CA’s attempts to find a voice, as discussed in chapter 1 
above. Debates and internal tensions about whether CA’s mandate would best be served 
by advocacy and by promoting ‘conscientisation’ among the poorer communities 
overseas or by supporting traditional fund-raising and project work were to occur 
throughout its history. As will be shown in chapters 4 and 5, in Ethiopia in the mid- 
1980s, the implications of an official international relief policy divorced from an 
understanding of the political crisis - a crisis that had been fanned by cold war politics -
79 Mark Duffield, Joanna Macrae & Anthony Zwi, ‘Conclusion’ in Macrae & Zwi (eds.), W ar an d  
H unger, pp. 222-32; Adams & Bradbury, C onflic t an d  D evelopment', Duffield, ‘The symphony of the 
damned’, pp. 173-193
80 Adams & Bradbury, C on flic t a n d  D evelopm ent: organiza tional adapta tion  in  con flic t situa tions, p.
20; Borton, ‘Recent trends in the international relief system’, pp. 187-201; Duffield, ‘Complex 
emergencies’, pp. 37-45
81 Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, p. 43; Duffield, Macrae & Zwi, ‘Conclusion’, p. 230
82Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, p. 38
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and of a destructive government development policy - also supported by international 
power, initially by America and subsequently by the Soviet Union - impacted directly 
on CA’s capabilities. Moreover, while CA pursued an alternative approach to 
engagement in the South, it was ultimately limited, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
below, by the absence of international accountability in the international community. 
This made the transition between relief and development particularly difficult.
3 .2  New approaches to sustainable development: rethinking the 
relief-development continuum
For CA, a major policy concern in Ethiopia was how to move from famine relief 
to development; how to move from the costly and short-term business of disaster- 
response to the more long-term business of providing poor people with secure 
livelihoods and efficient safety-nets. Certainly, by the 1980s, the increase in the number 
of displaced Ethiopians and refugees, implied that rehabilitation and the linking of relief 
to development had become a crucial concern. This section looks at the relevance of 
theories about the relief-development continuum to CA’s experience.
Initially, when agencies like CA shifted their focus from relief to long-term 
development in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘disasters’ as a policy concern were dropped 
from the main agenda. Disasters were portrayed as temporary interruptions to the long­
term process of linear development. ‘Relief’ became something to be undertaken to get 
back to development. Within this modernist paradigm, the transition between 
emergency, rehabilitation and development was normative and programmatic, often 
institutionally expressed by different planning procedures, different staff and different 
budgets. However as conventional discourses on relief and development began to be 
challenged, in a large part due to the resurgence of complex emergencies in Africa in the 
1980s, a growing interest in linking relief and development emerged, at an institutional 
and theoretical level.83 The division between development and relief, as emergency 
needs were increasing and as the experience of living with high risk became ever more
83 For an analysis of recent debates about the relief-development continuum see the articles in IDS 
Bulletin, 25 (October 1994)
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central to poor people themselves, appeared unsustainable. While the conventional 
discourse - treating famine and relief as an aberration - had driven a conceptual wedge 
between famine and development, the new approach argued for a more holistic 
response, and one more responsive to local interpretations. It was increasingly 
recognised that for poor people, “relief” and “development” were inextricably bound 
together in the complex and day-to-day business of managing risk and securing 
livelihoods. As described above, scholars, from the 1980s, argued that famine was a 
process embedded in local economics and politics. The message for agencies like CA 
was clear: if poor people planned for ‘uncertainty as norm’84, then a more complex 
model of the relief-development continuum was needed.
There were a number of key elements to this challenge for a new model. Firstly, 
that during times of hardship, people survived largely because of their own strategies - 
‘relief aid rarely accounts for more than 10-15% of the total food consumption in an 
area stricken by famine’85 - and that consequently, ‘enabling people to help themselves 
is a far more effective means of overcoming hunger than sending relief.’86 Significantly 
what was being argued was not that the existence of survival strategies removed the 
need for relief but that relief might best be constituted in the light of such survival 
strategies. External interventions needed to be planned to take account of local 
capacities, as well as vulnerabilities. Certainly CA’s experience of relief camps in 
Ethiopia in the 1970s, as described in chapter 3 below, highlighted the need to adopt a 
more empowering approach. To some extent this was attempted with the Afar nomads 
through food-for-work programmes, also discussed in chapter 3, but ultimately the 
framework was too narrowly defined and lacked operational capability. In contrast, 
CA’s operations in the 1983-85 famine, discussed in chapter 5, provide a clearer and 
more successful example of building on local capacities and enabling people to help 
themselves.
84 M. Mortimore, A dap ting  to D rought: fa rm ers, fa m in es  an d  desertification  in W est A fr ica  (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge) cited in Margaret Buchanan-Smitli & Simon Maxwell, ‘Linking relief 
and development: an introduction and overview’ ID S  B u lle tin , 25 (October 1994), p. 3
85 African Rights, H um an ita rian ism  U nbound?, p. 13
86 ibid., p. 13
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Secondly, that relief could undermine development just as inappropriate 
development could cause emergencies. What was needed was a model for the 
simultaneity of relief and development strategies - ‘long-term development programmes 
need to be tested against their ability to give people the capacity to deal with crises, 
while short-term relief activities need to take into account future needs and long-term 
consequences of their actions.’87 Not only did the opportunity exist to make famine 
policy preemptive and not merely reactive but at the same time, it appeared possible to 
make preparation for famine an ally of development, indeed a core component of 
development as against being an alternative to it.88 This issue of simultaneity was to be 
a crucial part of CA’s involvement in northern Ethiopia in the mid-1980s and a key 
strategy of CA’s partners in Eritrea and Tigray.89
Thirdly, that disasters were rarely proceeded by a ‘return to normal’ and that in 
many cases in Africa, people were subject to catastrophic disempowerment and asset 
depletion.90 This was an important challenge to conventional linear relief-development 
models. Survival strategies ‘cost’ and the trend was for assets to reduce: ‘in responding 
to the famine currently growing in northern Sudan, peripheral rural group have not 
made good their losses in livestock, movable wealth, and so on, since the last famine of 
the mid-1980s.’91 It was argued that various economic and political constraints often 
forced the adoption of ‘less-favoured’ survival strategies which were generally more 
damaging. In this respect, intervention needed to take account of and support local 
socio-economic responses: freeing up markets; pressing for greater freedom of human 
and livestock movement; supporting employment schemes; and assisting the survival of 
livestock (by providing fodder, veterinary services and free water).92 An important 
factor contributing to the vulnerability and asset depletion of the victims of the 1983-85 
famine in Ethiopia was the impact of military tactics on important survival strategies.
87 Adams & Bradbury, C o n flic t a n d  D evelopm ent, p. 41
88 John Osgood Field, ‘Understanding famine’ in Field (ed.), The C ha llenge o f  F am ine, p. 22
89 See chapters 4 and 5 below
90 David Keen, F am ine, N eeds-A ssessm ent a n d  Surviva l S tra teg ies in  A fr ica  Oxfam Research Papers 
No. 8 (Oxfam: Oxford, 1993), pp. 19-26; & Mark Duffield, W ar a n d  F am ine in A fr ica  Oxfam Research 
Paper No. 5 (Oxford: Oxfam, November 1990), pp. 11-12
91 Duffield, W ar a n d  F am ine  in  A fr ica , p. 12
92 De Waal, F a m in e  th a t K ills, pp. 214-226
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For CA, as will be shown in chapters 4 and 5, the issue of supporting local socio­
economic responses thus became crucial.
Fourthly, that emergencies were intimately linked to the essential development 
situation of communities; that strategies for meeting such emergencies had to address 
fundamental development; and that such strategies needed to take account of the 
historical, socio-economic and political processes within that locality. A crucial aspect 
of the alternative discourse was the need not only to see relief and development as 
organically linked but to find new ways of engaging with the local reality and political 
processes. This related, in particular, to situations of conflict where it was recognised 
that conflict could not be held in isolation from discussion of mainstream development 
policy but was the outcome of competing strategies between individuals and groups of 
individuals within the socio-economic landscape. As Keen argued for Sudan:
‘the coming of Sudan’s second civil war should be seen not so much as a 
senseless outbreak of violence interrupting processes of development, but rather 
as the most extreme expression of the resource conflicts, exploitation, and 
resistance bred by a pattern of uneven development that has created losers in the 
north as well as the south. This pattern of development was sponsored by the 
British, and reinforced by multilateral institutions like the World Bank. It is one 
thing to condemn violence; it is another, and more useful, exercise to sponsor a 
pattern of development that makes violence less likely.’93
Insecurity and violence were developmental issues. Conflict was often a result of
unequal development. Certainly Ethiopia, in the 1970s and particularly the 1980s, was
a country in which resource conflicts, exploitation and uneven development were
expressed in violent conflict. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, CA recognised that the
conflict could not be held in isolation from discussion of mainstream development
policy and made choices, to support the relief-development model of the liberation
movements and not that of the Ethiopian government, accordingly. Moreover, it was
argued that conflict was not necessarily temporary but might represent a permanent
emergency, developed to support the survival of the powerful.94 In order to achieve
sustainable development, to link relief and development, the reality of power
differentials and the economies that sustained them needed to be understood. In
93 Keen, The Benefits o f Famine, p. 233
94 Duffield, ‘NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn’, pp. 131 -157
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programming, this strand of thinking argued that approaches to relief and development 
had to give ample consideration to underlying political causes and possible solutions. In 
this respect, it was argued that only a relief approach that adopted ‘solidarity’ principles 
of strategic long-term programming, such as participation and the employment of local 
knowledge could lay the basis for meaningful development in the long-term. At issue 
was the need to understand the social reality of conflict and turbulent change. The role 
played by Northern NGOs in sustaining the predatory military and political power of 
the Ethiopian government during the 1983-85 famine has been dealt with in detail by 
key scholars.95 For CA, the result was a polarisation of the aid community around two 
approaches to relief, one channeled through the government and the other channeled 
through the liberation movements. The conflicting information, claims and operations 
that resulted from this, impacted significantly on CA’s capabilities, as will be discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5 below.
Violence was not however just seen as an issue of war: ‘there is a need to 
broaden the debate on development in conflict beyond the large-scale wars and 
“complex emergencies” to the daily conflicts, disputes, and insecurities that people face 
in “peaceful” situations.’96 Indeed, some argued that poverty itself was an act of 
‘structural violence.’97 Such violence moreover was not simply the result of political 
and economic processes but was ‘deliberately organised.’98 In this respect a 
development model that ignored power differentials or heightened social and economic 
disparities was seen to end up sustaining endemic violence. Chambers argued that the 
main responsibility for the failure of development policies to benefit the poor lay with 
the tendency of such projects to ignore the political dimensions of development.99 This 
applied to relief situations as well. McCann has shown how the response to drought 
and subsequent famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s was not chaotic, but was a process
95 J. W. Clay, Western assistance and the Ethiopian famine: implications for humanitarian assistance’ 
in R. E. Downs, D. O. Kemer & S. P Reyna (eds.), The P o litica l E conom y o f  A fr ica n  F a m in e  
(Gordon & Breach Publishers: Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 147-175; Africa Watch, pp. 359-378
96 Adams & Bradbury, C on flic t a n d  D evelopm ent, p. 4
97 J. Galtung, ‘Violence and peace’ in Smoker Davies & Munske (eds.), A  R eader in  P eace  S tud ies  
(Pergamon, 1990), pp. 9-14 cited in Adams & Bradbury, C onflic t and  D evelopm en t, p. 18
98 Adams & Bradbury, C onflic t a n d  D evelopm ent, p. 18
99 Chambers, R u ra l D evelopm en t, pp. 140-167
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determined by pre-existing social and economic institutions; that the effects were 
distributed unevenly, in that they represented a process of relative enrichment for some 
households just as they represented tragedy for others; and that without an 
understanding of the terms under which production and distribution of resources take 
place, relief and rehabilitation programmes often had a biased social impact, benefiting 
those households or household members (typically adult males) who had power and 
creating a class of vulnerable individuals with little ability to command food or 
economic resources.100
The above analysis has explored the difficulties surrounding development and 
has implied that new approaches to sustainable development have involved a re-thinking 
of the relief-development continuum. For CA, such difficulties and debates have been 
important and can be seen reflected in practice. In the 1970s, as will be shown in 
chapter 3, CA drew a distinction between relief and development and adopted a linear 
approach. CA’s interventions with the Afar nomads, Ogaden herdsmen and Wollo 
tenants ignored the political dimension of their situation and ended up heightening social 
and economic disparities. By the 1980s, by operating through and relying on the 
Eritrean Relief Association and the Relief Society of Tigray, CA’s approach was more 
holistic and reflected the changing theoretical framework. As described in chapters 4 
and 5, local socio-economic and political processes were taken into account and 
solidarity principles of strategic long-term programming were adopted. In this sense, 
the basis for and prospect of meaningful development in the long term was 
strengthened. The description of a development programme supported by CA in chapter 
6 however adds a cautionary note. The implication of the analysis is that the 
intervention, in certain areas, had a biased social impact, supporting those households, 
individuals and local organisations that had power, and creating certain groups with 
little ability to command future benefits. It would appear that on the issue of securing
100 James McCann, ‘The social impact of drought in Ethiopia: oxen, households, and some 
implications for rehabilitation’ in M. Glantz (ed.), Drought and Hunger in Africa: denying famine a 
future (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1987), pp. 261-265
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sustainable development, CA has experienced a number of difficulties.
4 . Conclusion
This chapter has looked in general terms at the ideas that have informed 
intervention; how ideas have been put to use; and what effects they have produced. It 
has looked at theories of famine, relief and development, in that order, as this sequence 
most typically reflects the history and policy concerns of agencies like CA. Having 
explored the debates and problems surrounding each, the analysis has ended by 
showing how the various debates have come together in evolving theories surrounding 
the relief-development continuum. Two issues in particular have emerged. One, using 
Foucault as a tool of analysis, is that discourse on famine, relief and development is 
linked to the prioritisation of certain kinds of institutional practices, that in the process 
local interpretations and alternative approaches are bracketed out and that this produces 
important power effects. Second, that structural relationships, arrangements and 
imperatives continue to influence how discourse is generated and put to use. Thus 
despite shifts in the theoretical perspective, agencies continue to come up against the 
functions of donor funding, media dependency, charitable law, and ultimately the 
institutional need to be publicly seen to be doing something and succeeding at it.
For CA these issues had real meaning around a set of policy concerns in 
Ethiopia over 30 years. As will be shown in the chapters below, the way in which 
power is elaborated through relief and development has had profound implications on 
CA’s capabilities. In the 1970s famine intervention, the result was a heightening of 
power differentials and socio-economic disparities.101 In the 1980s, the result was a 
process of empowerment.102 The record of development, discussed in chapter 6, was 
more confused. In all interventions, institutional structures determined how far practice 
could go in reflecting theory. The implication from the theoretical perspective analysed 
above and from its relevance to CA is that despite shifts in theory, structural difficulties 
make it difficult for agencies to move beyond a disaster-response type of approach.
101 See chapter 3 below
102 See chapters 4 and 5 below
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Chapter 3 
THE 1971-75 ETHIOPIAN FAMINE
In 1968 rainfall in the West African Sahel faltered and then in 1972 and 1973 
failed throughout the region. It is estimated that one-quarter of the Sahel’s livestock 
may have died.1 The number of human deaths is unknown. An extensive review of the 
available demographic information found that it was impossible to establish reliable 
demographic figures for mortality before the drought, and even less possible to 
establish a useful estimate of famine mortality. It concluded that the figure of 100,000, 
often quoted2, was probably exaggerated.3 The Sahelian drought also extended into the 
Horn of Africa and southwards into East Africa. Since the mid 1960s, rainfall in the 
Wollo region of northern Ethiopia had been low; in both 1971 and 1972 it failed 
seriously and by May 1973 many were dying.4 Deaths were estimated at between 
40,000 and 80,000.5 During 1974-75 the drought shifted south-eastwards to the 
Ogaden border with Somalia, where an estimated 55,000 died.6 Rainfall also failed in 
arid regions of Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania. For CA, these ‘natural’ calamities opened 
a new, more intense, chapter in Africa.
One aspect was the scale and type of disaster response: in Ethiopia, CA became 
involved in new partnerships and greatly expanded operations. In 1970, CA’s income, 
£2,848,657, had scarcely risen for a decade. Six years later, following famine in 
Ethiopia and the Sahel, it was £4,757,910.7 Another aspect was a realisation that not 
only in a war did a famine have to be ‘man-made’. As Black writes, ‘the tragedies in 
Ethiopia, the Sahel... were blamed not only on the weather, but on national and 
international neglect of peoples whose fate was marginal to the political and economic
1 Jonathan Derrick, ‘The great West African drought, 1972-74’ A frican  A ffa irs , 76 (1977), pp. 543-5; & 
J. C. Caldwell, ‘The Sahelian dr ought and its demographic implications’ (Overseas Liaison Committee 
of the American Council on Education, 1975), pp. 20-21
2 Hal Sheets and Roger Moms, D isaster in  the D esert: fa ilu r e  o f  in terna tiona l r e l ie f  in  the  W est 
A fr ica n  d ro u g h t  (1974), pp. 1 & 49
3 Caldwell, ‘The Sahelian drought’, pp. 8-15 & 23-27
4 D. S. Miller & J. F. J. Holt, ‘The Ethiopian famine’ P roceed ings o f  the N u tr itio n  S o c ie ty , 34 
(1975), pp. 168-9
5 ibid., p. 171
6 Africa Watch, E vil D ays, p. 6
7 CA financial statements and reports (1951-84), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
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interests of those manipulating the levers of power.’8 Further, ‘a closer look showed up 
something even more fundamental: the iniquitous impact of the forces of modernity - or 
‘development’ - on ancient environmental equilibrium.’9 The horrors of mass famine 
mortality focused attention on Africa’s poor and blew away the euphoria that had 
accompanied much of the development work of the 1960s. For CA, as for others, 
‘development’ had failed and the organisation was still in a position of reacting to a 
situation once it had got out of control rather than dealing with the underlying causes of 
the poverty and vulnerability that created such a situation.
This chapter looks at CA’s experience of famine in Ethiopia in the 1970s. The 
aim of the study is to find out how CA responded to the crisis, how it turned intentions 
into action, and to understand the influences - structural and theoretical - that impacted 
on it. The aim is not to condemn the relief operation but to understand it in all its 
complexity and from there to see a way forward. The chapter begins with an outline of 
vulnerability to famine in rural Ethiopia and a brief sketch of the profile of the 1971-75 
famine. The causes of the famine are analysed and the nature of the official discourse on 
the disaster discussed. The second part addresses CA’s involvement. It looks at how 
CA positioned itself within the official discourse and why, and examines the effect of 
its intervention. The implications of the experience are explored in the conclusion.
1 . ‘Famine* Discovered
In the previous chapter it has been argued that conventional discourses on 
‘famine’ - characterised by a focus on food supply and natural disaster - are often more 
representative of Western biases than of the concerns of the people who actually suffer 
and as such are in need of thorough critique. This study of famine and relief in Ethiopia 
follows this line of argument. It supports Sen’s analysis that ‘the Ethiopian famine 
[1972-74], took place with no abnormal reduction in food output, and consumption of 
food per head at the height of the famine in 1973 was fairly normal for Ethiopia as a
8 Black, A Cause For Our Times, p. 239
9 ibid., p. 239
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whole.’10 Where it differs from Sen’s interpretation is redirecting the emphasis to a 
political-economy analysis rather than concentrating on the purely ‘economic’ 
dimensions of famine; the focus is not solely on the victims but on the beneficiaries, 
and the analysis is of famine as ‘process’ and not simply ‘event’. It is within this 
interpretive framework that CA’s performance is examined.
10 Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 111
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Source: G. Kebbede & M. Jacob, ‘Drought, famine and the political economy of environmental 
degradation in Ethiopia’ Geography,13 (1988), pp. 66
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1.1 Vulnerability to famine in rural Ethiopia
Famine has been a common occurrence in Ethiopia and during the latter 
twentieth century, its recorded incidence appears to have increased, with hardly a year 
going by without an outbreak of famine somewhere in the north (see table 3.2 below). 
Indeed, ‘to Wollo peasants, famine is as familiar as their villages.’ 11 This section 
provides a brief historical analysis of the root causes of vulnerability to famine of 
individual peasant households. This will involve an overview of rural Ethiopian 
environment, history and political development. Such an analysis is important because 
it provides the framework in which the discourse on the 1970s famine and the 
subsequent relief actions can be better analysed.
Much of the central and northern highlands of Ethiopia experience a season of 
main summer rains (kremt), which run from June to September. The timing and 
duration of the rains can vary considerable. In parts of the highlands, a short spring 
(belg) season precedes the main rains, usually in March to April. Although the belg 
season typically provides only 5-10% of total crop production, it is very important in 
some locations (such as western Wollo), where it accounts for up to 50% of 
production. Eritrea and much of Tigray receive only the main kremt rains. The 
highlands support the vast majority of the population, most of whom are cultivators 
growing a wide variety of crops, especially annual grain crops, at various altitudes. 
These include teff (the most prestigious staple), wheat, barley, millet, sorghum and 
maize. The highlands’ farming system centers on the ox-plough (marasha) which is 
used to prepare the land. To the south and east the highlands give way to lowlands. 
These support much sparser populations which rely on pastoralism for a livelihood, 
although in many cases this will be supplemented with a degree of cultivation. In the 
southern and north-eastern lowlands there are two rainy seasons, the first occurs in 
April/May and the second in October/November. The rainfall in the lowlands is 
generally less than in the highlands. A failure of one rainy season is quite common,
11 Alemne Dejene, Environment, Famine, and Politics in Ethiopia: A view from the village (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado, 1990), p. 69
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while the failure of two rainy seasons in succession is potentially disastrous for the 
pastoral production system.
While agriculture is central to the Ethiopian economy, to see the highlands as an 
environmentally determined agricultural peasant economy made up of a simple 
agglomeration of individuals excludes other important aspects of rural life that are 
crucial to understanding the complexity of people’s vulnerability and the socio­
economic dimensions of famine. McCann has argued that, ‘the image of the insular, 
long-suffering Ethiopian peasant’ and the view that saw ‘highland farmers and highland 
agriculture as static and self-contained ... [have] obstructed understanding of the rural 
economy and social history of northern Ethiopia.’12 Rural Ethiopia is better understood 
as a pattern of geographically-specialized areas, with a set of exchange relations linking 
them. As one analyst observed:
‘the fundamental dichotomy is between areas which are normally surplus- 
producing, and areas which are regularly in food deficit. In the north, the 
surplus areas include: Gojjam province, southwestern Wollo, central Gonder 
and Simien, Raya district in eastern Tigray and Shire district in western Tigray. 
These areas are not particularly drought-prone; even when drought hits other 
parts of the country, they normally continue to produce adequate crops or 
surpluses ... the food deficit areas include most of the rest of northern Ethiopia, 
especially some parts of eastern Gonder, northern and eastern Wollo, most of 
Tigray, and almost all of Eritrea.’13
The western highlands are most favoured climatically for crop production, receiving the
highest amounts of rainfall, which is normally well-distributed. The north is less well-
favoured. The variability of rainfall also appears to be greater in the north. Most of the
deficit areas produce a good harvest perhaps once or twice a decade and a run of six or
seven years of crop failure is not unusual. Farmers living in deficit areas make good
that deficit through a number of strategies articulated with the market and the regional
economy: migrating to surplus-producing or coffee-producing areas in order to work
for money; engaging in petty trade - salt, grain, animals and consumer goods; selling
animals - both pastoralists of the lowlands and many highland farmers earn a
considerable income from selling animals; remittances from relatives working in towns,
12 James McCann, From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia: a rural history 1900-1935 
(University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1987), p. 69
13 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 31
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particularly in Eritrea which had larger cities, more industry and more ready access to 
neighboring countries.14
When famine occurs in the northeast it is rarely the case that all areas are 
affected equally and at the same time.15 Treated as a whole, northern Ethiopia has rarely 
been in overall food deficit. Overall food production per caput appears to have grown 
over the period 1974-76 to 1981-83, rising from 127 kg per caput to 145 kg per caput 
(see table 3.1 below). However these figures conceal great regional variations, and 
considerable year-to-year fluctuations in food production. What it does reveal is that the 
problem of famine has not been one of overall food availability, of household resource 
management, but of food distribution, of the relations of production between producers 
and non-producers.
Table 3.1 Cereals Production and Net Food Availability Per Caput 
1972-84
YEAR 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Cereals
Production
(kg)
140.1 136.2 115.3 139.8 126.2 1 1 1.2 141.5
Net Food
Availability
(kcals)
1584 1584 1566 1549 1611 1521 1654
YEAR 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 ii l l ; ■ iltlll
Cereals
Production
(kg)
169.9 145.7 136.3 166.0 133.0 112.2
Net Food
Availability
(kcals)
1791 1861 1817 1704 163 1695
Source: FAO cited in P. V. Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine in northern Ethiopia’ (PhD 
thesis: London University, 1988), p. 214
It is within the evolution of the Ethiopian political economy, that these relations 
of production can best be explored and the historical constraints on the fulfillment of 
Ethiopia’s production potential analysed. Ethiopia, as we know it in the 1990s, is the 
product of the expansion of a state, known as Abyssinia, centered in the northern
14 ibid., pp. 32-33
15 Rahmato, Famine and Survival Strategies, p. 68
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highlands into adjoining areas, mostly to the south.16 Originating from the Aksumite 
empire - first referred to in written records in the first century AD - Abyssinia was ruled 
from the middle of the 11th century by the Zagaw dynasty. In 1270, this dynasty was 
overthrown by another based on the Amhara, who claimed descent from Solomon. 
From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, conflict ensued with the expansionist 
Muslims, as both sides sought control of the south and eastern lowlands. Eventually, 
with the help of the Portuguese, the Muslims were expelled. However, the Abyssinians 
then fell prey to ‘a highly virile provincialism’17. By the late 18th century, the monarchy 
had become eclipsed, and a period known as the ‘age of princes’ followed, with 
endemic conflict being waged by provincial nobles seeking control over the state. This 
began to change in the mid-nineteenth century, as the northern kingdoms began a 
process of political centralisation, acquisition of European weaponry, and conquest of 
their southern neighbours. This reached its climax under Emperor Menelik II (1889- 
1913). Menelik doubled the size of the empire within a few decades, established the 
boundaries of modern Ethiopia and the supremacy of the Shewan Amhara. Menelik’s 
military achievements were followed by attempts to create the trappings and structures 
of a modern state: a modern army was established; and the elements of a modern 
administrative structure began to appear. Menelik was succeeded for a brief period by 
his grandson, Lij Yasa, who was ousted in 1916 by the Shewan nobility for 
sympathising with Islam. He was in turn succeeded by Ras Tafari Makonnen, later 
crowned Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1930. Haile Selassie continued the process of 
centralisation and modernisation, until he was overthrown by a coup in 1974 and 
replaced by a military committee, the Derg.
As Hoben has written, ‘the dominant secular ethos of northern Ethiopian 
(Amhara and Tigrayan) society was military, rather than agrarian’ and ‘the path to 
upward mobility for the lord was thus through success in court politics, loyal service to
16 For a history of Ethiopia’s political economy see John Markakis, E th iop ia : A n a to m y  o f  a  T rad itiona l 
P o lity  (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1974), pp. 13-26; Bahru Zewde, A  H is to ry  o f  M odern  
E th iop ia , 1 8 55 -1974  (James Currey: London, 1991)
17 Markakis, E th io p ia , p. 17
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his liege lord and military prowess, especially in the conquest of new lands.’18 If the 
nobles and gentry did not have strong incentives to make long-term investments in the 
land, neither did the peasants. This can be explained by the structure of the agrarian 
system. It has often been argued that historically this system can best be described as 
feudal. The relation between those who controlled the sources of rural wealth and those 
who produced it, and the social status of the latter in the overall political economy of the 
country, were essentially feudal in nature. This approach however is only valid to a 
certain extent and it should be recognised that it does not fully explain all the intricacies 
of the land system in all parts of the country.19 While feudal relations of production can 
be said to have existed in the southern and south-western regions, although as a hybrid 
of non- and pre-feudal forms and varying in character from one region to another, the 
‘tributary’ systems of the northern areas cannot be adequately explained in this way. In 
addition the concept of Ethiopian feudalism underestimates the role of the state in 
agrarian relations. Essentially, however, the system was characterised by the extraction 
of surplus from the peasantry by a ruling class. Forms of extraction included the land- 
tax; the asrat which amounted to a tenth of the peasant’s harvest; obligation to supply 
provisions for officials and visitors passing through the district; provision of firewood; 
provision of honey; ‘gifts’ made at the appointment of a new governor, his promotion 
or decoration, or the birth of a son to him; and labour on the state or governor’s land 
which generally took about a third of the peasant’s labour time.20 Within this system, 
the peasants did not have strong incentives to make long-term investments. While a 
large number, particularly in the north, enjoyed reasonable security of access to a share 
of their ancestral lands, as ‘rist’ or family land- holders, the periodic reallocation of 
land, the scattered and changing composition of the parcels that constituted a
18 Allan Hoben, ‘The cultural construction of environmental policy: paradigms and politics in Ethiopia’ 
in Melissa Leach & Robin Meams (eds.), The L ie  o f  The Land: cha lleng ing  received  w isdom  on  the  
A fr ica n  env ironm en t (International African Institute in association with James Currey: Oxford, 1996), 
pp. 189 & 190
19 For a discussion of Ethiopian land tenure systems, see Allan Hoben, L a n d  T enure  am ong  the A m hara  
o f  E th io p ia  (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1972); Dessalegn Rahmato, A g ra ria n  R eform  in 
E th io p ia  (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: Uppsala, 1984); Dan F. Bauer, H o u seh o ld  and  
So c ie ty  in  E th io p ia  (African Studies Center: Michigan State University, Michigan, 1977); &
Markakis, E th iop ia , pp. 73-91 & 104-129
20 Zewde, A  H is to iy  o f  M odern  E th iop ia , p. 87
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household’s holding and the division and redistribution associated with inheritance, all 
militated against the concept of an enduring family estate or ‘farm’. Rights to the land 
were usufructury and not private, farmers could not sell them for a profit or be certain 
of leaving them to their heirs. Agricultural production was primarily for subsistence, tax 
and tribute. This situation of insecurity was even more evident among the large number 
of tenants, leasing private land from the state or individuals, who themselves had been 
given the land by the state in reward for good service. Within this agrarian system, the 
lack of reinvestment of surplus in agricultural infrastructure or techniques, combined 
with the demands of army provisioning on peasant production, seriously impacted on 
resistance to periodic production failures through drought, pest attack or warfare.
The slow process of modernisation of the state, begun under Emperor Menelik 
II in the late 19th century, did little to alter these underlying structures. Indeed, 
processes of modernisation were funded with surpluses extracted from the peasantry.
In particular, the expansion of the imperial state under Haile Selassie led to increased 
demands on the peasant household. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, not only had 
taxes and demands on labour increased but they had done so in ways that considerably 
enlarged the risks to the household economy: the proportional (asrat) tax was largely 
supplanted by fixed taxes payable in cash. In agricultural systems dominated by 
unstable production conditions (weather, pests, access to means of production - oxen), 
fixed taxes put the household economy and the rural production system in jeopardy.21 
Thus the operations of the state under Haile Selassie’s regime continued to siphon off 
resources from the rural society without providing for the development of the 
productive forces in agriculture.22 Foreign investment, welcomed under Haile Selassie, 
was mostly confined to export crop production in a few areas. Capitalist development 
of agriculture was not widespread geographically, and where it did take place, peasants 
and pastoralists became swiftly marginalised and more vulnerable to famine as they 
were denied access to land which they had traditionally cultivated or used for grazing. 
This was particularly the case in the Awash valley discussed below.
21 McCann, From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia, p. 140
22 ibid., pp. 125-143
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In spite of its natural endowment, Ethiopia by the latter twentieth century was
believed by experts to be facing an environmental crisis.23 As one analyst commented:
‘Much of the north has a dissected, sloping terrain, fragile soils and is subject to 
highly erosive rainstorms during the main agricultural season. This area has 
little natural tree cover; its soils are low in organic matter and are subject to 
severe soil erosion. The plough-based mixed farming system contributes to soil 
erosion through fine tilling, mono-cropping, and a lack of vegetative cover 
during part of the heavy rains ... In the present century natural forest, which 
was extensive, has been reduced and grasslands brought under the plough ... 
there can be no doubt that there are serious problems of soil erosion in the 
extensive areas of highland Ethiopia.’24
In Rahmato’s analysis of the physical setting in Wollo, resource degradation appeared
critical:
‘In areas specialising in grain cultivation, particularly in the traditional famine 
areas, an average of about 100 tons of soil per hectare per year is permanently 
lost. The highest rate of erosion within the seed-farming regions occurred in 
Wollo, with the higher elevations of the province contributing most to the 
destruction of ecology compared with the lower. In about two and a half 
decades, resource degradation could wipe out about 15% to 20% of the 
province’s farmland affecting the livelihood of well over half a million 
peasants.’25
While the case for environmental crisis should be treated with caution, it is clear 
that Ethiopia’s landscape by the latter twentieth century was in parts showing signs of 
degradation.26 Yet northern Ethiopians have been aware of soil erosion and traditionally 
have practiced some forms of conservation.27 Historically, political, institutional, and 
economic conditions have given them little opportunity or incentive to invest in 
agricultural intensification and labour-intensive conservation measures. In this respect, 
processes of agricultural change have reflected historical events and the wider political- 
economy. In southern Ethiopia, pressures on the environment were caused by the 
conquest and occupation of what is now southern Ethiopia by the northern armies in the 
latter nineteenth century. Large numbers of northerners settled in the agro-pastoral
23 For a balanced discussion of Ethiopia’s natural resource base and trends in resource use, see IUCN 
(International Union for Conservation of nature and Natural Resources), E th iop ia  N a tio n a l 
C on serva tio n  S tra te g y , Phase I Report, (IUCN, 1990) pp. 8-28 cited in Hoben, ‘The cultural 
construction of environmental policy’, p. 188
24 Hoben, ‘The cultural construction of environmental policy’, pp. 188-189
25 Ralimato, F a m in e  a n d  Surv iva l S tra teg ies , p. 55
26 For a more cautious analysis of ‘environmental crisis’ in Ethiopia see Hoben, ‘The cultural 
construction of environmental policy’, pp. 201-202; James McCann, P eop le o f  th e  P lough : an  
a g ricu ltu ra l h is to iy  o f  E th io p ia  1800-1990  (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, Wisconsin, 
1995), pp. 31-38
27 Rahmato, F a m in e  a n d  Surv iva l S tra tegies, pp. 81-87
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regions, extracting labour and tribute from the indigenous peoples. The introduction of 
the plough and of grain crops, as well as the new labour demands, contributed to new 
problems of soil erosion. Northern settlers also moved southwards into forested areas 
in the west, clearing the land and introducing plough agriculture. In his analysis of rural 
history in the early part of the twentieth century, McCann has shown how changing 
government policy was dynamically linked to environmental management.28
Historically, the relationship between security and productivity has been 
structured by social and political processes. In this respect, there have been winners and 
losers:
‘the conditions that promoted the cycle of impoverishment... also stimulated a 
reciprocal, but much smaller, cycle of enrichment whereby wealthy peasants 
and officeholders expanded their control over the means of production through 
the manipulation of changing rural institutions.’29
State officials and newly favoured local elites were able to insulate themselves from the
effects of declining productivity by living off fixed assessments of labour, food, and
cash.30 Vulnerability was a product of the essential development situation of the
communities who suffered and as such, reflected their political and economic
marginalisation. While one way of interpreting such vulnerability may be in feudal
terms, as indicated above, this should not obstruct an understanding of more complex
social formations and exchange relations in the highlands, or of a modernising and
expanding state. During the course of the twentieth century, the relationship between
the state and agriculture changed dramatically, creating new vulnerabilities.31 Under
Haile Selassie, the rural economy was penetrated by the state and urban interests. In the
process, decision-making about local conditions shifted: ‘from an early period when
local officials were tied to farmers through local reciprocal links to a system of central
government bureaucrats relating to rural producers through the market or through
imperial edicts.’32 It was this increasing gap between government policy and the state of
28 McCann, From Poverty to Famine in Northeast Ethiopia,
29 ibid., p. 180
30 ibid., p. 180
31 ibid., pp. 125-143
32 ibid., p. 202
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the local economy, that famine in the second half of the twentieth century was to 
highlight.
Ethiopian rural society in 1971-75, against a backdrop of population growth,
faced a chronic shortage of productive resources - particularly land, oxen, forage,
modem technology and water; and lacked local grain stores or meaningful contact with
a heavily centralised government and central markets. The roots of this vulnerability lay
in historical and conjunctural socio-economic and political processes thcompacted on
investments in agriculture. In this respect, particular groups were rendered particularly
dependent on unreliable environmental factors. As Wolde Mariam observed:
‘vulnerability to famine ... is much more a function of the relationship between 
subsistence producers and the socio-economic and political forces rather than a 
function of the relationship between the former and the conditions of the 
physical environment.’33
1 .2  Profile o f  the famine 1971-75
During the early 1970s, there were two separate famines in Ethiopia, and for 
analytical purposes it is important to distinguish them: in 1971-73 the northern 
highlands, especially Wollo and parts of Tigray and the northern Rift Valley 
experienced severe drought and repeated crop failures; and in 1973-75 the drought 
moved south, centering on the lowlands of Harerghe. The biggest part of the mortality 
owing to starvation occurred in 1973, much of it in Wollo. Between 40,000 and 80,000 
people died in Wollo; while an estimated 55,000 died in the Ogaden.34
As already mention, even under normal climatic conditions, little excess grain 
was produced in the northern area of Ethiopia where the relief effort of 1973 was 
concentrated. Between 1966 and 1973 the rainfall had been erratic, resulting in poor 
harvests and inadequate grazing for livestock. Local food shortages occurred 
periodically during this time, leading to population movements and government relief.
In the Ogaden region of southern Harerghe province, a pattern of decreasing rainfall 
since about 1969 had been observed.35 1971 was a particularly bad year in a number of
33 Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability, p. 14
34 Africa Watch, Evil Days, pp. 6 & 58; & Miller & Holt, ‘The Ethiopian famine’, p. 171
35 Julius Holt & John Seaman, ‘The scope of the drought’ in Hussein (ed.), Rehab: drought and famine 
in Ethiopia (International African Institute: London, 1976), p. 2
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areas: north east Wollo suffered a near-disastrous crop failure in the plain of Raya and 
Qobbo; in the northern Ogaden, Cossins reported an exceptionally severe main dry 
season with unusual losses in cattle; and for the Mursi in southern Gemu Gofa, Turton 
cited 1971 as the first of three years of consecutive rain failure and food shortage 
unprecedented in living memory.36
The crisis was precipitated in northeast Ethiopia by a very serious and wide­
spread failure of the main kremt rains (June to September) in mid-1972 followed by an 
almost complete failure of the spring belg rains (March to April) in early 1973.37 In the 
desert areas of Wollo and Tigray, the drought probably had the most disastrous effect in 
that little or no grazing remained by the early part of 1973. Serious disruptions of the 
normal market equilibrium occurred, turning the terms of trade against the pastoralists: 
the cost of grain bought by merchants and sold in the large towns rose steeply, while 
the price obtained for cattle, sold in order to buy grain fell.38 Retrospective interviews 
of camp inmates in Korem, Alamata and Qobbo shelters showed a pattern of response 
to increasing hardship which developed over up to three years prior to the onset of the 
famine.39 From these interviews, the path towards destitution for farmers was put 
together. It began with reduced crops and grazing. Small-scale farmers, whether tenants 
or family-land (rist) holders lost cattle, then oxen, through death or enforced sale. They 
ran out of seed, particularly when a second planting was necessary after a false start to 
rains. Dependents (e.g. divorced sisters and young kinsmen, given food and shelter in 
return for labour) and servants were evicted to fend for themselves and were amongst 
the first to gravitate towards the towns. As crisis approached, the farmers were forced 
to sell their livestock, pawn or even sell their land and, in the last instance, the wood 
from which their houses was built. Tenants were evicted from the land by landlords 
who undertook planting with the labour of their own kin. Far more men than usual left
36 ibid., pp. 1-8
37 ibid., p. 2
38 Pastoralists in Ethiopia tend to meet about half their calorie requirement through exchanging animals 
for grain. J. Rivers, J. Holt, J. Seaman, & Bowden, ‘Lessons for epidemiology from the Ethiopian 
famines’ A n n a les Soc ie te  B eige  de  M edecine T rop ica le , 56 (1976), p. 354 cited in Sen, P overty  a n d  
F a m in es , p. 105
39 G. M. Mahari et al., P ro file  o f  W ollo  under fa m in e : survey M arch-A pril 1974  (Ethiopian Nutrition 
Institute: Addis Ababa, 1974), cited in Holt & Seaman, ‘The scope of the drought’, p. 4
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their families on the land and went in search of daily labour or harvest work to local 
towns, to the Setit-Humera cash-cropping region of Begemdir along the Sudan border, 
or to the cotton plantations on the Awash river in southern Wollo. Meanwhile the wives 
and children sought shelter with relatives or came to the towns to beg and seek relief.
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Map 3.2: Ethiopia - famine stricken zones 1971-75
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Source: Mehari Gebre-Medhin & Bo Vahlquist, ‘Famine in Ethiopia - the period 1973-75’ Nutrition Reviews, 35 
(1977), p. 196
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The group that suffered most from the famine were the Afar pastoralists who 
inhabited the middle and lower Awash Valley. Famine had already arrived in early 1972 
and the cumulative effect of eviction from their dry-weather grazing pastures, which 
had since the 1960s been ‘developed’ for growing commercial crops - particularly 
cotton and sugar- by a few big companies; and constriction of their movement by 
increasing armed clashes with their nomadic neighbours and competitors, the Issa, 
deprived them of the means of responding to that threat.40 Another group who suffered 
severely were the farmers in the middle-altitude areas of northern and central Wollo. 
Those who suffered most were tenants. The Raya and Azebo Oromo had been reduced 
to that state by ‘massive land alienation after they participated in the Weyane revolt 
against Haile Selassie in 1943.’41 Others had been forced to mortgage or sell their land 
by the stresses of repeated harvest failures in the early 1970s and by 1973 the 
enforcement of crippling tenancy contracts reduced them to starvation at the same time 
as grain was being exported from the area to the provincial capital Dessie, and to Addis 
Ababa42 In Tigray the famine appeared much less severe, despite the prevalence of 
drought. The difference was largely accounted for by the different systems of land 
tenure as in Tigray most farmers owned their own land 43
In December, 1972 the Ethiopian Red Cross was helping over a thousand 
refugees from Wollo who had arrived outside Addis Ababa, the Afar featuring 
prominently among them. By the beginning of 1973, it was apparent that a serious 
problem was at hand, but it was not until the end of February that the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation issued its Early Warning Food Shortage report and not until 
April that the Ethiopian government requested aid through the international agencies.44 
Reports of the impending situation had started to reach the outside world by the spring
40 See Helmut Kloos, ‘Development, drought, and famine in the awash valley of Ethiopia’ A frica n  
S tu d ie s  R ev iew , 25  (December 1982), pp. 21-48; Maknun Gamaledinn, ‘State policy and famine in the 
awash valley of Ethiopia: the lessons for conservation’ inD. Anderson &R. Grove (eds.), 
C onserva tion  in  A frica : p eo p le , p o lic ie s  a n d  p ra c tice  (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1987), 
pp. 327-344; Glynn Hood, ‘Nomadism and its future: the Afar’ in Hussein (ed.), R ehab, pp. 64-66
41 Africa Watch, E v il D ays, p. 60
42 ibid., p. 60
43 K. J. Lundstrom, N o rth -E ast E th iop ia : so c ie ty  in fa m in e  (Uppsala, 1976) cited in Africa Watch, E v il 
D a ys, p. 60
44 Miller & Holt, ‘The Ethiopian famine’, p. 169
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of 1973. On 22 March 1973, the Secretary for Social Affairs in the Ethiopian Church 
cabled the World Council of Churches in Geneva: ‘Wollo Province drought-stricken. 
Many dying. Mass exodus to other provinces. 2000 people without shelter and food. 
Emergency aid needed urgently.’45 With the almost complete failure of the spring rains 
of 1973, the situation deteriorated. Yet the regional authorities and the central 
government still remained officially reluctant to acknowledge it. Wolde Mariam has 
documented how it was only pressure from the University of Addis Ababa and 
Parliament, coupled with increasing public reporting by individuals and journalists that 
forced the government to act and send the first 10,000 quintals of grain to Wollo and 
northern Shewa to help victims of ‘drought’ in April.46 Finally, on 27 April 1973, the 
Amharic daily newspaper Addis Zemen reported the official request for outside 
assistance. It was estimated from official records that nearly 2 million people were 
affected, and the grain required was calculated as of the order of 50,000 tons a month.47 
It was not however until September 1973, at the end of the starvation crisis, that the 
first international relief teams arrived and not until November 1973 that the first 
shipment of foreign relief grain arrived.48
The 1973 planting season heralded a general break in the drought in the 
northeast and rainfall in the two subsequent seasons was adequate, allowing for an 
increased concentration on rehabilitation and development measures. While the situation 
slowly improved in Wollo and Tigray, it deteriorated in other parts of the country. Poor 
rains during mid-1973 resulted in a crisis in the south, affecting principally Harerghe 
and to a lesser extent Bale and Sidamo. The worst affected area was the Ogaden, 
Harerghe’s southern province. This lowland area had experienced erratic rainfall from 
1969 onwards. The area’s vulnerability had been further increased by the effects of a 
punitive campaign of pacification in the Ogaden, following resistance against taxation in 
the mid-1960s. Africa Watch has documented how the cumulative effect of ‘economic
45 Cited in Mehari Gebre-Medhin & Bo Vahlquist, ‘Famine in Ethiopia - the period 1973-75’, N utritio n  
R e v ie w s , 35 (1977), p. 196
46 Wolde Mariam, R u ra l V ulnerability , pp. 43-50
47 J. Mason & R. W. Hay & J. Holt, J. Seaman & M. R. Bowden, ‘Nutritional lessons from the 
Ethiopian drought’ N ature , 248 (April 19, 1974), p. 647
48 Holt & Seaman, ‘The scope of the drought’, p. 3
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war’ and a policy of encouraging Amhara farmers to settle in the more fertile areas, 
especially around Jijiga, deprived the Ogaden pastoralists of use rights.49 Lack of 
access to these pastures was to become critical when drought struck in 1973-74, 
following a general failure of the 1973 autumn rains. Also badly hit were the Issa 
Somalis in the Issa Desert who were themselves suffering from loss of pastures to 
immigrant fanners, restrictions on movement, and armed clashes with the Afar (conflict 
intensified by structural changes to both Afar and Issa production strategies).50 From 
May 1974, thousands of people, mostly pastoralists, flocked into some 18 relief 
centers. A surveillance team in the Ogaden in May 1974, reported that the worst affects 
of the drought had occurred in the Ogaden with death rates about three times their 
normal and with the majority of livestock lost.51 It reported that without food 
distribution famine would result. In the event the 1974 autumn rains (October - 
November) in the Ogaden failed and by early 1975, 80,000 people were living in relief 
camps.52
1 .3  A political economy o f famine in Ethiopia 1971-75
The famines in northeast and southeast Ethiopia arose from a combination of 
four processes: the erosion of rural production systems; the failure of market strategies; 
the failure of non-market survival strategies; and the inadequacy of relief.
The first process of famine, a sharp decline in assets and production, emerged 
from a long history of exploitative processes in the geographical areas affected, 
processes that had created famine in the past (see above). Further such processes had 
impoverished some while conferring benefits on groups with superior access to political 
power. Vulnerability had arisen through lack of political power as much as lack of 
purchasing power. Of course, not every group that benefited from famine deliberately 
set out to create it. The point is that in order to understand the process of famine both
49 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 71
50 ibid,, pp. 72-73
51 Jolm Seaman, Julius Holt & John Rivers, ‘Harerghe under Drought’ (RRC: Addis Ababa, 1974) cited 
in Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 73
52Holt & Seaman, ‘The scope of the drought’, pp. 1-8
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sides of the coin - the ‘winners’ as well as the ‘losers’ - need to be addressed. In the
northeast it was the Afar pastoralists and tenants in the middle-altitude areas of northern
and central Wollo, especially in Raya and Azebo, who suffered most. In the south, it
was the Ogaden and Issa Somali herdsmen. In each case, it was the conjuncture of
structural changes affecting local economies with drought that created famine. An
anthropologist working with the Afar at the time, graphically described this conjunction:
‘their [the Afar] relative autonomy has been severely threatened since the early 
1960s by the establishment, with the aid of massive investments of foreign 
capital, of highly profitable irrigated agricultural units in the Awash Valley. The 
effect of development on the pastoral economy has been belittled by those 
concerned, but there is no doubt that the Great Famine of 1972/3 owed much to 
it.’53
In the Ogaden, it has been argued that it was the counter-insurgency strategies of the
imperial state which created famine when drought struck in 1973-74. Two separate
insurgencies during the 1960s and 1970s, one centered in the Ogaden and the other in
Harerghe had led to ‘punitive expeditions , which killed or confiscated large number of
animals, depriving the pastoral communities of the basis for their survival.’54 A key
element to the pacification campaign in the Ogaden was the government control of water
points. As one analyst observed:
‘a network of functioning wells is crucial to the mobility which herders need in 
order to seek out seasonal pastures. There are many reports of the wells dug by 
the Ogaden people themselves being poisoned. New reservoirs (birkas) were 
built by the government, but primarily to serve the interests of settler farmers 
and townspeople.’55
In many ways, the famine can usefully be seen as a deepening of exploitative processes 
- major land alienation, restriction on movements etc. - already existing in normal times.
In addition to forcible alienation of resources and violence, elsewhere the 
evidence of an impoverished social system was overwhelming. The northern centered 
famine occurred at a time when the country had sufficient food supplies. As Mejid 
Hussein argues, ‘the worst affected areas of both Wello and Tigrai could have been 
supplied from the surplus of nearby Gojjam and Begemdir-Simien.’56 Groups of people
53 Hood, ‘Nomadism and its future’, p. 64
54 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 71
55 ibid., p. 72
56 Abdul Mejid Hussein, ‘The political economy of the famine in Ethiopia’, in Hussein ( e d Rehab, p. 
33
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starved to death in Ethiopia, not because of an extreme shortage of food but because the 
food was not distributed.57 Drawing from the Commission of Inquiry into the Wollo 
famine of 1973s8, Wolde Mariam has documented the elaborate and coordinated efforts 
of state officials at national and provincial levels to cover-up the Wollo famine and 
prevent relief assistance.59 He gives evidence that ‘Government officials at all levels ... 
had information on the imminent famine at least six months in advance, and in many 
cases more than a year in advance.’60 Reports had been reaching the Ministry of the 
Interior, via Dessie, consistently from as early as August 1971 that food aid was needed 
in many awraias (provinces) of Wollo. The Commissioner’s report pointed out that 
there was a surplus of food in other regions of the country as well as in parts of Wollo 
at the time and that the crisis would have been contained if the available resources of the 
country had been sufficiently mobilised for the purpose.61 The Ministry of Agriculture 
was certainly aware of the severe food shortages that threatened Wollo by November 
1972, following its own qualitative survey of the country’s crops.62 Yet the information 
was not made public. It was not until March 1973 that the completed crop report was 
published and then given only an extremely limited circulation. The Report covered 
82% of the total number of weredas (districts) and gave ‘by and large a reasonably 
complete picture of the staple grain production for the areas surveyed.’63 Its authors 
gave a clear warning of the impending disaster in Wollo and also of the precarious 
situation in the lowland and mainly easterly crop producing areas of Eritrea, Tigray and 
Shew a:
‘the most serious problem is centered in the lowland areas east of the 
escarpment road in Tigray and Wollo and the lowlands of northern Shewa with 
a less serious problem appearing in Eritrea, Harerghe and Begemdir-and- 
Simien. The nomadic areas of Geleb and Hamer Baco in Gemu Gofa has also 
reported drought and famine conditions for the past two years and the situation
57 Girma Kebbede, The S ta te  a n d  D evelopm ent in E th iop ia  (Humanities Press: New Jersey, 1992), p, 
76
58 Commission of Inquiry, The D e ta ils  o f  the  W ello F a m in e , (in Amkaric, Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, 
Tiqimt 1968). The Commission was established by die military government to investigate why and 
how famine occurred. It reported its findings in October 1975.
59 Wolde Mariam, R ura l V ulnerability , pp. 40-51
60 ibid., p. 42
61 Rahmato, F a m in e  a n d  Su rv iva l S tra teg ies , p. 102
62 Hussein, ‘The political economy of the famine in Ethiopia’, p. 23
63 ibid., pp. 9-43
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reportedly has become worse this year. Also the nomadic area of Awsa awraia
[province] in Wollo is suffering from continued drought.’64
In August 1973, two consultants to United Nations Children’s Fund visited 
Wollo and prepared a report on the famine conditions that detailed the estimated number 
of deaths and the sufferings of the survivors. One copy reached ministerial level, 
whereupon an order was issued that the report should be suppressed. When it was 
suggested that the report might help to attract international donations, the vice-Minister 
of Planning responded: ‘if we have to describe the situation in the way you have in 
order to generate international assistance, then we don’t want that assistance. The 
embarrassment to the government isn’t worth it. Is that perfectly clear?’65 Among the 
sixty or so officials executed by the military authorities in November 1974 for various 
political offenses, at least four were directly implicated in this cover-up of the Wollo 
famine.66
By the time drought arrived in Ethiopia, traditional systems of production and of 
famine protection had evidently been eroded by a number of political and economic 
developments. Relations between local authority and the imperial state had been recast 
reducing accountability between government policy and the state of the local economy: 
‘in the new relationship, local leadership received state sanction less from the successful 
manipulation of local legitimacy than from the ability to draw on personal support and 
armaments from the central state.’67 Meanwhile national economic policy channeled 
investment into large cash-crop enterprises such as those in the Awash valley, while a 
steady stream of cheap labour was supplied by the pauperisation of the highland 
environment, through surplus-extraction and lack of investment. For the Ogaden, Issa 
and Afar nomads, as for the Raya and Azebo Oromos, the experience of famine was not 
about starvation but about the survival of a way of life, their political survival.68 The
64 Cited in ibid., p. 23
65 Jack Shepherd, The Politics of Starvation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington 
DC, 1976), p. 33
66 Rahmato, F a m in e  a n d  Surv iva l S tra teg ies, p. 102
67 McCann, F rom  P overty  to F a m in e  in N ortheast E th iop ia , p. 110
68Flood, ‘Nomadism and it future’, pp. 64-66
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famine process was fundamentally about politics and processes of modern state 
formation.69
The second process of famine was the failure of the victims’ market strategies. 
Sen has published data collected at the time by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture 
which suggests that of the 14 districts in Ethiopia only 7% had a substantially below 
normal output of food grains.70 He concluded that there was ‘very little evidence of a 
dramatic decline of food availability in Ethiopia coinciding with the famine.’71 Yet while 
there was no noticeable food availability decline for Ethiopia as a whole in the famine 
year of 1973, there was clearly a shortage of food in the province of Wollo. Why then 
did food not move into Wollo from the rest of Ethiopia, what was the relationship 
between the famine victims and their local markets?
The behaviour of markets during the crisis in Wollo has been interpreted 
differently. Sen has argued that grain prices did not rise very far or for very long during 
the 1972-73 Wollo famine. He used wholesale prices from the provincial capital of 
Dessie in southern Wollo to support his case, arguing that Ethiopian subsistence 
farmers derived their food entitlements substantially from their own production, and 
were unable to buy food, even at normal prices, when their crops failed. Market failure 
in Wollo was thus interpreted as a direct result of the low purchasing power in the 
province.72 Seaman and Holt have argued, on the other hand, that grain prices did rise 
to exceptional heights during the famine, indicating that there was a problem of supply 
and not just demand. They observed that by the middle of 1973, grain prices in the 
capital of Wollo, Dessie, had approached twice their normal level, whilst a flow of 
grain out of the province to Addis Ababa and Asmara continued. By the end of 
September 1973, however, grain prices had returned to within 15% of the recent pre­
drought level.73 The main harvest would not be in until the end of the year, and relief
69 ‘The case of northeast highlands ... provides ample evidence that not all areas and all peoples of 
northern Ethiopia benefited from the process of modem state formation.’ McCann, From Poverty to 
Famine in Northeast Ethiopia, p. 4
70 Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 90
71 ibid., p. 92
72 ibid., p. I l l
73 Holt & Seaman, ‘The scope of the drought’, pp. 1-8
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grain from outside the area had reached only a small proportion of the population, in
tonnages that were unlikely to have affected the local market so significantly. The
explanation provided by Seaman and Holt indicated a broader political-economy
analysis of markets and price behaviour:
‘whilst thousands of families came to the very end of their resources during this 
period, there were many others, particularly in the highlands, who withheld 
their stocks from the market until they were confident that the 1973 main season 
would give them a reasonable return on their planting, and then in late August or 
September began to sell their stocks on the market again.’74
The implication was that economic phenomena could not be properly understood
without an analysis not only of the political context in which prices were created but
also the ways in which certain groups were able actively to shape markets and to benefit
from the price changes that accompanied famine. This was a fundamental departure
from Sen’s economic approach.
Other analyses of market failure in Wollo, have stressed their isolated and
fragmented nature. Devereux has argued that markets generally fail in rural Africa when
‘self-provisioning food producers suddenly become market-dependent consumers.575
He argued that the fact that traders fail to meet rural needs for food is not entirely
because of lack of entitlements (‘pull failure’) but because of the ‘distortion of normal
market activities which this dramatic transformation entails.’76 Village markets in
famine-prone areas of Ethiopia were small and isolated. A 1983 survey by the Ministry
of Agriculture and Food and Agriculture Organisation found that Wollo peasants were
far less integrated into the market economy than other peasants in Ethiopia.77 During the
1972-74 famine, the demand for food rose, but this was a temporary, localized
phenomenon. Recognizing this limited scope for profiteering or being unable to
logistically supply unusual markets, traders simply continued supplying their usual
customers in towns and cities. The ‘transaction costs’ of high transport costs and of
74 ibid., pp. 1-8
75 Devereux, Theories o f Famine, p. 186
76 ibid., p. 186
77 C. Tagoe, Ethiopian Highlands Reclamation Study: a tentative review of agriculture in the Highlands 
(MoA-FAO: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 1983) cited in Rahmato, Famine and Survival 
Strategies, p. 58
132
temporarily reorienting trading routes dissuaded traders from abandoning their larger,
permanent markets in the cities. As Devereux observed:
‘the more isolated and fragmented markets are, the greater the incentive for 
traders and producers to hoard food for speculative or precautionary purposes, 
and the more likely it is that those markets that do exist will become completely 
distorted during a local food shortage.’78
Griffin and Hay have identified grain price variability, both over time and between
villages which are fairly close together, as evidence of fragmented markets in Ethiopia,
and they have differentiated between the effects of patchy infrastructure development
and market imperfections, placing both in a political context:
‘the evidence thus points to a highly fragmented market with very imperfect 
flows of grain and information .... the most obvious reason for the limited 
movement of grain is the nature of the roads and the limited access they provide 
to rural areas. Grain may have to be packed by mule for days to reach a market 
where merchants are buying. Furthermore the road system has been developed 
to serve Addis Ababa. Direct inter-regional links are non-existent... a 
combination of demand pattern, the political imperative to feed the urban 
population and poorly distributed transport infrastructure determines the pattern 
of grain flows, leaving much of the rural areas isolated and without access to the 
national market. ...Often the market, such as it is, breaks down entirely and 
there is little or no trading in areas where production has been disrupted by 
drought. ’ 79
A pattern of price ripples identified as a feature of the 1974 famine by Seaman and Holt 
lends support to this ‘market fragmentation’ analysis of the famine.80 They have 
suggested that prices rise in a series of ‘ripples’ around a food shortage region as those 
afflicted migrate to neighbouring markets where food is more readily available. This 
observation contradicts the neoclassical economist’s belief that the ‘invisible hand’ of 
market allocation will ensure that food supplies move in response to price signals, from 
surplus to deficit areas. The ‘price ripple hypothesis’ reflects the reality of the 
breakdown of markets and market signals which typically accompany a crop failure in 
isolated, self-provisioning communities.
Importantly, certain groups with superior access to state power were able to 
benefit from the price changes that accompanied the famine:
78 Devereux, Theories of Famine, p. 99
79 K. Griffin and R. Hay, ‘Problems of agricultural development in socialist Ethiopia: an overview and 
a suggested survey’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 13 (October 1985), pp. 46-49
80 J. Seaman & J. Holt, ‘Markets and famines in the Third World’ Disasters, 4 (1980), pp. 283-297
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‘wealthy landlords and village chiefs, able to withstand the effects of the 
drought, have taken the opportunity to buy land and cattle from destitute 
peasants only too eager to sell their property for a pittance to buy food.’81
One group particularly ‘decimated by the market mechanism’82 were pastoralists forced
to make distress sales due to exceptional cash needs at a time when the exchange rates
between animals and grains were unfavourable. A detailed survey of market prices
conducted by Seaman, Holt and Rivers showed how the exchange rates between
animals and grain collapsed in a dramatic manner in the southern famine areas of
Harerghe.83 This decline in exchange position was coupled with the loss of animals
during the drought. Sen has calculated the percentage losses of grain entitlement from
animal holding as 84% for southern Ogaden, 86% for northern Ogaden and 92% for the
Issa desert.84 Thus characteristics of exchange relations between the pastoral and the
agricultural economies contributed to the starvation of the herdsmen by making price
movements reinforce the decline in the livestock quantity. The failure of the government
to intervene in the situation reflected the marginalisation of the pastoralists.
Changing prices in grain and animal markets give important insights into the
evolution of the famine process. Yet these economic phenomena cannot be properly
understood unless the political context in which prices were created and the ways in
which certain groups were able to benefit from the price changes that accompanied
famine, are analysed. In this respect the lack of physical infrastructure (roads) and
market infrastructure (cash available for food purchase) in Ethiopia underscored the
inability of the regional or local economies to interact with the national level. Famine
highlighted this relationship. Moreover normative patterns of resource distribution were
intensified during famine. As McCann has argued:
‘the response to drought and subsequent famine is not chaotic, but is a process 
determined by pre-existing social and economic institutions ... further, the 
effects of drought are distributed unevenly, in that they include a process of 
relative enrichment for some households just as they represent tragedy for 
others.’85
81 The Sunday Times, 25 November 1973
82 Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 112
83 Seaman, Holt and Rivers, ‘Harerghe under Drought’ ,(RRC: Addis Ababa, 1974) cited in ibid., pp. 
105-108
84 ibid., p. 109
85 McCann, ‘The social impact of drought in Ediiopia’, p. 247
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The failure of market strategies can not simply be understood as a failure of 
‘entitlements’ but needs to be seen as a process in which assets are transferred from 
victim to beneficiary groups in a context of acute political powerlessness on the part of 
the victims.
The failure of non-market survival strategies was another critical element in the 
evolution of the famine. These strategies included rationing consumption, gathering 
wild foods, finding new sources of income, calling on remittances from families or 
redistributive mechanisms within the community, freedom of movement, the use of 
grain stored from previous harvests and attempts to call upon political accountability. 
While some non-market strategies clearly offered valuable protection to some 
individuals and groups of individuals during the famine, we shall consider those 
strategies that were severely constrained in the context of the famine, notably by the 
influence of political factors.
The negative impact of restrictions on mobility has already been mentioned with 
regard to pastoral production systems. Mobility was crucial to the Afar, Ogadeni and 
Issa pastoralists. In times of drought, when resources were short, this ability to move 
freely over large distances became a vital survival strategy and means of securing 
livelihoods. Yet alienation of pasture and restrictions on movement had seriously 
reduced the ability of each of these groups to survive. The result was social breakdown 
and a desperate flight into relief camps - a highly publicised famine response but a 
severely limited and misunderstood one.
For particular groups of farmers in northeast Ethiopia, the slow on-set of famine 
and a history of exploitative economic processes had constrained the options for non- 
market strategies. Poorer tenants, indebted to and tied to their landlords, were prevented 
from migrating86; few households were able to rely on grain surpluses stored from 
previous harvests87; and lack of capital formation reduced options for strategic risk- 
management. Further, the evidence suggests that the survival strategies employed were
86 A. P. Wood, ‘Fanners’ responses to drought in Ethiopia’ in Hussein (ed.), Rehab, pp. 67-88
87 ibid., pp. 67-88
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those typically employed at a later, more desperate, stage of an evolving crisis88; that 
they involved a costly commitment of domestic resources; and a commitment that was 
in many instances irreversible. Sale of livestock, land and domestic assets - the last 
resort of an under-capitalised household unit - all jeopardised future rehabilitation. In 
the context of underdevelopment, survival strategies represented a deepening of 
processes of economic marginalisation and asset divestiture.
Finally, a crucial non-market survival strategy that ultimately failed was 
recourse to protest and supplication. The right to petition the Emperor had been a right 
of every Ethiopian citizen.89 In November 1972, the Emperor Haile Selassie visited 
Wollo. His itinerary was secretly changed at the last moment so that he would avoid 
meeting 20,000 villagers who had assembled in the market at Dessie to request Imperial 
charity. Similarly, two marches of up to fifteen thousand destitute villagers from Wollo 
and Gonder to Addis Ababa were halted by roadblocks thirty kilometers from the 
capital. Rahmato interprets the peasants’ convergence on centres of authority as a 
manifestation of a peculiarly Ethiopian tradition of supplication, which doubles as an act 
of silent protest. He wrote, ‘both the “supplicants” and the men of authority for whose 
attention the convergence is made understand the deeper meaning of this symbolic 
performance.’90 Such actions failed. As described above, the government, despite other 
warnings of the possibility of severe famine, had chosen to ignore it. Proud, afraid of 
losing face and not wishing anything to upset preparations for the lavish celebrations of 
the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, due to be 
held in May 1973, the government attempted to cover up the crisis.
The fourth process creating famine was the failure of famine relief. Just as 
market mechanisms could not be relied upon to distribute food resources in ways that 
would have prevented famine, so the evidence concerning Haile Selassie’s notorious 
attempts to conceal the existence of famine in Wollo, suggested that the same was true
88 See Keen, F am ine, N eeds-A ssessm en t a n d  Surviva l S trategies, p. 19
89 Rahmato, F a m in e  a n d  Surv iva l S tra teg ies
90 Dessalegn Rahmato, ‘Famine in peasant consciousness: aspects of symbolic culture in rural 
Ethiopia’ (Addis Ababa University, July 1989), p. 15 cited in De Waal, ‘Human rights’, Chapter 6, p. 
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of institutional mechanisms. The inability of particular groups to command food
reflected not simply a lack of purchasing power within the market but also a lack of
lobbying power within national (and international) institutions.
By the time relief was initiated in northern Ethiopia, the first step in the fight
against famine - acknowledging its existence - had been missed. Rahmato has written
that ‘if the cover-up of the famine revealed the callousness of imperial bureaucracy, the
pervasive corruption that thrived throughout the famine in Wollo showed the greed of
local officialdom’91 and goes on to cite examples of local officials selling food aid to
private soldiers instead of distributing it to the needy; of disrupting efforts by charity
organizations to carry out relief work; and of forcing peasants fleeing from the famine
zones to pay a travel tax to enable passage through the famine affected areas.’92 Africa
Confidential reported that the failure of the government to deal with the drought.
‘showed up once again the inefficiency of the country’s rural administration 
which is very largely controlled, not by the central government, but by local 
notables whose main aim is their own self-enrichment rather than the welfare of 
the rural population as a whole.’93
Thus, even once acknowledged, there existed no functioning mechanisms for the
responsible delivery of large-scale humanitarian relief. No preparations had been made
to accommodate the growing stream of refugees who began arriving from the
countryside at the roadside towns from at least March 1973. The local authorities
responded haphazardly by erecting temporary shelters. Food supplies had not yet been
established and the construction of latrines was begun through force of circumstance
after the shelters were already occupied, resulting in a high incidence of enteric
infections. Most camps lacked, until nearly the end of the year, resources and personnel
which meant overcrowding, a lack of sanitation or routine hygiene and indifferent
medical attention.
Equally slow to respond were the international aid agencies. It was estimated 
that the ‘starvation crisis reached a peak in August 1973, when over 60,000 people 
were crowded round relief camps which could not deal with a third of their number,
91 Rahmato, Famine and Survival Strategies, p. 102
92 ibid., p. 102
93 ‘Ethiopia: the emperor’s new clothes’ Africa Confidential, 22 March 1974, p. 1
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and many more flooded into the towns.’94 By the time foreign relief arrived some two 
months later, the camp populations had dwindled to 15,000, less than 1% of the 
affected population.95 It was not clear how many of the original people had died and 
how many had returned to their villages or migrated out of the province. What was clear 
was the inability of particular groups to command accountability and lobbying power 
within international institutions. The appropriateness of the types of food relief 
imported and distributed by most external agencies was also called into question. These 
showed:
‘an overemphasis on providing protein, regardless of energy intakes, 
particularly since the local protein supplement ‘Faffa’ was available to meet any 
extra protein requirement. Examples of foods supplied by foreign agencies are 
sweetened milk, protein biscuits, baby foods packed in individual portions, 
protein ‘tonic’ and of course, dried skimmed milk. These were neither locally 
acceptable, nor suitable for treatment or prevention of malnutrition, nor indeed 
had most of them been requested.’96
Misconceptions about the nature of famine were also apparent in the donors response, 
having important effects. This could be seen in the donor’s preoccupation with relief 
camps. In both the north and south, this resulted in increased mortality and most 
importantly, a deepening of destitution. In both instances, it reflected the donors 
inability to engage with, or take account of the political and economic processes creating 
famine. Misconceptions about the nature of famine could also be seen in the donor’s 
delayed intervention in the south. In their assessment of the Ogaden areas of the Harar 
province in 1974, Seaman and Holt discovered that five out of the six indices they had 
used to measure famine conditions showed high abnormality: mortality among the 
young was high; livestock losses were unusually heavy; grain prices had climbed up 
steeply while cattle prices were low or stable; there was a high rate of ‘rural’ out­
migration; and an unusually large number of people were in debt. On the positive side, 
they found that there was no serious malnutrition among children in the area who were 
given anthropometric tests. The final verdict of the authors was that the area was not 
suffering from famine.97 Famine was thus defined in terms of nutritional crises and little
94 Holt & Seaman, ‘The scope of the drought’, pp. 1-8
95 Mason & Hay & Holt, Seaman & Bowden, ‘Nutritional lessons’, p. 647
96 ibid., p. 649
97 Rahmato, Famine and Survival Strategies, p. 122
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attention was paid to the processes by which people had become and were becoming 
vulnerable. As a result little was done to pre-empt or prevent the ‘event’ which did 
indeed arrive in all its desperate and media-recognisable forms a few months later.
The above analysis has highlighted two key issues. Firstly that famine in 
Ethiopia in the 1970s had deep historical, political and environmental roots. In this 
respect, the famine can usefully be seen as a deepening of exploitative processes already 
existing in ‘normal’ conditions, a continuation and exaggeration of long-standing 
conflict over resources and a means of maximising the benefits of economic 
transactions. This implies that there may have been beneficiaries as well as victims of 
the famine and that the shock of drought can only be understood in terms of an entire 
political economy.
Secondly, that the international response to famine was inadequate: there was a 
serious delay in relief distribution in both the northern and southern regions 
succumbing to famine; and relief, when it did arrive, was often inappropriate. In part, 
this was due to structural difficulties. The Ethiopian government’s continual denial of 
the famine exposed the dilemma that until a sovereign government appealed for help, 
the international agencies could not volunteer it. But it was also due to the way in which 
discourse about famine was generated and put to use. Famine was constructed by the 
donors as a disaster event, characterised by starvation. It was the fact of famine’s 
occurrence, and particularly its biological manifestations, to which institutional attention 
was overwhelmingly directed. This donors failed to take vigorous action on relief until 
after the worst of the famine had been given widespread publicity, by the Jonathan 
Dimblebly television broadcast. Focused on the current crisis situation, donors tended 
to neglect the specificity of the context in which the famine had developed and the 
means by which it was progressing. In effect, famine was removed from its socio­
economic and political context into the realm of biological regulation and control by 
humanitarian institutions. The following section looks specifically at CA’s response to 
the famine and at how it positioned itself within this ‘official discourse’.
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2 . Christian Aid and the 1971-75 Famine
2 .1  A background to Christian Aid and famine in Ethiopia
CA’s experience of famine in Ethiopia predated that of the 1970s. In 1966, the
agency became involved in the Wag-Lasta famine, in northern Ethiopia. This section
looks at how CA dealt with the challenge. Wolde Mariam has documented how the
Wag-Lasta famine, like the Wollo famine that was soon to follow, was treated with
official indifference and at times, open hostility and that it remained ‘unknown to most
Ethiopians, let alone to the outside world.’98 Information on the impending disaster
reached the Ethiopian Ministry of Interior in October 1965. No action was taken and by
August 1966 the situation had deteriorated sharply with reports of severe starvation and
deaths. In September 1966 the Emperor ordered the Ministry of Finance to make a sum
of 220,000 Ethiopian Birr available to Wollo. This decision to do something was made
almost one year after the information had reached the Ministry of Interior. People had
already started dying. Wolde Mariam documents how even then official indifference
and bureaucratic inefficiency resulted in an ineffective and irresponsible relief effort.99
CA learnt of the Wag-Lasta famine in early 1967 when a photographer,
Margaret Murray, contracted to take photos of Sudanese refugees in Western Ethiopia
went to Wollo province and brought back disturbing photographs. It was partly as a
result of her visit, that the famine became ‘public’ in England and other NGOs began to
make their own inquiries. By April, through its’ representative in Ethiopia, Rev’d
Robert Huddleson, sponsored to assist and support the Inter-Church Aid Committee of
the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia, CA received confirmation of the situation:
‘without doubt there is a famine situation in Northern Ethiopia. The areas 
mainly affected are the provinces of Wag and Lasta ... the basic cause of the 
food shortage is a failure of the rains for nearly three years. This has been 
aggravated by disease and the extreme difficulty of communication ... estimates 
of the numbers who have died range from 2,000 to 20,000 and it is nearly 
impossible to get reliable statistics on the subject.’100
98 Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability, p. 37
99 ibid., pp. 37-39
100 R. Huddleson, ‘Preliminary report: famine area in northern Ethiopia’ (26 April 1967), 
(SOAS.CA/A/2.2)
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The famine was ‘public’ yet CA faced difficulties as to ‘how’ to get involved.
From the Public Health College at Gonder, via the British Embassy, CA learnt that, ‘the
area worst hit, Lasta, is remote, and the Ethiopian authorities, as a matter of deliberate
policy, are denying that there is any crisis. Food supplies for the region are held up in
Asmara and there is talk of peculation of the relief supplies by the District
Governors.’101 Correspondence between the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa and
H.I.H. Princess Ruth Desta in March 1967 indicated the major difficulty that faced
northern NGOs wishing to intervene:
‘before Oxfam can do anything, there needs to be an official request from the 
responsible body in Ethiopia. I have written to the Secretary of the Famine 
Relief Committee asking for his advice, but it may be that a request for help 
should come through the Ministry of the Interior.102
Similarly, CA had to wait upon a definite project proposal from the Ethiopian Inter-
Church Aid Committee - which itself required implicit if not explicit imperial sanction -
before it felt able to act. Even then, there was little strategic idea about what CA should
be doing to help but more a feeling within the London office that CA should at least do
something: ‘as we seem to have brought the news of this famine to England, it would
seem appropriate that we should do what we can.’103 Indeed a policy conflict had
already emerged between CA’s London office and its representative in the field, Rev’d
Robert Huddleson. Huddleson explained his inaction within the Inter-Church Aid
Committee thus:
Ethiopians are proud people and like to deal with their own internal problems. 
They do not like to be forced by outside pressure to accept aid which they are 
not ready to ask for, or to use
- food is available in Addis Ababa, so we have not offered more at this stage 
because it too might lie in Addis Ababa for a long time
- money aid might also remain in the bank, or might be used for some other 
purpose than was intended
- no clear plan seemed to be formulated by the committee [Inter-Church Aid 
Committee] and no local personnel seemed to be mobilised to help.’104
101 Cited in R. Huddleson, ‘Famine in Wollo province, Ethiopia: Wag and Lasta provincial areas’ (n.d), 
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Huddleson felt that the Orthodox Church, CA’s natural partner, was not yet capable of
handling relief; that as the issue was not being pushed in Ethiopia, there was a danger
of overriding local initiatives and imposing aid, a feature of unpopular ‘missionary’
endeavours of the past and a sensitive issue within the ecumenical movement105; and
that there was inadequate information on the situation: ‘Inter-Church Aid has been
trying since last Christmas to marshal the facts, but has encountered great difficulties ...
in establishing the truth.’106 However by April 1967, Huddleson reported that ‘thinking
is now on a constructive basis with an idea of future prevention rather than present
cure, and there are now responsible people in the area who can direct and supervise any
development work.’ 107 Yet the conclusion drawn by Huddleson that ‘Inter-Church Aid
will be requested, when there is something positive to request it for’ and that in the
‘meantime if some have died or are dying, we can only be sorry that the means are not
yet in our hands to prevent it,’ stands as an honest but regretful statement on CA’s
operational capabilities in the late 1960s.
In 1970 CA was again made aware of a general food shortage in Ethiopia and of
an official cover-up:
‘in my discussions with members of the Inter-Church Aid committee and with 
the Minister of Interior, it became clear th a t... the whole country is suffering 
from a general food shortage due to wide-spread crop failure caused by the lack 
of adequate rainfalls. ... Gojjam is supposed to be the major grain supplying 
province in Ethiopia. I was told that once there is a food problem in Gojjam, it 
is also a nationwide disaster. And that is what seems to be happening in 
Ethiopia now, although the government has so far been hesitant to say it 
publicly.’108
CA responded with an emergency allocation of £1,000 channeled through the World 
Council of Churches.
CA’s operational mechanisms in the late 1960s were incapable of dealing with 
the famine situations already emerging in Ethiopia. In the absence of effective channels 
of aid or a developed institutional structure for advocacy and education, CA was unable 
to respond either to the challenges of hunger or to official indifference. In many ways
105 R. Huddleson, letter to B. J. Dudbridge (2 May 1967), (SOAS.CA/A/2.2)
106 R. Huddleson, ‘Famine in Wollo province, Ethiopia: Wag and Lasta provincial areas’ (n.d), 
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the famine of 1966 can be seen as the forerunner to the major famines of the 1970s. 
Was CA was any more capable a decade later?
2 . 2  Christian Aid and the 1971 ”75 famine
The first part of this section looks at the nature of CA’s involvement in the 
1970s famines. Focusing on the relief interventions in the Afar rangelands and Ogaden 
lowlands, the analysis aims to highlight how particular institutional practices were 
prioritised by CA above others, how such prioritisation was linked to the dominance of 
a particular discourse and what the implications were. The second part is driven by a 
desire to find out why CA positioned itself as it did.
The famine of 1971-73 was an acute tragedy for the Afar. The extent of the 
human impact can only be estimated, but Bondestam has suggested that as many as 
30% of the Afar population perished.109 In the aftermath of famine both the government 
and international agencies, including CA, became involved in three types of 
relief/rehabilitation programmes for the Afar. These were organised through the 
Livestock and Meat Board and consisted of: (i) road building on a food for work basis; 
(ii) construction of irrigation schemes on a food-for-work basis; and (iii) restocking. 
These programmes had been part of a longer-term Afar rangelands project which had 
been originally planned by the Livestock and Meat Board under the Haile Selassie 
regime, and to which the World Bank had made a funding commitment. The worsening 
situation in 1973 had called for rapid action and it was in response to this that the 
British government, CA and Oxfam responded.110 In effect, their involvement was in 
the nature of a holding operation to cover the period before the long-term project could 
commence. From 1975 the project was taken over by the World Bank and became 
known as the North East Rangelands Development Project. The short-term aim of the 
relief and rehabilitation programme was to provide food, on a food-for-work basis to 
2,800 families continuously over two years; the longer term aim was to give the
109 Lars Bondestam, ‘People and capitalism in the north-eastern lowlands of Ethiopia’ Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 12 (1974), p. 423
110 The programme was initiated in August 1973
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opportunity for 1000 Afar families to switch out of a purely pastoral life to that of a
sedentary livelihood on irrigated farming.111 As a CA publication wrote about the
scheme, ‘Afars receive food and in return join in road construction, irrigation schemes
and planting of food crops and fodder. These will help them towards more permanent
settlement in new grazing areas unaffected by soil exhaustion.’112
This study does not question the genuine humanitarian aims of the programme,
rather it aims to point out a number of characteristics in its approach which enabled
particular models of understanding and action to be prioritised at the expense of
alternatives. To begin with, the programme’s approach was characterised by the very
poor participation of the Afar. Tensions between the aid workers and the beneficiaries
were soon to emerge:
‘one of the saddest lessons I learned is that the cultural gap between educated 
Ethiopians and the pastoralist is so great that, in spite of goodwill felt initially by 
our project managers for the Afar, in the end they finished up with a total lack of 
sympathy for the people whom they were trying to help. This is a very serious 
problem in relation to the long term development of the area.’113
Lack of participation also created problems in relation to the effective targeting of the
short-term relief - ‘selecting families to receive the herds was a problem. Many were
chosen from groups collected around food distribution centers, and those with the most
mouths to feed were given priority,’114 Secondly, it was clear that despite the ambitious
nature of the programme, there was,
‘a paucity of data on livestock production, the sociology and welfare of the 
Afars and on the ecology of the area. ...In any case, much of the information 
available came from subjective observations taken over a short period of time 
and from fairly small samples.’115
In many ways the poor record on participation emerged as a direct result of this:
‘ the main problem encountered so far has been the very great length of time 
required for the holding of discussions and getting agreement with Afar Tribal 
authorities. This has been partially due to a much more strongly-held concept of 
tribal territory than had been expected from this semi-nomadic people.’116
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Thirdly, and in the absence of locally-based knowledge, the programme’s 
approach tended to be defined by the hopes and aspirations of outsiders rather than by 
the reality of the situation. Optimistic and ambitious projections were generated. 
Typically these were revised downward as the nature of conditions emerged. Thus, 
while the original restocking programme envisaged the provision of cattle, camel, sheep 
and goats, the revised scheme provided only goats. Problems arose when the major 
source of supply, the Ogaden, dried up because of drought in that area. Consequently, 
even the revised scheme appeared over-ambitious and only limited geographical spread 
was achieved:
‘we also failed to cover as wide an area as we had originally intended. We had 
hoped to carry out work in the Afar parts of 4 awraias [province] in Wollo and 
one in Tigre. In the event our activities were almost totally confined to the one 
Aussa awraia [province] in Wollo. I also suspect that we did not get into the 
areas of greatest distress although this point is debatable.’117
Significantly, the process of revising over-optimistic projections led to an increased
distortion of participation and accountability:
‘registration has begun and is already presenting problems. Clearly the number 
of restocking units available will be much less than the numbers registered. The 
Livestock and Meat Board therefore has decided to keep secret the number of 
families it expects to restock until it has the final list of “legitimate qualifiers” 
and can determine what process of elimination will be introduced.
Doubts about the capabilities of the staff and this very process of qualification - ‘it is not
clear the Livestock and Meat Board people who are selecting the families are doing so
through the traditional as well as the official Afar leaders’119 - further exposed the
weakness of the scheme.
Finally, pursuing their own rationality, largely unhelpful policies were rendered
surprisingly unobjectionable. The road building programme was described as, ‘an
expensive way of making inferior roads’120 and a number of concerns raised:
‘another point which worries us is whether anybody will make urgent repairs to 
the road if they are cut by the rains. Also, after the rainy season will the roads 
by maintained (and upgraded) as part of a long-term road network policy for
117 Stephen Sandford, ‘Report on Livestock and Meat Board’ (2 January 1975), (OA.ETH 57)
118 Peter Oakley, memo to Humphrey Hilton (29 October 1974), (OA.ETH.57)
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Wollo or will they lapse for lack of funds in the Provincial budget for their 
maintenance.’121
To understand why sustainability and maintenance were not key issues one needs to
appreciate the rationale that lay behind the road building:
‘from my understanding of the project file, the principle purpose of this project 
is more associated with helping the Afar in a time of obvious disaster, than with 
the utility of the road building project.’122
In this respect water-logged roads did not compromise the fundamental validity of the
programme.
In the midst of the relief operation in the Afar rangelands, historically specific 
and locally based processes of famine were effectively ignored, without compromising 
the humanitarian goals of the operation. Knowledge of the specific circumstance of the 
Afar was essentially irrelevant to the apparent rationality of the programme. The 
information that gained dominance - typically focused on ‘numbers’, ‘nutritional 
deficit’, human and livestock ‘mortality’ - was that which supported the institutional 
practices - food-for-work, restocking, relief distribution. Conversely information about 
the socio-economic and political dimensions of the famine was marginalised. A focus 
on the physical needs of the Afar rendered the famine ‘knowable’, and hence ‘do-able’, 
through the application of a range of technologies. In this way famine was established 
as a subject of scientific knowledge, detached from the processes that actually underlay 
it. Moreover, the institutional practices applied to the famine had a legitimacy 
irrespective of the context in which famine arose. Thus the road-building programme 
could be judged according to the objectives of its own rationality and targets could be 
set according to the objectives of the operation rather than the reality of the social realm. 
The dominant view of the famine reflected a ‘natural disaster’ model. The programme’s 
approach was essentially technocratic. Focusing on the Afars’ physical state and on the 
precarious state of their natural environment, solutions were sought in physical 
rehabilitation and settlement.
It has been argued above that the fate of the Afar during the 1971-73 famine had
121 Humphrey Hilton, letter to Peter Oakley (2 July 1974), (OA.ETH.57)
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less to do with the direct effects of drought and soil erosion than with the direct erosion 
by the state of indigenous methods of resource conservation. It was the intrusion of 
commercial agriculture and the disruption of pastoral processes which caused the 
overgrazing, seen by some as a basic cause of plant degradation in pastoral areas, and 
not the activities of the nomads themselves.123 The construction of an apolitical 
approach to the famine and a focus on the Afars’ physical state, failed to address these 
underlying processes of asset transfer. In addition the dominance of particular 
institutional practices, linked to a ‘natural disaster’ discourse, and orientated towards 
settlement had crucial power effects. The remark of an aid worker exposed the form of 
this power:
‘We have had many problems with the Afars who are still suspicious of our 
motives but I feel that once they see something growing they will realise what 
we are trying to do. The idea of work is alien to them, they are a proud race and 
they feel that handling a shovel is degrading. It is difficult for them to make the 
transition from nomads to farmer but this project is a good starting point.’124
On the impact of such irrigated settlement schemes, Gamaledinn has written:
‘in fact, it is difficult to describe the schemes properly as settlement schemes. 
They are, in reality, relief camps in perpetuity. These camps were set up 
temporarily, so the participants are not strictly settlers, yet they are unable to 
improve their lot sufficiently to make leaving the camp a viable option. Relief of 
this type has not assisted a return to normal life for these Afar pastoralists. 
Indeed, the settlers have become a part-time wage labour force on the growing 
number of state farms.,12S
In this respect the settlement schemes represented a continuation and deepening of 
processes initiated in the 1960s.
Institutional practices supported by CA were more reflective of an official 
discourse that constructed famine as a disaster event than of the actual needs and 
processes operating at the ground level. An exclusive focus on the Afars’ physical state 
enabled the Afar to be isolated as targets of interventions from their wider socio­
economic and political context. As a result, certain apolitical institutional practices 
achieved dominance, while other kinds of practices and other kinds of information were 
subordinated. The dominance of the technocratic and apolitical approach and its
123 Gamaledinn, ‘ State policy and famine in the awash valley’, p. 336
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concrete power effects can be seen in the following observation by a CA staff member: 
‘Clive [a CA representative in Wollo] refuses to get drawn into debate on whether it is 
right to get nomads to settle down.’126 Ultimately the holding operation gave way to the 
larger programme financed by the World Bank - the North East Rangelands 
Development Project. The result was disappointing and reflected the fundamental 
weakness of the whole approach to the Afar rangelands. As the project completion 
report commented:
‘the second lesson ... related to our lack of knowledge of pastoral is Is’ behavior 
and the incentives needed to make them change traditional practices. As a result, 
the project failed to establish a system of controlled range use, which required 
the cooperation of pastoralists.
While recognising that at the national level, ‘the Afar people do not have the 
necessary political contacts to press their case and draw attention to their plight’128 and 
that this explained their desperate situation and the paucity of relief, the programme 
failed to establish the representation of the Afar within its own corridors. Technical 
intervention, apolitical charity and top-down planning were more reflective of the 
official relief discourse than of the actual needs and processes operating at the ground 
level. Accountability was eschewed and hastily designed projects were implemented by 
engineers - usually outsiders - with little more than vague hopes about sustainability. 
The main result from the Afar project seems to have been that agencies learnt a bit more 
about the Afar and were seen to be ‘doing something’. Undoubtedly they saved the 
lives of many, but equally evident was their failure to initiate sustainable or empowering 
development. As tensions deteriorated between the Afar and the military regime, 
tensions centered around development policies and perceptions of political survival, the 
bankruptcy of state policies and development initiatives in the rangelands was exposed. 
In June 1975, with the formation of the Afar Liberation Front and the instigation of 
revolt, an alternative violent solution to processes of marginalisation was initiated.
Was an alternative approach to the rangelands possible? Kloos has argued that
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real possibilities for development from below based on active articulation with the
political-economy of the Afar did exist. He presented a format less rooted in an
apolitical developmental approach to pastoralism and more indicative of a political
commitment to pastoral society. Indeed he argued that:
‘a framework of social and economic organization that aids the pastoralists in 
defining and achieving their objectives and restores a sense of responsibility and 
control over their own lands is a prerequisite for any development program.’129
By addressing the political processes that were radically transforming the marginal Afar
areas, Gamaledinn has however offered a pessimistic conclusion as to the possibility of
state controlled development initiatives:
‘in an extreme form, then, the Ethiopian famine raises the possibility that the 
survival of the state in Africa (in its present form and with its ambitions for land 
control), and the survival of anything resembling the subsistence economies 
which evolved within the constraints of semi-arid Ethiopia, may be mutually 
exclusive.’130
He also doubted the ability of aid agencies in recognising the importance of local 
conditions and needs.131 Certainly the actions of apolitical humanitarianism in 1973-74 
proved inadequate at solving the problem of famine and the processes that underlay it. 
Moreover, in many ways, they actually contributed to famine’s intractability. In the 
Afar rangelands, CA failed to grasp the significance of the political formations 
underlying the crisis and proved ineffectual in alleviating processes of asset 
stripping.132 This failure was to be repeated in the Ogaden in 1975.
Rehabilitation in the Ogaden was based almost entirely around the idea of 
settlement on irrigated farmland, mostly along the Wabe Shebelle between Gode and 
Kelafo. The aim here is not to look at the individual technical problems of such 
rehabilitation - certainly the question of whether flood-fed agriculture was sufficiently 
reliable for permanent settlement does not appear to have been properly addressed - but 
at the political functions it served and at why CA positioned itself as it did. By early 
1975 there were more than 80,000 Ogadenis living in 18 relief shelters close to the
129 Kloos, ‘Development, drought, and famine in the awash valley’, p. 41
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Somali border. Africa Watch, a prominent human rights organisation, has documented
how the camps served important political functions by undermining key aspects of the
Ogadeni way of life:
‘the shelters were run on military lines, with strict curfews enforced at 8.00 pm. 
Movement in and out was severely restricted -- making it impossible for each 
family to keep more than a handful of small animals. Traditional festivities were 
reportedly banned in some camps.’133
The report goes on:
‘the government had the explicit intention of turning the camp populations into 
settled farmers, rather than allowing them to return to a pastoral way of life. 
Another intention was to relocate camps well away from the Somali border.’ 134
Senior staff in CA’s aid administration were, at the time, aware of complexity and
implications of the relief camps and commented in a travel report that,
‘the government wishes to encourage settlement for good development reasons 
e.g. the ease of providing essential services and the availability of land suitable 
for irrigation along the Wabi Shebelle, but there are inevitably political 
considerations for encouraging a largely Somali population to settle in view of 
the security situation and the challenge from Somalia.’ 135
Yet, perhaps stung by accusations of earlier inaction, the imperative to be seen to be
doing something ultimately prevailed. Doubts were cast aside and the language of
developmental!sm overtook political analysis. CA’s aid administrator concluded that,
‘despite the negative comments, the settlement programme is basically a programme in
which CA should become increasingly involved.’136
Again, a focus on famine as a disaster event, characterised by starvation,
enabled famine to be detached from the socio-economic and political processes in which
it was embedded. Again apolitical humanitarianism had important local power effects.
Essentially, CA and other international agencies became involved in a mopping-up
programme, more supportive of government initiatives than of pastoral priorities. The
government’s hasty decision to close all relief shelters in the Ogaden in August 1976, at
a time when President Siad Barre in Somalia was pledging his support for the cause of
the ‘liberation of the Ogaden’ indicates the blatant relationship between political and
133 Africa Watch, Evil Days, pp. 73-74
134ibid., pp. 73-74
135 Vernon Littlewood & Sarah Hayward, ‘Visit to Ethiopia’ (14-25 October 1976), 
(CAO. AF/ME. 23a)
136 ibid.
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humanitarian concerns. In deference to immediate national security concerns,
humanitarian standards were lowered:
‘with the closing of the relief camps the government has embarked on a further 
resettlement programme on the Wabi Shebelle 40 km north west of Gode. When 
the original plans were sketched out earlier this year... agencies working in the 
relief camps were skeptical at the projected number for resettlements (which 
they felt was far too high) and criticised the lack of specific information about 
the proposed settlement. ...the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission went 
ahead ... there has been virtually no advance work done on the site prior to the 
arrival of the settlers.’137
It was at this point that the agencies stepped in, with health programmes, irrigation
programmes, housing and sanitation. In the fight against physical suffering, meaningful
political analysis and strategic planning about the nature of actual ‘suffering’ was
obscured. This had implications not just because of the manipulation of relief itself but
also for longer term aims of rehabilitation and development. Just as in the Afar
rangelands - where relief/development programmes were disrupted by conflict - so the
settlement schemes in the Ogaden were abandoned by the settlers and their international
supporters following the Somali invasion in 1977. In both cases, the experience of
relief and development policies had contributed to the conflict: ‘fear that the Ethiopian
government was intent on undermining their traditional way of life was one factor that
spurred many Ogadeni men into armed opposition to the government.’138
A key scholar has argued that while the shortcomings of humanitarianism are,
‘often conceived as a sort of gap between the reach of humanitarianism and the 
political nature of the problem, a gap that can only be filled when politicians 
play their “proper” role ... such a view is misconceived. Humanitarianism is a 
form of politics.139
The above analysis has shown how humanitarian interventions among the Afar nomads 
and Ogadeni herdsmen was political, exercising concrete local power effects. In 
Ethiopia, CA and other international agencies not only became emeshed in national and 
local politics but imported their own humanitarian mode of power. As described above, 
this power was typically elaborated in support of the powerful at the expense of the 
weak.
137 ibid.
138 Africa Watch, Evil Days, pp. 73-4
139De Waal, ‘Social contract’, p. 203
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Why did CA position itself as it did? For this we need to turn to the influences -
structural and ideological - that impacted on it. Until May 1973, CA’s only partner in
Ethiopia was the Orthodox Church. Experiences in 1966 had already exposed the
weakness of this partnership and the evidence suggests that the situation had not
changed by the 1970s. Following a visit to Ethiopia in November 1973, Vernon
Littlewood, CA’s aid administrator commented, ‘I am not optimistic regarding the
ability of the Orthodox Church to handle any relief goods that might be available.’140 A
few months later, a visitor from the World Council of Churches wrote:
‘everywhere I found bewilderment that in this situation the Orthodox Church 
was not seen to be taking action. This is not to say that no action of any sort has 
been taken by the Church, but I emphasise everyone says they do not see 
evidence of the hand of the Orthodox Church in relief work.
The launching by the Orthodox Church Development Commission, in 1973, of a
programme for the retraining of the Orthodox clergy, particularly in development
problems, had not yet borne fruit and certainly the capacity of such clergy to play a role
in relief was minimal. While the potential of the Orthodox Church as a development
agent - ‘there are 15,000 Orthodox churches and 200,000 priests in the country ... they
are a powerful and influential group in society and could play a vital role in
development’142 - was recognised, although even then as something of the future rather
than the present, its potential as a relief agent was clearly limited. The isolation of the
Orthodox Church compounded the problem. As Vernon Littlewood, CA’s aid
administrator commented:
‘relations between the Orthodox hierarchy and the mission churches are cool. 
The Orthodox resent the activities of other churches in Orthodox areas and they 
argue that if these other churches were sincere in their claim that they want to 
spread the gospel, they would confine their attention to the Muslim and pagan 
areas of Ethiopia.’143
Following the deposition of Haile Selassie, a further problem arose over the uncertain 
relationship between the Church and the new government, the Derg. On 18 March 
1976, the Patriarch of Ethiopia, Abuna Teofowlos was deposed by the Derg and an
140 Vernon Littlewood, letter to Stanley Mitton (22 November 1973), (CAO.AF/ME.20)
141 Stanley Mitton, ‘Ethiopian Report: 19 December 1973 - 5 January 1974’ (9 January 1974), 
(CAO.AF/ME.20)
142 Vernon Littlewood, ‘Visit to Ethiopia: 11 - 19 August 1974’ (30 August 1974), (CAO.AF/ME.20)
143 ibid.
acting Patriarch was appointed.144 While the Church itself was not persecuted under the 
Derg, it lost control of most of its land (through the land proclamation) and appeared to 
become paralysed in relation to the new political system.
With a weak and isolated partner, CA was operationally unable either to pre­
empt the famine crisis or initially to respond. Indeed, an effective channel for response 
was not opened until the establishment of the Christian Relief Committee in Addis 
Ababa in May 1973 and it was not until August 1973 that CA made the first of what 
was then to become many grants to the Committee - £5,000. Thus despite knowledge 
of the Wollo famine through the World Council of Churches from about March 
197314S, CA did not respond until five months later, when the starvation crisis had 
reached its peak.
The Committee, which was to become CA’s main partner in Ethiopia and the 
channel through which a large number of initiatives were funded, originated as an ad 
hoc group of local churches and missions who agreed to meet regularly to pool 
information and coordinate relief activities. Other agencies, including a number of 
secular agencies such as Concern, Save the Children Fund and Oxfam subsequently 
joined and to fill the gaps in the resources of member organisations, contact was made 
with overseas funding agencies. The funds received were allocated on the basis of 
decision by the Committee. During 1974 the Committee began to support members’ 
rehabilitation activities and the geographical area of the its coordination and support 
activities, originally concentrated in the northeast, was widened. In September, it was 
officially registered under a new name, Christian Relief and Development Association, 
with a mandate ‘to promote and encourage relief and development activities in 
Ethiopia.’146
144 The patriarch was accused of enriching himself, being a tool of the feudal system and showing no 
understanding towards the deprived and oppressed.
145 It was World Council of Churches and Ethiopian Orthodox Church funds that enabled individuals 
from the University of Addis Ababa to carry out a field investigation of the situation in Wollo in early 
April 1974. The investigators brought back photographs, recorded interviews and eye witness 
testimonies, exposing the famine and prompting a widespread national call for official recognition and 
action. Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability, pp. 43-47
146Borton, The Changing Role ofNGOs, pp. 69-75
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For donors, the Committee offered a valuable ‘clearing house’ facility enabling 
them to deal directly with one agency rather than several, thereby avoiding wasteful 
duplication of programmes or funding. Its coordinating function enabled the Committee 
to fill ‘gaps’ in assistance147 and its ability to receive resources and allocate them 
between its member agencies increased the access of the smaller, locally-based NGOs 
to donor resources. By supporting the work of the churches and missions, with their 
established structures, the Committee was also able to provide assistance to people in 
their own areas. This on-the-spot help lessened the need for people to migrate to other 
areas and prevented the influx of people to the improvised and temporary shelters 
established on the main highway. The same structures helped to repatriate people to 
their areas from shelters using rehabilitative methods such as seed and oxen 
distribution.
Undoubtedly, the Committee was an important and effective partner. However,
a picture quickly emerges, from the minutes of its meetings, of an organisation reacting
to events and negotiating a path through conflicting priorities and interests. Meetings
could become extremely heated as representatives of NGOs argued over their
interpretation of conditions and needs in areas they all claimed to have visited recently.
Inevitably, confusion over approaches remained. Such confusion was particularly
evident with regard to the Ogaden famine where much criticism was leveled at the
international agencies failure to get involved early enough. While reports were reaching
the Committee from the end of 1973 about the deteriorating situation, a number of other
considerations prevented early action by its member agencies. One was the absence of
an infrastructure of Committee members in the Ogaden which made it difficult to work
there. As senior staff members of CA’s aid administration commented:
‘the governments Relief and Rehabilitation Commission has criticised inter­
governmental and voluntary agencies for failing to respond adequately to the 
situation in the Ogaden as they did two years ago following the drought in 
Wollo. There are several reasons for this and in particular the difficulty of 
working in an area without the agency infrastructure to support work.’148
147 Between May 1973 and August 1974, the Committee distributed E$1.05 million to 17 member 
organisations. Kurt Jansson, Michael Harris & Angela Penrose, The Ethiopian Famine (Zed Books: 
London, 1990), p. 100
148 Vernon Littlewood & Sarah Hayward, ‘Visit to Ethiopia’ (14 - 25 October 1976),
(CAO. AF/ME. 23a)
154
Another problem was the confusion over the definition of famine which compounded 
conflicting information. Information received by CA’s aid administration highlighted 
this point:
‘the general opinion before the results are put through the computer is that there 
is no famine in this part of Ethiopia but there has been severe drought which 
means that these nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples off the main roads, are 
perforce selling their cattle and their already low standard of living is threatened. 
The crux of whether this is or is not a famine in this part of Ethiopia depends on 
a definition of what is famine.’149
Created once the disaster was already well under way, and so inevitably focused on
‘updates’ and the ‘current situation’, the Committee in the 1970s was ultimately trapped
in an eternal present and it was difficult for it to take account of the past or to predict the
future. The tendency was thus to equate the emergency of ‘famine’ with famine’s final
stage, that of mass mortality. A tendency compounded by the lack of operational
capability to interpret or act any differently. In the Ogaden, the result in words of one
journalist was ‘fumbling and chaos’150 and a slightly alleviated but still shocking repeat
of conditions that had been so recently experienced in the north. Accountability was
also a problem with the Committee. This tended to move upwards to the donors and
member agencies rather than downwards to the victims. Assistance was conceived in
terms of projects - fulfilling donors needs and budgetary requirements - rather than in
terms of addressing the complex processes of famine. In this respect, the committee
could be seen more as a channel for translating the priorities of the funders than as a
forum for voicing the priorities of the victims:
‘Mr Vernon Littlewood of CA has written indicating that his organisation would 
like to make a grant of £5,000 towards a specific project in Tigrai that would be 
of joint interest to the Orthodox Church, Mekane Yesus Church and the Roman 
Catholic Church ... The Executive Committee decided to contact the provincial 
social worker in Tigrai with the request that he present a suitable project 
proposal.’151
For CA in the 1970s, a commitment to social justice was far harder to 
operationalise in Ethiopia than a conventional ‘supply’ operation. CA’s involvement, 
influenced by its partners operational capabilities and driven by the need to be seen to be
149 Jeanne Townsend, memo to Sarah Hay ward (nd), (SOAS.CA2/A/5.13)
150 Jonathan Dimbleby, ‘Time passed and no one called’ The Guardian, 23 February 1976
151 CRDA minutes (6 August 1974), (SOAS.CA2/A/6.4)
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‘doing something’, ultimately constituted an apolitical approach, more reflective of a 
natural disaster discourse. However, alongside structural weaknesses it was also clear 
that CA’s pursuit of a social justice mandate committed to partnership with civil society 
was in itself under-theorised. CA’s concerns for civil society were framed within an 
apolitical discourse. In its publications, the focus was on feudal agrarian relations, the 
absence of wells and simple irrigation systems, of roads and transport, of storage and 
health facilities.152 What was not subject to scrutiny were the political processes that 
were radically transforming marginal areas. It has been argued above how in the Afar 
and Ogaden lowlands, CA’s involvement reflected a distancing from indigenous 
political processes and a crucial lack of political analysis or engagement.
3 .  Groping For a New Role
As CA emerged from its experiences in the Ethiopian and Sahelian famines of 
the 1970s, a number of its senior staff were aware of crucial limitations in its approach. 
In Ethiopia, it was felt that CA had not been able to react to the crisis early enough and 
that its intervention, determined by established channels and patterns of allocation, had 
been inadequate at addressing the underlying processes of famine or reaching the 
poorest in the community. Some senior staff felt that not enough questions were being 
asked, that the organisation lacked a strategic approach to problems of poverty and 
vulnerability and that as a result the agency had been unable to fulfill its social justice 
mandate.153 In particular, five key lessons were drawn.
Firstly, CA became aware of the need to move beyond government definitions 
of the relief problem; of when and where relief distributions were acceptable and 
possible. In this respect, the Ethiopian famine exposed the strategic problem 
surrounding the principle of sovereignty, and the deference owed to it. In Ethiopia, the 
Imperial regime shaped the relief agenda fundamentally by at first ignoring and then 
denying the existence of famine. By the time famine was publicly exposed, thousands
152 CA, ‘Record of a Year’ (October 1972-September 1973), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
153 CA, ‘Questions for consideration by the Africa Regional Committee’ (8 July 1977), 
(CAO.DIR.108)
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were already congregated in relief camps and the final stage of the famine process, 
manifest in starvation, had been reached. It was to this media disaster, exposed by 
Jonathan Dimbleby, that agencies like CA finally responded.
Secondly, CA began to be more aware of the need to look beyond the logistical 
provision of relief to its implementation. Such a responsibility would involve not just 
establishing the capacity to reach the marginalised, but also ensuring the accountability 
of the intervention, not to the western public or media, but to the victims of famine. 
Clearly, this would depend on a number of operational factors - the ability to access 
information, the existence of infrastructure (roads), the capabilities of local partners. It 
would also depend on a political commitment to adopt a more holistic approach to the 
famine process, to move beyond simply allocating relief to conveniently accessible 
areas once famine mortality occurred, and toward a concern with pushing relief through 
to all areas of need in a bid to halt the extended processes of famine before the final 
stage of mass mortality was reached. The issue of accountability to the victims of 
famine was a crucial lesson for CA.
Thirdly, interventions such as those mandated in Ethiopia, needed to address 
processes of development. In Ethiopia, famine were fueled by long-standing conflicts 
over economic resources, exacerbated by a particular pattern of uneven development 
that generated growing pressures. The lessons from the Afar rangelands, Ogaden 
lowlands and Wollo highlands was that CA needed to engage with the processes 
creating famine, rather than simply allocating relief to some of the poorest groups once 
they had descended into destitution. In particular, CA’s failure to take account of the 
essential development situation of communities seriously impacted on prospects of 
linking relief to development.
A fourth, and related, lesson for CA was the need to address the wider political- 
economy underpinning famine. The most striking characteristic about the victims of the 
famine in 1971-75 was not their poverty but their near-total lack of rights or political 
muscle within the institutions of the state. It was this that exposed them to the processes 
of famine and left them with little access to famine relief. The famine in Ethiopia was 
not just ‘policy’ failure, it had a real political economy and served important functions.
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That there were, overall, adequate food supplies in Ethiopia implies that thousands 
would not have died if the government had prevented hoarding, effected a programme 
of far reaching economic and social change and, when food shortages occurred in one 
area, redressed the balance by transferring food from surplus regions. Finally, CA 
drew lessons about the politics of relief. Concerns arose about whether the Ethiopians 
distributed relief supplies properly and equitably and whether relief was being diverted 
to the local officialdom or military. In the Ogaden lowlands, in particular, the 
experience was that humanitarianism itself, as constituted in CA’s interventions, had 
been a form of politics.
In the 1970s famine, CA’s discourse on famine and actions in relief reflected the 
conventional neutral approach of ‘food availability decline’ theories. Famine was 
identified in terms of nutrition and relief was focused on ‘numbers’ and ‘needs’. The 
processes by which people had become vulnerable to drought and ultimately famine 
were not addressed. The lessons drawn from the experience however, reflected an 
alternative understanding of famine’s nature and causes and in particular a recognition 
that a more strategic analysis and approach was needed both to relief and development. 
Chapter 1 has shown how institutionally, the mid-1970s were crucial years for CA 
involving major reassessments of its priorities and capabilities. Experiences in Ethiopia 
played a major part in these debates, bringing to the surface concerns (originally 
highlighted in the late 1960s) about CA’s traditional partnerships, its relations with 
states and its ability to anticipate rather than react to events. Horrific images of the relief 
camps in the Sahel and Ethiopia, along with a growing sense of inadequacy focused 
attention on issues of partnership, accountability and effectiveness. In particular, the 
frailty of the agency’s ability to pursue a social justice mandate had been exposed. It 
was in response to such internal questioning and debate that the Sinclair Committee was 
appointed and recommendations made to reorganise CA’s overseas aid policy. As a 
result, the aid department was strengthened, attempts were made to diversify and extend 
its partnerships and a more strategic targeting of the vulnerable and marginalised was 
defined. Reflective of emerging theoretical paradigms, remedies were sought in a 
commitment to civil society, to partnership and accountability. Whether CA was able to
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operationalise such a new role in Ethiopia will be taken up in the following chapters.
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Table 3.2 H istory of D rought and Fam ine in E thiopia
‘great tribulation hath come upon our land and all our men are dying of the 
plague, and our beasts and cattle have perished, and God hath restrained the 
heavens so that they cannot rain upon our land.’154
Failure of the Nile flood, with ambassadors from Egypt being sent to Ethiopia 
to request the king to allow the river to flow. This implies drought in 
Ethiopia, which supplies 90% of Nile waters.
‘famine and plague broke out in the land, and the rain would not fall on the 
fields, and great tribulation came upon the people.’155
Recorded as famine years by Pankhurst but no details given.
‘Famine of cereals due to lack of rain.’15*
‘a great famine, a punishment sent on the country by the glorious God.’157
Rain failures for three years following the killing of the Emperor Geladius, 
especially in Harer. ‘Prices of grain, salt and cattle rose to unprecedented 
levels’ and cases of cannibalism were reported.15s
Recorded as a famine year by Pankhurst, with no details given.
Unusually large locust swarms precipitating famine in northern provinces. 
Mass migration of victims in search of relief.
More locust plagues precipitating famine, with accompanying widespread 
disease epidemics.
Recorded as famine years by Pankhurst, with no details given.
‘a great famine” 5<) with exceptional grain price inflation and widespread 
livestock deaths.
All listed as famine years by Pankhurst but no details given.
Famine affecting the entire country, with starving peasants pleading for aid at 
the imperial court in Gonder.
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Two successive plagues of locusts that ‘covered the land like a fog’160 destroy 
crops. Influenza epidemics follow.
More famine deaths reported.
Famine referred to in chronicles as quachne. literally ‘my thinness.’161
A further famine outbreak ‘over all the provinces’, causing ‘great distress.’162 
Locust plagues destroying crops in many districts.
More famine deaths
Locust plagues causing ‘partial famine’1'’3, with several thousand deaths in 
Hammassien.
Famine in Shewa following rain failures which destroyed both grain and 
cotton crops. Also widespread cattle deaths and a cholera outbreak. High 
food prices, and voluntary enslavement by the peasantry.
Severe famine in Tigray and Gonder.
The most devastating famine ever recorded in Ethiopia, which affected 
virtually the whole country. The entire period was unusually hot and dry, and 
a rinderpest epidemic carried off 90% of cattle. Locusts, caterpillars and rats 
also infested the country at various times. Suicide and cannibalism occurred, 
and wild animals attacked dying people. About one third of the population is 
estimated to have perished.
Failure of winter and spring rains.
An unrecorded drought manifested through a fall in the 1900 level of lake 
Rudolph. The Nile flood was also unusually low that year.
Widespread drought in North Africa, with the effect on Ethiopia indicated by 
a very poor Nile flood (the lowest since 1895). The price of grain rose thirty­
fold in the north of Ethiopia, and there was great starvation in Tigray.
A similar drought to that of 1895-96. Complete failure of the rains between 
October 1920 and May 1921.
The level of Lake Rudolph dropped, implying a serious decrease in rainfall in 
southern Ethiopia. Victims fled to British Somaliland, where relief camps 
were set up to receive them.
Undocumented drought in Wollo and Tigray.
More than 100,000 people in Wollo and Tigray are reported to have died 
following drought and locust attacks.
Virtually undocumented drought and famine said to be more widespread than 
that of 1972-74.
Complete failure of the spring rains following two or more years of low
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rainfall. Northern, eastern and southeastern parts of the country affected. The 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission estimates the number of dead at about 
200,000 for Tigray, Wollo and northern Shewa. Death also reported in 
Harerghe.
Poorly documented drought and famine in Wollo, Tigray, Gonder and 
northern Shewa, following failures of 1977 spring rains and main rains of 
1978. More than 2 million people estimated to be affected, and relief 
operations undertaken.
Rain failure beginning in north and spreading to most parts of the country by 
1984. Relief operations mounted by insufficient to prevent mass migration 
and widespread deaths by mid-1984. Massive international response 
following media coverage towards end of 1984. UN estimates death toll of 1 
million, with more than 8 million victims requiring assistance. Relief 
operations continue into 1986.
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Chapter 4
THE 1983-85 ETHIOPIAN FAMINE: ‘FUNCTION’ RE-EXAMINED
In 1984 a massive intervention was launched by the international community to 
relieve famine in Ethiopia. The 1980s famine was on a far larger scale than a decade 
earlier, with an estimated 400-600,000 deaths1, and happened at a time when a 
profound shift in the operating environment for relief interventions was occurring. In 
particular, the relief efforts, to an unprecedented degree, relied upon NGOs as channels 
for the provision and distribution of assistance. The following two chapters look at 
CA’s ability to deal with these challenges.2 In particular they look at the evolution and 
positioning of CA’s mandate; at how the experiences of the past informed the present; 
and at how both influenced the framework for future action.
The 1980s Ethiopian famine is important for a number of reasons. Firstly it was 
a famine of political origin, the result of internal war and disputed sovereignty. The 
humanitarian crisis was concentrated in the northern regions of Eritrea and Tigray, areas 
where the counter-insurgency strategy of the central government had been to directly 
target civilian populations and their food security systems. In this respect, the famine 
represented a ‘protracted political crises’ or ‘complex emergency’3, in which the state 
had neither the capacity nor the will to provide emergency assistance. Secondly, the 
famine represented a spectacular example of manipulated humanitarianism. The 
international donors, by ignoring the political nature of the emergency and hence the 
political dimensions of the related humanitarian crisis; and by failing to acknowledge 
that there were winners as well a losers, exposed themselves to the charge that what 
they were doing was reinforcing inequalities of power; becoming part of the problem 
and not the solution. In this respect the central government was allowed to shape the 
relief agenda to support its own political objectives and was left largely unchallenged. 
Finally, the famine saw the development of a radically different form of humanitarian
1 Africa Watch, Evil Days, pp. 173-6
2 The focus will be on Eritrea and Tigray although the famine, at times, affected other parts of Ethiopia 
including much of the east and south (it is worth noting that the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front 
included parts of Gonder and Northern Wollo in its definition of Tigray).
3 For an analysis of these terms see Duffield, ‘Complex emergencies’, p. 38
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action in the cross-border operation in to Eritrea and Tigray. This was organised
through an ecumenical consortium, the Emergency Relief Desk (ERD), officially set up
in 1981. The operation arose from the problem of accessing humanitarian relief in the
context of internal war. Based in Khartoum, the consortium channeled assistance across
the border into rebel-held territory in neighboring Eritrea and Tigray from 1985 to
1991, without the permission of the Ethiopian authorities.
The ERD represented a crucial episode in the evolution of CA’s approach to
relief and development in Africa. Moreover as a consortium involved with indigenous
political and humanitarian structures and committed to the politically disadvantaged
within the international arena, the ERD was at the forefront of more general calls within
the international community for a new framework for humanitarian assistance in
‘complex emergencies’. In this respect, the ERD lay at the center of a profound change
in the nature of international relations:
‘from a cold war system based upon nation-state sovereignty to an emerging 
balance of power characterised by the enhanced role of NGOs, in which such 
things as the principle of non-interference, especially in relation to humanitarian 
aid, is less firmly supported.’4
The history of ERD provides a crucial insight into the changing nature of North-South
relations in the 1980s and the key debates within the international aid community.
This chapter begins by developing the concept of war in the theorisation of
famine and looks at the relationship between conflict and food security. It argues that
the 1983-85 Ethiopian famine was caused largely by a set of counter-insurgency
strategies implemented by the Ethiopian army and that relief was manipulated on the
government side to reinforce the political and economic marginalisation of the ‘losers’.
It then turns to the international political and legal framework for mitigation of the
crisis, and looks at how issues of sovereignty and access created a particular knowledge
of the disaster around which a narrative of relief was constructed. The aim of the
chapter is to look again at discourses on famine, disaster relief and development; to
analyse the power effects of such discourses; and to examine the implications for
4 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 9
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alternative models of understanding and action. Such a model, provided by the cross- 
border operation is examined in the following chapter.
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M ap 4.1: N orthern  E thiopia 1983-85
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1 . W ar and  Fam ine
‘In a non-war context... it is unlikely that drought alone would have produced 
frank starvation of the scale that occurred during the famine-disaster of 1984/85. 
Rather, it was a combination of war and drought that produced a crisis of such 
intensity, and specifically the fact that conflict either destroyed or curtailed 
people’s options for physical survival. Further the government’s use of 
counterinsurgency warfare, including direct attacks against the civilian 
population in rural areas, also acted as a catalyst for the decline of the 
countryside to starvation, and starvation-associated deaths.’5
Ethiopia in the 1980s provided a spectacular example of famine caused directly
by government policies and human rights abuses. This section looks at the nature of the
famine, at its functions and effects. In particular, it analyses the process of ‘militarised
asset transfer’6 from the politically weak to the politically strong that characterised the
famine. The discursive construction of the famine as a disaster event, characterised by
starvation, is challenged and an alternative interpretation of the ‘disaster’ as a protracted
‘permanent emergency’, embedded in a specific historical context and requiring political
action to address issues of political survival is presented.7
In 1983, as in 1971-75, the evidence suggests that while one cannot deny the
adverse effects of bad weather, it was structural factors (social, economic, and political)
that created famine. The evidence from rainfall data and food production reveal that
drought may not have been as prevalent during the 1980s as it was often presented and
that while the severity of the drought in 1984 was apparent, the rains of 1983 were not
abnormally low.8 A survey done among Tigrayan refugees in Sudan in 1985 found that
‘their highest yields in the last ten years occurred in 1982-83.’9 Similarly grain prices
failed to support an account of repeated and widespread drought, but of a highly
localized famine in Tigray, spreading out into Wollo and Gonder in 1984 and 1985.
One analyst argued:
‘the droughts of 1980-3 were unremarkable;... localized surpluses existed;... 
if normal processes of redistribution of food had been allowed to occur, there 
would have been no famine. 1984 was a drought year of unusual severity, it is
5 Barbara Hendrie, ‘Relief aid behind the lines: the cross-border operation in Tigray’, in Macrae & Zwi 
(eds.), W ar a n d  H unger, p. 126
6 See De Waal, ‘War and famine in Africa’, pp. 33-40
7 For an analysis of the terms ‘permanent emergency’ and ‘political survival,’ see Duffield, ‘NGOs, 
disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn’, pp. 131-157
8 Borton, The C h a ng ing  R o le  o f  N G O s, p. 21; Africa Watch, E vil D ays, pp. 133-139
9 Clay & Holcombe, P o litic s  a n d  the  E th iop ian  F am ine, p. 192
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true -  but had the famine not already been in train, and had the artificial famine- 
creating actions not continued, major famine could have been averted.110
Socio-economic factors that had historically exposed the Ethiopian highland
farmer to natural disaster were as prevalent in the 1980s as they had been in the 1970s.
These included the extreme exploitation of the peasantry by the ruling classes. While the
Wollo famine of 1973-74 had played a key role in precipitating the downfall of Haile
Selassie in 1974, in many ways the revolution and rural policy developments that
followed reaffirmed the alienation of the north from the national political economy.11
The revolution that had toppled the Haile Selassie regime and shattered the class basis
for his rule had been an urban phenomenon led by teachers, soldiers, young
bureaucrats, and students.12 In this respect, as McCann argued:
‘the revolution and policies that have emanated from it confirm a longer trend in 
which political issues affecting local economies in places like northern Wollo are 
less a reflection of local conditions than of development in the new political 
economy's modem sector. It is not surprising, therefore, that famine and 
vulnerability to famine in post-revolution Ethiopia appear to be more severe than 
the rural crises experiences in northern Wollo earlier in this century.113
One of the key reforms of the new government, the land reform proclamation of
197514, allowed the peasantry to own their land, but failed to transform peasant
agriculture or to provide for the development of productive forces. The reform allowed
tenants to escape those relations but it did not resolve their capital shortages which were
by far the more crippling restriction of their participation in agriculture. At the same
time, the highland peasant had to meet the new demands of the revolution and the state:
increased rural taxation: and the excessive demands of the national marketing parastatal,
the Agricultural Marketing Corporation.15 A range of other rural policies further
10 Africa Watch, E v il D a ys , p. 134
11 Haile Selassie was deposed on 12 September 1974 and replaced by a provisional military 
government, the Derg
12 McCann, F rom  P o verty  to F a m in e  in N ortheast E th iop ia , p. 205
13 ibid., p. 205
14 The main points of the proclamation were: all land was to be jointly owned by the Ethiopian people; 
every person was entitled to cultivate up to 10 hectares, depending on the productivity of the soil; 
peasant-landowner relationship was abolished; all fanners were to become members of peasant 
associations. Christopher Clapham, T ransform ation  a n d  C on tinu ity  in R evo lu tionary  E th io p ia  
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988), pp. 157-194
15 This was set up in 1976. A fixed quota had to be met by all fanners regardless of the size of their 
har vest. The price for each type of grain was centrally fixed - in 1984, the fixed price was only about 
20% of the free market price in Addis Ababa and stayed at die same level for 8 years despite inflation on 
the open market. Africa Watch, E vil D ays, p. 159
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weakened the peasant’s subsistence economies. These included: restrictions on trade 
which crippled the rural marketing system and stemmed the essential flow of grain from 
surplus to deficit areas; restrictions on money lending and rural credit; the restriction of 
wage labour on smallholdings, effected by the land reform of 1975 this prevented 
crucial seasonal labour migration; and coercive labour programmes on communal plots 
and state farms which had a deterrent effect on peasant food production and supply.16 
Restrictions on trade17 and migration and the contraction of credit, meant that excessive 
taxes were paid through divestiture of farmers’ productive assets (oxen, seed, tools), 
leading to severe structural constraints on production. In effect, the shape of 
vulnerability in the northern highlands of Ethiopia remained.
Yet, on their own, the Derg’s rural policies did not explain why the drought of 
1983-84 in the northern provinces became more than a ‘normal’ period of hardship. To 
understand why famine occurred, it is necessary to turn to an account of the conduct of 
war. Essentially the famine of the 1980s occurred against a backdrop of three internal 
wars fought against the Derg: in Eritrea by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF); in Tigray by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF); and in Oromo 
regions by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). This analysis will concentrate on the war 
in Eritrea and Tigray as it was these areas that were most affected by the famine and 
became the focus of the cross-border operation. The OLF insurgency will be dealt with 
less rigorously.
The origins of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia can be traced back to 1952 
when, with the approval of the United Nations and against the popular claim of the
16 Africa Watch, E vil D ays, pp. 159-169
17 An example of the impact of government trade restrictions relates to the United Nations Children’s 
Fund’s cash-for-food programme in Ethiopia, 1985-6. This programme assumed that, in certain areas, 
hardship was caused by a lack of purchasing power, rather than a lack of food per se. It was therefore 
expected that recipients of cash would be able to tap distant regional markets where food could still be 
obtained at reasonable prices. At one site, farmers traveled up to 100 kilometres to purchase grain, only 
to have it confiscated on die way home and to be accused of illegal trading. ‘As a result, most recipients 
were forced to stay home and to contend with local inflationary effects of the cash transfer scheme.’ 
Patrick Webb, Joachim von Braun, Yisehac Yohannes, F am ine in E th iop ia : p o lic y  im p lica tio n s o f  
cop ing  fa i lu r e  a t na tio n a l a n d  househo ld  levels (International Food Policy Research Institute: 
Washington, DC, 1992), p. 76
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Eritreans to independence, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia.18 During the following 
years such federal rights as Eritrea had were slowly eroded. In 1961 Eritrea was 
formally annexed by Ethiopia and its parliament abolished. In September 1961, a three 
decade long struggle for independence was launched when a contingent of eleven 
fighting men formed the first armed forces of the Eritrean Liberation Front. The 
government responded with a brutal counter-insurgency strategy.19 Civilians were 
regular targets of violence whether from punitive army patrols, indiscriminate 
requisitioning of food or forced relocation in fortified villages. Such actions led to an 
increasing exodus of refugees; by May 1967, there were 25,500 Eritreans in the 
Sudan20; and in 1970, a renewed Ethiopian offensive resulted in a further 16,700 
seeking refuge across the border.21 In the mid-1970s, the political leadership of the 
armed struggle for independence passed from the Eritrean Liberation Front to a break­
away movement, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Between 1975 and 
1977, the liberation movements succeeded in bringing the greater part of Eritrea under 
their control leaving the capital, Asmara and the sea-port of Massawa, still under 
Ethiopian control, in a virtual state of siege. This balance of power changed from mid- 
1978 when, with a large peasant army and sophisticated armaments provided by the 
Soviet Union, the Ethiopian military unleashed an all-out offensive.22 The Ethiopians 
reoccupied all major cities and towns of Eritrea and dismantled the political, economic 
and social structures set-up by the Eritreans. The EPLF was pushed back to the Sahel 
district on the Sudan border.23
58 Eritrea, an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, came under British administration until 1952. The 
extent to which areas of Eritrea were integrated into Ethiopia before the colonisation, and therefore the 
strength of Haile Selassie’s claim to the territory once the Italians had been ousted, is disputed by 
historians.
19 Africa Watch, Evil D a ys , pp. 42 - 53
20 ibid., p. 44
21 ibid., p. 46
22 The defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden in the summer of 1977 freed up Soviet equipment and supplies 
for the Derg forces
23 The government offensive resulted in the near- collapse of the Eritr ean Liberation Front. During 1980, 
open fighting developed between the EPLF and Eritrean Liberation Front which resulted in 1981, in the 
latter being forced out of Eritrea and into Sudan. The Eritrean Red Cross and Red Crescent Society - the 
relief wing of the Eritrean Liberation Front - was confined to refugee work in Sudan from that date 
onwards, and the Eritrean Relief Association - the relief wing of the EPLF - became the sole relief 
association operating within Eritrea.
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Between May 1978 and July 1979, a total of five offensives were launched by 
the Ethiopian forces in Eritrea. These were characterised by massive and sustained 
bombing and the deployment of a large infantry. Between 1978 and 1980, 70-80,000 
people died as a result of the war and the refugee population in Sudan doubled to nearly 
420,000.24 At the end of 1979 and during the early part of 1980, the EPLF successfully 
counter-attacked, pushing back the Derg’s troops. The government responded in 1982 
by launching its brutal Red Star Campaign. Over 120,000 ground troops were 
deployed, alongside cluster and phosphorus bombs.25 The campaign failed although an 
Offensive which lasted from March until August 1983 in Barka and Senhit provinces, 
brought the Derg some gains. For the next four years, war was fought around a fairly 
stable front line running through Sahel Province to the east of Nacfa. Throughout there 
were regular air attacks on EPLF positions and villages in EPLF-held areas.26 In March 
1988, the balance shifted in the EPLF’s favour when they captured the strategic 
government garrison in Afabet and went on to take Barentu, Tesseni and Agordat. The 
government responded with a brutal counter-offensive which restored the balance of 
power until February 1990, when the EPLF took the port of Massawa. This initiated 
the siege of Asmara which finally led to the surrender of the garrison in Asmara in May 
1991. The EPLF emerged first as the Provisional Government of Eritrea and then, after 
the United Nations supervised independence referendum of April 1993, as the 
Government of Eritrea.
In Tigray, conflict can be traced back to 1975 and the formation of the Tigrayan 
Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF wanted an end to the military dictatorship 
of Mengistu. Unlike the EPLF, it was not seeking separation from Ethiopia but power 
within it and an end to the centralized Shewan Amhara dominance.27 Between 1975 and 
1983, the Ethiopian government launched seven major offensives in Tigray, most of
24 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 34
25 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 118
26 Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs, p. 19
27 Amhara dominance went back to the 1880s, when Tigray was incorporated into Ethiopia by the 
Emperor Menelik.
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which occurred during critical months in the agricultural cycle.28 During the 1980 
offensive in central Tigray, the army destroyed grain stores, burned crops and pastures, 
killed livestock, burned houses, enforced the collection of taxes and contributions 
including ‘arrears’ and displaced about 80,000 farmers.29 In 1982, the TPLF, in 
coordination with the newly formed Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement launched 
its own offensive in Tigray and northern Wollo and by late 1984, TPLF forces 
controlled up to three-quarters of the rural areas of Tigray.30 In 1988, the EPLF victory 
at Afabet contributed to a weakening of the Derg forces positions in Tigray and from 
March to June, the TPLF took control of several garrison towns. The Derg responded 
with intensive air attacks on the towns, indiscriminately targeting civilians and relief 
agencies. The TPLF implemented a tactical withdrawal to the rural areas. In early 1989, 
the TPLF merged with the Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement to form the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and launched an offensive which 
succeeded in taking the main towns in Tigray including, for the first time, the capital 
Makelle.31 In August 1989, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
forces advanced southwards into Shewa and at the end of May 1991 moved into Addis 
Ababa. The Front then established itself as the Transitional Government of Ethiopia.
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) started its armed liberation struggle in 1974. 
The OLF was very much a junior partner in the wars against the Derg. While Oromo- 
speakers were the largest ‘nationality’ in Ethiopia, making up around 40% of the 
population32, they had no clear territorial basis, living in 12 of Ethiopia’s former 
administrative regions but only forming the majority in one. Welch has argued:
‘constructing an Oromo sense of unity for the struggle against the Derg was
considerably complicated by the regime’s land reform in the south, which won
it considerable support, and by differences between Christians and Muslims. A
28 Barbara Hendrie, ‘Do We See Famine As It Is? The experience of people living in TPLF-controlled 
areas during the 1985 famine’ (later-Africa Group: Addis Ababa, 1995)
29 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 142
30 The Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement had been formed in 1981 and was militarily active in 
Wollo and Gonder.
31 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front brought Oromo and Derg POWs together 
with the largely Amhara EdiiopiaPeople’s Democratic Movement into a grand coalition.
32 P. T. W. Baxter, ‘The creation & constitution of Oromo Nationality’ in Katsuyoshi Fukui & John 
Markarkis (eds.), Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa (James Currey: London, 1994), pp. 167- 
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“politically coherent” Oromo identity proved difficult to develop - and, as a 
consequence, so did an effective organization.’33
Such an argument should however be treated with caution. Other writers have argued
that Oromo nationality is a political fact which has to be taken into account.34 What was
evident, during the 1970s and 1980s, was that the Oromo’s struggle lacked the
cohesion of the northern provinces.
By 1983, in Eritrea and Tigray, there were at least 250,000 war causalities and
around 500,000 civilians had sought refuge in Sudan, while countless more had been
internally displaced.35 War and instability have historically been a major cause of famine
in Ethiopia.36 What was arguably different in the 1980s was the extent to which the
rural people and their food security systems became a consistent and direct target of the
actions of the Ethiopian army. It was the extreme nature of warfare that proved so
destructive. Counter-insurgency strategies pursued by the Ethiopian government
involved repeated military offensives into surplus-producing areas, the bombing of
market places and relief operations, the planting of land mines, the destruction of crops
and livestock, the poisoning of wells and the relocation or corralling of groups to
prevent them from providing sustenance to opposing bodies. All of Eritrea and Tigray
were affected by the war, as were most of the northern half of Wollo and Gonder by
1983 with the TPLF operating throughout most of their territories. The evidence
suggests that the strategies pursued by the Derg were instrumental in setting the famine
in train. The Relief Society of Tigray (REST) estimated that in Tigray, between 1975
and 1984, 20,000 tons of grains had been either burnt or confiscated by the Ethiopian
army, 10,000 head of livestock had been killed or confiscated, 8,000 civilians killed
and 100,000 displaced internally.37 One analyst has argued that the ‘drought of 1984
was used as a scapegoat for a famine that had begun much earlier.’38
33 Claude E. Welch, P ro tecting  H um an  R igh ts in A frica: stra tegies a n d  roles o f  non -governm en ta l 
o rg a n iza tio n s , (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1995), p. 120
34 Baxter, ‘The creation & constitution of Oromo Nationality’, pp. 167-201
35 Duffield & Prendergast, W ithou t Troops a n d  Tanks, p. 34
36 Kebbede, The S ta te  a n d  D evelopm ent in  E th io p ia , pp. 67-69
37 Kirsty Wright & Max Peberdy, ‘Convoy to Tigray: report on the drought in Tigray1 (May 1984), 
(CAO.AF/ME.441)
38 Africa Watch, E v il D a ys , p. 138
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The logic of the Derg’s actions were clear. The TPLF operated as a classic
guerrilla ‘hidden’ movement whose success depended entirely upon civilian support
and accommodation.39 Unlike the EPLF which fought to acquire and defend territory,
the TPLF fighters moved among the population to attack Derg targets over a wide area,
refusing to defend any territory.40 Counter-measures were thereby centered increasingly
on attacks on the civilian population, the aim being to ‘drain the sea to catch the fish. ’41
This helps to explain why famine conditions were more severe in Tigray than Eritrea.42
A monitoring mission to Tigray in July 1983, stated that the overall strategy of the
governments seventh offensive in Tigray was both ‘to disrupt relief efforts and capture
western grain reserves’ and ‘to reduce the economic capacity of the civilian population
so that they would be forced to go to government-held areas for survival.’43 De Waal
has argued that, ‘the seventh offensive and the disruption it caused marked the onset of
the mass famine’ and that it was, ‘the human debris from this assault [that] forced the
international agencies to cry ‘famine.’44
If the aim of the government’s counter-insurgency strategy was in a large part
the creation of famine, an important element in this was the disruption of local coping
strategies such as trade and migration. Market systems were continuously attacked by
the state army. Grain surpluses that were produced in parts of western Tigray and
northern Gonder every year from 1980 to 1984 were not moved to deficit regions in the
central highlands. A Tigrayan farmer interviewed in a refugee camp in Sudan explained:
‘It is because of the Derg that we are now in Sudan. Under normal conditions, 
even with the drought, we would have been able to trade and make a living. But 
now that markets are bombed, most are held at night and its hard for us to travel 
to them.’45
39 John English, Jon Bennett, Bruce Dick, ‘Tigray 1984: an investigation’ (January 1984), 
(CAO.AF/ME.441), p. 16
40 The Front did establish semi-secure base areas in Shire, central Tigray and Agame, for training, 
treating their wounded, keeping prisoners of war, and as places of refuge. But essentially it remained 
committed to a guerilla style of warfare until die expulsion of die Derg from Tigray in 1989 when it 
had no choice but to operate as a convendonal force militarily. John Young, ‘Peasants and revolution 
in Ethiopia: Tigray 1975-89’ (PhD thesis: Simon Fraser University, 1994)
41 REST, 1, Abadi Zemo
42 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 34
43 Gayle E. Smith, ‘Counting quintals: report on a field monitoring visit to Tigray, northern Ethiopia’ 
(July 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.441)
44 Alex de Waal, ‘Human rights’, chapter 6, p. 26
45 Cited in Clay & Holcombe, Politics and the Ethiopian Fatnine, p. 65
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As early as 1979, Kirsty Wright was reporting from western Tigray that:
‘the increase in military activity in towns and the common practice by the 
Ethiopian army of gathering up peasants for militia service from the market 
place there has discouraged the peasants from traveling to urban areas to sell 
their crops.’46
In this respect, one analyst has argued that:
‘the sequence of the intensification of restrictions on the grain trade goes a long 
way to explaining the grain price rises in Tigray and northern Wollo during the 
period 1981-3, when food shortages per se were not significant.’47
As trading networks collapsed, people were forced to pursue other strategies, notably
migration. In Tigray, migrants headed westward toward the surplus-producing regions
of Shire and Wolkeit. The fact that these regions became prime targets for the
government’s ground offensives, especially during 1983 and 1985, severely hampered
their capacity to absorb the migrants. The response was an exodus of nearly 200,000
migrants across the border to refugee camps in eastern Sudan.48
Relief was also a target in the government’s warfare. Indigenous operations
mounted by the relief wings of the EPLF and TPLF, the Eritrean Relief Association
(ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) respectively, and supply lines from
Sudan were constantly bombarded by the government. During the eighth offensive in
Tigray in February 1985, refugees, REST aid convoys and feeding and transit centers
were bombed while ground forces cut relief routes from Sudan so that the cross-border
operation had to be suspended 49 An independent observer witnessed the effect of
bombings on ERA’s relief operation:
‘There were 2 bombings near the town of Germica in Barka province on June 
21 and July 12-13 [1986]. Both of these attacks occurred during the time that 
ERA was distributing food assistance to people from the surrounding region 
and refugees returning from the Sudan. Since there are no EPLF military targets 
in the area, it seems clear that the Ethiopian airforce specifically targeted those 
civilians who were gathered near the town to receive food.’50
A direct impact and goal of the actions of the Ethiopian army was the
impoverishment of rural people in the northern provinces and a weakening of their food
46 Kirsty Wright, ‘Relief for Tigray: report on a visit, February - March 1979’ (2 May 1979), 
(CAO.AF/ME. 156)
47 Alex de Waal, ‘Human rights’, chapter 6, p. 28
48 Hendrie, ‘Relief aid behind the lines’, p. 129
49 REST, telex to Paul Renshaw (31 March 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.439)
50 Barbara Hendrie, ‘Field report on Eritrea’ (August 1986), (CAO.AF/ME.385)
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security systems. In this respect the famine had a distinct political economy structured 
by relations of power; there were ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Famine was both the outcome 
of a process of impoverishment resulting from the transfer of assets from the weak to 
the politically strong, and itself a means by which the activities of the latter were 
facilitated in support of this process. Most importantly, people’s strategies for coping 
did not simply break down but were broken down by systematic violence. As in the 
1970s, famine had complex social and political dimensions.
1 . 1  The state and famine relief 1983-85
The response of the post-1974 military government to the 1983-85 famine was
remarkably similar to that of the previous administration. The relief agenda - in terms of
when and where relief distributions were acceptable and possible - was defined by the
government. If there was a difference, it was in the extent to which the agenda and food
were used by the Derg for proactive political ends. Haile Selassie’s regime attempted to
cover up the famine to save itself from international embarrassment, the Derg defined
and controlled the relief agenda as an integral part of its military and political strategy.
In the context of internal war, food aid became an important strategic resource
and convenient weapon of war. In late 1984 Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister admitted that
“‘food is an element in our strategy against the secessionists.’”51 An independent
investigation carried out in 1984 and circulated among northern aid agencies, among
them CA, stated that:
‘reports from recent refugees in Sudan as well as those remaining in TPLF held 
areas of Tigray suggest that the govemment-run drought reception centers in the 
towns of Tigray and Wollo were doubling as recruitment centers. This in part 
explains why drought victims have preferred to move westward rather than into 
the towns for relief assistance.’52
Other investigations observed:
‘there is compelling evidence, that food aid under the control of the government 
was denied to those areas where the liberation Fronts operated. Food aid was 
available only to government forces, militia, and loyalist civilians in these areas,
51 David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union (Croom Helm: London, 1986), p. 
137
52 John English, Jon Bennett, Bruce Dick, ‘Tigray 1984: an investigation’ (January 1984), 
(CAO.AF/ME.441)
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or else was given out only as an inducement for resettlement of households, or 
to facilitate conscription of able-bodied men.’53
Evidence of the direct and widespread diversion of food aid by the government also
emerged - largely from the testimony of refugees in Sudan, ERA and REST officials,
and visitors to EPLF and TPLF controlled areas who saw relief food stockpiled in the
stores of captured garrisons.54 A TPLF press release in 1985 asserted that:
‘with the massive provision of food supplies throughout the area, in part by the 
air forces of the UK and West Germany, the same towns that serve as garrisons 
are now prepared logistically with food supplies for the army donated by the 
international community.’55
In November 1983, a document sent by the former Commissioner of the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission, Shimelis Adugna, to officials in Wollega, instructing them
to falsify records and fabricate bogus evidence prior to a visit by an auditor of United
Nations World Food Programme was unearthed.56
Food was not the only political weapon used by the government. The most
politically motivated relief action came in the form of large-scale resettlement.
Resettlement involved the movement - between November 1984 and March 1988 - of
about 600,000 ‘environmental refugees’, largely from the northern provinces of Tigray
and Wollo to the south-western provinces of Gojjam, Wollega, Illubabor and Kefa.
Resettlement itself was not necessarily a bad strategy. Indeed the rationale for
resettlement on environmental grounds was initially supported by a 1985 joint Food and
Agriculture Organisation/Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture study which argued in
favour of a substantial resettlement programme of at least 150,000 people a year.
Problems arose in the way the programme was planned and organized. By early 1985,
clear evidence emerged that the resettlement was being carried out forcibly and against
the will of both those relocated and those on whose lands they were being settled.
People were being lured to government feeding centers in the north by offers of free
53 Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine’
54 Africa Watch, E v il D ays, p. 190; & Roy Pateman, ‘Drought, famine and development’ in Lionel 
Cliffe & Basil Davidson (eds.), The Long Struggle  o f  E ritrea  fo r  Independence a n d  C onstructive Peace  
(Russell Press: Nottingham, 1988), pp. 171-174
55 TPLF press release (3 March 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.317)
56 Document enclosed in Solomon Inquai, letter to Paul Renshaw (28 November 1983), 
(CAO.AF/ME.219)
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distribution of grain, rounded up by soldiers and taken south.S7 In the process families,
neighbourhoods and communities were disbanded. Those who survived the appalling
transport conditions, arrived to face ill-prepared and randomly selected sites.58 Funding
was woefully small and the government’s inability to provide adequate food and
services resulted in many deaths. Medecins Sans Frontieres estimated that 100,000
deaths could be directly attributed to the resettlement of civilians from Tigray and Wollo
to the south-west.S9 In addition, there was evidence that the programme was diverting
scarce transport and other resources that would otherwise have been available for food
distribution in the north and was thereby reducing the effectiveness of relief elsewhere.
Resettlement led to increased displacement and migration both in the north and
in the areas to be settled. In late 1984 and early 1985 people began to avoid the feeding
centers in the north. CA received a telex from REST stating that:
‘people are coming back from government camps due to the resettlement plan. 
As a result people in their tens of thousands are streaming into western Tigray 
from all corners. ...In 2 weeks time about 20,000 people have crossed into the 
Sudan. There are about 1,200 people coming daily. The death toll in our 
operational areas is estimated to be about 1,500 - 1,700 people daily.’60
The interpretation of events among senior staff within the British Council of Churches
was that:
‘the move west which includes whole villages, has been accelerated in Tigray 
by fears caused by the Ethiopian government’s decision to airlift famine victims 
to other parts of the country. People within 3 hours’ walk of government-held 
towns are turning west instead.
In Wollega Province, where many of the settlers had been settled, widespread internal
displacement of indigenous peoples and the flight of up to 20,000 from the area into
Sudan’s Blue Nile province occurred. The areas chosen for resettlement were exactly
those where the OLF posed a security problem, western Wollega and Illubabor.
Although the resettlement programme was presented to the international community as a
means of responding to the famine in the north, many Tigrayans, Oromos and
57 Survival International, ‘Ethiopia/resettlement: the evidence’ (29 March 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.439)
58 Gayle E. Smith, ‘Report on new refugee arrivals to Blue Nile Province, Sudan’ (13-14 January 
1985), (CAO.AF/ME.318)
59 Clay and Holcombe, Politics and the Ethiopian Famine, p. 102
60 Abadiin, telex to Paul Renshaw (29 November 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.439)
61 Rev’d Brian Brown, letter to Marcus Colchester (19 December 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.311)
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independent observers viewed it as a military operation aimed at depopulating the
countryside in order to weaken popular support for the TPLF and OLF. The Oromo
Relief Association in an open letter to northern aid agencies, including CA, stated:
‘This programme is not an exercise for famine relief, as the Ethiopians claim, 
but a political device to break up homogeneous populations in both areas 
[Tigray and Oromo areas of south].’62
The existence of alternative resettlement schemes in the western highlands of Tigray and
Wollo, where movement had been voluntary and cultural uprooting minimalised,
exposed the political motive of the government’s programme. An investigation by
Cultural Survival, which had taken place in refugee camps in Sudan in early 1985,
concluded that the programme was primarily being undertaken for counter-insurgency
aims.63 The aim was to depopulate the areas controlled by forces opposing the regime.
As CA noted, while
‘...a  good case can be presented for the policy in a country with Ethiopia’s 
terrain,... the manner in which it is being implemented, with virtually no 
budget for services, suggests that ideological factors are predominant and that 
the Derg sees it as an important way of consolidating control.’64
Towards the end of 1984, at the same time as the world became morally 
outraged by the media images of starvation65, at the same time as a ‘juggernaut of 
international aid’66 was unleashed and at the same time as mortality rates due to famine 
peaked, the Ethiopian government launched a major offensive in Eritrea, followed by 
heavy military activity in Tigray and in Oromo areas where the OLF was active. The 
implications to those present were stark: ‘the government is attempting to hit with force 
the same people who are dying of starvation.’67
62 ORA, ‘The destruction of the Oromo areas in the name of resettlement of famine victims’ (13 
December 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.430)
63 Clay & Holcombe, Politics and the Ethiopian Famine
64 Justin Phipps, ‘Report of a visit to Ethiopia’ (17 November - 5 December 1986), 
(CAO.AF/ME.411)
65 With the screening in October 1984 of a film by Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin, first on the 
BBC and then throughout the world, on the situation in Korem and Makelle, northern Ethiopia
66 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 177
67 TPLF press release (3 March 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.317)
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Recent research on war and famine has argued against an understanding of 
conflict as a short-term or abnormal occurrence.68 Internal conflict has been analysed as 
a long-term problem, organically linked to the instability of semi-subsistence production 
and having its own logic and political economy.69 This logic moreover depended upon 
variously controlling, incapacitating, or destroying semi-subsistence economies. This 
was because the survival of people as political beings depended upon the survival of 
their livelihoods. To defeat people politically, their way of life had to first be destroyed 
or incapacitated. In this way, the ‘various and complex patterns of semi-subsistence, 
together with their related coping strategies, are both the front-line targets and defensive 
strongholds of internal conflict in Africa.’70 Food was not simply a weapon in internal 
conflict, it was a necessary goal of conflict. In Eritrea and Tigray the political economy 
of violence ensured that farming households were the principle targets of the Ethiopian 
offensive:
‘people were being deliberately starved by the Derg, at the same time 
bombarded with the aim that if starvation affected them seriously, they would be 
weakened and the armed struggle would also be affected.’71
In this context, controlling the flow of relief became a key component of the war.
The Ethiopian famine had implications not just for the logistical design of an
effective relief policy but more significantly, for the strategic implications of
humanitarian intervention. The nature and effects of the international famine relief
efforts in 1983-85 are the subject of the section below.
2 . The International Polities of Relief
Unlike Haile Selassie in 1973, the Ethiopian government widely publicized the 
1980s famine. Yet despite repeated calls from 1981 onwards from both government and 
rebel sources, western governments failed to respond vigorously until the famine was 
passed its peak. From 1980-84 the total amount of food aid requested by the Ethiopian
68 Adams & Bradbury, Conflict and Development; Keen, The Benefits of Famine', Duffield, War and 
Famine in Africa
69 Duffield, War and Famine in Africa, p. 3
70 ibid., p. 17
71 REST.l, AbadiZemo
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Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was 2.46 million tons. Of this amount, it 
received just 440,000 tons, 18% of the amount requested.72 The reasons for under­
reaction seem to have reflected important strategic goals and diplomatic priorities. To be 
understood, they need to be seen within the context of a cold-war system based upon 
nation-state sovereignty.
Ethiopia throughout the 20th century had been an important ally for western 
governments. From the 1950s, Haile Selassie cultivated particularly close ties with the 
United States and Ethiopia became the largest recipient of American aid in Africa.73 
Immediately following the 1974 revolution, the United States maintained its interest in 
Ethiopia, although a rather more concerned and cautious approach was evident. 
However, following the seizure of absolute power by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam 
in 1977 - a close ally of the Soviet Union - America-Ethiopia relations deteriorated 
rapidly. A year later, the Soviet Union emerged as the Ethiopian’s government’s 
principal patron.74 American development aid to Ethiopia was subsequently terminated, 
and humanitarian aid substantially cut.
Growing humanitarian need in the context of an impending famine in 1983 
created a diplomatic problem for American policy. The situation was compounded by 
the uncertain applicability to Ethiopia of the Reagan Doctrine, which called for assisting 
rebel movements against Soviet-supported regimes such as Nicaragua. Fears 
surrounding the communist agendas of the EPLF and TPLF, as well as the hope of 
swaying the Ethiopian government to the West, insured that the EPLF and TPLF, and 
their respective humanitarian wings, received no American support. In the words of one 
US Embassy staffer in Khartoum: ‘we see our interests served best by maintaining as 
cordial a relationship as possible with Addis Ababa. And who knows, maybe Ethiopia 
will turn into another Egypt’, referring to the 1972 expulsion of Soviet influence from 
Egypt.75 Until 1984, American response to the growing Ethiopian crisis was thereby
72 Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs, p. 25
73 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 359
74 It was this assistance that enabled the government to launch a series of large-scale offensives in 
Eritrea from 1978-84, with the huge ‘Red Star’ offensive of 1982 representing the most brutal.
75 David Kline, ‘Hunger, who’s next: the politics of good deeds’ South, December 1984
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hedged with restraint. The cross-border operation from Sudan into Eritrea and Tigray 
was not seen as an alternative and subsequently the humanitarian aid that was being 
supplied went to the government side on which the fewest hungry Ethiopians could be 
found. For other western governments, the inadequacy of response was determined by 
a number of reasons. Ethiopia was seen by some as a cold war enemy that deserved to 
be shut off from any assistance. Many others had followed American policy in the late 
1970s and had substantially cut or terminated their aid programmes to the country. In 
1979, the British government terminated bilateral aid, although Ethiopia still remained 
eligible to receive disaster relief assistance.
In the meantime, there was a degree of skepticism about the figures produced by 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, a problem compounded by the conflict and 
the Derg’s restrictions on travel which prevented visits to the worst affected areas by 
representatives of western donor organisations and reduced the ability to corroborate the 
assessments by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the United Nations.76 
The fact that the revolution had resulted in a significant deterioration in the relationship 
with key western donors and the termination of several western programme of 
development assistance had also meant that the number of aid personnel in areas that 
were to be affected by the 1984-85 famine who could provide assessments of the 
situation had been drastically reduced.77 Another factor that contributed to the 
inadequacy of relief was the evidence that aid was being misused. This issue of food 
aid being diverted for use by the Derg’s armed forces arose on several occasions during 
1982-84 and led to the temporary freezing of additional food aid whilst inquiries were 
pursued. For instance, a poorly researched article which appeared in the British Sunday 
Times in March 1983 alleged that western food aid was being sent to the Soviet Union 
in partial payment of a huge arms bill. Questions in the British and European 
Community parliaments followed making it more difficult to justify increased levels of 
food aid.
76 Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs, p. 25; Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine’, p. 
372; & Africa Watch, Evil Days, pp. 364-366
77 Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs, pp. 17-18
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Not all western donor agencies shared the same reluctance. The major United 
Nations agencies (World Food Programme, United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Children’s Fund) 
and the European Community actually increased their assistance during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Yet the destination of this aid did little to ameliorate famine in that it 
was supportive of the Ethiopian government. Due to sovereignty considerations - article 
2 (4) of the United Nations charter ruled out the threat or use of force against territorial 
integrity or political independence of the state - United Nations humanitarian assistance 
was not forthcoming in non-governmental areas.78 It was not until 1990, and even then 
with some difficulty, that the United Nations was drawn into aid negotiations involving 
non-government areas. European Community aid was similarly supportive of the 
Ethiopian government, constrained by the Lome I agreement of February 1975 which 
committed it to a special developmental relationship with the Ethiopian government, an 
original signatory.79
International strategic and diplomatic interests ensured that while there was a 
response to famine in Ethiopia, initially it was both selective and inadequate. Certainly, 
the situation was to change in October 1984 with the screening - initially on the BBC 
and then around the world - of the film by Michael Buerk and Mohammed Amin of the 
situation in Korem, northern Wollo. The response that followed, from official and 
private sources, was unprecedented in its scale and diversity. It has been estimated that 
between the October screening and the end of 1985, more money was channeled into 
the Ethiopian famine than to any other previous emergency humanitarian operation.80 
As Cutler emphasized in his study of relief to Ethiopia in 1983-85, increased media 
coverage meant that the risks for donors of not taking vigorous action came to outweigh 
the risks of action.81 Yet ultimately the strategic and diplomatic concerns of the major 
western donors remained. These provided the critical context for the actions that 
followed. These actions were unhelpful in three main ways: the donors allowed the
78 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, p. 38
79 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, pp. 38-39
80 Clay, ‘Western assistance and the Ethiopian famine’
81 Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine’, pp. 401-404
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Ethiopian government to define the relief problem; they failed adequately to monitor the 
delivery of relief or to insure it reached the intended beneficiaries; and they avoided 
addressing the under-lying conflict. The parallels with the international relief 
intervention in the 1971-75 famine are evident.
Donors’ unwillingness to move beyond government definitions o f the relief problem:
‘Security is a problem in some areas ... [but] we can reach all the people.’
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Commissioner, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, 
1983.82
‘With the exception of the major towns along Tigray’s only main road, almost 
the entire region is currently under the control of TPLF.’ Jon Bennet, 
independent observer, 1983.83
In December 1984, diplomats and relief agency staff in Addis Ababa estimated 
that the government had access to just 22% of the famine-stricken population.84 The 
great majority could only be reached by the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the 
Relief Society of Tigray (REST), which worked in territory administered by the EPLF 
and TPLF respectively and relied on cross-border routes from Sudan. Despite this 
situation, the majority of aid - over 90% - was channeled directly through the 
government’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The result, as Charles Elliott, 
former director of CA, argued, was that ‘the aid is not gong to those who need it most. 
The Ethiopian government is receiving aid but in Eritrea and Tigray this doesn’t get 
beyond the main towns.’85
The problem of targeting humanitarian relief was a defining characteristic of the 
international relief operation in Ethiopia. In the mid-1980s the crucial question of access 
to populations in the war zones and the ways in which military realities on the ground 
were affecting the flow of relief food was left unchallenged by international donors, as 
was the Ethiopian government’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of war in the 
north of the country. Particularly culpable in failing to challenge this misinformation
82 Notes on meeting with Ethiopian Ambassador and Relief Commissioner, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, 
(Oxfam House, 25 November 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.312). Dawit was formerly head of COPWE for 
Eritrea and a key strategist in the Red Star- campaign in 1982. Solomon Inquai, letter to Paul Renshaw 
(28 November 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.219)
83 Jon Bennett, ‘Preliminary report on Tigray’ (October 1982 - January 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.441)
84 Paul Vallely, ‘Famine: Russia and UK on collusion course’ The Times, 4 June 1985
85 CA, ‘Information’ (6 March 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.247)
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was the United Nations. In August 1985, the United Nations Emergency Office for
Ethiopia - set up in late 1984 to coordinate the international relief effort - released a
report by Kurt Jansson on the relief operations in Eritrea and Tigray. The report,
conducted under the constraints of the UN mandate which ensured that contact was not
made with either REST or ERA, concluded that 75% of the affected people in Eritrea
and Tigray were being reached from the government side.86 The effect of this report on
the drought-stricken was highlighted by REST:
‘this report has received widespread publicity in the international press. 
International opinion has been affected. This could have a potentially 
devastating affect upon the famine victims of Tigray - both by denying them the 
food aid they so desperately need and in terms of public opinion as people are 
led to believe that most victims are already being provided for. For example it 
might lead certain aid agencies and governments whose supply of food aid to 
Tigray via the Sudan is influenced by international public opinion to reduce their 
assistance to REST and therefore dramatically decrease the amount of food 
reaching the famine victims of Tigray.’87
In the meantime, the existence of the cross-border operation from Sudan was never
publicly acknowledged as an alternative or complementary route. In an interview with
The New York Times, Kurt Jansson was reported as saying that ‘supplies reaching
Eritrea and Tigray from the Sudan were insignificant making up less than 10% of the
total.’88 The result of this misinformation was that the majority of assistance continued
to be channeled through the government’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission while
the majority of famine victims in the northern provinces of Ethiopia continued to suffer.
In effect the Ethiopian government was allowed to shape the relief agenda.
The government’s hostility to relief for rebel-controlled areas of northern
Ethiopia was clearly highlighted by its refusal throughout the 1980s to consider
proposals forwarded by the United Nations, diplomats and the rebel fronts for the ‘safe
passage’ of relief supplies into Tigray. Essentially such an arrangement would have
entailed a de facto  recognition of the war and of the Front’s control of large parts of the
countryside. This would have been in direct contradiction of its own official statements
that all famine victims in the north of the country were accessible for the purposes of
86 Africa Watch, Evil Days, p. 368
87 REST, ‘A response to Mr. Jansson’s report on the food distribution to famine victims in northern 
Ethiopia’ (September 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.439)
88 ‘UN Says Food is reaching Northern Ethiopia’ New York Tunes, 4 August 1985
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relief distributions through government channels alone. To justify their unwillingness to
move beyond government definitions of when and where relief distributions were
acceptable and possible, the major donors invoked the notion of state sovereignty and
non-interference in a state’s internal affairs. The resulting neglect of rebel-held areas did
however come under some heavy criticism from individual agencies, notably CA. A
senior CA staff member argued:
‘free passage is now essential. There is no way that agencies like ourselves can 
hope to reach people in significant numbers from Sudan. Despite the public 
outcry there has been no positive response from the Ethiopian government to the 
requests for access and free passage for vital aid supplies. The international 
community is turning a blind eye to what is going on in order not to jeopardise 
other relief operations but the needs of vast numbers of people in these areas 
will not go away.’89
A further manifestation of the donor’s deference to the sensitivities of the 
Ethiopian government can be seen in the redirection of resources towards NGOs from 
the mid-1980s. In the context of the misuse of aid and government hostility to relief to 
the north, this allowed donors to avoid outright conflict with the Ethiopian government, 
while at the same time providing them with a way of minimizing their own 
accountability.90 Lacking the political muscle to sway powerful obstructionist elements 
in the Ethiopian government and fearing for their operational survival, most relief 
agencies remained silent about abuses of aid. Such caution was vindicated when 
Medecins sans Frontieres was expelled in December 1985 for speaking out against the 
Derg’s resettlement policy.91 Other agencies operating on the government side feared 
that if the western public’s awareness of the role of conflict in causing the 1984-85 
famine was increased then it might well reduce the level of interest and thus resources 
made available for their relief efforts.92
It was estimated by CA that in 1985 under one-third of the European 
Community’s aid to Ethiopia was going to the 3.25 million severely affected people in
89 Paul Renshaw, ‘Information’ (2 November 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.311)
90 Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine’, pp. 400-401
91 Borton, The Changing Role of NGOs, pp. 30 & 64-65
92 Duffield Sl Prendergast, Without Troops & Tanks, pp. 87-88
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Eritrea and Tigray, who could only be reached by ERA and REST respectively.93 CA 
noted that:
‘European Community officials have been sympathetic but have taken more 
account of the difficulties of providing aid than the needs of the population ... 
the EC finds it difficult to approve funds under Article 137 of the Lome 
convention but has the option of using Article 950 of its own budget. The 
desire to avoid diplomatic offense to an ACP [Africa, Caribbean and Pacific] 
partner seems to take precedence over humanitarian principles.’94
It concluded that, ‘the priority given by the European Community to legalistic and
diplomatic factors is costing thousands of lives.’95 The objections of the Ethiopian
government coupled with fears of violating diplomatic protocol in relation to Ethiopian
sovereignty meant that the major donors treated the war and questions of access with
discretion. Yet as an independent observer argued with regard to Tigray:
‘the majority of drought victims in Tigray are to be found in TPLF-held 
territory. The only way of reaching these people is through REST. This is not a 
matter of political choice, it is a matter of necessity.’96
The failure of the donors to challenge the government’s relief agenda considerably
damaged the victims of famine.
Donors' lack o f attention to implementation o f relief programmes:
The many problems besetting the distribution of relief, once operations had been
initiated, were closely related to the various benefits of famine. Essentially, the lack of
adequate monitoring or supervision of relief supplies enabled the Derg to use food aid
to further its own political aims. Donor’s lack of concern with ensuring receipt of relief
by famine victims was reflected in the unwillingness to publicly highlight government
obstruction of relief reflected. The United Nations consistently concealed disturbing
evidence produced by it own monitors about the diversion of food, forcible
resettlement, and other abuses. Its role has been described thus:
‘The United Nations Emergency Office for Ethiopia’s main function was to act 
as a ‘screening device’, giving the appearance of competent action in response 
to famine but not compromising its actual position in Addis Ababa by unduly 
antagonizing the host government... it would have been as embarrassing for the
93 CA, ‘The need for a balanced share of EC emergency aid for the areas of Ethiopia not controlled by 
the Government’ (15 February 1985), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
94 ibid.
95 ibid.
96 Jon Bennet, ‘Preliminary report on Tigray’ (October 1982 - January 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.441)
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donors who had entrusted resources to the Ethiopian government as it was for 
the government itself to have aid misallocation exposed.’97
Donor’s tendency to divorce themselves from responsibility for finding out
what happened to their relief was illustrated by the wishful assumption that people from
TPLF and EPLF-held territories would be able to enter government-controlled towns to
receive official relief distributions. As reported by Carol Berger of the BBC, this was
not the case:
‘drought victims who trekked to the government held feeding center at Korem 
from TPLF-held areas have been refused food rations and any other services 
until they bring identity cards from government sponsored farmers associations. 
They have been told to return to their villages to fetch such papers which, you 
may understand, is impossible as no government sponsored farmers association 
operates in TPLF held areas.’98
Another manifestation of donor’s lack of concern with relief responsibilities was
highlighted by the Food for North initiative in early 1985. This initiative followed
agreement between the American Vice President and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister to
provide American relief to contested areas in Tigray and Eritrea from the government
side. In Eritrea the programme was implemented by the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat
on behalf of Catholic Relief Services. In Tigray, by World Vision in conjunction with
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The initiative was criticised by those who, seeing
Catholic Relief Services/Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat programmes commencing in
towns taken by Derg forces only a few days before, saw it as supporting the Derg’s
pacification campaign. Paul Valley wrote:
‘the relief agencies were pleased. So was the Derg, because the deal would 
provide a programme of pacification in the rebel areas newly under its control. 
Food could be distributed without the risk that it might fall into the hands of the 
rebel army. Moreover, the presence of western aid workers in the area would 
constrain the vigour of any TPLF counter-offensive. Having got the Soviet 
Union to finance the operation, Colonel Mengistu had now got the United States 
to finance its consolidation with food handouts.’99
Another analyst added:
‘when Ethiopian troops advance on a place like Barentu, and then a few days 
later an American voluntary agency comes in to distribute US food and medical
97 Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-85 famine’, p. 408
98 Solomon Inquai, telex to Mary Galvin/Paul Renshaw (2 November 84), (CAO.AF/ME.439)
99 Paul Vallely, ‘Famine: Russia and US on collusion course’ The Times, 4 June 1985
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supplies, you become hard-pressed not to see this as an odd kind of 
coordination.’100
In the absence of an international relief operation genuinely accountable to the victims of 
famine, relief ‘policy’ was not only inadequate but had important power functions. As 
one report claimed:
‘in Tigray, the role of the relief agencies operating on the government side was 
distorted to protect military garrisons and their overland supply routes; in 
Eritrea, to pacify the countryside by supporting a programme of population 
relocation.’101
Donors’ unwillingness to address the conflict underpinning the famine:
The third major limitation in donors’ actions in relation to the famine was the
neglect of the underlying causes of famine, notably the counter-insurgency strategies of
the government and, more broadly, the civil war. Throughout the crisis, there was a
significant lack of public criticism of the government’s prosecution of the civil war,
both in terms of causing the humanitarian crisis and in terms of deepening and
manipulating it. The United States was the only donor government to undertake an
investigation into the human rights aspects of the famine. That the 1985 investigation
concluded that there was no deliberate policy of starvation being conducted by the
government indicated the degree to which the strategy of the Ethiopian government by
1985 was misunderstood. As Duffield argued:
‘American investigators failed to understand that the Ethiopian government had 
shifted to using the provision, rather than the denial, of food aid as part of its 
counter-insurgency strategy. Destroying the means of subsistence by civilians 
and then using internationally provided food aid to lure people into government 
held garrison towns was the new favoured war strategy.’10
Importantly, the idea of linking aid with progress on peace was not taken up.
In the meantime donors tended to define the famine in terms of nutritional crisis
and famine mortality. The focus was on biological cases and ‘numbers in need’. Little
attention was paid to the socio-economic and political processes by which people had
become and were becoming needy, or how these processes might be slowed or
100 J. B. Tucker, The Politics o f Famine: US foreign policy in Ethiopia, 1982-85 (Mimeo, 1985), p. 
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reversed. In effect the famine was de-contextualised. Writing about the relief operation 
to Tigrayan refugees in eastern Sudan in 1984-85, Hendrie has argued how institutional 
practices were dominated by an official discourse that focused on reducing death 
rates.103 The broader socio-economic and political context was ignored as,
‘knowledge of the specific circumstances of the Tigrayan refugees was
essentially irrelevant to the implementation of the dominant programme of the
relief operation - namely, to get the death rates down.’104
Such de-contextualisation was both inadequate and inappropriate. In the case of the 
Tigrayan refugees in Sudan, it led to a failure to anticipate the large-scale repatriation 
movement, and a failure to provide rehabilitation necessities to households returning to 
their land.los More importantly, it led to a general failure to address the underlying 
causes of migration rather than just the symptoms. For the most part, agencies working 
in government-held areas remained happy to either echo the government’s assertions 
that the famine was ‘natural’ or remain silent. Most agency personnel believed that an 
open debate on the causes of the famine would lead to donor apathy and reduced 
contributions. Indeed, as Clay has documented, many agency personnel were anything 
but passive in their attempts to limit the debate concerning the famine’s causes.106 For 
agencies, like CA, involved in the cross-border operation from Sudan into Eritrea and 
Tigray, such misinformation was a particular problem, impacting on their ability to 
educate their northern constituencies about the crisis and on the efficacy of their public 
advocacy.
It would appear that official donors only wanted a particular knowledge of 
events, one that fitted in with their strategic and diplomatic priorities and helped 
underpin a narrow definition of what was to be done. Ultimately the failure to adopt a 
strong international advocacy position on the politics and conflict underpinning the 
famine meant that international humanitarian aid was exploited to support processes of 
violence.
103 Hendrie, ‘Knowledge and power’, pp. 57-76
104 ibid., p. 70
105 ibid., p. 74
106 Clay, ‘Western assistance and the Ethiopian famine’, pp. 153-157
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3 . Conclusion
Famine and famine assistance in Ethiopia in the 1980s were political. The failure 
of the international relief community to address this issue directly resulted in a number 
of avoidable mistakes and ultimately, ‘the help hurt.’107 Most of the damage to the 
victims of famine resulted from the unwillingness of western governments and agencies 
to understand the context in which the famine occurred and into which the assistance 
was delivered. Those involved in planning relief operations largely failed to come to 
grips with the local processes of force and exploitation that were creating famine and 
failed to anticipate opposition from those with a vested interest in blocking relief. Most 
importantly, the United Nations and most western governments did not speak out about 
the government’s role in creating famine and blocking relief. Portrayed largely as a 
‘humanitarian’ problem rather than a political problem, the United Nations, western 
governments and aid agencies were excused from direct involvement. The effect was a 
remarkable integration of humanitarianism and war: ‘the provision of ‘‘humanitarian” 
assistance, with no questions asked, helps the Ethiopian government get away with 
murder.’108
One issue that has emerged in particular, is that the official discourse on famine 
in the 1980s was similar to that in the 1970s. To begin with, the charitable urge that led 
to international response in 1973 and 1984 was motivated more by media pressure and 
the needs of appeasing northern constituencies than by a real desire to tackle the political 
crisis.109 In this respect, it was characterised not by solidarity but by neutrality. The 
official discourse assumed a conventional, ‘neutral’ humanitarianism. A particular 
knowledge of the famine was created around which interventions were arranged. In the 
process the socio-economic and political dimensions of the famine were ignored and the 
possibility of alternative actions obscured. Whether in shaping the relief agenda, 
reaching the victims or treating the causes, donors’ actions were informed by neutrality 
and an unwarranted respect accorded state sovereignty. In this context, donors’ policy
107 ibid., p. 148
108 Clay & Holcombe, Politics and the Ethiopian Famine
109 In 1974, it was the effect of Jonathan Dimbleby’s report on famine in Ethiopia, and in 1984, 
Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin’s report that forced international action
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goals were seen to fail because they were ‘thwarted’ by structural, legal or political 
impediments. Further, the dominance of a particular discourse on famine had important 
local political and economic effects, fulfilling important functions for different groups 
of people. This could be seen as clearly in the Ogaden lowlands in the 1970s, as in 
Eritrea and Tigray in the 1980s. The issue in both cases was not why ‘policy’ had failed 
but to understand what ‘policy’ actually did. This tied in with Keen’s political economy 
analysis of famine and relief, discussed in chapter 1, which argued that failure to push 
grain through to famine victims may not be about ‘policy’ failure but about relationships 
of power and hidden functions within policy.110 The implication, born out by 
experience in the Afar rangelands in the 1970s and the Eritrean and Tigrayan highlands 
in the 1980s, was that, in the context of local political processes, where physical and 
nutritional survival equaled political and military survival, claims of charitable 
‘neutrality’ have been a dangerous dishonesty.
Where did CA position itself within the official discourse? Had the lessons of 
the organisation’s own experiences in the 1970s famine been learned? The next chapter 
analyses CA’s capabilities in the 1983-85 famine and in particular, its involvement in a 
very different discourse on famine and relief that developed on the rebel side of the 
conflict, in Eritrea and Tigray.
110 Keen, The Benefits of Famine, pp. 8-11
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Table 4.1 Main Feature of Warnings of and Responses to the 1983-85 
Ethiopian Famine
Ethiopia warns of serious crop failures in the north. UN Co-ordinating 
Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation investigates and recommends relief 
and development package
Rain failure reported in Wollo, Tigray and Eritrea
The Organisation of African Unity warns that more than 100 million Africans 
would be affected by severe food shortages continuing into 1983
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission details assistance requirements for 
more than 5.5 million people and states that ‘drought an the effects of war ... 
have together made the food supply most critical’
The National Meteorological Services Agency warns of drought following a 
one-month delay in the onset of kremt rains in the north
REST reports drought and warfare displacing populations in Tigray and 
Eritrea. High food prices (3x normal) reported in centre of famine zone
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission publishes a second ‘assistance 
requirement’ report asking for aid for 4.8 million people. Save the Children 
Fund begins warning donor agencies of the likelihood of famine, including 
an influx to Sudan, and sets up a supplementary feeding centre at Korem in 
northern Wollo
First alert from the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on 
the African Food Situation for 1983-84
Oxfam begins feeding operations at Ibnat
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission requests relief for 3.9 million 
people
New Relief and Rehabilitation Commission aid request for 3.3 million 
drought affected people in the four northern regions. Save the Children Fund 
team kidnapped by TPLF guerrillas at Korem
Rain failure repeated and spreading. Early Warning System report further 
crop failures expected
FAO convenes a special meeting of representatives of donor countries and 
drought-affected countries to discuss the food crisis. Catholic Relief Services 
requests a further 16,000 Mt. Food from the United States Agency for 
International Development
The International Wheat Council warns of the deteriorating situation in the 
Sahelian countries, including Ethiopia, during its 99th session. Survey into 
Tigray by Oxfam team. Very poor nutrition status of children in famine zone. 
Massive outmigration of farmers into Sudan in search of work. Sorghum 
harvest poor in northern Sudan, so many return empty handed. Unseasonal 
grain price hikes in Wollo, spreading southwards. Grain prices rising in 
food surplus areas of western Tigray. Increase in volume of livestock sales 
in Wollo.
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Deaths in Korem camp reach 100 a day. The situation there is filmed by 
Mohamed Amin and presented by Michael Buerk as a ‘famine of biblical 
proportions’. Film extracts get prime-time coverage worldwide over the 
coming weeks, stimulating an international political furor. According to the 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission more than six million people 
threatened.
Sources: (CAO.AF/ME 587.3); & P. V. Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine in northern 
Ethiopia’ (PhD thesis: London University, 1988), pp. 365-367
The UN Economic Commission fro Africa states that 150 million Africans 
will ‘face hunger and malnutrition in 1984’
The USA announces $90 million Additional aid for Africa. The International 
Disaster Institute / London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine begin 
warning agencies of worsening famine conditions and publishes evidence
FAO convenes joint session with UN ambassadors to inform them of crop 
conditions, food supplies and relief effort in famine-affected African nations. 
FAO/World Food Programme mission sent to Ethiopia to assess needs
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission launches extraordinary appeal for food 
for more than 6 million people, accompanied by a film to help convince 
donors of the seriousness of the situation. The World Bank issues a strong 
warning that Africa is facing a ‘food catastrophe’ and that Ethiopia, Chad, 
Mozambique and Burkina Faso have only four month’s food left in stock
The US government approves only 8,000 MT of emergency food for 
Catholic Relief Serv ices
The London Economic Summit states that Western leaders are ‘greatly 
concerned’ about African drought and are ‘pledged to maintain and wherever 
possible increase’ aid to Africa. Church Drought Action in Africa issues a 
famine warning for Ethiopia. Oxfam warns of famine in Tigray. The 
FAO/World Food Programme needs assessment report is published, 
recommending only 125,000 MT of emergency food aid for Ethiopia. FAO 
delays clearance of World Food Programme shipment of 30,000 MT.
‘Harvest Hunger’ shown on British Independent Television. Disaster 
Emergency Committee appeal launched. Office of the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Coordinator circulates 5 telexes on the deteriorating situation 
in Ethiopia between May and July
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission publishes an update on relief 
needs and the general situation, stating that ‘we have no grain in our stocks 
as of the middle of July’. World Food Programme calculates the Ethiopian 
food deficit at only 50,000 Mt. Mass migration to roadside begins
Christian Relief and Development Association demands ‘immediate and 
extraordinary action’ of western donors. Oxfam announces a 10,000 MT 
grain shipment to shame Western governments into action. World Food 
Programme figures state that Ethiopian food aid received or in the pipeline 
exceeds requirements. The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator states that crop growing conditions in the northern famine areas 
are ‘almost satisfactory’. Revolutionary celebrations draw Ethiopian attention 
away from famine
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Chapter 5
THE ETHIOPIAN FAMINE 1983-85: A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
It has been argued above that the 1983-85 Ethiopian famine was a spectacular 
example of manipulated humanitarianism and that conventional official discourses on 
relief were inadequate. This chapter looks at the alternative framework for action 
presented by CA, through the Emergency Relief Desk (ERD) and its cross-border 
operation into Eritrea and Tigray. It argues that this illegal operation not only responded 
to the needs of the famine victims in Eritrea and Tigray - areas largely ignored by the 
international community due to an overriding respect accorded state sovereignty - but 
more importantly, impacted on processes of political survival in a radically different 
manner. In government-held areas, famine was politicised on the terms laid down by a 
predatory dictatorship and relief manipulated to support processes of asset stripping. In 
rebel areas, an alternative form of the politicisation of famine occurred in which a 
strategic commitment to fight famine was made as part of a progressive social contract 
and relief was used to strengthen processes of accountability. ERD thus, ‘provided a 
critical, if not subversive, reflection on conventional practice.’1
Yet the story of the consortium was neither harmonious nor simple and the 
humanitarianism that it represented was not free from internal contradiction and tension. 
As a clandestine and innovative relief operation, ERD had the handicaps of its 
pioneering role: its members could not publicise its fundamental nature and remained 
trapped within a contradiction between the reality of its involvement and the claims, 
given the perquisites of international law, of its neutrality. Moreover, contradictions in 
the balance between neutrality and involvement reflected important differences amongst 
ERD’s member agencies. My concern in this chapter is not to describe the history of the 
consortium but to examine the fundamental nature of the alternative structure it provided 
and the implication for the positioning of relief and development mandates. In this 
respect, my concern is to analyse the tensions within the consortium as a way of
1 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 172
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reflecting on the new framework for the theorisation of famine and organisation of relief 
that it provided.
CA was a key player in the history of the ERD. This study examines the role of 
CA in the consortium and its positioning with regard to the shaping of new practice and 
new theory. It explores how CA defined its role in the 1980s and what its capabilities 
were. The analysis begins with a brief history and profile of the consortium and CA’s 
involvement. It then moves on to an analysis of the operation’s organisational 
adaptation to the conflict situation in Ethiopia and the practical and theoretical 
implications of its internal debates. As the starting point for this study is a recognition 
that the cross-border operation provided a radically different model of humanitarianism, 
the analysis then moves on to evaluate this model. Finally, the implications for CA are 
discussed.
1 • The Emergency Relief Desk 1981-85
The ERD was formed in 1981 as an ecumenical NGO consortium to facilitate 
cross-border humanitarian assistance from Sudan into non-government areas of Eritrea 
and Tigray.2 It arose from the effects of internal war in Ethiopia and the indifference of 
the international community to conditions in non-government areas due to an overriding 
respect accorded Ethiopian sovereignty: ‘because of the Organisation of African Unity 
and United Nations Charters ... it is only NGOs that can step in to provide assistance 
and support the populations outside government control.’3 There were 9 core members:
Bread for the World, Germany 
Christian Aid, UK 
Danchurch Aid, Denmark 
Dutch Interchurch Aid, The Netherlands
International Coordination Committee for Development Projects, The 
Netherlands
Lutheran World Relief, USA 
Norwegian Church Aid, Norway 
Sudan Council of Churches, Sudan 
Swedish Church Relief, Sweden
2 For a history of the ERD, see Duffield & Preudergast, Without Troops and Tanks
3 Gayle E Smith, ‘Briefing document on Eritrea and Tigray’ (February 1983), (CAO.AF/ME. 199)
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The role of ERD in channeling emergency aid to victims of war and drought in 
Eritrea and Tigray was both crucial and controversial. In 1983, grain supplies delivered 
through Ethiopian government channels were 9 times greater than those reaching Eritrea 
and Tigray. This was despite the fact that up to one in three affected Ethiopians were 
depending on the Eritrean Relief Association and the Relief Society of Tigray, 
operational in Eritrea and Tigray respectively, for food.4 Before its closure, in June 
1993, ERD had mobilised about 3/4 million metric tons of food aid for Eritrea and 
Tigray. Duffield and Prendergast calculated that the ERD consortium alone provided 
US $350 million worth of cash and goods, about one third of which was raised by 
ERD members themselves.5
The origins of the consortium can be traced back to the 1970s when intermittent 
and confidential attempts were made through the ecumenical network, focusing on the 
Sudan Council of Churches, to bring humanitarian assistance into rural Eritrea.6 By the 
autumn of 1976, the Sudan Council of Churches had established an Eritrean Relief 
Desk in Khartoum, largely supported by Swedish Church Relief, for the reception of 
material aid and the purchase of Sudanese sorghum for transport to the border. A year 
later, Norwegian Church Aid opened an office in Khartoum to serve its programme in 
Eritrea. Discussion subsequently took place between the Sudan Council of Churches 
and Norwegian Church Aid with a view to establishing a joint desk to foster ecumenical 
assistance to Eritrea and Tigray and on 21st February 1981 the ERD was officially 
established.
The actual transport and distribution of humanitarian assistance channeled 
through the consortium was undertaken by three operational partners in their own target 
areas - the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and 
the Oromo Relief Association (ORA). ERA and REST managed all relief distributions 
in the areas under the control of the Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the
4 CA, ‘Statement based on memorandum to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on 
the difficulties associated with providing aid to areas not under Ethiopian government control’ (18 
December 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.247)
5 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 6
6 ERD 3 , Jacques Willemse
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Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) respectively. ERA had been set up in 1975 
and REST three years later, as quasi-autonomous relief administrations. ORA, formed 
in 1979 to provide relief and rehabilitation support to Oromos displaced in their own 
country or taking refuge in neighbouring states, was not such a big player in the 
operation. In terms of aid received, compared to ERA and REST, ORA took less than 
10% of the total.7 The difficulty of assessing the Oromo Liberation Front’s claims to 
have liberated areas within which ORA could work accounted for this. ERD therefore 
confined its support to ORA’s programmes in the Blue Nile Province of Sudan where it 
undertook to supply a few thousand Oromo refugees in the Yabus region with 
assistance. The cross-border operation also depended on and would not have been 
possible without the cooperation of the successive Sudanese governments and their 
permission to keep the border open. As one observer put it, ‘there was a lot of political 
risk in it for them - sovereignty was a holy cow.’8 Essentially, Sudanese cooperation 
was won for two reasons: the tacit support given to the liberation fronts was a response 
to the much more substantial support the Derg gave the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army 
in Southern Sudan; and the operation promised to contain a situation characterised by 
massive outpourings of Eritrean and Tigrayan refugees into Sudan. In this respect, the 
operation was often called a refugee preventing operation.9
The ERD was characterised by a limited humanitarian brief and ‘informal’ 
organisational structure. This was because it had been primarily conceived as a 
response to symptoms, the influx of refugees into Sudan, and not to causes, food 
insecurity in Front-held territories, and because it operated as an illegal and clandestine 
cross-border operation. In an unwelcome international environment, it was seen as a 
temporary instrument; cash payments were excluded and only aid in kind provided; 
transport, in the form of trucks which were in short supply in Eritrea and Tigray, were 
not provided and transportation costs only met either to Port Sudan or the border and 
not to the point of distribution; no formal mechanism for the consultation or
7 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 54
8 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
9 ibid.
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involvement of the ‘implementing agencies’ (ERD’s terminology for its indigenous 
relief partners) were established; no provision for long-term development was made; 
and ERD’s projected profile was as a non-political humanitarian consortium.
Essentially, the consortium was ‘an ecumenical conduit for channeling relief assistance 
in kind to the implementing agencies, verifying its legitimate distribution and 
disseminating information to its members.’10
However, the limits of this informal relief structure were already being felt by 
mid-1983 as the worsening situation in Eritrea and Tigray created pressure for change. 
This in turn exposed differences between member agencies over such issues as member 
representation; broadening the mandate to include rehabilitation, transport and 
development assistance; and ERD’s policy with regard to publicity and advocacy. 
Despite all being ecumenical agencies, it must be remembered that the consortium 
members had marked differences in philosophy and approach, as well as in 
personalities. It was the injustices of the war and the needs of its victims that essentially 
held it together.11 In February 1984, in response to these conflicts over an essentially 
neutral approach, an evaluation of the programme was carried out. Eighteen months 
later, in October 1985, a new ERD agreement was finally ratified. By this agreement, 
ERD re-established itself as a formal consortium of agencies, with Norwegian Church 
Aid playing a leading role. The restricted humanitarian mandate was reaffirmed but 
broadened to include rehabilitation: provision of seeds and tools; transport operating 
costs; internal grain purchase in Tigray; provision of medical items and water resources; 
and cash assistance. Member agencies were formally involved in the structure, by 
inclusion on ERD’s Board, and the implementing agencies were given the right to 
approach the executive committee for consultation and were invited to request 
administrative assistance from the ERD office although ERD could still not speak out on 
their behalf.
To some member agencies, ERD still remained trapped in a profound 
contradiction - between the narrative of ‘neutrality’ and the operation’s real nature. The
10 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 49
11 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
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fault lines of this contradiction had moreover become increasingly apparent as the 
political and media climate rapidly changed between the time of the evaluation in early 
1984 and the formalisation of the agreement towards the end of 1985. This was 
characterised by the increasing involvement of strategic donors - with the United States 
and subsequently the European Community giving assistance to the operation; the 
precedent established by some member agencies of more active individual campaigning; 
and the increased media recognition of the need for cross border activities. The 
differences between the agencies were becoming more apparent, the fault lines more 
entrenched. While the reaffirmation of a limited relief and rehabilitation mandate by the 
new agreement represented on one level a necessary compromise for holding the 
consortium members together, on another level, it reflected a more general failure to 
satisfactorily resolve the issue of engagement with the political reality of the complex 
emergency.
CA was at the forefront of calls for a broader and more effective relief and 
development agenda and advocated an ‘involvement’ that essentially went beyond 
ERD’s mandate and ‘neutral’, discrete profile. CA had been channeling relief into 
Eritrea, through Norwegian Church Aid, from as early as 1979. Between that time and 
the height of the famine, its involvement grew substantially and far exceeded its 
assistance to relief efforts on the government side, channeled largely through the 
Christian Relief and Development Association and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
Table 5.1 Christian Aid Grants to Ethiopia (£) 1979-1984
Ethiopia (via Addis) KhSm“ £ 5
1979-80 65,0000 3,300
1980-81 28,985 32,000
1981-82 51,548 116,500 20,000
1982-83 2,200 75,450 75,855
1983-84 147,425 712,000 381,250
Source: Paul Renshaw, ‘CA, Eritrea and Tigray - what next?’ (14 June 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.411)
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By 1984, CA was in the words of one senior staff member, a ‘big agency’ in 
terms of funding in Eritrea and Tigray through the ERD.12 Importantly, senior CA staff 
had developed a closer identification with the people and their problems. This resulted 
from various factors: the experience derived from a number of staff visits to Eritrea and 
Tigray which reinforced awareness of the scale of need and impressed on all the visitors 
the capacity of the relief administrations; an increase in the amount of documentary 
information coming out of the northern provinces which provided a firmer base upon 
which to assess possible responses; the growth of experience in relating to ERA and 
REST; and a growth in confidence about the effectiveness of ERD to act as a 
monitoring channel.13 With this closer ‘solidarity’ went a growing feeling and much 
debate within CA about the need to say more in public about the Eritrean and Tigrayan 
struggles; about the gross imbalance of humanitarian resources flowing into the 
northern provinces by comparison with other parts of Ethiopia through Addis Ababa; 
and about the need to support the respective relief administrations in broader 
developmental programmes aimed at reducing vulnerability and not simply alleviating 
distress through the input of food aid. How issues of ‘neutrality’ and ‘involvement’ 
were played out and how CA resolved its position is taken up in the following section.
2 . Organisational Adaptation in Conflict Situations: the Emergency 
Relief Desk in Ethiopia 1981-91
The tension between neutrality and involvement in western humanitarian 
interventions exposes the truth that the components of aid agencies’ relief mandates may 
conflict - a human rights agenda based on principles of solidarity may conflict with 
charitable imperatives based on principles of neutrality. Duffield has written that, ‘apart 
from its ecumenical basis, the defining characteristics of the ERD mandate was (a) its 
restriction to relief items in kind and (b) its discrete and non-political style of work.’14 
To have engaged in wider development activities or to have accepted a public advocacy
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
14 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 49
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role for the Fronts would have implied political solidarity and seriously jeopardised its 
legitimacy as a humanitarian agency at a time when sovereignty was paramount. Thus, 
despite being created to deal with the political challenges of a political disaster - refugees 
and victims of starvation - ERD’s projected self-image as a neutral humanitarian 
consortium implied a degree of political distance from the operation itself.
The international respect accorded to sovereignty and consequent principle of 
non-interference began to change from the mid-1980s. As political restrictions on aid 
agencies, like CA, fell away, their expanded operational involvement was supported by 
increased donor funding. By 1985, American and subsequently European Community 
assistance, although still cautious, swung behind the cross-border operation. The 
previously illicit operation began to gain de facto recognition at the expense of nation­
state sovereignty. As an increased operational involvement allowed for greater 
association with the complex reality in Eritrea and Tigray, the limitations of neutrality as 
a policy became manifest. Yet the contradiction between ‘neutrality’ and ‘involvement’ 
continued to shape the internal discourse and outward policy direction of ERD, 
reflecting the differences amongst its members. The key contradictions in this shifting 
debate may be analysed with respect to three main operational issues: partnership; 
information; and development.
The meaning o f partnership:
At the core of ERD’s operation lay its relationship with its main implementing 
agencies: ERA, operating in areas controlled by the EPLF; and REST, operating in 
areas controlled by the TPLF. At the core of this relationship lay a profound 
contradiction. This reflected a basic misunderstanding, on the part of the consortium, of 
the nature of the liberation fronts and the role of the relief organisations they had 
established. It was a contradiction to which CA proved especially sensitive.
Duffield has written that, ‘the Fronts ... established a political economy of 
liberation capable of simultaneously providing effective famine relief, engendering 
political support and pressing the war.’15 Moreover, at the heart of this political
15 ibid., p. 18
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economy lay a ‘process of internal development and social change having few parallels
in contemporary Africa.’16 To understand why public welfare was placed at the heart of
the Fronts* political agenda and how war facilitated development, one must turn to the
politics of the liberation Fronts and the nature of their armed struggles. Essentially,
these centered around the idea of ‘a social contract between the guerrillas and the
peasants.’17 Recent research on peasant mobilisation in Tigray has warned that:
‘although apparently driven to destitution by the crisis in the rural economy, 
most Tigrayan peasants did not rush to the revolutionary banner, but instead 
stood back and evaluated the ideals and programs of the movements contesting 
for their support, considered the personal credibility of the revolutionaries, and 
judged their prospects of defeating the Derg, before pledging themselves.’18
Mass resentment was channeled into revolutionary struggle by the organization and
mobilization of the peasants and by a social exchange between the revolutionaries and
the peasants.19 Components of this social exchange included the provision of facilities
such as schools and clinics and a program^bf reforms designed to transform rural
society. Of particular importance was land reform and the extension of a system of local
government known as baitos and based on elective village committees. The link
between the provision of welfare and the mobilisation of the peasantry was indicated by
one TPLF cadre:
‘often a peasant meeting would not end until there was a resolution and an 
agreement to carry out some reform. In many parts of Tigray this commitment 
was to land reform and only after baitos were set up and land reform carried out 
were peasants prepared to defend their institutions and join the TPLF 
fighters.’20
This commitment to public assistance was complemented by the Front’s pursuit 
of self-reliance. To this end civilian administrative structures in Front-held territories 
were organised in such a way that civilian productive capacity and political support 
could be voluntarily accessed. Structures involved the creation of elective village 
committees interconnecting with civilian departments responsible for the main aspect of 
public policy - health, education, transport, economy, social welfare. These vertical
16 ibid., p. 17
17 REST.5, Yemane Kidane
18 John Young, ‘Peasants and revolution in Ethiopia: Tigray 1975-89’ (PhD thesis: Simon Fraser 
University, 1994), pp. 386-387
19 ibid., p. 386
20 Gebru Asrat cited in ibid., p. 386
203
structures were complemented by horizontal mass political organisations based on
socio-economic groups - women, peasants, workers and professionals. The structure
allowed for development and relief assistance, land reform and political education to be
channeled in one direction, while voluntary material and political support could be
accessed in the other. It was the ability of the Fronts to defend the civilian populations
and meet their economic and welfare needs that won them their political support. From
as early as the mid-1970s, the possibility of supplying foreign relief assistance was
seen as an important part of this relation of reciprocity. To access such relief and to
improve the disaster management capacity of the Front s'civilian departments, relief
associations - ERA and REST - were established. In this respect, ERA and REST
should be seen as an ‘organic part’ of the social contract between the Fronts and the
peasants. Indeed, initially it was the Fronts that bore the responsibility for supporting
the relief associations, in terms of manpower, transport and financial support. As
Ibrahim Seit, former Head of logistics for ERA remarked, ‘without the EPLF, ERA
could not have done anything.’21
Constitutionally, ERA and REST’s administration and personnel were separate
from that of the EPLF and TPLF respectively. At the local level, cooperation and
coordination between the relief and civilian administrations meant that to the people of
Eritrea and Tigray, as to independent observers, they were virtually indistinguishable.
In practice, both relief associations worked through the civilian administrative structures
set up by the Fronts. As Gayle Smith observed:
‘Peoples councils, called baitos in Tigrinya, are the backbone of village life in 
the TPLF-administrated areas of Tigray, and integrated across the territory, they 
provide the human infrastructure through which both REST and TPLF 
coordinate their activities.’22
The success of ERA and REST hinged not only on their operational capability which
will be looked at in more detail below, but most importantly, on this political
relationship between the Fronts and the people. Unlike the predatory relationship
between the ruler and ruled in government-controlled areas, the political accountability
21 ERA.2, Ibrahim Seit
22 Gayle E. Smith, ‘Counting quintals: report on a field monitoring visit to Tigray, northern Ethiopia’ 
(July 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.441)
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of the Fronts to their civilian population ensured that relief was not manipulated. In 
Front-held areas, political mobilisation was characterised by a social contract in which 
the struggle against famine and enviro-economic vulnerability became a political issue. 
Paul Renshaw of CA noted that, ‘neither ERA nor REST can operate in a political 
vacuum.’23
In the meantime and in contrast to this reality, ERD’s projected self-image
as ‘neutral’ necessitated ERA and REST similarly be cast as neutral ‘implementing
agencies’ devoid of political reality. Accepting a public solidarity role with ERA and
REST, would have jeopardised ERD’s neutrality and its role as a discrete buffer in
attracting much needed international aid. This contradiction had profound implications
on the reality of the ‘partnership’ pursued by ERD with the indigenous relief
organisations. CA noted, with regard to ERA, that:
‘the effects of continued indirect relationships through ERD, with its 
limited mandate ... are such that, effectively, ERA is denied the ability to 
administer the funds for a large proportion of the programmes which it is 
acknowledged effectively to implement in Eritrea. The existence of ERD 
and, still more, its growth, means restricted opportunities for self­
development by ERA and its staff.’24
It was a situation much resented by the relief associations. As the former Chairman of
ERA remarked:
‘ERA was doing everything, managing everything and yet ERD played it 
as though it was its show and would never discuss policy with us. It was 
a joke among us that they would shut the door on us.’25
The niceties of international sensitivities was undermining the principles of
empowerment and equal partnership, to which most aid agencies were committed, at
least in rhetoric, by the 1980s. ERD was denying its implementing agencies, on whose
capacity it depended, the ability to develop. This tension was ultimately resolved by
individual members pursuing ‘partnership’ bilaterally, while ERD maintained its
neutral platform and essentially acted as a ‘donor’.26 CA resolved to ‘move to a position
23 Paul Reushaw, ‘Notes on ERD evaluation report’ (16 April 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
24 Paul Renshaw, ‘Eritrea: some reflections on a recent visit’ (11 January 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.412)
25 ERA.l, Paulos Tesfagiorgis
26 ibid.
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where CA conducts its essential business with ERA and ... contribute^] towards 
enabling ERA to grow itself as a “non-profit humanitarian organisation.’”27
ERD’s failure to resolve the contradiction between its claim to ‘neutrality’ 
and its reliance upon indigenous relief agencies had significant implications for policy 
prescription. The work of ERA and REST would not have been possible without the 
material, institutional and political support of the Fronts. Yet to a significant extent, 
ERA and REST were portrayed as ‘neutral’ by ERD, their efficiency and humanitarian 
credentials emphasised, their political profile played down.28 ERD’s guidelines on the 
evaluation of indigenous agencies seeking to become recipients was essentially de­
politicised, putting emphasis on monitoring, logistical and administrative capacity. As 
Duffield and Prendergast have argued:
‘it is interesting to note that these criteria do not include any reference to 
the participatory or community targeting systems that the EPLF and TPLF 
had developed or the relations of accountability and reciprocity linking 
rural producers to the political authorities.’29
The Fronts in Eritrea and Tigray presented Western donors with a unique political
economy in which public welfare constituted an integral part of the armed struggle.
ERA and REST were a core feature of this political economy. In this respect, notions of
‘neutrality’ belied the reality and provided a flawed analysis of policy. In addition, the
dictates of a neutral approach exposed the rhetoric of partnership. As a former ERA
official argued:
‘partnership, in the real sense, is about decision-making, ownership of 
projects and being able to prioritise the programme to suit your own 
environment. We were not even part of ERD. ERD wanted to decide for 
us, it was only for consultation that we were sometimes called. Later on, 
it was decided that we should be part of the meetings [1985 October 
Agreement], but still in terms of operational issues there were times that 
things were dictated to us.’30
Information in a disaster zone:
‘Yesterday the news came over the World Service of the BBC that Ethiopia is in 
desperate need of food assistance. ... the news is received with knowing 
glances by my co-workers here. No one here has any doubt that the civilian 
food needs in the government-held areas are vast, but the fact that they on the
27 Paul Renshaw, memo to Martin/Kate (30 January 1984), (CAO.AF/ME 290)
28 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 11
29 ibid., p. 55
30 ERA.3, Roso
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other side of the lines are nowhere mentioned in the report does not sit well with 
REST officials attempting to mount a massive relief effort, or with the civilians 
that know that food donated through the Office of the United Nations Disaster 
Relief Co-ordinator will never reach them. The BBC quotes a figure of over 
four million people seriously affected by drought, and a detached news 
announcer stated that Eritrea, Tigray, Wollo and Gonder are the areas hardest 
hit. It was not stated, however, that the gains of the TPLF and EPLF have 
meant that the government can barely move off the main highways in Tigray or 
Eritrea, or that the war zone is spreading to include eastern Gonder and northern 
Wollo. For all anyone who heard the report knows, there is a drought and there 
is a government body to implement the needed relief effort. ... From the angle 
of relief, the broadcast means that REST is still in a position of having to prove 
itself capable of delivering to civilians in Tigray, and must continue to counter 
the publicity which reinforces the notion that all of Tigray is being reached by 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. In fact, REST is still at the stage of 
having to prove it exists -  it is a tricky arena to enter for an organisation that 
must repeatedly demonstrate its humanitarian objectives in the midst of a 
disaster shrouded in and directly related to political controversy. For me it is a 
different irony, and I have the sinking feeling that no one in the outside world 
knows we are here save an insufficient number of comparatively courageous 
NGOs.’31
Information is not neutral and never less so than in situations of war. How was 
information used in the context of Ethiopia in the mid- 1980s? The official line of the 
consortium was that the cause of getting aid into Eritrea and Tigray would be best 
served by keeping as low a profile as possible. In terms of gaining official aid, this was 
a necessary precaution. Bilateral donors had powerful reasons fueling their reluctance to 
provide assistance to ERA and REST: such assistance would undermine the sovereignty 
of the internationally recognised government of Ethiopia and was hence illegal; and the 
close ties between the relief agencies and the Fronts posed the dilemma that assistance 
could be easily diverted for military use. As arguments about the severity of the 
humanitarian need in the Front-held territories and the need to ‘balance’ humanitarian 
assistance provided on the Derg side began to prevail, the conditions under which 
donor assistance would be made available became apparent - aid was to be restricted to 
‘relief’ and to be treated as confidential. To this end, donor aid allocations were often 
hidden in programmes to refugees in Sudan or other allocations to Ethiopia. ERD 
provided otherwise reluctant donor governments with an acceptable conduit so long as 
it maintained its ‘discrete’ self-image and limited humanitarian brief. Paul Renshaw of
31 Gayle E. Smith, ‘Counting quintals: report on a field monitoring visit to Tigray, northern Ethiopia’ 
(July 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.441), p. 58
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CA dismayed, ‘the problem with ERD is that to maximise its resource, it can only go at 
the pace of the most cautious.,32
The operational demands of maintaining a ‘low profile’ conflicted with the fund­
raising and development education demands of the member agencies, as they developed 
a deeper understanding of what was happening in Eritrea and Tigray and felt the need to 
go on public record about the consequences of the war. Paul Renshaw complained:
‘we do not seek massive publicity for our support of ERA/REST but at the same 
time want to see the grave needs in Eritrea/Tigray more widely recognised. It is 
undoubtedly an uncomfortable position!’33
By early 1984 CA resolved to take a higher media profile on Ethiopia.34 In February, it
launched an Appeal for Eritrea and Tigray:
‘to raise the level of awareness of our constituency and the general public about 
the plight of the people, the political reasons which prevent a solution to their 
problems and the unwillingness of the international community to help them on 
anything more than a token scale.’3S
Dr Solomon Inquai, former Chairperson of REST, noted the effect of such an appeal:
‘I think that was a very big breakthrough for us because they put REST on the 
front. More than what they gave us in kind, the fact that such a reputed well- 
known organisation was willing to deal with us, gave us credit so that others 
would come in. What I appreciated at the time and all my colleagues in REST, 
more than the aid was this fact of recognition.536
Respectful of ERD’s desire not to have its name mentioned in public and media forums,
CA became increasingly accustomed to using the names of the implementing agencies in
its press releases, articles and interviews. From using ERD as a ‘cover for discreet and
limited assistance in a contentious but needy area’, CA began increasingly to give ‘the
appearance of relating directly to agencies associated with “liberation movements. ”’37
Fears of alienating its constituency by association with ‘liberation movements’, founded
on the agency’s past experiences in the 1970s discussed in chapter 1, were belied by
results: ‘CA’s own appeal for Eritrea and Tigray [in 1984] was couched in terms which
made it clear that assistance was sought for programmes being operated by indigenous
32 Paul Renshaw, ‘Notes on ERD evaluation report’ (16 April 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
33 Paul Renshaw, letter to Jan Van Doggenaar (17 February 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.219)
34 Paul Renshaw, ‘Ethiopia, CA and the media: considerations for llie formulation of a policy’ (11 
January 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.412)
35 CA, ‘Appeal for Eritrea and Tigray’ (February 1984), (CAO.AF/ME. 199)
36 REST.3, Dr Solomon Inquai
37 Paul Renshaw, ‘CA, Eritrea and Tigray - what next?’ (14 June 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.411)
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agencies in “liberated areas. ”’38 Money flowed in surprising quantities. CA concluded
that ‘in the political context of the Horn the general public was not concerned about CA
working in an unconventional way.’39 Indeed it was felt that:
‘the more publicity about whom we support would increase our constituency’s 
awareness of the “root causes” behind the grants that we make and that this 
would be a good thing altogether.’40
For many operational agencies working on the government side, the fear of 
expulsion and of jeopardising the interests of their beneficiaries and local staff, acted a 
major consideration when deciding whether to support the consortium or engage in 
public advocacy. While CA was not immune to this fear, given its continued assistance 
to partner agencies on both sides of the conflict, notably the Christian Relief and 
Development Association and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and at times felt 
uncomfortable in its position, it decided early on to publicise its activities. It reasoned 
that:
‘the Christian Relief and Development Association, despite a long working 
relationship with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, is part of the 
“minority church” network in Ethiopia against which action has been taken by 
the government (Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, Mekane Yesus 
Church). How far it would suffer “guilt by association” with agencies funding 
the humanitarian work of liberation movements is difficult to say. The Christian 
Relief and Development Association Executive feels it is walking on a tightrope 
and asks CA to be “careful.” Their position may, however, be easier than that of 
operational agencies in Ethiopia also assisting REST/ERA. The Christian Relief 
and Development Association is, after all, not CA. Oxfam is Oxfam wherever it 
is .’41
To some extent the situation changed during 1984, with the worsening crisis, 
the extravagance of the Derg’s 10th birthday celebrations in September and the TV 
coverage of October.42 Towards the end of 1984, media interest and public concern 
fueled an increase in the number of journalists, observers and agencies crossing the 
border and with it, an increase in the knowledge of non-government areas.43 Within a 
matter of months, the nature of public debate had undergone a perceptible change, with
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
40 Paul Renshaw, ‘Ethiopia, CA and the media: considerations for the formulation of a policy’ (11 
January 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.412)
41 ibid.
42 Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin’s film about the situation in Korem and Makelle in northern 
Ethiopia, was screened on the BBC on 23 October 1984 and then around the world.
43 REST.l, Abadi Zemo
209
account of government aggression against civilians, political factors in the famine, 
government abuse of food aid and neglect of famine victims and the importance and 
fragility of the cross-border operation. By November 1984, ERD members felt 
confident enough to issue a resolution pointing out that the geography of war meant that 
the 6 to 7 million people at risk in Eritrea, Tigray, Wollo and Gonder could not be 
adequately helped without a safe passage for relief supplies. In this resolution, ERD, 
for the first time, publicly acknowledged the war as a contributing factor to the famine, 
running counter to the government’s view which emphasised drought and 
environmental degradation. Yet the demands of discretion, a condition for attracting 
donor support, ensured that a strong public advocacy role was never adopted by ERD. 
Such a ‘neutral’ stance was criticised by some member agencies, such as CA who had 
found themselves involved in a media and political learning process during 1984 and 
1985:
‘It has been a year in which unprecedented attention has been given in the media 
to Ethiopian affairs and, for the first time in many of our countries, the first 
serious attention to the situation in rural Eritrea and Tigray. This has, if CA is 
typical, involved all our agencies in new responses and new initiatives on the 
humanitarian and diplomatic levels.’44
CA was particularly sensitive to the resentment felt by the Implementing Agencies at
ERD’s stance with regard to information and how this impacted on notions of
partnership. As Rosso, formerly Head of information in ERA, explained:
‘the issue that we most criticised was that the famine was caused by the war and 
the atrocities committed by the Ethiopians, and that if the problems were to be 
solved, the political causes had to be solved. And we had expected our partners 
to air our cause and at least come up with an advocacy role. They were not 
prepared to go further than portray us as victims. We felt that this was not true 
partnership.’45
The internal tension between member agencies was partially ‘resolved’ by individual 
members, such as CA, forming bilateral development links with ERA and REST and 
undertaking advocacy and public campaigning on an individual agency basis, while 
ERD’s collective neutrality was confirmed.
One effect of decisions by member agencies, such as CA, to engage in public
44 Paul Renshaw, letter to ERD Members (22 April 1985), (CAO.AF/ME 386)
45 ERA.3, Roso
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advocacy was an increasing polarisation of the aid community. Some non-ERD 
agencies working in Ethiopia had misgivings about the consortium antagonising or 
compromising efforts on the government side effectively. From the end of 1984, with 
the increased media exposure of the famine and with it, of the government’s abuse of 
food aid and neglect of famine victims, coupled with increasing reports from non­
government areas carrying contrasting accounts of the effectiveness of the Fronts'public 
welfare policies, divisions between non-ERD and ERD agencies became particularly 
hostile. In August 1984, Save the Children Fund-UK expressed its concern to CA over 
its public stance on Eritrea and Tigray. Save the Children Fund felt that to draw media 
attention to the conflict was having the effect of reducing donor confidence in the 
Ethiopian government and its Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. It was also alleged 
to be causing Save the Children Fund problems in Ethiopia due to its association with a 
fellow British agency.46 The very public controversy surrounding the resettlement 
programme after it had gained media exposure, further entrenched this hostility between 
agencies.47
In Ethiopia, in the mid-1980s, information had an instrumental role in shaping
public opinion; sustaining expenditure and lobbying for funds; directing resources; and
securing access. The dilemma posed by ERD’s need to remain formally ‘neutral’ and
the need, felt by many of its member agencies, to disseminate information about ERA
and REST in the absence of international awareness of the operation was thereby
crucial, both in terms of fund-raising and in terms of advocacy. While it was partially
resolved by the increased media exposure from the mid-1980s, on an individual
member agency level, an unsatisfactory dichotomy over ‘profile’ remained. As Paul
Renshaw of CA noted:
‘...the policy of ERD is to keep a low profile. CA has, thus, in its coverage of 
Eritrea/Tigray in Christian Aid News, come to keep ERD out of the picture and 
has told its constituency of the fact that the relief aid is distributed through 
REST/ERA. We are thus in a fairly strange position of approving grants to the 
Sudan Council of Churches/the Emergency Relief Desk because of the sensitive 
nature of the ultimate recipients but more or less denying the existence of the 
channel and playing up the ultimate recipients when it comes to publicity. We
46 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 88
47 For an analysis of the resettlement programme and how it divided agencies see Clay, ‘Western 
assistance and the Ethiopian famine’, pp. 163-166
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need to resolve this. It is very relevant to the inter-related aid/information 
questions about this region which are becoming my daily fare.,48
Relief and development:
It was argued in chapter 2 that without an approach that addressed the political 
reality of a given situation and recognised that short-term relief activities needed to take 
into account future needs and the long-term consequences of their actions, relief would 
continue to address consequences and not causes. Only an approach that adopted 
principles of strategic long-term programming, such as participation, the employment of 
local knowledge, resources, and management capacities would enable relief and 
development to be linked. Essentially, such an approach was a ‘solidarity’ one. African 
Rights has argued:
‘“Neutral” relief and participatory community development are almost certainly 
incompatible, and once a relief agency has built up an institutional reputation in 
one area it will find it very difficult to move to the other.’49
As described above, ERA and REST were not merely charitable organisations,
following in the wake of one crisis or another. They were an ‘organic’ part of a national
welfare programme aimed at providing long range solutions to long-term problems. To
Justin Phipps, of CA, it was clear that ‘we should regard the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front as a civilian administration in the making.’50 How was the challenge -
posed by ERA/EPLF and REST/TPLF - to engage in real participatory, community
development, and capacity-building met?
At an ERA/Donors Conference in 1983, Justin Phipps, CA’s representative,
noted how NGOs’ limited relief mandates and short term interventionism tended to
conflict with long-term rehabilitation and development needs:
‘While agency representatives tried to give warning about their own limitations, 
it was not clear to what extent they are prepared to take up the challenge that in 
some senses ERA represents to their way of working as agencies, I think that 
establishing closer links with ERA will require time and effort. All the usual 
difficulties with liberation movements/constituency are likely to arise, and it may 
take time for ERA to see that donors usually think in terms of geographically 
identifiable projects, not national programmes. EPLF is after all trying to set up 
a government administration, and doing so without the help of the “big gun” 
NGOs. It must therefore find it hard to “prioritize” requests in the way that we
48 Paul Renshaw, memo to Martin/Jenny (18 January 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
49 African Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound?
50 Justin Phipps, ‘Report on ERA/donors conference’ (27-29 April 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
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small agencies want, and to accept the inevitable large shortfall on their financial 
requests.’51
A chronic problem in assisting the long-term recovery of peasants in Eritrea and Tigray 
was the reluctance of major donors to provide adequate inputs for ERA and REST’s 
rehabilitation and development projects. This was largely due to the fact that 
infrastructural assistance implied political support for the EPLF and TPLF and their 
national recovery programmes. Particularly sensitive was the issue of transport. 
Throughout 1985, the main constraint on food distributions via the cross-border 
operation was trucking capacity.52 Yet repeated appeals for new trucks were highly 
problematic with major donors because of their perceived potential for use in military 
operations.53
ERD never satisfactorily resolved the debate over providing development
assistance in the midst of a conflict and throughout its history, remained internally
divided over the relief versus development fault line. Certainly the decision in October
1985 to expand ERD’s relief mandate to include rehabilitation inputs was an important
step, allowing for the diversification of ERD’s public welfare activities through a
number of cash programmes - transport, locust control, medical supplies, storage,
agricultural rehabilitation, administration. A full development mandate was however
consistently rejected. To senior staff in CA, and some other member agencies54, ERD
was failing to address the issue of structural impoverishment and the opportunities
presented by ERA and REST for participatory long-term development:
‘the question arises of whether ERD is an adequate means of our relating to 
Eritrea ... while it can be very helpful as a co-ordinator of emergency relief 
work, we should be aware that it ultimately amounts to an expatriate 
intermediary, and we should therefore follow our nonnal philosophy of 
developing links with organisations which are more representative of Eritreans 
themselves. In short, I think that working with ERA more closely than we do at 
present could seriously test our flexibility as an agency as well as our 
commitment to ‘people’ participation.’55
51 ibid.
52 Extremely nigged roads through mountainous terrain, and the need to move relief supplies at night 
due to threat of air attack, meant that on average about 20% of ERA and REST’s transport fleets were 
‘ off-road’ at any given time. Barbara Hendrie, ‘Cross-border relief operations in Eritrea and Tigray’ 
Disasters, 13 (1990), pp. 351-60
53 Hendrie, ‘Cross-border relief operations in Eritrea and Tigray’, pp. 351-360
54 See Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, pp. 82 & 112
55 Justin Phipps, ‘Notes on the BCC/CA report on ERA/Donors Conference (13 May 1983), 
(CAO.AF/ME. 199)
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To some extent, ERD’s limited relief approach represented a strength. It is
questionable whether ERD would have been able to attract donor support or indeed
continue to hold itself together as a consortium if it had broadened its mandate; and it
has been argued that by limiting its mandate, it allowed for ERA and REST to form
diversified bilateral relations with individual agencies, thereby ensuring plurality of
support and hence reducing the danger of dependency on any single monopoly
supplier. As a former chairman of ERD remarked:
‘ERA and REST were always shouting at us that our mandate was too limited, 
but the good thing was that it allowed them to set up other partner networks. 
They had a very good excuse, we were not doing development. So they hooked 
into other consortium and partnerships and that was a good development.’56
In 1984, CA recognised ERA and REST as bilateral partner organisations. Responding
to the ‘exciting possibilities for beginning to tackle some of the root causes of
poverty,’57 CA directly supported a number of long-term agricultural programmes
initiated by ERA and REST: soil and water conservation in central Tigray; water
exploration and well digging in Eritrea; local production of drugs for use by Eritrea’s
barefoot doctors and health workers; materials and equipment for primary schools in
Tigray. Throughout, CA was aware of the political implications involved in supporting
development work closely linked to the civilian departments of the Fronts. At the same
time, what it was equally aware of, was the fact that ‘ERA relates to EPLF departments
only insofar as their interests in the civilian population merge;’58 that humanitarian
needs were not being met in Eritrea and Tigray59; and that competent indigenous
organisations were posing a challenge and real opportunity for effective grass root
development and poverty-alleviation.60
Demands for rehabilitation, transport and development assistance and the
inability of ERD to address these needs also led to the creation of other cross-border
consortia. In 1983, the Eritrean Inter-Agency Agricultural Consortium and the Tigray
Transport and Agricultural Consortium were formed on the initiative of Roger Briottet
56 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
57 CA, ‘Hunger in Africa’ (July 1984), (SOAS.CA/J/5)
58 Justin Phipps, ‘Report on ERA/donors conference’ (27-29 April 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
59 Paul Renshaw, ‘CA, Eritrea and Tigray - what next?’ (14 June 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.411)
60 Justin Phipps, ‘Report on ERA/donors conference’ (27-29 April 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
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and agencies originally associated with Euro-Action Accord.61 The Eritrean Inter-
Agency Agricultural Consortium initially concentrated on agricultural, veterinary and
water drilling programmes, adopting a transport programme in 1989. The Tigray
Transport and Agricultural Consortium tackled transport from its inception and, from
1984, agriculture. In her history of the Eritrean consortium, Martine Billanou calculated
the assistance generated by it, in the form of trucks, trailers, machinery for road
construction, drilling rigs, pumps etc., to be of a value of US $42 million.62 The
Eritrean and Tigrayan consortiums tended to have closer organisational association with
ERA and REST respectively and by the end of the 1980s, a process whereby power
was to be devolved to the indigenous relief associations was firmly in place.63 Both the
Eritrean Inter-Agency Agricultural Consortium and the Tigray Transport and
Agricultural Consortium wound up their individual functions in 1993. Of the ERD
members, CA was alone in being involved in both these consortiums, and between
1989 and 1990 acted, along with Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, as the lead
agency. These consortia complemented ERD, enabling donors to support more
development-oriented programmes. Talking about the limits of ERD’s mandate, a
former REST official argued:
‘if they [ERD] were trying to get involved in development, I don’t think they 
would have raised as much support as they did. It was not easy for them to go 
to their donors to get development aid. The Tigray Transport and Agricultural 
Consortium emerged to fill the gap, it was a good arrangement. While the ERD 
was busy raising money for relief, the Tigray Transport and Agricultural 
Consortium was supporting the other needs - supplying hand tools etc.’64
Through the cross-border operation, approaches to relief and development
were, in many instances, integrated. The cross-border operation played a vital role in
empowering the relief associations in Eritrea and Tigray. As a former REST official
stated:
‘the local capacity-building was the most important part of the operation. We 
started as a very different organisation and the ERD supported our institution
61 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 57
62 Martine Billanou, The Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium, 1983-1993: a brief historical review (El AC, 
September 1993)
63 ERD.4, Martine Billanou
64 REST.l, Abadi Zerno
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and helped build our capacity, both in terms of our management capacity and
our resources i.e. trucks.’65
By the later part of the 1980s moreover, it was clear that ERD’s cash-supported 
programmes had moved away from a limited relief brief to include a wider range of 
rehabilitative activities. Thus while a solidarity position with regard to the civilian 
governments was never adopted, and the tension between relief and development never 
resolved by the ERD, the operational reliance of the consortium on REST and ERA and 
the unique relation of those associations to their respective Fronts, ensured that relief 
and development were linked in a dynamic way.
The above has highlighted the contradictions in ERD’s approach to the situation 
in northern Ethiopia. In particular, the social and political dynamics that made the cross- 
border operation possible were not publicised and the discourse remained divorced 
from the local reality. The analysis has also shown how CA positioned itself, repeatedly 
adopting a ‘solidarity’ role and displaying a perceptive analysis of the complex political 
situation. In particular, senior staff at CA were aware of the impact of the organisation’s 
own intervention and the implication of this on how it should operate. In contrast to its 
experience in the 1970s famine, senior staff at CA in the 1980s acknowledged that 
humanitarianism was political. The suggestion is that a new role had been found. The 
nature and effectiveness of that role will be analysed in the following section.
3 . The Cross-Border Operation Evaluated 1981-91
CA’s prime policy concern in Ethiopia in the 1980s, as indeed in the 1970s, 
remained how to move from relief to sustainable development. In the context of political 
and military conflict in the 1980s, such a concern necessarily involved issues of human 
rights and conflict resolution. In this respect, CA’s mandate, relevant to the Ethiopian 
policy environment in the 1980s, can be broken down into five basic components. 
These are: meeting basic needs; development; promotion of justice and rights; mediation
65 ibid.
216
and negotiation; and sustainability. CA’s role, through the cross-border operation, will 
be evaluated under these headings.
Meeting basic needs:
Throughout its history, the provision of food aid and additional relief and 
rehabilitation programmes supported by ERD never matched assessed needs. In 1983, 
ERD was supporting only around 5% of ERA and REST’s requests for food aid.66 By 
1988/89, the operation had become much more effective but still only met 40% of 
estimated need.67 ERD was never able to meet its Implementing Agencies demands. 
During the first half of the 1980s, it was limited, largely, by the capacity of ERA and 
REST, notably transport capacity. In the later 1980s, it was limited by the available 
resources. However by 1986, ERD’s ability to increase the flow of food aid and funds 
was clearly beginning to have a beneficial impact on the relief situation within Eritrea 
and Tigray. Monitoring reports indicated improved health, reduced internal migration 
and some indication of increased herd sizes.68 In Eritrea, the Leeds study of 1987 found 
that while a structural food deficit existed, the operation had been successful in 
stabilising the short term food requirements of the population.69 While food aid was 
never enough, it was its utilisation as part of the integrated relief strategy managed by 
REST and ERA, that meant it became a crucial and effective coping mechanism. In this 
respect, the following analysis focuses on ‘how’ aid was used rather than ‘how much’.
Relief management in Eritrea and Tigray was firmly set in the context of 
participatory structures of civilian administration established by the EPLF and TPLF 
respectively. Such structures were characterised by the election of village, district, and 
regional-level civilian councils responsible for coordinating socio-economic activities 
and implementing community-based development projects. The relief and development 
operations of ERA and REST were thus able to relate directly to highly organized
66 Kirsty Wright & Max Peberdy, ‘Convoy to Tigray: report on the thought in Tigray’ (May 1984), 
(CAO.AF/ME.441)
67 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks
68 ERD, Annual Report, (1986) cited in Duffield & Prendergast, p. 103
69 Leeds University Agricultural & Rural Development Unit, ‘Eritrea: food & agriculture assessment 
study (April 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.434)
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administrative structures with roots at village level.70 In this way, ‘relief distributions 
were community managed and linked through relations of accountability to the political 
authority.,71
Needs assessments were carried out at village committee level and were based 
on the collection of detailed socio-economic information on household productive 
capacity and needs.72 Lists of beneficiaries were then approved in discussion and with 
the agreement of the village committees before being forwarded through regional 
councils to ERA and REST headquarters. At the headquarters, allocations of available 
resources would be made on a percentage basis in relation to aggregate numbers of 
beneficiaries in each administrative zone. Relief distributions were then carried out at 
district centres by ERA/REST workers in the presence of village council members who 
ensured that targeted families within their respective communities received their 
supplies. The village councils had the responsibility for organising the onward transport 
of goods by pack animal back to the village.73 Through a lengthy but democratic 
process, ‘it was the village committees who took responsibility at the grassroots for 
identifying needs, guaranteeing the fair and accurate distribution of supplies, and co­
ordinating the final leg of transportation.’74 Such a method of needs assessment and 
food distribution was essentially pro-active. As Duffield and Prendergast have written: 
‘it takes account of expected trends and, unlike the collection of nutritional stress 
indicators favoured by many international relief agencies, favours attempts to conserve 
assets.’75 Most significantly, it addressed the need to preserve livelihoods, providing an 
integrated approach to short-term relief and long-term development.
The dominant impression from field reports, monitoring missions and 
independent observations was of a high degree of professionalism and competence. 
Carlisle Patterson, Head of CA’s Aid Department, wrote:
70 Hendrie, ‘Cross-border relief operations in Eritrea and Tigray’, p. 355
71 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 28
72 Arild Jacobsen, ‘Report on field visit to Eritrea’ (16 September -16 October 1984), 
(CAO.AF/ME.385)
73 Hendrie, ‘Cross-border relief operations in Eritrea and Tigray’, pp. 355-356
74 Barbara Hendrie, ‘Field report from Eritrea’ (April 1986), (CAO.AF/ME.386)
73 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 24
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‘we have full confidence in the ability of ERD to administer the aid responsibly 
and in REST and ERA themselves to distribute it according to strict 
humanitarian criterion and to afford full facilities for reporting and 
monitoring. ’76
Operational flexibility was ensured by decentralised administration and the continual
updating of assistance requirements by the civilian councils. Distributions were
‘efficient and orderly, and display a spirit of co-operation aimed at solving community
problems.77 And targeting effectively addressed the most vulnerable:
‘[the relief programmes of ERA and REST] effectively targeted commonly 
unsupported population groups, including women ... and the programming has 
begun to both erode the socio-economic inequalities that have contributed to 
unequal and limited development, and to combat the effects of drought and 
epidemics.’78
The conclusion drawn by Paul Renshaw of CA, following a visit to Eritrea in March 
1984, was that, ‘the ability of ERA to provide assistance to people in need ... is limited 
more by lack of resources than organisational capacity.’79
ERA and REST’s competence in the field was complemented by an approach 
that was strongly oriented to maintaining livelihoods and working with the people. An 
approach that aimed to involve local communities in the management of their own relief 
and use local skills and resources. REST’s management of the enormous displacement 
of people both internally in Tigray and externally into Sudan highlighted how relief was 
not perceived in narrow terms of ‘saving lives’ but always maintained a long-term 
perspective aimed at supporting coping strategies and maintaining ‘livelihoods’. By 
March/April 1983, following the failure of rains in 1982, an estimated 350-400,000 
people had been forced westward in search of food and work.80 Between March and 
June of that year, REST established and administered 17 reception centres in the 
western region and in the drought source areas. Approximately 100,000 migrants were 
received and given food and medical treatment, as far as supplies permitted. The 
remaining 300,000 were directed to villages in Shire and Wolkeit districts where their
76 Carlisle Patterson, letter to D. L. Stanton (30 May 1984), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
77 Barbara Hendrie, ‘Field report from Eritrea’ (April 1986), (CAO.AF/ME.386)
78 Gayle E. Smith, ‘Briefing document on Eritrea and Tigray’ (February 1983), (CAO.AF/ME. 199)
79 Paul Renshaw, Inter-office memo (March 1984), (CAO.AF/ME. 199)
80 John English, Jon Bennett, Bruce Dick, ‘Tigray 1984: an investigation’ (January 1984), 
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absorption by the local communities was arranged.81 As far as possible efforts were 
made to keep migrating communities together in groups with at least some of their 
elected administrators. Migrating communities were integrated in to the administration 
of the area through the election of Emergency Relief Committees which would establish 
links with the corresponding committee of the local administration. Emergency Relief 
Committees would undertake needs assessment, relief distribution and help stimulate 
economic activity, thereby involving the drought victims in their own relief.82 Most 
significantly, a high degree of accountability to the receiving villages was maintained. 
Potential problems were discussed at public meetings in all the villages where migrants 
were to be distributed and rules of conduct were established for the handling of the 
migrant communities: migrant families should help in the day-to-day domestic and 
agricultural work of the families they lived with; and migrants who were sick were to be 
allocated to Reception Centres to avoid the possible outbreak of epidemics.83 The whole 
approach aimed at creating accountable and hence, as far as possible, sustainable 
communities.
Due to the largely successful settlement of displaced drought victims in western 
Tigray few of the 1983 migrants found their way across the Sudan border. This 
situation was to deteriorate dramatically between October 1984 and May 1985 when 
approximately 200,000 Tigrayans crossed the border to eastern Sudan.84 Many lived 
within 1 or 2 days’ walk from government-controlled towns where international 
agencies were providing food aid and medical assistance. They chose to make the 4-5 
week walk to Sudan out of fear of resettlement or of being identified as TPLF 
sympathisers. Once again, the migrants were supported by the REST pipeline described 
above. It is important to note that this exodus only ever represented a temporary 
survival strategy to the migrants involved. Consequently, by March, even while 
migrants were still arriving, small groups of people, mainly male heads of households,
81 ibid.
82 Kirsty Wright, ‘The administration of the drought relief operation’ (August 1983), 
(CAO.AF/ME.441)
83 ibid.
84 Hendrie, ‘Do we see famine as it is?’
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began leaving the camps. By early May, a trickle had become a flood and 7,000 people 
were leaving every night. Out of a total of 200,000 people who entered Sudan in 1985,
70,000 returned the same year. In 1986 and 1987, a further 100,000 people returned 
home.85 The returnees were again assisted by REST. Guided by REST field workers, 
they would walk in village groups to transit camps inside Tigray where food rations, 
water and medical care would be provided. The village groups would have elected 
committees for medical needs, relief distribution, administration and security during the 
return journey 86 Once people crossed the border, they were immediately re-integrated 
into the assistance program of REST inside Tigray, which included the distribution of 
agricultural rehabilitation inputs - seeds, tools, oxen etc.87
This repatriation was not supported by most international donors, most notably 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, who argued that since the war and 
famine were still raging, populations should not return88 In doing so, they failed to 
fully appreciate the nature of the migration strategy and the concerns or priorities of the 
farmers. Migration was only ever a temporary dry season survival strategy. For rural 
households, it made sense to send the most vulnerable groups to Sudan for the months 
just prior to harvest, when food supply was lowest, and to send heads of households 
and active producers back to Tigray at the same time, in order to take advantage of the 
spring rains. While REST supported this strategy, United Nations aid officials in Sudan 
were unable to comprehend why people were moving in two directions at once, both 
coming and going across the border. In this respect, they failed to understand that local 
survival strategies were as much about saving lives as saving livelihoods; and that it 
was vital for farmers not to lose a single season of cultivation. The rainy season of 
1985 was in fact good and many households that had been refugees in Sudan only 
months before were able to obtain some food from their own production.89 
Institutionally, CA supported REST’s strategy. There were three main reasons for this:
85 ibid.
86 Barbara Hendrie, ‘Report on REST repatriation programme’ (1 March 1987), (CAO.AF/ME.385)
87 Hendrie, ‘Do we see famine as it is?’
88 For an account of this discrepancy between the priorities of international donors and those of the 
Tigrayans see Hendrie, ‘Knowledge and power’, pp. 57-76
89 Hendrie, ‘Do we see famine as it is?’
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CA was committed to partnership with REST, both bilaterally and through the ERD; 
senior staff members wanted to get involved not just in relief but in development and as 
far as possible wanted to keep farmers on their land to enable this transition; and senior 
staff were aware of the Ethiopian government’s military strategy that underlay the 
migration and recognised the political need to keep the Tigrayan farmers on their land.90
The meeting of other basic needs similarly reflected the reciprocity between the 
victims of famine, the indigenous relief associations and the Fronts. It has been argued 
above that the public welfare policy of the Fronts and their respective relief associations 
ensured that, even by the end of the 1970s, impressive levels of health coverage had 
been achieved. That ERA and REST were able to broaden their public welfare 
programmes to include programmes in water supply, seed collection and agricultural 
extension attested not only to the policies of the Fronts but also to the growing 
effectiveness of the cross-border operation in stabilising the situation.
The security needs of the civilian populations were also met by the Fronts who 
endeavoured to protect migration and relief routes. Indeed, civilian protection was a key 
military strategy, the physical survival of the peasantry being crucial to the political 
survival of the Fronts. However, it was within this context of reciprocity that donors, 
such as the United States, voiced concerns about the impact of the operation on the 
fortunes of war. By the end of the 1980s, it became apparent to ERD members and 
donors that the relief management systems developed by the Fronts and their respective 
relief associations had stabilised the public welfare crisis, although most recognised that 
structural food deficits still existed.91 It was also recognised that ‘stabilisation’ in 
1986/1987 was followed, in 1988, by significant military advances by the Fronts. 
While donors, such as the United States, tended to worry about the direct diversion of 
aid to the military, an accusation that has not been substantiated, ERD members, such 
as CA, were more aware of the operation’s real military impact. As Jacques Willemse, 
former Chairman of ERD, explained:
90 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw
91 Leeds University Agricultural & Rural Development Unit, ‘Eritrea: food & agriculture assessment 
study’ (April 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.434)
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‘in the late 1980s, we [ERD members] became more and more a factor in the 
war, for we allowed the Tigrayans to keep their people where they were which 
was a contribution to the resistance. And in Eritrea we avoided a further massive 
outflow of people due to the fact that there was no food, which gave the EPLF 
political capital with the local people.’92
By stabilising the food crisis in Eritrea and Tigray, the Fronts could sustain the support
of the growing numbers of people under their expanding administration so that their
own resources could be directed to the war effort.93 While well aware of this situation,
Paul Renshaw explained CA’s position in the 1980s on this issue:
‘There are those who would say that the likes of CA prolonged the war. As far 
as I recall, it wasn’t a subject that was discussed - the war and the effect of the 
relief operation on the war ... so, beyond the occasional, almost rhetorical 
questions - what can we do? - 1 don’t recall it being a central concern in those 
days. There was nothing that the Derg was doing that was commending us to 
take any other line. You have to keep a balanced^pf that.’94
By 1990/91, individuals within CA were however taking a more political and strategic
position on the continuation of war. Jenny Borden, Head of Overseas Aid at CA
commented:
‘I was completely convinced that the war would not stop until it was won. And 
that the EPLF had the best interests of the people at heart and the majority of 
people were in support of them. Therefore the best thing to do was to give them 
humanitarian support whilst they got on with winning the war.’95
Staff within CA, supporting an illicit cross-border operation, were aware that keeping
people alive in an internal war was political. Moreover by 1984, from staff visits and
increased independent reporting, it was recognised that the political legitimacy of the
Fronts was based on their ability to sustain livelihoods and prevent famine and that they
were not conventional armies diverting relief grain.96 This contrasted to government
areas, where CA staff were aware of the predatory nature of the Derg, a key feature of
which was the creation of famine and increased insecurity of civilian populations. In
this respect, sensitivities about the war tended not to be discussed. Ultimately, senior
staff were aware that the political, and hence military, survival of the Fronts was crucial
to the cross-border operation’s aims of meeting basic needs.
92 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
93 ‘This stabilisation was a necessary precondition for the great military advances of 1988.’ Duffield & 
Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 163
94 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw
95 ERD.9, Jenny Borden
96 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw; & ERD.9, Jenny Borden
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Development:
It has been argued above that ERD never fully resolved the tension over 
providing development assistance in the midst of conflict but that its limited mandate 
represented a strength both in attracting sensitive donor support; and in enabling ERA 
and REST to diversify the internationally supported programmes in Eritrea and Tigray 
by establishing bilateral relationships with individual ERD members, like CA, and 
becoming members of other CA-supported consortia. Moreover, from the mid-1980s, 
the nature of ERD’s support underwent a significant change, albeit within a limited 
relief and rehabilitation remit. During 1986, ERD progressively met more of ERA and 
REST’s demands for assistance with transport and administrative costs. In addition, 
ERD increased its direct cash payments to ERA and REST, supporting a diversified 
range of activities such as locust control, medical supplies, the purchase of 
rehabilitation inputs such as seed, tools, and oxen, and storage. These fed into a 
number of agricultural development programmes which both REST and ERA had been 
involved in implementing from the beginning - soil conservation, water preservation, 
irrigation, reafforestation, introduction of new crops and animal husbandry.
Other important development initiatives that the cross-border operation 
supported were the internal purchase and resettlement programmes both in Tigray. The 
internal purchase programme was a particularly important component of REST’s relief 
programme, involving the purchase of locally produced grain in western and southern 
surplus areas of Tigray for distribution in eastern and central deficit areas. ERD began 
to support the programme in 1983 when crop failure in Sudan prevented the further 
purchase of Sudanese sorghum. The programme had implications for development in 
that it not only increased the total tonnage of food available for distribution, without 
increasing the cross-border transport load but encouraged the re-establishment of a 
grain market infrastructure, giving farmers an incentive to increase production and 
enabling small traders to increase their activity and expand purchasing and transport 
networks into areas previously unserved by an integrated market. It thereby stimulated 
local agricultural production and marketing structure; provided farmers with cash and 
seasonal labourers with work; increased the capacity of REST to reach people in their
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home areas thus reducing migration; and did not alter local consumption patterns, 
thereby preventing ‘dependency’.97
REST’s resettlement scheme, initiated in 1980, was another important strategy 
and was very much orientated towards ‘working with the people’ to address issues of 
long-term vulnerability. There were 7 such schemes in Tigray, all located in the more 
fertile west.98 REST’s management of the programme provided a stark comparison with 
that of the government’s, discussed earlier: the programme was voluntary; sites were 
selected after careful study of water resources, wood supply, health conditions and 
grazing land supply; the heads of families requesting resettlement and approved by 
village resettlement committees would inspect the sites before committing; upon arrival, 
participants would be given a plot of land, seeds, house-building materials and access 
to health care facilities; and land remained the property of the village council although 
the settler had the right of use while he fulfilled the conditions of resettlement.99 Unlike 
the forced resettlement programme operated by the government, REST’s programme 
was characterised by voluntarism, good management and accountability to the receiving 
community. In this respect, it represented a genuine rehabilitation strategy.
Most significantly, the growing activity and increasing effectiveness of the 
cross-border operation from the mid-1980s impacted on organisational development of 
the ERA and REST themselves. As Jacques Willemse, former Chairman of ERD, 
explained:
‘in the beginning they were not all that capable. ERD as a group invested a lot of 
money and time in helping them develop organisational structures. Our 
monitoring system was also used to help them organise their operations. They 
developed as we developed. We also started on a very small scale, somewhat 
amateuristic but became a rather professional operation on both side.’100
Evidence of organisational growth is most readily available for REST. A reorganisation
of administrative capacity in 1985 and a radical redevelopment of their disaster
management programme during 1986 enabled REST to withstand the return of famine
97 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, pp. 144-147
98 Kirsty Wright & Max A Peberdy, ‘Convoy to Tigray: report on the drought in Tigray’ (May 1984), 
(CAO.AF/ME.441)
"ibid.
100 ERD,3, Jacques Willemse
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conditions in 1987 and prevent a renewed refugee influx into Sudan. The basis of this 
new programme was an improvement in relief capacity and the provision of alternative 
survival strategies in the villages: food aid distribution, using the baito system of 
community recommendation was improved - in 1986 26,000 Mt. (9,200 Mt. from ERD 
and 9,000 Mt. from internal purchase) were mobilised, by 1987, REST was moving
5,000 Mt. per month and internal purchase had expanded to 27,000 MT; transport 
capacity was increased from 27 trucks in 1984 to around 150 in 1986 and new roads 
were built by the TPLF; in 1986,53,000 families were provided with basic agricultural 
inputs; food for work programmes were established in central region; opportunities for 
wage labour were expanded, TPLF encouraging wealthier farmers to increase their 
cultivated area and take on as labourers those not receiving food aid in exchange for 
agricultural inputs - in 1987, 500,000 farmers were assisted in the Western Region in 
finding work.101
What was apparent was an empowerment of indigenous capabilities through 
sustained external support. Such support included material aid but also, significantly, 
the establishment of credibility. Gained from ERD’s support and recognition, this 
credibility enabled ERA and REST to expand and diversify their relationships with the 
international aid community. It empowered them vis-h-vis the donors, having important 
implications both for development and sustainablility.102 Independent pursuit of 
advocacy by individual ERD agencies, notably CA, was a crucial contributing factor to 
this empowerment.
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Promotion o f Justice and Rights:
Throughout its history, ERD was limited to maintaining a low profile. As
Jacques Willemse, former Chairman of ERD, explained:
‘a strong advocacy role, certainly in the beginning, would have jeopardised the 
operation completely. It would also have broken up ERD. ERD was not in that 
sense, a united front. At the end of the day, what kept it together, was really the 
worries that we had about the population in those places. And the one expressed 
that in political terms and the other in religious and the other in humanitarian 
terms.’103
Justice and rights were promoted in so much as the ‘war in Eritrea and Tigray, was 
never a forgotten war, we [ERD] kept on publicising.’104 Through monitoring missions 
and field reports, ERD and its member agencies like CA enabled a ‘flow of words’. 
Despite maintaining a neutral stance, ERD essentially gave ERA and REST a public 
forum in which needs and grievances could both be aired and substantiated. Indeed, in 
this respect, neutrality was a clear advantage in that it assured ERD of a non-partisan 
position and enabled it to act as honest broker. In addition, from the mid-1980s, 
individual members such as CA campaigned on an independent basis to increase public 
awareness of the situation in Eritrea and Tigray. Such campaigns relied heavily on 
information coming through ERD channels. Ultimately however, a human rights 
agenda was not fully endorsed by the cross-border operation. Nor was the true nature 
of the operation publicised. In this respect an opportunity to endorse an anti-famine 
practice rooted in a social contract that saw famine as a political scandal was missed.105
Mediation and Negotiation:
In many respects, ERD’s neutral stance strengthened its position with regard to 
behind the scenes diplomacy . As Jacques Willemse, former Chairman of ERD, 
commented:
‘Behind the scenes, both TPLF and EPLF, I think EPLF more, used our 
network for diplomatic approaches and visits. We were very neutral but we 
gave them, from 1983/1984, a public forum. ... they won the war themselves, 
but politically, I think, we gave them a lot of tacit support.’106
103 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
104 ibid.
105 For an elaboration of social contract theories as they apply to famine prevention strategies see De 
Waal, ‘Social contract’,pp. 194-205
106 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
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Acting as an honest broker, ERD was able to facilitate a number of meetings between
ERA and REST and the Ethiopian government in early 1984. The purpose of these
meeting was ostensibly to secure a safe passage, whereby relief trucks would be
allowed to move out from government-held towns into the non-government controlled
countryside. The meetings broke down as highlighted above. However in 1990,
through the mediation efforts of ERD, representatives of the Joint Relief Partnership
(the main Ethiopian NGO consortium which included the Ethiopian Catholic, Lutheran
and Orthodox churches together with the American based Catholic Relief Services), the
TPLF and REST met secretly in Khartoum to again discuss arrangements for a free
passage, whereby aid would be channeled into eastern Tigray and Wollo from
government-held areas in the south. The meetings this time succeeded and the plan
became known as the Southern Line Operation. As Willemse argued, ‘it took care of
quite an extensive part of the population that it was difficult for us [ERD/REST] to
reach from the other side of the mountains.’107 During 1990, this operation delivered an
average of 9,000 Mt. per month to Tigray and 3,000 Mt. to northern Wollo.
ERD’s neutral stance also enabled it to act as a buffer if things went wrong.
Such an event occurred on 23 October 1987 when a convoy of 30 trucks, including 24
Band Aid trucks carrying relief supplies, was attacked and destroyed by the EPLF, 51
kms south of Asmara. International condemnation was quick to follow, especially
amongst the Addis Ababa based donors, such as the United Nations, United States
Agency for International Development and the European Community. Donors were
quick to interpret the attack as part of a change of policy by the liberation movements.108
The EPLF responded with a statement:
‘the Addis regime is continuing to use relief supplies as a cover to transport 
military hardware and move about its troops through otherwise inaccessible 
routes in Eritrea ... the Derg’s regime has moreover decided to escort all relief 
supplies with an enlarged military convoy.’109
While condemning the action, ERD and its member agencies such as CA, pursued a
damage limitation policy as explained by Jacques Willemse:
107 ibid.
108 Justin Phipps, memo to Tom (7 December 1987), (CAO.AF/ME.411)
i°9 e p l p ) tejex to a]j donor agencies active in Eritrea (1 November 1987), (CAO.AF/ME.411)
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‘we explained to the European Community, United States Agency for 
International Development and other donors that the Ethiopians had indeed been 
mixing the convoys all the time; and that the United Nations was not sticking to 
its own rules - food only - but was using these mixed convoys to transport its 
food.’110
In November, ERD arranged a meeting in Khartoum at which the EPLF was invited to 
put their version of the incident to the donor and NGO community. The result was a 
draft agreement with the EPLF, co-signed by ERD, Band Aid and Oxfam-UK, 
establishing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of relief trucks entering EPLF 
controlled areas of Eritrea from the government side. It is notable that the UN rejected 
the request to help in carrying forward the plan.111
Continually from 1989, there were discussions among ERD member agencies 
about whether the ERD should be doing more to bring the war to an end. Such 
discussions grew out of concern felt by some members that humanitarian relief itself 
was prolonging the war, feeding people today only for them to be killed tomorrow. 
Ultimately, internal divisions within the ERD prevented any involvement in peace 
advocacy on a united front. When calls for a political resolution were finally made in 
May 1991, as concerns that assistance was prolonging the war reached a climax, the 
war was already within days of ending. It has been argued above that such concerns for 
peace were misplaced. The struggle of the TPLF and EPLF was essentially a war 
against famine and in this respect, a long-term humanitarian agenda demanded that the 
‘war be played out to it decisive climax.’112 Certainly this was the position of key 
individuals within CA at the time who felt that the facilitation of cease-fires and safe 
zones might represent an accommodation with rather than a resolution of violence by 
separating the politics from humanitarian relief.113 For the consortium, tensions 
between ‘neutrality’ and ‘involvement’ were becoming increasingly apparent and by 
1991, if war had not come to an end, it is arguable that a charitable peace would have 
been pursued at the expense of political resolution.
110ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
111 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 111
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230
Sustainability:
The extent to which the cross-border operation left a lasting legacy will be 
examined in respect of its political a well as humanitarian heritage. It has been argued 
above that the cross-border operation divided agencies, with those NGOs working 
exclusively on the government side adopting a defensive and hostile attitude to those 
who were seen to be playing politics with the ‘rebels’. When the ‘rebels’ came to power 
in 1991, such attitudes persisted. To this end, some members in ERD felt that a forum 
for agency discussion which would allow the sharing of experience and bridge-building 
between those that had worked on different sides of the line was required. It was 
envisaged that such a forum would be supported until the official phase out of ERD 
activities, set for 1 June 1993. The aim was to publicise the ERD experience within the 
wider NGO community; and initiate dialogue between ERD members, ERA and REST, 
and the Ethiopian church agencies and consortia in order to develop cooperation and 
greater understanding and hence lay the foundations for a more stable and sustainable 
future.
Such efforts to leave a lasting heritage were to fail. Many church agencies, often 
with large Oromo and southern following, felt that ERD was politically linked to the 
rebels and that the new Tigrayan-dominated government would exact some fonn of 
retribution on those NGOs that had operated under the Derg; or that the government 
would transfer all resources from the rest of Ethiopia to Tigray. Hopes for a bridge- 
building role were also undermined by fragmentation amongst ERD’s own ranks, 
reflecting agency’s different histories and approaches. Many member agencies simply 
did not believe in such a role. Those with former church links, preferred to resume their 
traditional bilateral relations. Senior staff within CA felt that, as an organisation which 
had historically and consistently been involved on both sides of the conflict, CA had an 
important role to play just through continuing to work with its partners.114 By 1992, it 
was clear that attempts to bridge suspicion and misunderstanding between the main 
church agencies and the government; to educate about the different relief model pursued
114 CA. 5, Sarah Hughes; & ERD.9, Jenny Borden
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with such success in non-government areas; and to facilitate dialogue between the new 
government and Oromo Relief Association/Oromo Liberation Front, in at atmosphere of 
increasing tension between the two, had failed.115 In this respect, the participatory relief 
models pioneered by ERA and REST went unpublicised; the more centralised 
conventional models pursued in government-areas left unchallenged; and an opportunity 
for resolving political instability by mediating between the Oromo Liberation Front and 
the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front passed over. For some, this 
seriously undermined prospects for a smooth transition to peace and development and 
opportunities to engage with the political and long-term complexity of post-conflict 
development.116
The ‘development’ picture was no brighter. A study carried out in Eritrea by 
Leeds University in 1987 and 1991, found that while in 1987, 62% households were 
classed as ‘poor’, this figure had risen to 78% by 1991.117 Serious depletion of the 
rural asset base had clearly occurred. Moreover, most provinces had also witnessed a 
severe reduction in herd size and, for poor farmers in particular, the lack of draught 
oxen was an important limitation on production. While, ‘the cross-border operation had 
helped to stabilise the humanitarian crisis by 1987, it was insufficient to prevent a 
continuing impoverishment.’118 The governments of Eritrea and Tigray on gaining 
power, faced an unresolved material and financial deficit in the face of growing popular 
demand. In Eritrea in 1992, the case of the estimated 500,000 refugees - about 20% of 
Eritrea’s total population - awaiting repatriation from Sudan at the close of the war 
highlighted the scale of the problem.119
In one important respect however, sustainability in the sense of enhancing 
capacities was ensured. It has been argued above that self-reliance was a key
115 In June 1992, OLF withdrew from the transitional government, unleashing the fear of continuing 
political instability within Ethiopia. ERD had links with both REST and ORA and consequendy it was 
thought that ERD could help in promoting some degree of reconciliation.
116 ERD.6, Jacques Willemse
117 Leeds University Agricultural & Rural Development Unit, ‘Eritrea: food & agriculture assessment 
study’ (April 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.434)
118 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 134
1,9 Elias Habte-Selassie, ‘Eritrean refugees in die Sudan: a preliminary analysis of voluntary 
repatriation’ in Doombos et al. (eds.), Beyond Conflict in The Horn, pp. 23-31
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component of the Front’s political agenda. As Justin Phipps of CA wrote:
‘in spite of the difficulties posed by its status as a liberation movement... EPLF 
seems able to attract support from a surprisingly broad spectrum of people and I 
suspect that this is in part due to its humanitarian and non-doctrinaire approach. 
There seems to be something rather special about the Eritrean experience; it is 
rare to find such an enthusiastic commitment to self-reliance, which goes 
beyond mere rhetoric. Such an approach probably means that outside aid has to 
be given very much on Eritrea terms - something which donor may not always 
find easy to come to terms with.’120
Moreover, this study has shown how ERD empowered ERA and REST - through
capacity-building and the strengthening of credibility - thereby supporting such a
commitment to self-reliance. Most importantly, while international substitution for
indigenous public welfare capacity, in terms of the Fronts increasing dependency on
donor governments for financial and material aid, clearly occurred, it was significant
that the operation of the relief and development system remained firmly under
indigenous management. The implications for post-conflict development were
profound. As Jacques Willemse, former Chairman of ERD, explained:
‘a year ago [1995], we had a meeting in Addis Ababa between the local agencies 
and the government. I was invited along with a couple of other ERD people. We 
were treated by the [non-ERD] agencies with hostility. We had spoiled their 
paradise - now things are far more difficult for them. Now they have to be 
accountable to the system - there are a lot of questions asked if you have 17 
different types of hand pumps etc. There is a Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission, which comes basically from the REST structure, and they have 
learnt to work with NGOs and keep an eye on them.’121
Despite international material substitution, indigenous managerial independence
had not only been maintained but strengthened. The new Relief and Rehabilitation
Commission in Ethiopia currently operates an Emergency Code, aimed at decentralising
the management of relief; taking control out of the hands of northern NGOs by making
them more accountable; and ensuring that northern NGO activities fit in with regional
development plans. In Eritrea, a new policy enforced by the Provisional Government in
1994 prohibited foreign agencies from being ‘operational’ in Eritrea, reserving this role
entirely for Eritreans. Donor agencies were restricted from paying Eritrean staff higher
than prevailing in-country rates, to prevent them from pulling skilled people out of
government service or private-sector activity; and were required to account for all funds
120 Justin Phipps, ‘Report on ERA/donors conference’ (27-29 April 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.290)
121 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
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spent in Eritrea, with no more than 10% to be used for office overheads. Most 
importantly, donor agencies were limited to supporting projects that fell within the 
country’s national and regional development plans. As one government official noted, 
‘the basic lesson from our independence struggle is that we were able to win the war on 
a very self-reliant basis. This is a very important lesson for the future as well.’122
For many members, the rationale for phasing out ERD was to re-establish more 
traditional links and forms of NGO activity. In this sense, an opportunity for 
institutionalising the successful relief model operated by the Fronts was missed. 
Principles of ‘participation’ and ‘working with’ the people’ were, in a large number of 
cases, surrendered to the more conventional ‘neutral’ model of externally-managed, 
non-participatory interventions. At the same time, however, the experience of the ERD 
had changed the operating environment in a profound way. The empowerment of REST 
and ERA created an atmosphere of donor accountability. As the former General 
Secretary of the Eritrea Inter Agency Consortium remarked: ‘both in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, you now have to deal with people who are not afraid of the international 
community.’123 With regard to prospects for the future development of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, such a legacy of the operation can not be underestimated. Indeed, as CA had 
argued in its 1987 corporate Statement of Commitment, it was through such principles 
of self-reliance that prospects of meaningful and sustainable development seem most 
likely.
The evidence suggests that CA’s role in Ethiopia in the 1980s, through the 
cross-border operation, reflected a broad relief-development agenda. However, it was 
the relations between the ruler and ruled in non-government areas that ultimately 
determined the efficacy and fundamental nature of its impact. While the consortium was 
crucial in that it gave the victims in Eritrea and Tigray a channel for aid and a forum for 
recognition - ‘it was only when ERD gave a channel, that world relief came, not only
122 Yemane Gebreab, head of the political section of the Peoples’ Front for Democracy and Justice cited 
in ‘Eritrea’s economic success story’ New African, February 1995
123 ERD.4, Martine Billanou
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food aid but also help with logistics - trucks’124 - and kept people alive, it was only 
‘successful’ in that it supported an ‘outstanding model of famine relief and prevention 
grounded upon an inclusive social contract.’125 Relief and development needs were met, 
not out of charity and the supply of physical goods, but because of political 
accountability and the support of progressive internal political relations. The efficacy of 
CA’s role in the 1980s famine, mediated through the ERD, lay in its constructive 
engagement with civil society, a relationship facilitated by indigenous liberation fronts 
and their respective relief associations.
4 . Christian Aid in Ethiopia 1981-91: an analysis of capability
The above analysis of the Emergency Relief Desk and CA’s role in it has 
presented a critical reflection on CA’s evolving capabilities in the 1980s in Ethiopia. On 
one level CA’ involvement in the cross-border operation provided a radical critique of 
conventional models of assistance which had been typically set up to deliver visible 
relief, as in Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, and had failed to address the social and political 
dimensions of the crisis. Through the cross-border operation, CA pursued an 
innovative approach which effectively supported indigenous anti-famine social contracts 
in Eritrea and Tigray.126 For CA, it was time when ideas about partnership, 
participatory development and grassroots social change were debated and implemented 
in a committed manner, albeit by a small number of involved staff.
On another level, CA’s experience through the cross-border operation reflected 
structural problems that continued to determine how famine was perceived and what 
actions were taken. Notable was the effect of the ‘official discourse’ on the famine.
This, largely set by the media and unchallenged by the major donors, reflected a bias 
towards a ‘natural disaster’ interpretation. The crucial broadcast of October 1984 used 
religious imagery - ‘a Biblical famine’127 and metaphors of hostile nature - ‘the closet
124 ERA.3, Roso
125 De Waal, ‘Human rights’, chapter 6, p. 47
126 The idea of anti-famine social contracts has been developed in De Waal, ‘Social contract’, pp. 194- 
205
127 Michael Buerk’s narration of the 2 3  October 1984 film about the Ethiopian famine screened on the 
BBC and then worldwide
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thing to Hell on earth’128 - to describe a famine that was political. While the knowledge
about the famine did change, the ability to educate the public about the real causes and
processes of famine remained constrained by the overriding respect accorded state
sovereignty. Famine was still portrayed as a natural and neutral ‘event’. This created a
fundamental contradiction with regard to the operation’s profile and for individual ERD
member agencies, such as CA, ensured an uneasy dichotomy between fund-raising and
where the money actually went. The norms of international relations and donor
government sensitivities’, along with the conventions of media representation created an
official interpretation of events divorced from the reality. This left agencies such as CA
with little room for manoevre.
The study has shown how these different levels of experience impacted on each
other and how the consortium, in general, and CA, in particular, attempted to overcome
structural limitations: for the consortium, the alternative interpretation and structure it
offered was screened by a ‘neutral’ a-political public profile; for CA, independent
advocacy and bilateral partnerships were pursued. Ultimately however, the fundamental
nature of the cross-border operation was not publicised. This shortcoming meant that
after the closure of the ERD, the operation’s model of relief-development was
abandoned. While the writing of ERD’s official history in 1994 was certainly important
in documenting events129, for CA, the absence of rigorous analysis of its own
experience appears to have resulted in a mystification of the operation. Lessons do not
appear to have been shared or institutionalised; practice has not informed theory.130 This
has had crucial implications, impacting directly on CA’s capabilities in the 1990s. As
one REST official remarked:
‘I feel that CA has stopped discussing things with REST. During the war, CA 
was very involved and was asking lots of questions about politics. They are not 
doing that any more. They are not asking about government policies. 
Development needs are about politics. We need the kind of brainstorming and 
strategy discussion that has been missing since the late 1980s.’131
128 ibid.
129 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks
130 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw; ERD.9, Jenny Borden; & CA.5, Sarah Hughes
131 REST.7, Berhane Wolde Tensaie
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That practice was not institutionalised, points to a third level of analysis on
CA’s capabilities in the 1980s, focused not on ‘how’ CA acted but on ‘why’. In many
ways CA’s experience in the cross-border operation reflected a conjuncture of specific
historical events rather than the expression of clear strategy. As Paul Renshaw
commented on the motivation behind CA’s initial involvement:
‘In Eritrea and Tigray there evolved a kind of accumulation of feelings - one 
was respect for the people and their work, another was an observation that there 
were a lot of people up there who were simply not able to be reached through 
Addis and the international community wasn’t even trying to reach them through 
Addis and couldn’t anyway. So, I guess, we, as an NGO, felt that we should 
do what we could to forge relationships irrespective of the politics.’132
CA was not ideologically committed, as say War on Want, to the situation in northern
Ethiopia. Its response was essentially pragmatic and humanitarian.133 It was historical
relations with the other European ecumenical agencies that made up the consortium,
such as Norwegian Church Aid, and, most importantly, the unique challenge offered by
the indigenous structures of ERA/EPLF and REST/TPLF at the time that motivated and
determined the nature of CA’s role. As Paul Renshaw of CA remarked:
‘It was ERA and REST that first approached CA. ... the liberated areas of 
Eritrea and Tigray were just like blank areas on the map - nobody knew a 
thing.’134
Certainly, with increasing personal experience and knowledge of the situation in
northern Ethiopia, relevant staff at CA did begin to define a more strategic role for the
organisation as seen in an increased commitment to advocacy and to a broader
developmental role. To a significant part this was aided by close contact with various
solidarity offices in London, ERA and REST both had offices in London. As Sarah
Hughes of CA commented:
‘We had weekly and daily contact with the people in the solidarity offices here, 
so we were building up very close links with the people here as well as with the 
people in the field. That added a whole different dimension and quality to the 
relationship... we probably lost that intensity when the war ended’1
132 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw
133 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw; ERD.9, Jenny Borden; & CA.5, Sarah Hughes
134 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw
135 CA.5, Sarah Hughes
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That the experience of the cross-border operation was not institutionalised lies in the
specificity of that experience, in particular the existence of effective indigenous partners
at that time. Jenny Borden of CA commented:
‘It is very hard to transfer lessons. You don’t get exactly the same situation 
tw ice.... ERA and REST were able to implement programmes in the field 
competently, if you don’t have that end of the chain it makes the role of the 
northern agency much more difficult.’136
In the 1980s, one of the major structural weaknesses that had historically constrained
CA’s capability, the existence of good partners and partnerships, was overcome in
Eritrea and Tigray. CA was able to find a new strategic role, less by design and more
by default.
CA’s experience, through the cross-border operation, reflected the enhanced 
capability of the organisation in responding to relief in the 1980s. However this 
capability was ultimately determined not by the physical supply of goods or by the 
structural arrangement of a consortium, crucial as these were, but by the nature and 
ability of CA’s indigenous partners, ERA and REST.137 While the operation 
represented a conjuncture of events leading to an innovative and successful model of 
famine prevention, at the same time it exposed fundamental structural difficulties - in the 
north, the functions of international relations, donor funding and media representation; 
and in the south the dependency on effective partners - that continued to determine 
CA’s capability.
136 ERD.9, Jenny Borden
137 For the importance of indigenous political structures for successful humanitarian intervention see the 
comparison of ERA and REST with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army in Duffield & Prendergast, 
Without Troops and Tanks, pp. 164-166; & a review of Operation Lifeline Sudan, a cross-border 
operation into Sudan, in Mark Duffield et al., Operation Lifeline Sudan: a review, (UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs, July 1996)
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Table  5.4 E m ergency R elief Desk: C ash D onations 1981-91
; lTRF:A/T [GliAY ./:OROMO AUffgwafttti US $ L000 < ‘ ' ~
Dom^r 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 TOTAL
Christian Aid 69 70 725 1,754 1,337 3,955
DanchurchAid 134 400 286 1,058 1,878
Bread for the World 8 100 524 625 1,036 2,293
Dutch Interchurch 
Aid
144 145 323 505 1,117
Inter-Church 
Coordination 
Committee for 
Development 
Projects
33 84 233 164 466 980
Lutheran World 
Relief
47 50 1,157 1,474 938 3,666
Mennonite Central 
Committee
297 297
Norwegian Church 
Aid
594 265 931 931 944 3,665
Swedish Church 
Relief
1,480 425 617 1,547 221 4,290
Other 61 555 485 153 1,254
TOTAL 2,292 1,272 5,287 7,589 6,955 23,395
. . . . . . . . 1..... :" "V.... ;l" ' W it r je a / d c i r a v / o r o m o a I figures in US $ 1,000
Donor : ' 1986 10S7 1988 1989 1990 1991 TOTAL
Christian Aid 1,228 1,808 2,165 236 200 330 5,967
Canadian Lutheran 
World Relief
50 25 25 100
Church of Sweden 
Aid
300 400 700
DanchurchAid 643 1,998 866 605 1,581 1,481 7,174
Bread for the World 1,323 1,565 1,888 500 820 522 6,618
Dutch Interchurch 
Aid
184 1,178 3,382 240 654 664 6,302
Finchurchaid 1,398 150 1,548
Inter-Church 
Coordination 
Committee for 
Development 
Projects
813 1,980 439 3,214 3,956 2,632 13,134
Lutheran World 
Relief
731 440 200 205 802 120 2,498
Mennonite Central 
Committee
200 100 300
Norwegian Church 
Aid
2,868 3,952 3,291 2,332 3,257 958 16,306
Swedish Church 
Relief
2,516 3,952 3,291 2,332 3,257 958 16,306
Other 173 5,387 2,504 10 125 141 8,340
TOTAL 10,479 22,441 17,364 10,589 17,478 10,295 88,646
Source: Norwegian Church Aid, Addis Ababa
T able 5.5 Em ergency R elief Desk: Cash Donations P e r D onor
1981-91
Cash Donation Per Donor 1981-91 
AUfigim»inUSS
Christian Aid 9,922,000
Canadian Lutheran World Relief 100,000
Church of Sweden Aid 700,000
DanchurchAid 9,052,000
Bread for the World 8,911,000
Dutch Interchurch Aid 7,419,000
Finchurchaid 1,548,000
Inter-Church Coordination Committee for 
Development Projects
14,014,000
Lutheran World Relief 6,164,000
Mennonite Central Committee 597,000
Norwegian Church Aid 23,424,000
Swedish Church Relief 20,596,000
Various non-ERD donors (others) 9,594,000
TOTAL CASH DONATIONS I98L-91 1 12,0-11 000
Source: Norwegian Church Aid, Addis Ababa
Table 5.6 Emergency Relief Desk: Food Donations 1981-91
... ^ ... : -  - ' ' ...: " ..TW ALFDOD'bBiliVERiBS........................... - .......... L....7
-  " . • ■- ' - All figures in metric tons V
YEAR ERITREA TIGRAY OROMO TOTAL
1981 4,662 162 0 4,824
1982 4,250 1,705 125 6,080
1983 12,589 4,636 217 17,442
1984 16,382 4,817 582 21,781
1985 55,944 16,900 190 73,034
1986 57,986 9,207 1,953 69,146
1987 26,124 8,646 2,320 37,090
1988 55,258 54,617 1,287 111,162
1989 28,515 24,478 2,541 55,534
1990 111,804 107,721 4,517 224,042
1991 40,699 21,317 2,450 64,466
TOTAL 414,213 ....... .....S&SSL 16,182
Source: Norwegian Church Aid, Addis Ababa
Table  5.7 E m ergency R elief Desk: T otal D onations 1981-91
: \ ' ; y  V  '  > \  -  ;  ; ; ;  TOTAJjyAEtJBOFpONATiONS
4  4 ' ^  A1J fig u re  in 11$ $ 1 /
YEAR CASH FOOD NON-FOOD TRANSPORT TOTAL
1981 2,292,000 2,292,000
1982 1,272,000 1,272,000
1983 5,287,000 5,287,000
1984 7,589,000 11,000,000 773,000 19,362,000
1985 6,955,000 27,454,806 777,487 4,011,854 39,199,147
1986 10,479,000 19,517,920 715,507 5,849,240 36,561,667
1987 22,441,000 5,852,532 2,398,566 9,962,086 40,654,184
1988 17,364,000 24,607,785 1,550,426 18,087,215 61,609,426
1989 10,589,000 19,804,119 3,118,246 6,172,502 39,683,867
1990 17,478,000 70,648,844 3,940,585 54,470,699 146,538,128
1991 10,295,000 22,163,744 2,158,202 17,499,389 52,116,335
1oi.il I 12,041.000 ' 201.049,750 . 15,432,019' J 16,052.985 444,575,754
Source: Norwegian Church Aid, Addis Ababa
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Chapter 6
CHRISTIAN AID AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN
ETHIOPIA 1985-97
In the wake of the 1983-85 Ethiopian famine, a major policy concern for CA 
was how to move from relief to development. In the north, as highlighted in chapters 4 
and 5, CA supported the relief-development policies of the Eritrean Relief Association 
and the Relief Society of Tigray. In the famine-affected areas of the south, it became 
involved in an ambitious programme of community-oriented rehabilitation and 
development. The programme, known as the Freedom From Hunger Campaign1 
(FFHC), was launched by the Ethiopian government and supported by a number of 
other northern aid agencies.2 Over the following decade, this intervention became 
operational in 13 sub-project areas, with a target community of 174,858.3 This chapter 
explores CA’s involvement in the FFHC programme and examines what it reveals 
about the organisation’s capabilities in moving from relief to development in the 1990s.
The analysis follows two strategies. Firstly, it returns to the discussion of 
chapter 2 about the relevance of theories of development to CA. In important ways the 
FFHC programme reflected the general debates and preoccupations of the aid 
community at that time. Emerging from what has been called the ‘new world disorder’ 
of the early to mid-1980s, characterised by the resurgence of conflict-disasters such as 
Ethiopia, agencies like CA were concerned with how to make development work on a 
sustainable and significant scale and so prevent recurring disasters. Development theory 
offered ‘alternative’ concepts of accountability, participation, and empowerment, in 
which NGOs acted as facilitators of local development efforts rather than as operational 
service-deliverers. Central to the FFHC programme was the stated motive and accepted
1 The Freedom From Hunger Campaign itself, as discussed in chapter 1, had been created in 1959 to 
provide support for the activities of NGOs in the area of rural development. The programme was 
particularly concerned with the long-term alleviation of poverty and priority from the start was given to 
the participation of local people and the long-tenn impact of the project as opposed to the merits of the 
project itself and its capacity to relieve immediate suffering.
2 Other agencies involved in the programme were Band Aid Foundation (UK), Broederlijk Delen 
(Belgium), Comite Francais Contre La Faim (France), Danchurchaid (Denmark), Deutsche 
Welthungerhilfe (F.R.G), Ford Foundation (USA) andTrocaire (Ireland)
3 Yoseph Negassa, Project Progress Report 1994: FFHC/AD programme in Ethiopia, (FFHC: Addis 
Ababa, February 1995)
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claim that it would promote such an ‘alternative development strategy’.4 FFHC aimed to 
put people at the centre of their own development; to empower the marginalised through 
institution building; to target the poor; to decentralise decision-making processes; and to 
work with central and local government structures in order to create sustainable and 
supportive institutional settings. This study looks at CA’s experience of ‘alternative 
development’, through the FFHC programme.
Secondly, using Foucault’s notion of power, the analysis explores the empirical 
evidence and looks at what actually happened. Exploring the links between the 
development discourse and the institutional practices that emerged, the analysis explores 
how power was elaborated. It suggests that despite the shifts in the institutional 
language of development employed by CA, through the FFHC programme, the set of 
power relations which underlay the development process reflected a greater degree of 
continuity and persistence. The objects of development in southern Ethiopia were all too 
readily seen as existing outside, rather than a products of, the tide of modem history; as 
victims rather than agents of change. This study explores the implications of this on 
CA’s capabilities and the difficulties it faced in trying to define a new role for itself and 
escape from models of conventional development.
1 . * Alternative * Development: theory and practice
The FFHC programme in southern Ethiopia was bom out of an agreement 
between Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture and the FFHC programme of the United 
Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1985. The plan was to channel 
support from NGO donors to rural communities in 13 service cooperatives3 in the 
drought-prone south and south-west of Ethiopia. In the aftermath of the drought and 
famine of 1985, Western donors and NGOs wanted to move beyond crisis-management
4 See Korten’s concept of third generation NGOs - ‘the more fully the NGO embraces third generation 
programme strategies, the more it will find itself working in a catalytic, foundation-like role rather than 
an operational service-delivery role - directing its attention to facilitating development by other 
organizations, both public and private, of the capacities, linkages, and commitment required to address 
designated needs on a sustained basis.’ Korten, ‘Third generation NGO strategies’, p. 149
5 Service cooperatives represented local administrative and economic structures and convenient points of 
entry to grassroots communities
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to address the root causes of the problem. Based on a community-oriented, 
participatory methodology, FFHC aimed to meet this need by providing rehabilitation 
for drought-affected farming families in the short term, and by laying a basis for 
sustainable development in the long-term.6 FFHC represented the ‘new 
professionalism’7 of the 1980s: at the core of its programme design and methodology 
lay notions of participation and the strengthening of the linkages between grassroots 
priorities and development policies.8 The shifts in development practice from 
technology-centered to people-centered have been briefly mentioned in chapter 2. Here, 
the evolution of development theory and the nature of the alternative participatory 
agenda pursued by CA, through the FFHC, is explored in more detail.
Development theory in the post-war era held that development was primarily a 
function of capital investment. In the 1950s, capital was directed to filling a ‘technology 
gap’ identified between the more and less developed countries; and in the 1960s to 
filling ‘resource gaps’, between government revenue and expenditure, between exports 
and imports, between savings and investments.9 By the end of the 1960s, concern at 
the lack of progress in altering the plight of the poor and at the failure to achieve ‘take 
off’ into self-sustained economic growth led to a revision of thinking and a shift away 
from production-centered strategies and methodologies to a more people-centered, 
basic-needs approach.10 As economists moved away from the previous doctrine that 
unequal income distribution promoted economic growth, more thought was given to 
appropriate technology, labour-using strategies, self-reliance, equitable growth and 
income distribution. Popular participation was identified as an essential organisational 
element of this basic-needs strategy. The emphasis in development theory shifted from 
the role of the central government and of non-local agents and began to emphasis the
6 The programme’s aims are documented in Manzi Bakuramutsa & Dick Sandford, E va lu a tio n  R eport:  
N G O  su p p o r t f o r  loca l agricu ltu ra l rehab ilita tion  in itia tives  (FFHC: Addis Ababa, August 1988)
7 Chambers, R u ra l D evelopm en t, pp. 168-188
8 A. G. Drabek, ‘Development alternatives: the challenge for NGOs - an overview of the issues’ W orld  
D e v e lo p m e n t, 15 Supplement (1987), p. x
9 J. M. Cohen & N. T. Uphoff, ‘Participation’s place in rural development: seeking clarity through 
specificity’ W o rld  D eve lopm en t, 8 (1980), p. 215
10 For ideas about ‘take off’ see W. Rostow, The S tages o f  E conom ic G row th: a  n on -com m un ist 
m a nifes to  (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1960); H. Chenery & A. Strout, ‘Foreign 
assistance and economic development’ A m erican  E conom ic  R eview , 56 (1966), pp. 679-733
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importance of local organisation. An ‘organisation gap’ between central government 
agencies and the rural communities they were supposed to assist was identified and the 
importance of participatory local organizations as intermediaries recognised.11 By 1974 
the United Nation’s Economic and Social Council was recommending that governments 
should ‘adopt popular participation as a basic policy measure in national development 
strategy’.12
By the early 1980s, the participatory development paradigm was co-opted by
political economist who placed the issue of state-society relations firmly at the centre of
analysis.13 The central concept was that development should be people-centred.
Priorities were no longer those projected by professionals but those perceived by the
poor. The goal of development was ‘no longer growth as defined by normal
professions, but well-being and secure livelihoods as defined by the poor
themselves.’14 Most importantly, people-centred development offered the prospect of
sustainable development; decentralisation and empowerment would enable local people
to exploit the diverse complexities of their own conditions. The rationale for the
reorientation of development practice was seen to lie in the persistence of poverty, the
lesson that rural elites had tended to capture the benefits of government programmes,
the abundance of uneconomic showcase projects, the increasing dependence of
southern countries on external resources and the stifling of local private initiative. One
development analyst argued that:
‘where such decentralized, self-organizing approaches to the management of 
development resources are seriously undertaken, they generally result in more 
efficient and productive resource management, a reduction in dependence on 
external resources, increased equity, increased local initiative and accountability 
and a strengthening of economic discipline. ’15
The strategy was supported by a new professionalism which reversed the 
‘values, roles and power relations of normal professionalism’ and put ‘people first and
11 Esman & Uphoff, L o ca l O rganisa tions
12 Commission for Social Development, Report of the 24th Session, January 1975, (Official Records 
of the Economic and Social council, 58th Session, Suppl. No. 3, UN Document No. E/CN. 5/535), 
para 4. cited in Cohen & Uphoff, ‘Participation’s place in rural development’, p. 213
13 Hyden, N o Shortcu ts  to P rogress
14 Chambers, C ha llen g in g  the  P rofessions, p. 10
15 Korten, ‘Third generation NGO strategies’, p. 146
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poor people first of all.’16 New professionalism offered more than just an alternative
value system, it offered a variety of alternative technologies, organizational forms,
management and research methods appropriate to a people-centred development. As a
key theorist commented: ‘the “last-first” paradigm includes learning from the poor,
decentralization, empowerment, local initiative, and diversity.’17 A blueprint approach
to development, well-suited to the production-centred development of the past was
rejected in favour of a learning process approach, more suited to people-centred
development with its flexible and changing definitions of roles, obligations, procedures
and methods.18 The central leadership role was to be assumed by organisations with
experience in grass-roots development and with the potential to serve as catalysts of
institutional and policy change. The decade of NGOs had arrived. As Korten argued:
‘a number of NGOs have a natural interest in micro-policy reforms supportive 
of people-centred development, view development as primarily a people-to- 
people process, and lack the inherent structural constraints faced by the large 
donors.’19
Much was written about the suitability of the NGO sector in pluralising and 
strengthening civil society and so contributing to the ‘democratisation’ of African 
countries, an important ideological side-line to the new development paradigm.20 The 
role of NGOs was recast as an enabling one, facilitating the creation of sustainable 
systems at the local, regional and national level. Such a role extended to the 
international level through advocacy and lobby.
Under the force of theoretical ‘orthodoxy’, popular participation had become a 
cliche by the end of the 1980s that was difficult for Western donors and NGOs to 
ignore. What was easier to ignore perhaps was the continuity of structures and 
relationships that lay behind it. This takes us back to the issues, discussed in chapter 2, 
about how development has worked in practice; to the institutional setting. Hirschman
16 Chambers, C ha llen g in g  T he P ro fessions
17 Chambers, C h a llen g in g  The P rofessions, p. 1
18 D. C. Korten & R. Klauss (eds.), P eop le-C en tred  D evelopm ent (Kumarian Press: West Hartford, 
Connecticut, 1984)
19 Korten, Third generation NGO strategies’, p. 154
20 Alan Fowler, The role of NGOs in changing state-society relations: perspectives from eastern and 
southern Africa’ D evelopm en t P o licy  R eview , 9 (1991), pp. 53-83; Bratton, T he politics of 
govermnent-NGO relations’, pp. 569-587
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was among the first to argue that effective development policies and programmes - ones
that mobilise funds - rest on a set of more or less unproven, simplifying and optimistic
assumptions about the problem to be addressed and the approach to be taken.21 More
recently, Roe observed that such optimistic ‘enabling assumptions’ are encoded in
‘development narratives.’22 A narrative is a story, with a ‘beginning, middle and end’.
As such, narratives tell scenarios about what will happen according to their tellers if the
events or interventions are or are not carried out as described. Development narratives
are programmatic, they have a cohesive story-line and as such are difficult to rewrite.
Development is thus constructed as a phenomena that is ‘do-able’ and ‘programmable’
according to the application of a range of technologies. Development, like disaster
relief, is characterised by its own science, the content of which need not necessarily
relate to the specific context in which it occurs. Its legitimacy derives from its own
rationality and narrative.
In line with such arguments, recent case study research in Africa has shown
how the driving force behind much development policy has been a set of powerful and
widely perceived images of historical and geographical change.23 These images and
interpretations are often deeply misleading yet have proved both persistent and
powerful. The result has been a de-contextualisation of development and the creation of
a ‘development apparatus’ that is seen to systematically translate the ills and ailments of
less developed countries into,
‘technical problems such as isolation, lack of markets, lack of credit, 
unfamiliarity with a cash economy, lack of education, lack of fertilizer, lack of 
tractor, lack of purebred livestock, lack of farmers’ associations and 
cooperatives, and lack of appropriate energy technology.’24
Thus development interventions become institutionalised, reflecting a tendency ‘to be
mixed and matched out of a given set of available choices’25, and legitimised by their
own imperious rationality.
21 A. O. Hirschman, D evelopm en t P ro jec ts O bserved  (Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 1968)
22 Emery Roe, ‘Development narratives or making the best of blueprint development’ W orld  
D e v e lo p m e n t, 19 (1991), pp. 287-300
23 Ferguson, The A n ti-P o litic s  M achine', & collection of essays in Leach & Meams (eds.), The L ie  o f  
The L and
24 Ferguson, The A n ti-P o litic s  M ach ine , p. 87
25 ibid., p. 259
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It has been discussed above how discourses, in the sense meant by Foucault, 
are distinct orders of reality embodying real relations of power. Embedded in particular 
institutional structures and material relationships, development discourse has origins, 
objects, purposes, consequences and agents. Thus, ‘to comprehend the real power of 
development we cannot ignore either the immediate institutional or the broader historical 
and geographical context within which its texts are produced.’26 There are major 
problems with taking the participatory development discourse at face value. Aid 
agencies, such as CA, which support local organisations and ideas of participation and 
empowerment, cannot avoid imposing their own views of development, their own 
priorities, and their own bureaucratic requirements on the recipient. Northern aid 
agencies carry their own societal and institutional baggage and in order to understand, 
how they ‘do’ development, these influences need to be taken on board along with the 
mission statements and genuine intentions.
Further, the new agenda in the 1980s, for empowering civil society and 
participation, was in important ways influenced by and driven by ideology. In the 
1980s, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, state organisations were widely seen by the 
major bilateral and multilateral donors as overgrown, inefficient, corrupt and costly. In 
line with neo-liberal ideology, state organisations were to be slimmed and an efficient, 
competitive private sector promoted. Consequently, official bilateral aid agencies and 
multilateral lending institutions made assistance conditional upon the host government’s 
acceptance of structural adjustment packages. Such packages contained requirements 
for reduced economic intervention by governments and for the allocation of resources 
by market forces. Even among those, typically NGOs like CA, who opposed structural 
adjustment for its lack of concern for the poor, there was a degree of acceptance that 
government should do less. The preoccupations of the 1980s were arguably less about 
a new-found understanding of civil society’s role in making development work and 
more to do with finding cheaper and more efficient alternatives to faltering 
governmental delivery systems. Ideology was not a stranger to development. In the
26 Jonathan Crush, ‘Introduction: imagining development’ in Jonathan Crush (ed.), Power of 
Development (Routledge: London, 1995), p. 6
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1960s, development was to be achieved through national planning and state intervention 
and in the 1970s, redistribution with growth was advocated through a neo-Fabian 
extension of state organisations.27 Ideologies about the state had always provided a 
framework for thought and action in development.
Escobar has argued that development may be seen as an apparatus ‘that links 
forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and 
intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies.’28 In 
this perspective, development may be seen as the name for a complex set of institutions 
and initiatives encompassing multiple, and often contradictory, interests.29 Planned 
interventions are not always what they appear and there are a complex set of cultural 
and institutional structures that determine the way in which development initiatives are 
actually produced and put into practice. The following section looks at whether CA’s 
involvement in southern Ethiopia, through the FFHC, was what it appeared.
2 . A New Storyline: reality or rhetoric?
The FFHC programme represented a new challenge for CA. Geographically, it 
enabled the organisation to work in the south of Ethiopia where CA lacked effective 
partners. Operationally, it enabled CA to work with the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, through the Ethiopian government’s civil service, with local 
farming communities and alongside other northern NGOs. Strategically, it was a 
programme founded on principles of participatory development and one committed to 
creating sustainable systems at the local, regional and national level. Compared to CA’s 
traditional involvement through individual partners, the FFHC programme represented 
a new comprehensive and larger-scale strategy for achieving greater impact. This 
section looks at the ‘new’ development apparatus of the FFHC programme. In 
particular, it explores whether a reversal of the center-outwards, core-periphery views
27 Chambers, C ha lleng ing  T he P ro fessio n s , p. 106
28 Arturo Escobar, ‘Imagining a post-development era’ in Jonathan Crush (ed.), P o w er o f  D eve lopm en t 
(Routledge: London, 1995), p. 213
29 Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts & Gavin Williams (eds.), R ura l D evelopm ent in T rop ica l A fr ica  
(Macmillan: Hampshire & London, 1981), p. 12
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that had dominated the conventional ‘planners’ top-down approach to rural development 
was achieved. The framework for analysis will be a description of the aims and 
initiatives of the programme and an analysis of what happened when they were 
implemented. The approach is not an evaluation, nor is it exhaustive; rather the aim is to 
understand the development apparatus in its own right and to explore the relation 
between ‘planning’ and ‘outcome’, through a number of episodes.
2 . 1  The plan
Central to the FFHC programme was a commitment to participatory 
methodology: a bottom-up planning process with individual cooperatives in sub-project 
areas identifying, formulating and implementing activities for their own rehabilitation 
and development; and an emphasis on self-evaluation. The strategy was for the farmers 
themselves to analyse their situation, identify problems, propose solutions and evaluate 
the actions taken. This was considered a key element in adapting programme activities 
to the changing circumstances and needs of the concerned communities and in 
facilitating an active process of ‘learning by doing’ on the part of project staff, 
participating institutions and farmers.30 Blueprint development with its emphasis on 
planning from the top was to be rejected and a learning process approach which started 
from below and accepted that projects were hypotheses and failure was part of a 
broader learning curve implemented.31
In reality, participatory planning was not what it seemed. A review of FFHC’s 
project papers indicates that participation varied over the cycle of the project, with a 
tendency to be stronger when the project was up and running and weakest at the project 
design stage and when working out how to wind down the projects. From the outset, 
contradictions existed between the rhetoric about participation and the reality. The 
original FFHC consultancy report of 1985 argued for the establishment of a NGO-
30 For a theoretical discussion of such strategies see articles by Korten and Friedmann in Korten & 
Klauss (eds.), P eop le-C en tred  D eve lopm en t; Hyden, N o Shortcu ts to P rogress, p. 65; Chambers, R ura l 
D evelopm en t, pp . 211-212
31 For a discussion of ‘blueprint development’ see Hyden, N o Shortcuts to Progress', Chambers, R ura l 
D evelop tnen t
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Liaison Unit within the Ministry of Agriculture , responsible for communicating and 
disseminating the concept of participatory development among NGOs wishing to work 
with the Ministry. Technical teams from the Ministry were to assist the cooperatives in 
formulating project proposals. These would then go to Liaison Unit for evaluation and 
from there through the FFHC/FAO office to a suitable NGO for funding. The NGO 
would then assist the cooperative either directly or through the FFHC programme. In 
this respect, it was envisaged that the main demand for project funding would come 
from the cooperatives themselves, through the Ministry of Agriculture. As soon at the 
Liaison Unit was established it was approached by a number of aid agencies with 
proposals for large sectoral rural development projects. These neither originated from 
the cooperatives or from the Ministry of Agriculture field offices. As the 1988 
evaluation report argued, ‘it [the Liaison Unit] has become an institution which is 
helping to translate NGO funds into action programmes rather then translating farmers’ 
needs into requests for funds.’32
Throughout the history of the FFHC programme, project planning remained 
top-down and was more notable for it rigidity than its flexibility. The 1988 evaluation 
found that in the ‘trial and demonstration’ component of the programme, the 
‘demonstration’ aspect was given precedence and that even the Amharic term used - 
serto masavat - only indicated the demonstration element. Indeed the evaluation noted 
that the ‘relevance of the trial plots is not apparent to farmers. They do not feel involved 
and the work on these plots conflicts, predictably, with their own field work.’33 The 
1991 evaluation revealed that little had changed and that ‘project planning was still too 
much with the staff of FFHC and not with the farmers.’34 More serious attention 
needed to be given to the specific needs of each community, deriving from the local 
ecology and existing traditions and to the institutionalised involvement of that 
community before the rhetoric could be believed. As a senior CA staff member
32 Bakuramutsa & Sandford, E valua tion  R eport
33 Paul Spray, memo to Doug/Rachel/Jenny/Clive (10 November 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.545)
34 FFHC, E va lua tion  a n d  P lann ing  W orkshop: N G O  support to loca l agricu ltura l rehab ilita tion  
in itia tives  (FFHC: Debre Zeit, Ethiopia, 31 May - 6 June, 1992)
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commented: ‘what is quite evident from dialogue with farmers is that they have little
interest in the purposes of the trial plot and have had no involvement in its planning’35
Certainly the similarity of the constituent components of sub-project proposals
appeared to conflict with known variations in climate and local tradition and called into
question whether blueprint development had indeed been replaced by participatory
planning at the grassroots level. In one cooperative, at Tuka, a Band Aid evaluation
revealed how field level reality was at odds with the ‘stereotyped’ credit scheme input:
‘At Tuka service cooperative we were briefed by the development agent as to the 
progress of the project. In reply to questions concerning the poor repayment 
record of the service cooperative’s revolving loan of oxen ... he replied the 
loans made to “stronger” farmers had mostly been repaid, whereas poor fanners 
had simply not earned enough income to effect the payments. Asked if there 
would have been a better way of operating the scheme ... “we think it would 
have been better if all the oxen had gone to stronger farmers in the first instance, 
then from their repayment we could have helped farmers without expecting cash 
repayment. You see, in Borena culture, we have a tradition of richer members 
helping the poorer. ” Was this done in expectation of repayment in due course? 
“No, not to the person who provided the gift. But when the recipient was able 
to do it, he had a Borena duty to help another poorer member of society.’36
The evidence suggested that the FFHC programme increased in size, scope and
influence through stereotyped ‘input’ packages, training and networking.37 In line with
this observation, site selection tended to depend on accessibility, crucial to the delivery
of such conventional ‘development.’38 What remained elusive was more locally-driven
planning and the flexibility of procedures and methods implicit in a learning process
approach. Clearly ‘planning’ could not be taken at its word and FFHC’s interventions
were not always what they appeared to be. When an FFHC report can make reference
to training farmers in the principle of a participatory approach, it becomes clear that
despite the aim and indeed the on-going rhetoric, participation had in fact become an
‘input’ and not a process.39
35 Paul Spray, memo to Jenny Borden/Doug Souter (29 September 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.545)
36 John James, R eport: f i e ld  tr ip  to F F H C  sub  p ro jec t  (Band Aid: London, November 1990)
37 For an analysis of NGO ‘scaling-up’ strategies see Edwards & Hulme (eds.), M aking  a  D ifference
38 FFHC, E va lu a tio n  an d  P lann ing  W orkshop
39 Bakuramutsa & Sandford, E va lua tion  R eport
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2 .2  The outcome
This section looks at what the FFHC programme was, and the outcomes it did
have. It suggests that in reality the programme adopted a conventional approach to
development; that local processes were de-contextualised and technical solutions applied
to problems even when they were not technical in nature. Further it suggests that in the
absence of political engagement, power was elaborated in unintended ways.
One issue that emerged was how the complex dimensions of soil erosion were
translated within FFHC programme documents into technical problems requiring
standard development inputs: training; credit for fertiliser; nursery management;
environmental education; and reforestation. The reality was certainly much more
complicated, as indeed the evaluation missions of 1988 and 1991 were to discover.
These missions found that while farmers tended not to express soil and water
conservation as a priority for themselves or the community, at the same time they
recognised that loss of trees and soil erosion made it difficult to reduce their
vulnerability to drought. The explanation for this apparent contradiction did not lie in
the irrational or uneducated attitude of farmers but was reflective of their very real
political and economic situation. At a 1992 FFHC workshop it was reported that:
‘farmers were fully aware of many of the measures needed to protect their soil 
and vegetation but unless they knew that the land was theirs, they had little 
interest in investing time and energy in improvements which could be either 
undone or taken away from them.’40
What the missions exposed was how FFHC’s conceptual apparatus translated visible
ills into simple, technical problems instead of addressing the real issues; in this case
structures of land ownership.
Similarly, with the reforestation component, a standardised ‘neutral’ approach
was adopted. A 1988 FFHC evaluation pointed out that:
‘currently this project has not developed its thinking beyond the general 
assumption that “tree planting is a good thing”. It cannot be wrong that the 
project is investing money and effort in encouraging tree planting. It is wrong 
that it should be doing so without a clearer picture of what it aims to achieve. ’41
40 FFHC, Evaluation and Planning Workshop
41 Bakuramutsa & Sandford, Evaluation Report
253
This comment followed directly from a statement that the FFHC team must avoid the 
easy options afforded by a standard format and give ‘more serious attention to the 
specific needs of each community driving from the local ecology and existing 
traditions.’42 A 1992 evaluation report similarly recognised the weakness of the 
technical approach of the programme’s water component. This had failed to establish 
water committees and had subsequently experienced only varied success in terms of 
participation and continuation. Essentially, ‘covering too wide an area, with insufficient 
resources, it has been unable to mobilise the local community to undertake community 
water development - except in a few areas.’43 The failure to ensure community support 
and concentration on technology had profound implications for sustainability. Indeed 
the water project appeared to be driven more by a concern with quantity than quality. In 
answer to questioning as to why 2 out of 7 water points in one sub-project area were 
not functional, a local field worker remarked: ‘there are plans to construct other water 
point for the other peasant associations [local administrative units] in this project area 
and because of that maintaining these ones is a secondary issue.’44
Essentially the programme reflected a conventional relief and development 
interpretation of agricultural change. The focus was on the management and regulation 
of natural processes. In this respect, environmental degradation and resource depletion 
were constructed as ‘natural’ and technical problems; the solution as a matter of 
educating people and providing appropriate technology even to the point where the 
introduction and adoption of improved and appropriate technologies were seen as an 
impact in itself.45 What was absent was an analysis of political processes. The result 
was that local realities and interpretations of development were marginalised. This was 
clearly seen in the programme’s ‘women’ component where the interventions failed to 
address structural and political issues or to embrace the broader social problem. A 
senior staff member at CA remarked:
‘despite the programme’s stated aim of focusing on the role of women in the
community economy, there is little evidence that... the programme has built up
42 ibid.
43 FFHC, Evaluation and Planning Workshop
44 FFHC.6, Addis Belay
45 Penny Jenden, letter to Dick Sandford (19 April 1991), (CA Working document)
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a database of information on women in the local communities ... this is partly 
because participation has tended to be narrowly defined - using formal 
structures such as group meetings ... where they are reluctant to express 
opinions which differ from their men.’46
Women’s exclusion from membership or representation in cooperatives and local
political associations acted as a serious constraint in facilitating their participation. The
problems faced by women in development were often not technical in nature. FFHC’s
conceptual apparatus precluded against such an awareness and its structural apparatus
only succeeded in initiating an unduly slow and cumbersome learning process by which
alternative means of involving women were finally realised.47
The evidence suggests that the FFHC programme was unable to deal with
marginal groups, be they women, pastoralists or the poorest farmers despite the fact
that empowerment, meaning empowering people for their own development had been a
major goal.48 A field trip by a Band Aid representative to a sub-project, in Tuka, in
1990 found that the FFHC programme had failed to provide support or legitimacy to the
Borana vis-h-vis the government, or empower them to direct their own development.
When the representative visited the area, he found great concern being expressed at both
the regional and local (awraja) level over the deterioration of Borana rangelands due to
the government’s ban on burning. Burning the grass prior to the main rains of
February/March had been a standard practice of the Borana until 1980 when it was
banned as part of a nationwide policy to protect against forest fires. The effect of the
ban on the Borana had been to accelerate the intrusion of thorny scrub which by 1990
had shaded out much of the grass; and a great increase in the tick population. This
issue, directly affecting the livelihood of the target population of the sub-project, had
not been a subject of FFHC reporting, and no offer had been made to bring pressure to
bear on government policy.
46 Beverley Jones, FFHC: an agricultural programme in southern Ethiopia, (CA: London, January 
1992)
47 Women’s credit schemes have since been set up with good results, providing an alternative means of 
engaging with their needs and priorities.
48 One of the major tenets of FAO’s FFHC/AD programme was that it facilitated dialogue between 
governmental organisations, North/South NGOs and rural communities; that it helped ‘to provide 
support and legitimacy to local groups vis-a-vis the governments of their countries’. Bakuramutsa & 
Sandford, Evaluation Report
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Such a depoliticised, technocentric approach was also evident in the Weyito
Valley sub-project. This area that had been voluntarily and spontaneously settled by a
community from the Konso highlands because of drought. While previously used by
segments of the Konso people for the seasonal grazing of their livestock, there had been
traditional friction between the Konso and the Tsamai pastoralists who grazed their
stock on the other side of the Weyito river which formed a boundary, and with the
Borena pastoralists who came into the area, with or without agreement on occasion,
with raiding and counter-raiding taking place. Friction over this area’s resources while
always apparent had thereby been exaggerated by the settlement. Yet the pattern of
development initiated by FFHC in this area was neither sensitive nor sustainable given
the broader political-economy. As one FFHC consultant argued:
‘the project is isolated and not integrated into local development. All 
infrastructure was realized for the immigrant group - no effort made to involve 
neighbouring pastoralist populations. Training staff seem to side with the new 
settlers and maintain some prejudice against semi-nomadic populations probably 
because of ignorance of these societies.... effort should be made to approach 
the pastoralist populations because they have their own specific problems which 
need to be addressed. And in this case a kind of dialogue would take place again 
between farmers and breeders of livestock just like in the past.’49
A more general example of the FFHC programme’s tendency to construct a
particular kind of interpretation, typically apolitical, and to organise its interventions on
the basis of this interpretation can be seen when one looks at the profile of development
across the region as a whole. While the FFHC programme constructed a development
discourse and geographical area within which it organised ‘development’ according to
its own conceptual and structural apparatus; outside this area, ‘development’ was
perceived and organised by other aid agency programmes completely differently:
‘We [FFHC] have been singularly unsuccessful in promoting activities 
requiring sustained community effort i.e. in pond construction and maintenance. 
There is a Ministry of Agriculture soil conservation project in our midst 
providing food for work and many of our NGO neighbours do the same. At a 
meeting held in September with members of the cooperative, they expressed the 
wish for help with pond rehabilitation but at the same time made it clear that 
some incentive was expected. I think these discrepancies in the approach of 
different organisations has to be sorted out at a higher level.’50
49 Eugene Binama, Report: monitoring FFHC/AD FAO programme in Ethiopia, (FFHC: Addis Ababa, 
December 1990)
50 W. J. Bradfield, ‘End of tour report’ (December 1990), (CAOAF/ME.542)
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As with its myopic approach to the conflicting interests in the Weyito Valley, on a 
broader scale, FFHC’s failure to structure a concerted approach at provincial and 
regional level undermined prospects for sustainability
Quite different philosophies and procedures were pursued by different northern 
NGOs in the same geographical area with the same target groups. The FFHC 
programme essentially constructed its own object of analysis which in turn shaped its 
own interventions. In this respect, ‘development’ was not a neutral technique; it was a 
very real historical event, specific to it own immediate institutional context. This 
tendency for FFHC to generate its own discourse, typically apolitical was a 
fundamental characteristic of the programme. As seen above, it resulted in the 
programme’s detachment from the actual socio-economic and political processes that 
underlay development. Development became a package implemented by outsiders and 
local needs and priorities were subordinated. Pursuing its neutral and technical 
rationale, the intervention not only bracketed out alternatives but more importantly 
produced concrete power effects. These can be most clearly seen in the programme’s 
reliance on local political institutions and individuals.
The FFHC programme operated through a local government system of peasant 
associations and cooperatives which had historically been imposed by an unpopular 
central government. Peasant associations had been formed by the Derg in the mid- 
1970s as semi-official government entities at the lowest administrative level.51 They 
sent representatives to the cooperatives which acted as consumer cooperatives involved 
in the procurement and sale of consumer goods; agricultural marketing; and grain 
milling. The cooperatives in turn reported to the local departments of the various 
ministries at district and regional level.52 Formed by decree, cooperatives in Ethiopia 
were used primarily as mechanisms for government functions at the local level and as 
tools for general rural development efforts by government and donors alike. They were
51 In 1992, peasant associations numbered about 17,000 with an average membership of about 275 
peasant families, and a total membership of some 6 million. Paul Ojermark, D eve lo p m en t o f  
agricu ltu ra l m u lti-purpose  co -opera tive  societies in E th iop ia  (FAO: Rome, March 1992)
52 The total number of service cooperatives established in Ethiopia is approximately 4000, with an 
estimated membership for all cooperatives at 4.8 million farmer households, thus an average of 1200 
per cooperative. Ojermark, D evelopm ent o f  agricu ltura l m ulti-purpose co -opera tive  soc ie ties
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top-down institutions with upwards and not downwards accountability. Peasant
association leadership was determined by Party appointment in almost all areas and in
turn was largely responsible for determining cooperative leadership. As a result
cooperative members became alienated from what should have been their own
organisations and denied the right to influence even issues that were of direct concern to
them, such as the marketing and pricing of their own products. A 1992 Food and
Agriculture Organisation consultancy report concluded that:
‘the potential of genuine co-operatives to contribute to rural development based 
on popular participation was missed [during the time of the Derg] and the very 
concept of co-operatives fell into widespread disrepute.53
Despite this fact that a very real problem existed in the relationship between the
cooperatives’ executive and the farmers, the FFHC programme, from its inception,
relied heavily on the cooperatives’ leadership for planning and project implementation.
At the start there were good reasons for choosing to collaborate with this level of
community organisation - government recognition and official legal status. By the 1988
evaluation however, it was clear that weak communication between the cooperatives
and individual farmers was seriously threatening the integrity of the programmes
participatory methodology. A field visit by a CA staff member to Abela Farechew sub-
project found that:
‘communications between the service cooperatives management and the farmer 
members appear to be almost non-existent... We got the impression of an over 
confident cooperative management who do not bother too much with farmers’ 
opinions and of superficial monitoring by visiting staff relying too much on 
service cooperative-provided information.’54
Further, the lack of participation was impacting on the performance of specific projects.
A senior CA staff member remarked about the oxen distribution scheme at Abela
Farechew that:
‘one got the impression that participation in the development planning involved 
only the cooperative at committee level and had not gone down to the farmers 
themselves... it was difficult to find farmers who knew either the price that they 
had paid for the oxen or the basis of their repayment calculation. Although 
mortality was quite high and discussions about insurance had been proceeding 
for some time, there was in fact no insurance provision in operation. Repayment
53 ibid.
54 Paul Spray, memo to Jenny Borden/Doug Souter (29 September 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.545)
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was demanded and pressure was brought to bear on individuals irrespective of 
whether they were in a position to repay.55
By ignoring the local historical and political realities, the possibility that the
FFHC programme was in fact strengthening state presence in the local region can not be
ignored. The programme’s reliance on cooperatives for implementation opened it up to
charges of supporting and reinforcing a form of community organisation that was
essentially external and unpopular. In Borana areas, pastoralist organisations clearly
would have had more legitimacy than cooperatives or other government bodies.56
Indications that the FFHC programme did indeed witness an extension of bureaucratic
state power may be found in the reaction of the cooperatives and the peasant
associations following the move in 1995 to decentralise the programme’s entry points.
This move came after it was recognised by the programme that cooperatives were not
the ideal tool for participatory development. Their role was recast as conduits of
activities rather than as the focus, and efforts made to exploit more infonnal village-
based organisations. The 1995 progress report noted that:
‘although the idea of working through smaller groups was enthusiastically 
received by farmers, they are not so enthusiastically endorsed by the 
cooperatives, which fear that their resources and influence will be depleted,’57
Similarly, the disruptive attitude of the Ministry of Agriculture towards the deployment
of locally trained paravets as a decentralised alternative to their own employees, was
indicative of the Ministry’s desire to maintain control over resources and processes.58
Such competition between grassroots workers and the official establishment belies any
perception of development as a neutral process, devoid of political effect. A related
problem concerned the programme’s initial reliance on development agents who were
attached to the cooperatives and were the main grassroots implementers of the
programme and at the same time government officials. These individuals were neither
neutral nor appropriate. Responsible for collecting taxes, seeing that conscription
quotas were fulfilled and in some areas for rounding up workers for cotton picking in
55 ibid.
56 Ruth Segal, Note: FFHC (CA: London, April 1996)
57 Yoseph Negassa, Project Progress Report 1994
58 FFHC. 1, Y oseph Negassa,
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the Lower Awash Valley, development agents were often resented by local 
communities. Moreover, rarely from the local community, rarely speaking the local 
language and generally urban-educated, their commitment was in doubt and they often 
appeared to talk ‘at’ the people.59
2 . 3  Discussion
Embedded within the FFHC’s programme design was a picture not only of the 
target population but also a related conception of the programme’s own nature. In 
essence, the official thinking that presided over the creation of the programme saw 
government and programme alike as neutral instruments of development, providing 
technical solutions and social services to an equally depoliticised and undifferentiated 
rural poor. As such, the political and structural causes of poverty were reduced to the 
level of individual motivation and attitude; and development became a matter of simply 
educating individual people.
Despite the rhetoric, FFHC systematically translated problems into technical 
ones requiring apolitical, technical and ‘development’ intervention. In this respect, the 
‘problem’ of Ethiopia’s periodic famines was identified as environmental degradation 
due to population increase, poverty and poor farming practices.60 And the logical 
‘solution’ was for the provision of agricultural inputs; development of irrigation 
schemes; reversal of environmental degradation through reforestation and soil and water 
conservation; and training and educating farmers.61 What became revealed in the 
process was a tendency to abstract the problems, to ignore the historical and political- 
economy and to see agricultural rehabilitation a the sole determinant in breaking the 
cycle of drought and famine. As a result, there was an equally clear tendency for the 
programme components to come as standardised packages, typically providing technical 
solutions even to problems even when these were not technical in nature.
‘Participation’, the guiding principle was invoked as a technique, an educating tool, to
59 Beverley Jones, inter-office memo (5 July 1991), (CAO.AF/ME.542)
60‘The project is operating in a food crisis situation in which means must be found to feed an increasing 
population from deteriorating land’ Bakuramutsa & Sandford, Evaluation Report
61 ibid.
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reach fixed goals determined by outsiders. As such, it became just that, a technique; an
‘input’ rather than a result; a methodology rather than ‘the institutionalised involvement
that contributes to long-term sustainability.’62
Why did the FFHC programme loose its way and become captured by a more
conventional development discourse? To begin with the language of participation failed
to address the limitations imposed on the development process by the non-discursive
culture of donor agencies, their funding and reporting requirements. In this perspective,
the programme’s ability to promote participatory planning and adapt to field level
realities was belied by conflicting structural origins and purposes. An indication of such
contradictions is given in the following comment by Beverley Jones of CA:
‘given the pressure of time to move directly into implementation ... [this water 
engineer] felt that it would have been useful to have a greater understanding of 
the range of cultural differences between the various target communities. While 
they occupied one region, there were significant differences in their agricultural 
and pastoral methods (e.g. the Boran land-burning), their organisational 
structures and their attitudes which affected the appropriateness of the 
methodology and the transferability of models which had worked in one area to 
another. This suggests that more time is needed to evaluate models and the 
contexts in which they might be replicated.’63
Participatory planning and a ‘learning process approach’ take time, require high staffing
levels and good management. It costs. Yet the reality was that resources moved
between Western government donors and NGOs, like CA, when quick quantifiable
results were demonstrated. Money needed for the sort of feasibility analysis and project
evaluation that would include real participation, despite the rhetoric on both side of the
donor-NGO equation, would simply not have been available; and the managers of
FFHC knew this. In contrast, NGOs like CA can mobilise funds for selling
standardised packages. FFHC’s programme planning and reporting reflected the
quantitative nature of analysis both of problems and of solutions. We have seen how
with the water component, quantity was prioritised over quality; a reflection of donor
reporting and funding requirements. Moreover, where financial and technological
investment at the local, basic-needs level was suitable, the FFHC programme
performed relatively well: veterinary and human health inputs benefited rural
62 Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, p. 225
63 Beverley Jones, inter-office memo (5 July 1991), (CAO.AF/ME.542)
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communities; grinding mills provided to cooperatives made a qualitative difference to 
the lives of women and provided a good source of income for the cooperative; and 
some farmers benefited from agricultural and oxen credit, although this tended to be the 
richer members of the community.
Yet it was not just structural factors that made the FFHC programme what it 
eventually was. Weak theorising, particularly on civil society was also crucial. This can 
be seen with regard to the programme’s interpretation of and dependence on 
cooperatives. Realistically, it would have been difficult to find alternative community 
structures to support in the mid-1980s. But there was another imperative. Cooperatives 
provided grassroots local organisations central to a strategy of institution-building and 
empowering civil society. They represented pluralism and as such were good. Yet what 
has been highlighted in the analysis above is that ‘civil society’ discourse - a central one 
to the new ‘orthodoxy’ of alternative development - needed to be thought about more 
carefully. The FFHC’s programme design reflected an apolitical analysis of civil 
society. In effect, civil society was ‘good’ regardless of its context. The fact that the 
context was highly political indicates that the approach was flawed and even harmful.
The FFHC programme was not what it appeared. Arguably, it fitted more 
comfortably with the conventional production-orientated, technical, top-down approach 
than with any ‘alternative’ approach. In reality, growth in the sense of an ‘additive’ 
strategy that focused on a package of standard technical inputs was pursued; 
consciences were lulled by the rhetoric of participation; and the thornier issues of the 
pastoral dimension, of land ownership and of political processes left unattended. The 
following section looks at the role played by CA within the programme, at what CA felt 
about its results, and at what the programme reveals about CA’s evolving capabilities.
3 . Christian Aid and the Freedom From Hunger Campaign
Programme in southern Ethiopia 1985-97
CA’s involvement in the programme began from its inception in the form of
funding although perhaps its most significant and direct involvement occurred between
1988 and 1991 when CA appointed and sponsored a water engineer to oversee the
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water development component. There were many reasons why the decision to support 
the FFHC programme was taken. As a neutral non-government agency, it provided CA 
with a useful channel for aid during the highly politicised and sensitive years of the 
Derg; it enabled CA to find a way of working with a difficult government.64 It also 
enabled CA to become involved in the south of Ethiopia where a dearth of potential 
partners and concern over the imbalance of its assistance, the majority of which was 
going to the northern non-government-held areas as opposed to the government-held 
areas, were providing strong institutional and moral imperatives for action. To a greater 
extent, the programme also appeared to tie in with CA’s corporate priorities during a 
time of self-analysis in the mid-1980s: it offered the prospect of a decentralised 
approach to agricultural rehabilitation; one committed to credit-based initiatives rather 
than hand-outs, countering arguments that aid produced dependency and disempowered 
the recipient; one that addressed the long-term, underlying cause of famine, that looked 
at the relationship between society and environmental change rather than merely 
alleviating its symptoms; one that sought to work with government and local authorities; 
and one that focused on the poor and marginalised, particularly women. In essence it 
offered the prospect of a move from emergency relief to agricultural rehabilitation, a 
major priority for the organisation as it emerged from the famine of 1983-85.
Increasingly over the years however and perhaps especially between 1988 and 
1990 when it had direct personal contact through the water engineer, Bill Bradfield, CA 
experienced problems with the programme. A recurring issue was the quality of 
monitoring, evaluation and feed back. It was generally felt that the programme’s 
reporting had a number of failings: line management between the FAO/FFHC Rome 
office, the Addis office and the field office in southern Ethiopia was complicated; CA 
staff had little direct contact with the field staff; all reports and accounts were processed 
in Rome, so that informal communication and rapid response both ways was rarely 
possible; and the nature of analysis was weak:
‘it is felt that some of the reporting received through Rome does not always
acknowledge the full extent of the problems that FFHC faces and that this
64 See chapters 4  & 5 above
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detracts from the quality of the relationship between donors, FAO and 
FFH C.’65
Relevant CA staff found it difficult to work with the unwieldy bureaucracy of the 
programme’s management. Some specifically felt that ‘many of the problems have been 
as the result of management issues relating to FAO Rome’66 With all funding and 
reporting channeled through the FAO and no formal mechanism for direct 
communication with the field staff, concerns were expressed by CA staff members 
about issues of accountability. In particular, some felt that opportunities for developing 
and empowering local organisations through flexible and responsive partnership was 
being missed.67 It was for this reason that senior members of staff were keen to see 
FFHC develop as an independent Ethiopian NGO with the capacity to react quickly to 
changes on the ground and to be directly accountable to the donor agencies. This 
process was finally initiated in 1995, to become operational during 1997.
Yet, some senior CA staff also recognised a more fundamental problem less to 
do with the overt institutional structure of the programme and more to do with its 
hidden origins, objects and purposes. In essence, doubts about the programme’s 
rhetoric of participation began to emerge. Certainly during the 1991 evaluation mission, 
some began to question the achievements of the programme and its relevance to the 
fundamental issues underlying progress towards sustainable food production: whether 
only lip-service was being paid to the issue of participation; whether a bridge between 
‘relief’ and ‘reconstruction’ had been crossed or whether vulnerability was still a major 
issue; whether an understanding of what was important for the success of reducing 
vulnerability and what was simply cosmetic had indeed been achieved.68 Some felt that 
the programme had lost its way: its participatory methodology was weak; analysis had 
been poor and overly quantitative; reporting had been fairly abstract and often
65 Dan Collison, letter to NoraMcKeon (24 January 1994), (CA Working Document)
66 Dan Collison, Report: FFHC project staff, Ministry of Agriculture and donors meeting, (CA: 
London, June 1992)
67 FFHC.7, Beverley Jones
68 CA, ‘FFHC Questionnaire for funders’ (1991), (CAO.AF/ME.589)
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unreliable; the approach had been too general; and a clear picture of what had been and 
what was going to happen in the localities was absent.69
Individual’s unease with the programme’s rhetoric may be seen in a number of 
examples. Certainly in the programme’s scaling-up strategy, some CA staff felt that 
participatory methodology had been sacrificed and that the programme had expanded 
too fast. While FFHC sought to plan projects and replicate them within a year or two, 
senior CA staff advocated a slower approach steering away from the danger of 
compromising the quality of impact. The fear was that if FFHC spread itself too thinly, 
it would be difficult to implement a staff-intensive participatory methodology and the 
programme would become inclined to operate a ‘package-approach.’70 Similarly, some 
felt that the programme relied too heavily on seconded ‘experts’. In its desire to 
demonstrate quick results, the programme had come to rely on over-centralised 
management rather than investing time and energy into generating community 
participation. With the water development component, this state of affairs aroused 
particular fears. It was felt that in the face of uncertain central funding and the absence 
of community financial responsibility, the short-term benefits of such a programme 
were simply not sustainable. As Bill Bradfield, the CA-sponsored water engineer 
wrote:
‘because it was not built into the FAO proposals, it was very difficult to build 
up an effective core of local staff to implement water technology in different 
regions. This had implications for sustainability once the water engineer 
withdrew.71
Similar problems occurred with the health component, where an over-reliance on 
seconded staff from the Ministry of Health created a crisis situation in 1996 when staff 
were withdrawn by the government, following a major restructuring of the Ministry.72
69 ibid.
70 ‘Penny Jenden reiterated Band Aid’s feeling that FFHC/AD should be more dynamic in seeking 
additional sources of funding... there may, however, be some contradiction between Band Aid’s desire 
to see substantial amounts of funds raised and CA’s preference for a more selective approach, based on 
the quality of donor commitment and the need to expand the programme without compromising the 
quality of its impact.’ Nora McKeon, ‘Report on duty travel to London’ (22-23 June 1988), 
(CAO.AF/ME.545)
71 Beverley Jones, inter-office memo (5 July 1991), (CAO.AF/ME.542)
72 FFHC.l, Yoseph Negassa
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By the early 1990s, senior CA staff clearly felt that FFHC was operating a
standardised ‘package-approach’; that project staff and cooperative communities had too
readily accepted the rhetoric of a participatory narrative; and that participation needed to
be a fuller, more reciprocal dialogue, using different techniques to involve people.73
Beverley Jones forcefully argued:
‘despite being established with the intention of being a bottom-up participatory 
model of agricultural rehabilitation and development, FFHC has fallen into 
many of the bureaucratic traps which beleaguer projects with such complex 
multi-disciplinary webs of participation and responsibility. It might not be too 
harsh to say that it has become a top-down programme which elicits support by 
describing itself as bottom-up.’74
In many ways, FFHC did not turn out to be the programme its advocates in CA had
wished to support.75 What does this reveal about CA and how its role in development
was determined and constructed?
What is particularly interesting is how CA seemed to accept a neo-malthusian
environmental degradation narrative for southern Ethiopia - in FFHC’s programme
documents, labels such as ‘food crisis situation’, ‘increasing population’, ‘deteriorating
land’ and ‘poor natural resource use’ were adopted as technical phenomena; their causal
interrelations assumed - when such a narrative was in direct opposition to its analysis of
the situation in the north. Here, in Tigray and Eritrea, CA was involved in a highly
political relief and development intervention; and one, moreover, which identified the
causes of famine as lying in the political-economy and not the environment. This
contradiction can be explained by the links between the discursive and the non-
discursive; by the relationship between the words and the institutional expression of
development. Essentially it was the different origins, purposes and structures in
northern Ethiopia as compared to southern Ethiopia that ensured that while the
intentions of development may have been the same, the outcome was very different.
The complex relation between the ‘intentionality of planning and the strategic
intelligibility of outcomes’76; the fact that development interventions are not simply the
73 Beverley Jones, ‘The FFHC agricultural programme in southern Ethiopia’, p. 79
74 ibid., p. 79
75 CA.5, Sarah Hughes
76 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 20
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expression of objective interests but are social institutions with real functions is perhaps
most clearly seen in this dichotomy between CA’s interpretation in the north and south
of Ethiopia. CA did not operate in a political void, where intentions could be simply
translated into outcomes. Different situations demanded different ways of
operationalising intentions. CA’s initial and continued support of FFHC was essentially
a reflection of the agency’s characteristic pragmatism. As a balance to its involvement in
the cross-border operation and a ‘way of not demonising everything to do with the
Derg’77, it reflected the awareness of senior staff within CA that there were different
ways of looking at things and different levels of involvement. While this may be
interpreted as ‘sitting on the fence’, it was a policy that had important effects in the
long-term. As Beverley Jones explained:
‘the agencies who didn’t work on both sides had much more of a problem in re­
adjusting to the new Ethiopia in 1991 because they had no credibility in other 
parts of Ethiopia - they were seen as the hacks of Tigray and Eritrea whereas 
CA was credible with the church, with the Ministry of Agriculture, and I’m sure 
it helped our transition to the new regime.’78
Structurally dependent on the effectiveness of its partners in the south, CA’s ability to
fulfill its intentions were ultimately determined by the situation on the ground. A
comparison of CA’s intervention in southern Ethiopia, through the FFHC programme,
with its intervention in northern Ethiopia, through the cross-border operation, reveals
this.
4 . Understanding Development: lessons for Christian Aid
The FFHC development programme in southern Ethiopia promoted, licensed 
and justified certain interventions and practices, delegitimising and excluding others. A 
storyline was created, with its own interpretation and stabilized assumptions about the 
problems and the solutions to be addressed. The analysis has shown how this storyline 
was dictated by a ‘development’ representation of southern Ethiopia in that it was 
determined largely by what the FFHC programme could or couldn’t do. In essence, 
FFHC could supply technical inputs and so the experiences of the target population
77 FFHC.7, Beverley Jones
78 ibid.
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were represented largely outside their specific historical and geographical context. 
Development became a task of education, the introduction of changes in ‘traditional’ 
attitude. While the ‘centre-outwards’, ‘core-periphery’ language of development may 
have been reversed, the structures that underpinned the development process were left 
unchallenged and the last were not put first.79 The FFHC programme was not an 
isolated example. In general, aid agencies, find it hard to escape from conventional 
models of development even when the rhetoric implies that they have done so. Clearly 
there are hidden structural purposes that need to be addressed. Despite the rhetoric of 
the ‘new professionalism’, it would appear that ‘the inertia of the normal has been 
shifted but little. ,8°
The reasons for this ‘inertia’ lie at many levels. On a very human level, it is 
conceptually easier for development professionals to ‘think in linear terms,’ despite the 
fact that field-level realities - whether ecosystems, fanning systems, or livelihood 
strategies - are ‘non-linear, adaptive and differentiating.’81 Equally, on a broader policy 
level, there will always be a tendency for national policy-makers, aid agencies and 
academics to adopt a ‘set of concerns for dialogue and debate, for securing and 
legitimating flows of funds, and as a framework for thought and action.’82 These 
concerns - women in development, participation, institution-building etc. - are very 
functional, they ‘move money’, and as such there is a clear tendency for simplification 
and standardisation. In the process, the real and more complex issues underlying the 
problem of women’s development or grassroots participation, the issues that aid 
agencies are less capable of addressing, are obscured. At an institutional level, a clear 
imperative to translate the political realities of poverty and powerlessness and the 
economic realities of complex livelihoods into technical problems awaiting solution by 
‘development’ agencies and experts becomes blatant. As one analyst has argued:
‘the more uncertain things seem at the micro-level, the greater the tendency to
see the scale of uncertainty at the macro-level to be so enormous as to require
79 Chambers, Rural Development
80 Chambers, Challenging the Professions, p. 14
81 ibid., p. 13
82 Robert Chambers, The State and Rural Development; ideologies and an agenda for the 1990s Institute 
of Development Studies Discussion Paper No. 269 (Institute of Development Studies, November 
1989), p. 1
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broad explanatory narratives that can be operationalised into standard
approaches with widespread application.
A prime institutional need of development agencies is to ‘move money’; to spend the 
money they have been charged with spending, and to put their resources into action.84 
Their organisational need is to find the right kind of problem; the kind of ‘problem’ that 
requires the ‘solution’ they are there to provide. In this perspective, the tendency is to 
veer away from the political and structural problem and to plug into the technical and 
geographical one.
The rhetoric of much of the ‘alternative development’ paradigm is not simply 
due to the mystification of ideology.85 The language employed in development is not 
simply a misrepresentation of what the development apparatus is really up to. Words 
may indeed put up a smokescreen but this is not always intentional. Rather it is because 
discourse has concealed structures, embodying material, political and indeed ideological 
relationships, that development often becomes something other than intended. This is 
not to excuse responsibility, rather to draw attention to the fact that in order to 
understand why and how agencies such as CA are drawn into homogenized 
conventional models of development so frequently, despite aspirations otherwise, one 
must look at the institutional context within which ‘development’ discourse is located. It 
is here that one can see how intentional plans interact with unacknowledged structures 
and purposes to produce unintended results. And it is here that the challenge of finding 
new forms of engagement with the questions of poverty, hunger and oppression must 
begin.
CA’s experience in development in southern Ethiopia, through the FFHC 
programme, exposed the limits to the organisation’s capabilities. In confronting the 
challenge of development it was often more convenient to promote particular, off-the- 
shelf intervention ‘packages’ which framed problems and solutions in technical terms
83 Roe, ‘Development narratives’, p. 288
84 J. Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1975) cited in Ferguson, 
The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 70
85 For an elaboration of this point see Gavin Williams, ‘The world bank and the peasant problem’ in 
Heyer, Roberts & Williams (eds.), Rural Development in Tropical Africa, pp. 37-42; & Ferguson, The 
Anti-Politics Machine, pp. 17-21
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and obscured alternative analyses such as those which lay in the realm of political 
economy. Empirical evidence suggests that the programme became a standardized 
intervention package for rural development, more representative of simplifying 
interpretations of agricultural change than of field-level geography or history. The 
rhetoric of participation was too easily accepted; its meaningfulness belied by the reality 
of top-down programming and implementation.
Despite the apparent change in the ‘fashion-conscious institutional language of 
development’86 since the 1960s, the underlying metaphors of development employed 
by agencies like CA have proved persistent. The above analysis has implied that 
development structures are multi-layered and often contradictory; and that planning 
cannot be taken at its word. For CA, the FFHC programme reflected key problems with 
development work, both generally and in the specific policy environment of southern 
Ethiopia. Most importantly, this analysis has questioned whether CA, and NGOs in 
general, are institutionally equipped to respond to current challenges for ‘alternative 
development’.
86 Doug Porter, ‘Scenes from childhood: the homesickness of development discourses’ in Crash (ed.), 
Power o f Development, p. 64
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Conclusion
LESSONS: THE PAST HISTORIC AND THE FUTURE IMPERFECT
Adopting a historical time-frame, this thesis has explored the evolving 
capabilities of CA as a charity in Ethiopia over 30 years. What is most striking is how 
CA has continued to 1 -ose its way down the same paths. Two issues in particular have 
emerged in explanation of this. The first is that CA has had difficulties finding a voice, 
a clear theoretical strategy and agenda for action. The second, is that CA has had 
difficulties operationalising intentions. The following draws together the main findings 
of the thesis. The first section explores why these difficulties have arisen. The second 
section looks towards the future and asks what policy prescriptions can be drawn from 
CA’s history.
1 • Christian Aid and lessons from the past
This study has highlighted a number of key influences and structures that have 
impacted on CA’s performance in Ethiopia. Each of these has touched upon the multi­
layered and often contradictory nature of the organisation, on how different voices exist 
at different levels and on how theory has related to practice. They are drawn together 
below under four headings.
The persistence o f conventional interpretations o f famine, relief and development:
Chapter 2 put forward the argument that the driving force behind much 
development and emergency policy in Africa has been a set of powerful interpretations 
and widely perceived images of change. The idea of famine as a ‘disaster event’ has 
been particularly persistent, as have images of soil erosion and an essentially 
undynamic view of peasant behaviour. Commonly represented in the form of a 
narrative, such interpretations have made stabilizing assumptions about the problem to 
be addressed and the approach to be taken. Such assumptions have thus substituted for 
the rich diversity of people’s historical and political interactions with particular 
environments. They have constituted ‘discourse’, in the sense meant by Foucault to 
draw attention to the way in which they have embodied relations of power that were
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constituted through acts that went unnoticed because they were taken for granted. The 
fact that discourse was embedded in particular institutional structures has not only 
accounted for its tenacity, but has enabled it to have practical consequences, or power 
effects that reveal the underlying exercise of power.
The thesis has shown that in CA’s development interventions in Ethiopia in the 
1980s/1990s and emergency interventions in the 1970s, policy was driven by an 
interpretation that had more to do with the specific cultural policy paradigm of 
‘outsiders’ and little to do with the specific historical and socio-political context of those 
who were actually suffering, the ‘insiders’. Theoretically, structurally and strategically, 
it was more convenient for CA to promote particular, off-the-shelf intervention 
‘packages’ which framed problems and solutions in technical terms, and obscured those 
which lay in the realm of political economy. Such de-contextualisation had profound 
implications for the validity of CA’s humanitarian undertaking and explained why the 
organisation had difficulties operationalising intentions in northern Ethiopia in the 
1970s and in southern Ethiopia in the 1990s.
Fund-raising, development education and the media:
CA’s activities have relied on fund-raising from the general public. The 
organisation’s fund-raising has therefore had to appeal to and elicit a response from a 
wide audience. This has often served to reinforce stereotyped images and interpretations 
which, in CA’s development education mode, the organisation has wished to challenge. 
For example, the northern popular perception of famine as evidence of a malthusian 
crisis in Africa with an environmental dimension played an important role in sustaining 
aid flows to Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, but arguably did little to further understanding 
among the general public in the north of the social and political realities in the south. In 
fund-raising, a number of factors have acted to reinforce stereotyped images. Firstly, 
the motivation to give has been largely driven by emotion, guilt and horror. In 1968, 
CA’s publicist noted: ‘the vast majority of people... give emotionally rather than 
intellectually.’1 Such emotions were best triggered by images of ‘victims’ and
1 Hugh Samson, memo to Alan Brash (12 July 1968), (SOAS.CA/I/15.2)
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‘disasters’. Secondly, fund-raising operated in a competitive field. In 1968, again, it
was recognised within CA that:
‘in communication terms we must not delude ourselves in believing that because 
we are a charity we have a divine right to be read. We have to compete on a 
commercial basis with other advertisers in the same issue of the newspaper and 
with many other demands made on peoples’ thinking time.’2
Thirdly, there was a public expectation that fund-raising should correspond with what
the agency was seen to be concretely doing. Fund-raising thus became tied to raising
money for specific and definable projects. All the above posed problems for
development education. The first two points related to the content of fund-raising
appeals, the impact on development education was consequential. The third point was
more about CA’s mission, about whether it should have simplified its operations by
concentrating on its particular job of raising money for projects or whether it should
have acted as an educational instrument for the wider field of relations of rich nations to
the poor nations, and the whole problem of international economic and political justice.
As CA’s publicist argued in 1975, it was a question of whether ‘CA should relinquish
its role of leading public opinion and conform to the lowest common denominator in its
constituency’s understanding of Third World need and CA’s response to it.’3
The tension between fund-raising and development education was about finding
a voice and defining a strategy but also about structure and how to operationalise
intentions. CA had two constituencies, those who gave money in the north and those
who received it, in the south. In such a situation, accountability was hazardous. While
CA did resolve to move forward as an educational and campaigning agency, the basic
tension and internal ambivalence between its need to raise funds within the domestic
context, and the need to maintain an institutional ethos appropriate to the organisation’s
southern clientele remained. It was a tension that went to the root of what CA was, did,
and was ultimately capable of achieving. In Ethiopia in the 1970s stereotyped images
and interpretations of change were more reflective of CA as a fund-raising organisation
than as one committed to its southern clientele. In the 1980s famine, CA was more
2 P. Mead, letter to P. Watts (21 August 1968), (SOAS.CA/I/15.2)
3 Hugh Samson, letter to George Sinclair (25 March 1975), (CAO.DIR.A)
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sensitive to the needs of its partners in the south and yet its performance remained tied 
by the wider fund-raising profile of other agencies and donors in the north. This 
reduced its ability to effectively pursue advocacy and education. In the 1980s and 
1990s, fund-raising for the Freedom From Hunger Campaign programme remained tied 
to a conventional development narrative, reflecting what was ‘do-able’ rather than what 
was ‘possible’.
The tension between defining strategy and operationalising that strategy was 
further exacerbated by the character of relief and development coverage in the mass 
media. This could distort images both of CA and of the Third World, and most 
importantly of ‘relief’ and ‘development’. It was recognised early on that CA’s image 
as an organisation was not totally of its own making. In the 1970s, CA’s publicist 
remarked:
‘despite a substantial output of controlled publicity, many supporters (and all 
potential supporters) are still influenced more by what they learn of CA from 
independent and uncontrolled sources - newspapers, TV and radio - not solely 
because of their superior coverage but also because the public accepts 
“impartial” reportage more readily than what an organisation prints about itself. 
Hence the importance of good media relations w ork,... although ... the 
selection and presentation of what is actually published is out of one’s control.’4
This distortion created problems of credibility: ‘one result of this is that when less
publicised activities come to light, they may strike some people as being at variance
with what they have assumed to be CA’s policy or role,’5 Media interpretations of
development and relief were equally problematic. Benthall has argued that the media has
an inbuilt tendency to generate ‘crisis’ narratives with respect to development issues. In
recent years, the rapid technological development of communications media and the
more rapid circulation of information has increased the tendency towards simplification
and convergence in the substance of popular discourse about development. What has
become increasingly evident has been a marked similarity in images and interpretations.
The persistence of such interpretations, what Benthall has called ‘folk narrative’6, was
seen to lie in the cultural paradigm of the news room. The implications have been
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media, p. 188
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profound. As Smillie has commented:
‘that the media concentrate on disaster and bad new is not news. What is more 
problematic is their preoccupation with quantitative data rather than qualitative 
analysis of the context in which an event takes place.’7
In other words, media preoccupations are with ‘who did what?’, ‘where?’, ‘when?’, 
‘how?’ but not with ‘why?’
The volume and character of media coverage has historically made CA’s job of 
development education increasingly difficult. Not only has the media distorted 
perceptions of relief and development - typically offering a conventional ‘natural5 
interpretation of the problem and a technocentric solution to it - but by so doing, it has 
distorted the mission of NGOs such as CA, typically portraying them as neutral ‘angels 
of mercy’ rather than as political actors. In turn, CA, institutionally, has found it 
difficult to ignore the momentum and fund-raising potentials initiated by massive, 
emotional media coverage. There has been an institutional need - both in terms of 
immediate fund-raising and long-term public credibility - to be seen to be doing 
something. This impacted on CA in the Ethiopian famines of 1967 and 1974. Moreover 
the debate about how the organisation should capitalise on media coverage has been on­
going among CA staff. Paul Renshaw has commented on the unforeseen effect of 
Michael Buerk and Mohamed Amin’s film of Korem, Ethiopia, in 1984:
‘He [Michael Buerk] succeeded in making an impact where the agencies had 
not, and we were not prepared for the response from the public, by telephone, 
letter, financial, offers of help. ...when the media publicity followed, CA was 
unable to capitalise - absence of overseas personnel (i.e. white faces to be 
photographed); mechanism of helping through partner programmes - easiest in 
Eritrea and Tigray. Is this something CA has to live with? Willing to take earlier 
initiative than most in response to partners - and then leave field to more 
publicity conscious agencies with overseas staff? And go on to the next and/or 
continue to work quietly. Xian imperative of “hiding our light under a bushel” - 
but doesn’t get the money in.’8
The danger of such a debate, was the extent to which it threatened the independent
mission of CA. The media has impacted not just on the educational performance of CA
but by setting the agenda, on the organisation’s very identity and mission.
7 Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, p. 133
8 Paul Renshaw, ‘Notes on Ethiopia appeals’ (n.d.), (CAO.AF/ME.587)
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North-south partnerships:
The challenge of partnership, in the 1950s as in the 1990s, has been one of
converting a giving-receiving relationship into one that could transcend money. Already
at the World Council of Churches assembly in New Delhi in 1961 it was stated that:
‘the static distinction of “receiving church” and “giving church” must go so that 
all will share spiritual, material and personal gifts in the light of the total 
economy of the household of God. ...Aid can never by and should not be a 
one-way affair. Out of their rich cultural heritage, the developing nations have 
much to contribute to the enrichment of the life of the people of the world as a 
whole.’9
Such language of mutuality and empowerment was also evident in CA’s 1987 statement
of commitment, ‘To Strengthen the Poor’:
‘We must act strategically to strengthen the arm of the poor until they can stand 
up to those who so often act against them, and have the power to determine their 
own development under God.’10
Operationalising such intentions has proved more difficult. There have been five
main reasons for this. Firstly, partnership has required a degree of solidarity that CA
has not always been capable of giving. During famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s, the
thesis has shown how CA was seriously compromised on its ability to speak out on
behalf of those suffering in the north. Similarly, the thesis has shown how in its
campaigns, CA’s freedom to pursue meaningful and accountable partnership with the
politically and economically marginalised, has historically been limited by the dictates of
charity law and the sensitivities of its donors and its northern constituency. Secondly,
words of mutuality and empowerment are quite simply inadequate in the face of the
significance of the uni-directional flow of resources. The vertical bonds of dependence
have proved particularly persistent. Conventional interpretations and actions on relief
and development are rarely challenged. Further, in order to attract funding, there has
been an incentive for southern partners to respond to and comply with an agenda set by
their northern partners and in so doing, to internalise the specific discourse used by
northern NGOs to justify that funding. As Leach and Mearns have argued:
‘while inhabitants of local African environments may themselves participate in 
the production of ideas about environmental change, they do so with less power 
to define the terms of debate. As token participants in global and national fora,
9 Cited in Taylor, Not Angels but Agencies, p. 81
10 CA, To Strengthen the Poor
276
they may have little chance to express alternatives to the dominant viewpoint.
But equally, it is not uncommon for rural inhabitants in their interactions with 
development fieldworkers to confirm outsiders’ preconceived ideas, given the 
power relations which operate at such “interfaces”.’11
This author’s own experience of interviewing farmers in the Freedom From Hunger
Campaign programme’s project sites, and in particular the internalising of discourses on
women in development and soil erosion, confirmed such an observation. Chapter 1 has
explored how the national councils of churches were created and ‘moulded’ as effective
partners in the 1960s. As Michael Taylor, Director of CA, has written:
‘then as now the national councils of churches were supported and shaped as 
instruments of the north, equipped to do what the north required. Then as now 
they were potentially diverted from an holistic task to a specialised task, from 
what they might have done if left to themselves to what they did do at the behest 
of others.’12
Similarly, implicit in the strengthening of development initiatives within the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, from the 1970s, was an adoption of northern interpretations and 
priorities, however successful. While examples of resilience and independence have 
existed among southern partners, for example with the Eritrean Relief Association and 
the Relief Society of Tigray, the evidence suggests that such partnerships are unique 
and, typically, it is the north that has set the priorities and the south that has 
accommodated and adopted them. Thirdly, concepts of participation, empowerment and 
civil society - guiding words in building partnerships - are under-theorised. The thesis 
has shown how the de-contextualisation of partners has contributed to processes of 
marginalisation and that farmers and herders may selectively adopt outsider’s idioms 
and turn them to their own advantage in struggles over identity and resource control.
The powers accorded leaders of cooperatives and peasant associations through the 
Freedom From Hunger Campaign programme indicates that the meaning of 
‘community’ or ‘civil society’ is complex and political.
Fourthly, ‘partnerships’ may become distorted by problems of capability and 
understanding. A major debate within CA, in the mid-1970s, was whether CA’s 
historical commitment to partnership with national councils of churches and churches
11 Melissa Leach & Robin Meams, ‘Environmental change and policy: challenging received wisdom in 
Africa’ in Leach & Meams (eds.), The Lie of The Land, p. 27
12 Taylor, Not Angels but Agencies, p. 139
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fulfilled the organisation’s strategic commitment to the poor. In Ethiopia, CA’s
partnership with the Orthodox Church was riddled with ambiguities as to how far
understanding and partnership could go. Sarah Hughes of CA has written:
‘as an experienced overseas partner put it at the round table, it is impossible for 
a person from the western tradition to intellectually understand the Orthodox 
Church, but by experiencing it he/she can arrive at some kind of appreciation. 
...experiencing the church ... means understanding what is meant by the often 
made statement "the people are the church and the church is the people”. This 
includes appreciating the huge numbers of priests (and their families), over 
300,000 in all, and the position of the priest within the Orthodox family, as 
“soul father” to every member. It helps to explain why there is no question in 
parish councils minds that a project which develops church land in order to 
provide food and income for the clergy is a community project. ... It has been 
stated in previous travel reports that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is weak in 
the field of emergency response and relief. This is still probably true and it is all 
the more important to try and support and strengthen their efforts at the present 
time.’13
Paul Renshaw has commented in a similar vein:
‘in 19801 went to Addis [Ababa], it was the first meeting of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox consortium. I sat there with the bishops and we talked straight past 
one another. It was a cultural experience I shall never forget. They were 
concerned with saying, "we are the guardians of the faith, we are the 
repositories of Ethiopian culture, listen to us and our priorities”, which were 
things like printing presses. ...Moreover, they were historically close to the 
central power, the most hierarchical organisation conceivable, as male- 
dominated as they come. If you asked the question, "is this an organisation that 
we can work with in development terms?”, it would have been quite easy to say 
“no”. But, CA in those days, even more than it is now, and it still is to some 
extent, does see the roots of its existence to be in working with the church body 
out there.’14
Partnership, for CA, has proved complicated, entailing an ability to understand different 
perspectives, capabilities and priorities, and ones that have not necessarily fitted in with 
the fashion-conscious language of development. Historically divided between a 
commitment to the ecumenical family and to specialised development, the issue of 
partnership has lead to much internal debate and tension within CA. Strategic attempts 
by senior CA staff to resolve the basic ambiguity have continually come up against 
structural constraints, which have in turn reflected the many voices within the 
organisation.
Fifthly, partnership demands knowing each other, talking to each other and
13 Sarah Hughes, ‘Report on a visit to Ethiopia to attend die Ethiopian Ordiodox Church Development 
and Interchurch Aid Department Round Table meeting’ (7-9 January 1990), (AF/ME 540)
14 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw
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learning from each other. As a non-operational organisation, the physical distance 
between CA’s London office and its partners overseas has imposed a degree of ‘arms 
length’ communication. At times, this has been replaced by a more intense relationship. 
For example, in the heady days of the cross-border operation into Ethiopia when senior 
figures in CA were in constant contact with the liberation movements’ London-based 
offices and CA staff returned from field trips into Eritrea and Tigray with a personal and 
intense sense of solidarity and commitment. In the more mundane, day-to-day 
partnerships, as with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church or the Freedom From Hunger 
Campaign programme, such enthusiasm, built from close contact, has been absent. 
While this may be been as a strength, allowing southern partners more room for 
independence, initiative and capacity-building, it has also lead to misunderstanding and 
a distancing on the part of CA, from local and national realities and priorities. This has 
been discussed, in chapter 5, in relation to post-conflict Ethiopia in the 1990s and in 
chapter 3, in relation to the 1971-75 famine. From 1997, partly in recognition of this 
problem CA initiated a process of opening key overseas offices. It remains to be seen 
whether partnerships will be strengthened and transformed by this process.
The thesis has shown how, as a non-operational agency, the nature and 
effectiveness of CA’s partnerships have been crucial to the agency’s performance. A 
comparison of CA’s interventions in the 1970s and 1980s famines in Ethiopia has 
revealed just how crucial they were. Institutionally, CA has made important steps 
towards securing more effective and flexible relationships in which institutions of the 
north and the south challenge each other and work together on problems. Such 
arrangements include the establishment of round tables15, consortia, country 
programmes16, mission statements, ecumenical resource-sharing arrangements17,
15 Round table structures were established ill 1984 as a way of sharing resources a the national rather 
than regional level.
16 Before round table sUuctures came country programmes, started as an experiment in 1976, which 
brought the churches in a country together to decide on a programme and how much of it they could 
support themselves before looking for outside funding.
17 A new resour ce sharing system was approved by the World Council of Churches central committee in 
1982. The proposal insisted that, ‘the transfer of funds should take place within a framework of equality 
and trust relationships based on a common understanding of objectives and priorities. Sharing of 
resources is a mutual process which requires transparency on all sides.’ cited in Taylor, Not Angels but 
Agencies, p. 82
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campaigns for structural change. The hopes of such institutional arrangements have
however been all too often belied by results. In the words of Michael Taylor, CA’s
Director, the lesson of the past has been that,
‘partnership remains an empty slogan; that words are not matched by deeds; that 
despite all the fine proposals the actual dynamics between north and south, 
funding agencies and receiving “partners” remain much the same; that financial 
considerations all too easily dominate round table discussions and attempts to 
make shared decisions.’18
The politics o f humanitarianism - relations with states and non-states:
Janet Lacey, CA’s first Director, commented about CA’s relations with states
and role within the broader international humanitarian system:
‘the raison d'etre of a voluntary organisation ... is to be free to pioneer and to be 
in the front line when need is apparent. While it should work whenever possible 
with the government and the United Nations ... it must also retain its freedom to 
agitate for the rights of those in need when the state and the community are 
falling short of their responsibilities.’19
This thesis has highlighted a number of constraints that have impacted on CA’s freedom
to agitate for the rights of those in need. In turn, these have exposed the fundamental
contradiction within CA as a charity; the tension between the principle of neutral
humanitarianism and the reality of political involvement. Chapter 1 discussed how CA
has institutionally found it difficult to pursue a campaigning style, coming up against
different levels of awareness and concerns within the organisation about how ‘political’
it could or should be. As Jenny Borden of CA remarked in 1988:
‘Many staff at CA believe that we should not engage in “controversial”, 
“political”, “conflictive” situations - for all kinds of good reasons - damage to 
CA’s name, fear of a fall in income, the Charity Commission, a deep seated 
belief in reconciliation etc.’20
A campaigning style has demanded the institutional ability to mix up education,
information, fund-raising and aid. As such it has come up against a number of different
voices and concerns within CA, operating at different levels within the organisation’s
institutional structure. Chapter 1 also highlighted how a strong campaigning style has,
in past, upset CA’s domestic constituency. In 1983, CA Year’s Report commented that:
t8 ibid., p. 95
19 Lacey, A Cup o f Water, p. 104
20 Jenny Borden, memo to Michael Taylor (9 April 1988), (CAO.DIR.208)
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‘an increasing number of supporters have recently expressed regret or anger that 
so much of what CA says and writes “has a political flavour”. It would not need 
or have to if so much of the deprivation which we are mandated to meet were 
not politically caused and politically perpetuated. It is not part of our job, nor 
within our competence, to apply the necessary political correctives, but because 
our daily life is spent picking up the piece we have a right and a duty to identify 
the causes and to refer them to politicians for action.’21
By exposing the political nature of CA’s work, an institutional campaigning style has
proved hard for the charity to implement.
Operationally, CA’s independence has been constrained by its changing
operational environment. In chapters 1 and 2, the thesis has explored how the role of
NGOs, like CA, within the international relief system was enhanced during the 1980s.
In particular, within this evolving relief system, NGOs, like CA were being used as an
important channel available to donor organisations wishing to provide relief assistance
in areas of conflict and disputed sovereignty. This was particularly the case in Ethiopia
in the 1980s. Chapters 4 and 5 have highlighted how in this situation, accountability
became a big problem for CA. In effect, CA’s institutional freedom to pioneer and
agitate for the rights of those in need were constrained. The organisation was not able to
publicise or speak out openly about the cross-border operation for fear of upsetting
donors and the United Nations. Structurally, the evolving operational environment in
Ethiopia in the 1980s placed a division between relief and politics. This had profound
implications for the independence and accountability of CA’s agenda. In particular, it
meant that CA’s charitable works - supplying relief - were prioritised over human rights
concerns - advocacy.
CA’s freedom to agitate has also been effected by the nature of its relations with
states. In Ethiopia, the difficulties of NGO-state relations have been particularly
evident. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, CA confronted the difficulties of how to
work independently and, in the 1980s in particular, in direct opposition to the state. In
part, CA’s ability to pursueindependent path was determined by the nature and
capacity of its partners. In part, it remained dependent on the positioning of the
international relief system, discussed above.
21 CA, ‘Year Report’ (April 1982-March 1983), (SOAS.CA/J/1)
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CA’s freedom to be at the ‘front line when need is apparent’22 came up against 
fundamental structural problems. These concerned the politics of humanitarianism; the 
fact that humanitarianism, or keeping people alive, as in northern Ethiopia in the 1980s 
or in the Ogaden lowlands in the 1970s, was political. CA’s ability, as an organisation 
made up historically and structurally of different levels of concern and different 
motivations for action, to define a role within the politics had profound implications on 
its performance.
The most striking feature of the above analysis, is how closely it resembles the
discussions within CA, reflected in the Sinclair Report, in the mid-1970s. This begs the
question of whether CA has moved forward at all. Yet, while there has been failure,
compromise, and conflict, there has also been successes, both celebrated and silent, and
examples of meaningful co-operation. The cross-border operation into Eritrea and
Tigray, a programme committed to the politically disadvantaged within the international
arena, stood out in particular as an impressive example of a new framework for
humanitarian assistance. On a different level, CA’s support for the New Internationalist
and campaigns over such issue as apartheid, debt and overseas aid have helped move
the agenda forward over such issues, however modestly. Similarly, CA has helped
create and sustain an entire generation of indigenous organisations in Ethiopia. These
organisations have taken civil society a step further, recognising and strengthening
traditional institutions at village level and, together, they have constituted an important
buffer between people and the state. With the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, CA has
supported its moves into development and its tentative steps to reach out in different
ways to its parishioners. As Paul Renshaw of CA commented:
‘I remember they had a parish council programme which was, although in very 
hierarchical terms, trying to enable the laity to participate, from the local parish. 
It was an impulse to create structures that would allow the laity to speak. To 
speak on everything - development and other things. It seems to me to have 
been an important initiative and has had some success.’23
22 Lacey, A Cup of Water, p. 104
23 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw
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Finally, CA’s programmes have in some cases contributed to the improved living 
standard of the beneficiaries.
In the specific policy environment of Ethiopia and in the broader institutional 
environment, the thesis has shown that CA’s capabilities have increased. However, as 
indicated in the parallels with the Sinclair Report indicated above, the thesis has also 
highlighted that key structural and theoretical weaknesses have remained unresolved. 
Most importantly, CA in the 1990s still faced difficulties in defining a clear strategic 
voice. Theoretical clarity and institutional strategy remained elusive. The following 
section explores what lessons a historical analysis of the past offers for the future and 
how such clarity and strategy may be found.
2 . Christian Aid and lessons for the future
Human compassion is an essential component of a more humane world. This 
thesis supports such a philosophy. What it has questioned however is how 
humanitarianism has manifested itself as a practical philosophy. Much of the analysis 
has been driven by the recognition that success in the provision of aid has been 
overshadowed by failures; that mistakes have been repeated; and that CA is still 
responding to disasters rather than facilitating development. An institution developed in 
a previous era, CA, like other NGOs, is today at a major crossroads. It is an 
interchange where its value and importance is acknowledged, but where it is 
increasingly challenged by forces and structures which threaten to undermine the very 
independence that distinguishes it. As in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, so in the 
1990s, CA is at a junction characterised by self-doubt about the agency’s 
accountability, independence and mission. The final part of this chapter seeks to make 
possible recommendations, based on the lessons from the past, about how CA should 
move forward.
2 .1  Broadening the research agenda
One of the issues that emerges from the thesis has been the tendency for 
CA’s policies in Ethiopia to be founded on conventional ‘natural’ interpretations of
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environmental change. Famine, in the 1970s and development, in the 1990s, were de- 
contextualised and the agency’s intervention pursued its own rationality, divorced from 
local needs and processes. As the thesis has shown, the result was misguided and, in 
some instance, fundamentally flawed interventions. The policy implication is that for as 
long as local processes remain peripheral, rather than central, to the rationality of the 
humanitarian undertaking, it will remain flawed. To move forward, CA needs to 
broaden the research field, to clarify a new interpretation of change in Africa and 
develop a new dynamic agenda. Given the power relations through which, as this thesis 
has argued, orthodoxies are produced and sustained, such an endeavour is clearly not 
simple. Nevertheless, the evidence assembled in the thesis has pointed towards ways in 
which the research field can be broadened.
Two issues that have emerged from CA’s experience in Ethiopia are the need to 
work with and build on the understandings and skills of Ethiopia’s farmers and herders; 
and the need to create the enabling conditions under which local resource-management 
and survival strategies can be pursued effectively. This implies that good policy will 
require research into environmental change and people’s roles in it; research which pays 
attention to the inhabitant’s own experiences and opinions; and which includes 
historical and political-economy perspectives. Yet as indicated in this introduction, 
research is unlikely to have practical impact on orthodox thinking and practice without 
more fundamental changes in the institutional structures through which problem-claims 
are made, solutions elaborated, and intentions translated into policy and practice. 
Conventional and alternative interpretations about change in Africa, do not simply draw 
different conclusions about strategy; they also uphold different social and political 
commitments and claims. Even in the cases where a particular interpretation can be 
shown to be false, there will not necessarily be a single alternative analysis which can 
be shown to be ‘truer’ to all parties involved, nor policy solutions derived from it which 
all would find acceptable. Knowledge is conditional, in the sense that it reflects the 
institutional context in which it is produced. Shifts in interpretations of development 
should therefore be treated less in terms of their claims to ‘truth’, and more in terms of 
the implicit social commitments that underlie them and on the validity of which they
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depend. This task, requires a radical shift in the relationship between research and 
policy as conventionally conceived.
The analysis in this thesis of relief and development reveals degrees of 
uncertainty associated with knowing the character, direction and strength of causal 
linkages, and with designing policies that achieve their stated objectives once put into 
practice. Under such conditions of uncertainty, conventional policy blueprints are of 
questionable validity. From this perspective, the task of linking research into policy­
making shifts to one of broadening the range of problem-claims, and negotiating 
outcomes among an extended group of actors. The research-policy process is 
reconceptualised into a more pluralistic, or democratic, approach. As the thesis has 
revealed, a number of structural problems may be anticipated with this new approach. 
Firstly, it may be argued that building consensus among actors whose world views and 
political interests are different is impossible and that exchanges between policy actors 
with different endowments of power and resources could never be neutral. Yet the 
argument for a ‘democratic’ approach to the research-policy process aims precisely at 
revealing the hidden social and cultural assumptions underlying different actors. 
Rendering such conflict explicit may enable them to be addressed more openly, rather 
than remain concealed in hegemonic development interpretations and actions. Secondly, 
it may be argued that an exposure of plural viewpoints would serve to replace a simple 
orthodox interpretation with excessive complexity. There is a danger that findings 
generated by locality may be too complicated to be of practical use to policy makers. In 
this context Roe has argued that simplified but compelling narratives are in fact 
necessary to the policy process.24 The challenge is to create equally compelling 
alternatives, but ones which fit the claims of a different set of stakeholders.
If policy process is to change, then innovative institutional arrangements will be 
needed and new alliances built, between the south and the north, and, most importantly, 
between both and the media. This, in turn, will depend upon CA’s ability to re- 
invigorate its message, to tighten up its ideology and clarify its direction. As a first step
24 Emery Roe, ‘Development narratives, or making the best of blueprint development’ World 
Development, 19 (1991), pp. 287-300
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in this process, this thesis has demonstrated the importance of revealing alternative 
perspectives which challenge conventional interpretations. A second step would be to 
put such perspectives into circulation both within CA and among its constituency in the 
north and south.
2 .2  L in k in g  good practice with good theory
The implication of chapter 3 was that famine victims have been ill-served by
famine theory and, consequently, by the practice of famine relief. The argument of the
above section has been that better research will lead to better policy. This section reveals
that CA has another, more easily operative, tool for discovering good theory and policy:
its history. This section looks at the policy implications that can be drawn from CA’s
involvement in the cross-border operation into Ethiopia in the 1980s. Chapter 5 has
shown how the cross-border operation provided an example of an innovative and
successful programme of famine relief and prevention. In particular, it has shown how
this success depended on the performance of the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and
the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). Can the operation be used as a theoretical and
practical framework for future action?
As discussed in chapter 5, the success of ERA and REST’s relief programmes
rested to a large extent on their reliance on village committees and the subsequent
accountability of aid at all levels. Most importantly, the unique relationship of the
guerrilla Fronts to the peasants - in which the physical survival of the peasantry in the
face of famine was linked to the political fortunes of the Fronts - enabled the
implementation of a truly participatory relief model. As an independent observer noted:
T he  Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front would not have achieved its present 
level on internal security and territorial supremacy had it not been for the 
widespread cooperation and support of the peasantry in Tigray. Similarly, 
REST, as a truly grassroots organisation, is able to draw upon precisely this 
same resource which is likely to ensure the ultimate success of any relief 
programme launched in the region.’25
25 Jon Bennett, ‘Preliminary report on Tigray’ (October 1982 - January 1983), (CAO.AF/ME.441)
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ERA and REST’s undoubtedly high humanitarian credentials rested not on the ability to
provide relief - indeed the one constant throughout this period was the limited resources
at their disposal - but on the relationship with the people they were assisting.
In government-held areas, the relief model was very different. The
government’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission operation was run on a highly
centralised basis with a strictly hierarchical structure. Decisions, even on local level
food distributions, were taken in Addis Ababa. Very little freedom of action was left to
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission regional representatives who remained
largely subject to the control of the regional party secretaries.26 The structure of the
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission slowed down the decision-making process, and
as Duffield and Prendergast have argued: ‘rather than empowering populations, the
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission concentrated power within itself.’27 An
independent food assessment mission in 1987 noted severe failings in the Relief and
Rehabilitation Commission’s distribution system. The survey revealed that:
‘in some places the registration for relief by the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission required payment of a fee - a most remarkable way of covering the 
costs of administering the distribution of externally donated food. In other 
instances, registration was a matter of being on the books of the government- 
instituted local peasant associations, which people living beyond the de facto 
control of these local authorities naturally are loath to expose themselves to.’28
Independent observations of food being denied to people in government-held towns on
suspicion of supporting the Fronts, of food being exploited to corral people in
preparation for resettlement, of widespread diversion to the military and of
misinformation about access produced a picture of accommodation with violence, in
strong contrast to the relief management system in non-government areas.
NGO operations in government areas also contrasted to the integrated
community based relief systems developed by the Fronts. These have been examined in
detail elsewhere and it is proposed here only to describe the principal elements.29 The
relief model may be characterised as externally-managed and technically-orientated. It
26 Jansson, Harris & Penrose, The Ethiopian Famine, p. 46
27 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 153
28 Leeds University Agricultural & Rural Development Unit, ‘Eritrea: food & agriculture assessment 
study’ (April 1988), (CAO.AF/ME.434)
29 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, pp. 153-155
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was the NGO representatives who made the key decisions concerning entitlement and
there were no relations of political accountability between the representatives and the
beneficiaries. In this respect local resources and skills were not recognised and
opportunities for involving local communities in the management of their own relief
missed. Most significantly, in government areas, the creation of emergency relief camps
persisted, despite the well-documented public health risks of such structures. As
Jacques Willemse, former Chairman of the Emergency Relief Desk, argued:
‘the international relief community killed tens of thousands of people by 
trapping them into the hunger camps in Makelle etc. and people knew, even at 
that time, that if you bring starving people together in one place you get a high 
level of communicable diseases - measles, diarrhoea etc. - in seconds. And the 
diseases kill more people than the actual starvation. The problem is that relief 
camps are good for publicity.’30
Control of populations, whether by international aid agencies concerned with
maximising the effectiveness of food distribution and visibility of their inputs, or by
soldiers concerned to depopulate specific areas, exposed the powerless to major health
risks, while, according to one analysis allowing, ‘the powerful (internationally and
nationally) to meet their objectives.’31 The aura of neutrality and charitable altruism,
reinforced by fund-raising images of food hand-outs to the victims, enabled NGOs and
their donors to maintain a political distance while exerting some control over the
resources disbursed. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, it was a distance that proved
destructive to people’s physical and political survival. Few NGOs on the government
side were in dialogue either with the victims of famine or with the Derg. Umbrella
organisations such as Christian Relief and Development Association, a forum
composed of national and international aid agencies and CA’s main partner in
government-controlled areas, and the Churches Drought Action Africa/Ethiopia
maintained a profile as operational bodies whose main links were with donors.32 Aid
agencies in Ethiopia tended to keep their distance from the Derg. This contrasted with
the clear relations of reciprocity and accountability between ERA and REST and their
respective Fronts in Eritrea and Tigray.
30 ERD.3, Jacques Willemse
31 Macrae & Zwi, ‘Famine, complex emergencies and international policy in Africa’, p. 27
32 Duffield & Prendergast, Without Troops and Tanks, p. 155
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A key issue that emerges is how the long-term success of the operation was
largely determined by the nature of the controlling authorities’ relationship with civilian
populations. This point is usually overlooked or ignored in most analyses of
interventions, but it is perhaps in the long run the single most important lesson of the
intervention experience in Ethiopia. Political dialogue and relations of accountability are
vital to the success of any relief programme. In addition, the full participation and
approval of local political parties and institutions is crucial. This support was a
determining factor in the success of ERA and REST. In government areas, Cutler
reported that the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was rendered virtually incapable
of carrying out its mandate through lack of support from the government.33 The cross-
border operation reveals how an effective relief model needs to move beyond notions of
‘neutral’ charity. It needs to engage constructively with civil society and, particularly in
cases of complex political emergency, analyse processes of change in a more dynamic
way. As Teklewoini Assefa, Director of REST, argued:
‘on the government side most of the aid agencies were charity-oriented and were 
only involved in relief and not linked to rehabilitation/development activity. The 
approach of the cross-border operation was very different. It was based on 
change. There was a clear vision of that change and everything was linked to the 
medium and long-term.’34
The success of the cross-border operation into Eritrea and Tigray was ultimately
determined by the political structures that existed in the non-government areas. It was
the relations of accountability that ensured that famine prevention was undertaken as a
political obligation.
The starting point for a new framework for theory and practice should thus
perhaps lie with an understanding of those who suffer famines themselves. As Hendrie
has observed:
‘the unproblematic assumption that responsibility for famine victims belongs to 
the international community is rarely commented on, although it is a crucial 
aspect of the de-contextualisation of famine from its socio-economic and 
political roots’3S.
33 Cutler, ‘The development of the 1983-5 famine’
34 REST.4, Tecklewoini Asseffa
35 Hendrie, ‘Knowledge and power’, pp. 70-71
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If there are perceived to be only ‘victims’ of famine, it becomes hard to credit the idea 
that famine is a process, with culprits and beneficiaries, and easier to credit the idea that 
famine is an apocalyptic event whose manifestations must be brought under control by 
humanitarian institutions. The implication of the above analysis is that the role of NGOs 
like CA and international government organisations is secondary as a means of famine 
control; that famines happen because governments allow them to happen; and that relief 
should be redirected towards enforcing accountable systems. Wolde Mariam has argued 
for Ethiopia, that starvation has been a concomitant of authoritarianism and that only 
responsive government and better protection of human rights could provide a strategy 
for preventing its recurrence.36 Such a view echoed Sen’s observation that upholding 
liberal civil and political rights provided protection from famine. De Waal has gone 
further and has written of a ‘social contract’ that placed a specific political obligation on 
rulers to prevent famine as a basis for their political legitimacy: ‘in the most effective 
anti-famine social contracts, famine is a political scandal: it is enforced by changing a 
government that allows it to happen.’37 He has argued that while liberal civil rights and 
the existence of independent institutions such as uncensored media and free political 
association are important, on their own they are not sufficient to ensure protection from 
famine.
Until the complex dimensions and local interpretations of famine and 
development are recognised and incorporated, institutional practices will remain 
detached from reality and power exercised often to the detriment of the intended 
beneficiaries. Conventional analyses of famine have concentrated on the losers, 
allowing donors and NGOs to maintain a political distance. What has been neglected are 
the winners and the possibility that famine reflects economic and political processes in 
which power is exercised to the advantage of the politically strong. To ignore the 
politics is itself a political act. As a western diplomat in Ethiopia remarked in 1985:
36 Wolde Mariam, Rural Vulnerability, pp. 102-116
37 De Waal, ‘Human rights’, Introduction, p. 7
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‘what the government has to consider is can they afford another major military 
operation and can they count on the donors to continue supporting the relief 
effort while they are fighting.’ 38
The cross-border operation provided important lessons as to theory and practice. Most 
importantly, it demonstrated that relief and development are about human rights and 
justice, that short-term charitable imperatives based on conventional interpretations fail 
to protect such rights and that ultimately agencies need to make real political and 
strategic choices in their interventions. What is called for is a new ideology of 
humanitarianism; one that does not separate humanitarianism from politics but rather 
sees technical solutions in their political context (resettlement programmes are typically 
presented as relief strategy, their political function of controlling populations ignored); 
one that engages with the political landscape (the relationship between ruler and ruled); 
and one that supports some kind of social contract that places political obligations on 
ruler. In particular, the notion of neutrality and of apolitical humanitarianism requires 
thorough critique and the way forward needs to be guided by a real theoretical and 
practical commitment to ‘solidarity’.
The thesis has however also shown that CA’s interventions in Ethiopia have 
been determined as much by theory as by structure. In this respect, the analysis has 
touched on the structures internal to CA and those that relate to the broader international 
relief community and the economic world order. The challenge for CA has been, and 
continues to be, how to define its position within this economic and political order vis­
it-vis its donors, the host state, the media, its northern constituency, its beneficiaries 
and its partners. This comes back to the need to broaden its research agenda and re- 
invigorate its message discussed above. It also relates to the task of circulating and 
promoting that agenda, which will be discussed below.
2 .3  Development education
As discussed in chapter 1, CA has historically faced a number of problems in 
clarifying and promoting its agenda. As Jenny Borden commented in 1990: ‘We are not
38 Reported in The New York Times, 9 January 1985 & cited in Clay and Holcomb, Politics and the 
Ethiopian Famine, p. 225
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good at bringing the real experiences of our partners and their struggles to our
supporters in this country.’39 While CA in its organisational ethos has moved away
from concepts of philanthropy, welfare and social care, towards ideas of sustainable
development, community participation and social justice, it has not taken its donors and
the broader public with them.40 Development education has had little effect in
galvanising public opinion behind the urgent development challenges that CA faces on a
daily basis or in informing public opinion about the real nature of those challenges. To
move forward, CA needs to find a way of leading on such issues. Broadening its
research agenda and mobilising informed public opinion around such an agenda would
be one step. Building new alliances, aimed at creating public ownership of both
problems and solutions; and at finding ways to help governments and donors make the
commitment that will be necessary for real change, would be a second step. As one
analyst has argued: ‘enlightened altruism rather than blind compassion, what de
Tocqueville called “self-interest properly understood”: this is likely to make the most
headway in the years to come.’41
Janet Lacey, CA’s first Director, argued in the 1960s:
‘...Perhaps the primary task of the governmental and non-governmental 
organisations alike is to help the ordinary man to try and comprehend the 
background of the great problems of our time and so give him the information 
he needs to help him to make his choice.’42
That the debates around such ‘choice’ have been interpreted in neutral charitable terms,
rather than in political, human rights terms remains a major failing. The challenge that
lies ahead is for CA to provide leadership and convey a different message, one that can
inspire ordinary people as well as the media.
Throughout its history, CA’s performance and capability as a charity in the 
world of relief and development, has continued to be influenced and constrained by a 
number of structural and ideological contradictions. These contradiction have reflected
39 Jenny Borden, memo to Michael Taylor (27 April 1990), (CAO.AF/ME.589)
40 ERD.6, Paul Renshaw; CA.5, Sarah Hughes: & ERD.7, Jenny Borden
41 Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, p. 257
42 Janet Lacey, ‘The development apocalypse’ (Oxford annual conference: the role of the voluntary 
agency in development, n.d), (SOAS.CA/I/15.4)
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the organisational origins of CA, the individual motivations among its staff and
constituencies, the different institutional purposes inherent in its broad mandate and the
changing ideological and structural environment in which it operates. In particular the
thesis has highlighted the difficulty for CA to find a voice, at once a symptom of these
contradictions and a cause. Historically, CA has been an organisation debating the
tensions, trade-offs and contradictions between its goals and activities, between its
dreams and the reality. It has restructured and fine-tuned its mission statements.
Ultimately, it has lacked intellectual sharpness and clarity in its strategy and has failed to
become a prophetic organisation. It has been the rationale of this thesis that the way
forward for aid agencies, such as CA must lie through establishing institutional memory
and from that institutionalised processes of learning. As Smillie concluded in his recent
exploration of ‘the alms bazaar’:
‘knowledge, combined with heart and commitment, has always been a key to 
development, and moving away from ad hoc charitable amateurism towards 
lasting, longer-term solutions, and the policies needed to sustain them, will 
require politically aware, focused, specialised organisations that can learn, that 
can remember and share what they learn, and that are prepared to build on what 
they remember.’43
This historical analysis of CA’s interventions in Ethiopia, is a first attempt to establish a 
body of knowledge, understanding and theory, upon which CA may be able to build.
43 Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, p. 241
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